|
||
|
DIFFERENCES GROW OVER H5N1 FLU VIRUS CONTROVERSY Man-made virus sparks growing debate on how to manage its risks. By Edward Hammond The controversy that ignited last December when Dutch and US researchers revealed that they had created H5N1 influenza virus strains that transmit between mammals continues to divide governments on both sides of the North Atlantic. Because it is feared that the man-made viruses could trigger a human pandemic, and because some say that publication of the experiments could provide a blueprint for criminals, a row has broken out over whether to publish the studies, and what steps should be taken to oversee such highly risky research in the future. Many security experts in the North favour censoring the studies and some among them, including some biosafety advocates, propose tighter controls on similarly risky experiments. A group of influenza scientists and research officials see less cause for alarm. The influenza scientists have advocated a brief moratorium on research and propose "public education" instead. In recent weeks, the disagreement about how to manage the risks has been sharpening. The World Health Organisation (WHO) finds itself in an unenviable position as the debate drags on. WHO has hosted one meeting in February and says it will facilitate further discussions to address issues disputed by the warring factions, while signaling that it will defend the new WHO Framework on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP Framework), adopted in 2011. Most recently, on 7 March, six Dutch ministers signed a letter indicating that export controls would be applied to the virus and research created by Erasmus University in Rotterdam. This means that a government license will be required for Erasmus to send the virus and/or related research details outside of the European Union. Since publication of research details is considered transmitting outside the EU, the export control is a de facto ban on publication without prior government approval. The Dutch government's announcement is seemingly at odds with the outcome of a WHO technical consultation that was held on 16-17 February. After that meeting, WHO reported that consensus was reached in favour of "full disclosure of the information". Two Dutch government representatives were part of that consensus, as well as two Dutch scientists representing Erasmus. The ministers' 7 March letter, however, notes that Dutch security experts were not involved in the WHO meeting. Uncertainty in the Dutch government is paralleled in the United States, where the outcome of the WHO consultation was perceived as a victory for those opposing new research oversight over those raising security and safety concerns. After the WHO meeting, it was announced that the US government advisory board that first recommended not publishing the experiments would be reconsidering the issue. (No timetable for that action has yet been set.) But the Dutch government's announcement underscores that critics of the H5N1 experiments are more in the process of retrenching rather than the act of retreating. The Erasmus experiments were US-funded, and the US government has been most vocal about the issue, initiating efforts to squelch publication. It can thus be assumed that The Hague imposed the export control in consultation with Washington even if both capitals as yet continue to send mixed messages about their policy preferences. The Dutch export control amounts to a retort from the North Atlantic security community to the small but vocal group of influenza scientists that have attempted to steer the debate in a direction away from any new controls over research. It is a more severe measure than what the scientists had proffered, which was merely a self-imposed short-term moratorium on research (initially for 60 days) and "public education" efforts. The export control, however, makes unlicensed publication of the experiments a prosecutable offense. The public surfacing of H5N1 export controls, however, is likely to complicate matters at WHO because of the controversies that surround them. Biological export controls were created by a small number of wealthy countries as a means to avoid biological weapons proliferation. Internationally, the export control system functions outside of the United Nations, managed by a small club of wealthier nations called the Australia Group. Reform of the export control system is a longstanding demand of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), where NAM and its members have routinely denounced Australia Group export controls as arbitrary and unfair, and as an impediment to the implementation of the BTWC's technology transfer provisions. NGOs have also pointed out that the Australia Group system may be inconsistent with the technology transfer obligations of States Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. This inconsistency may extend to the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing, a new treaty under the Convention that was adopted in October 2011. The Australia Group functions by developing a common understanding between Group members on biological and chemical technologies and knowledge that members deem too dangerous to be freely transferred between all nations. The controlled items are identified in lists that are agreed at Australia Group meetings. These lists are then enforced by group members, who block exports of listed technologies to certain states through their respective domestic (or regional) regulations. The Group describes itself as an "informal arrangement" of 41 nations admitted as members. The Group membership is composed of European Union member states and aspirants, plus the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and Norway. Argentina is the only member from Latin America. Russia and China are not members. There are no members from Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East (Cyprus and Turkey excluded), or South Asia. In addition to complicating matters for WHO, the Dutch decision may buttress the NAM's opposition to Australia Group export controls, particularly in view of the fresh commitments to share viruses and knowledge for pandemic preparedness that were only recently undertaken by The Netherlands when the PIP Framework was adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2011. WHO has promised to hold additional consultations on the issues raised by the H5N1 research. The intensifying debate poses dangers to WHO, however, if security advocates in the US and Europe turn to the public health organization to try to implement their security policies to prevent some countries from accessing potentially dangerous research results and influenza viruses. An Australia Group-style system for access to influenza virus research, dividing countries into “trustworthy” and “untrustworthy” groups, with differing levels of access to resources and information, would be very difficult to reconcile with the guiding principles and requirements of the recently agreed PIP Framework. The agreed objective of the PIP Framework is "to improve pandemic influenza preparedness and response, and strengthen the protection against the pandemic influenza by improving and strengthening the WHO global influenza surveillance and response system, with the objective of a fair, transparent, equitable, efficient, effective system for, on an equal footing: (i) The sharing of H5N1 and other influenza viruses with human pandemic potential; and (ii) Access to vaccines and sharing of other benefits." To date, it remains unclear if the WHO Secretariat or WHO Member States intend to formally raise the issue at the annual World Health Assembly in May. – Third World Network Features. -ends-
The above article is reproduced from the South-North Development Monitor (SUNS) #7330, 15 March 2012. When reproducing this feature, please credit Third World Network Features and (if applicable) the cooperating magazine or agency involved in the article, and give the byline. Please send us cuttings. And if reproduced on the internet, please send the web link where the article appears to twnet@po.jaring.my. 3794/12
|
||
