TWN Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues (Oct26/10)
9 October 2026
Third World Network

WTO: Credibility concerns mount over decision-making track of reform
Published in SUNS #10530 dated 9 October 2026

Geneva, 8 Oct (D. Ravi Kanth) -- The facilitator overseeing the World Trade Organization reform track on "decision-making" is convening a meeting on 8 October amid numerous concerns raised over the "integrity" and "credibility" of the WTO reform process, as well as by the least-developed and several developing countries over the "pace and scheduling" of meetings, according to people familiar with the development.

Following the WTO Director-General's agreement to act as a depository for the controversial and yet-to-be- adopted plurilateral Agreement on Electronic Commerce (ECA), the credibility of the WTO reform process has hit a new low, said people familiar with the discussions.

The increased interference of the DG, Ms Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, and the Secretariat in the controversial initiative marred the overall image of the WTO as a rules-based and member-driven organization, said a trade envoy who asked not to be quoted.

Several developing and least-developed countries harbor fears that the controversial initiatives could be rammed through under the guise of WTO reforms by circumventing the rules set out in the Marrakesh Agreement, said a trade envoy who requested anonymity.

In an email sent to members (ICN/GC/REFORM/9) last week, the facilitator, Ambassador Katsuro Nagai of Japan, wrote: "at the outset, let me acknowledge the views expressed by Members regarding the pace and scheduling of our meetings."

Ambassador Nagai said, "the GC Chair and all Facilitators have taken careful note of these views."

He noted that "in this regard, I would like to seek Members' understanding in relation to the present meeting, which is intended to complete the discussion of the guiding questions taken up at the September session and to consider the proposals that have since been tabled."

Earlier, he framed the "guiding questions" addressed at the 22 September meeting. Although the tools in question appear to have been mooted by the proponents themselves, Ambassador Nagai posed the following questions for them to address:

* Have proponents had an opportunity to consider the questions and comments raised at our last session, and are there additional clarifications they would wish to provide?

* Are there other questions or concerns that Members would like proponents to consider and respond to?

* Looking ahead, what practical steps could be taken to further develop and operationalize the proposed tools and approaches?

Regarding past mandates, and without quantifying the large majority of countries that suggested it, the facilitator stated: "It has been suggested that a review and stocktaking of past mandates should precede or inform the work on decision-making."

Against this backdrop, the facilitator noted in his latest email that the meeting will be conducted in two segments.

During the first segment, Ambassador Nagai said that he "will first invite proponents of new proposals to present their submissions," with each proponent given "five minutes for their presentation."

The proposals will be taken up in the following order:

* Further Reflections and Suggestions on WTO Reform - Communication from China (WT/GC/REFORM/W/12)

* Progress through Flexibility: The Case for Plurilateral Work at the WTO - Communication from the United Kingdom (WT/GC/REFORM/W/13)

* Guiding Principles for Plurilateral Initiatives and Agreements at the WTO - Communication from India (WT/GC/REFORM/W/14)

China, which expressed its support for WTO reform at the General Council meeting on 5 October, proposed further discussions on "decision-making" across three areas: "first, increasing flexibility to facilitate consensus in negotiations; second, enhancing the role of plurilateral agreements as a building block for multilateralism; and third, strengthening political guidance to foster consensus."

In its proposal (WT/GC/REFORM/W/12), China advocated for "a constructive approach" to exploring "ways to update the rules while upholding the WTO's fundamental principles," while also pressing for a subtle change in the decision-making process to open the door for controversial plurilateral initiatives.

The United Kingdom, also a front-runner in advancing WTO reform, argued that "anchoring plurilateral work under the WTO umbrella can strengthen the system by providing transparency (especially to non-participants), aiding inclusivity through generating greater opportunities for engagement, leveraging the institutional benefits the WTO provides, and offering clearer routes for wider participation over time."

According to India's proposal (WT/GC/REFORM/W/14), "preserving consensus-based decision-making" is its core objective.

Unlike China and other proponents seeking varying levels of change to the consensus principle enshrined in Article IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement, India categorically stated that the letter and spirit of consensus-based decision-making are embedded in several provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement.

India argued that consensus-based decision-making "gives practical effect to the sovereign equality of Members."

Moreover, it said "in the reform discussions, Members have identified consensus-based decision-making among the foundational principles underpinning the functioning of the WTO, ensuring that all Member voices are respected in the decision-making process."

Furthermore, India argued in no uncertain terms that "preserving the multilateral character of the WTO" must remain a core objective of the reforms, emphasizing that "the Marrakesh Agreement established an integrated multilateral trading system."

Highlighting the negotiating history of the Uruguay Round, New Delhi stated that "members made a deliberate commitment to reject the GATT a la carte approach," given how "the GATT era witnessed a proliferation of the Tokyo "codes" which were optional in nature and led to a fragmentation of the trading regime with different rules applying to different countries."

Consequently, India argued that "the principle of multilateralism is enshrined in the Marrakesh Agreement including in its preamble," and stated that "plurilateral cooperation should complement rather than substitute for multilateral rulemaking."

According to the facilitator's email, after all proposals are presented, Ambassador Nagai will open the floor for members' interventions, subject to a three-minute time limit.

In this second segment, he stated, "we will then continue the thematic discussion from our last session, focusing on guiding questions 4 and 5 in ICN/GC/REFORM/6, concerning past mandates and plurilaterals."

He also asked the Secretariat to briefly present the revised compilation contained in document JOB/GC/ REFORM/5/Rev.1.

FACILITATOR'S REPORT

In his report on the 22 September discussions on "decision-making", the facilitator issued a rather confounding summary, according to people familiar with the discussions.

In the restricted report (WT/GC/Reform/8) issued on 1 October, Ambassador Nagai resorted to vague characterizations such as "some", "several", and "many" without identifying who said what, critics noted.

He acknowledged that "at the outset, Members raised a number of procedural concerns, including the two-minute speaking guideline, the framing of the guiding questions, the informal snapshot, and the ten-day circulation timeline."

The facilitator admitted that "some cautioned against moving too quickly from exploring proposals to their operationalization, or creating any perception of convergence or formality in what remains an informal, Member- driven process."

He clarified that "these were practical guidelines, not formal rules, intended to facilitate and not limit participation particularly of smaller and capacity-constrained delegations."

The facilitator assured members that "the guiding questions [that he had framed on his own responsibility] did not prejudge outcomes, that the snapshot was informal reference material with no agreed status, and that the ten- day timeline was not a procedural deadline but guidance to allow sufficient preparatory time and consultations with capitals."

He said that he "heard from a number of Members, particularly smaller delegations, that they found the snapshot useful."

As previously reported, the proposal presented by Norway, New Zealand, and Singapore was severely criticized by several developing and least-developed countries for its perceived "patronizing" attitude, said a member who requested anonymity.

In his summary, the facilitator noted that "some Members welcomed the proposal as a practical confidence- building measure and noted that a one-stop platform could enhance transparency and help smaller delegations navigate plurilateral initiatives."

Without quantifying the opposition, Ambassador Nagai wrote that "others questioned whether low participation could primarily be attributed to capacity constraints, and how the proposal would account for the significant variation in participation rates across different plurilateral initiatives among resource-constrained Members."

More importantly, the facilitator stated that "members also pointed to substantive and systemic considerations, development priorities, policy space implications and trust."

He noted that "questions were raised regarding the neutrality of the proposed expert pool, the legal basis, resources, including Secretariat resources, possible overlap with existing platforms, and the potential diversion of resources from multilateral priorities."

Without identifying the country, he said, "I also heard a view that inclusivity should extend beyond facilitating participation to enabling Members to influence negotiations and shape rules."

Some Members asked whether the initiative could prejudge wider discussions on plurilaterals, while others drew a link to the development track.

According to the facilitator, the three proponents (Norway, New Zealand, and Singapore) "clarified that the proposal was not intended to be diagnostic and was not premised on an explanation of why Members did or did not participate in particular initiatives."

On strengthening decision-making, the facilitator noted that "it was clear from our exchanges that consensus remains the cornerstone of WTO decision-making," adding that he "did not hear any Member propose changing this fundamental practice."

Indeed, many members emphasized that consensus should be strengthened, not replaced.

Many also "pointed to trust, implementation gaps, unresolved mandates and unequal participation" as the real issues to be discussed.

However, the proponents seeking a "regime change" in the rules "stressed that consensus should not be a permanent veto, recalling Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement, and considered that tools may be needed where processes are unable to deliver outcomes."

The facilitator noted that "several Members cautioned that many impasses reflect genuine substantive differences which cannot be resolved through procedural means alone," while "a number of Members therefore suggested that, when considering particular difficulties, it may be useful to distinguish between procedural, political and substantive factors."

With transparency and early engagement highlighted as major prerequisites for the decision-making stage of the reform process, the proponents offered "a range of practical approaches: earlier circulation of texts, adequate consultation time, predictable scheduling, early identification of areas of divergence, engagement with capitals, facilitator-led or structured bridge-building consultations, regular stocktaking, and mechanisms to identify and address concerns before positions become more entrenched."

The facilitator added, "A number of Members also suggested that, rather than creating entirely new mechanisms, we should take stock of existing WTO practices and identify what has worked in different contexts."

On Article IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement, the facilitator pointed out that "on the elements of consensus under Article IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement, I heard different perspectives."

On the one hand, he said, "there was a view emphasizing sovereign equality [a point India raised in its proposal] and the standard reflected in Footnote 1 that consensus is unqualified and that an objection need not be justified."

On the other hand, "I heard that consensus is not synonymous with unanimity and involves active efforts to build convergence and enable outcomes - and objections should be accountable for non-objecting Members to understand the rationale behind it for their fair assessment."

Without naming the members, the facilitator said, "Yet, a further perspective was that consensus is both a rule and a process: the rule itself remains unchanged, while its effective functioning depends on participation, transparency and addressing concerns at an early stage."

The proponents repeatedly argued that "consensus should remain outcome-oriented and should not lead to paralysis. In this context, some Members referred to the existence of voting provisions in Article IX as demonstrating that the Marrakesh Agreement contains means for decisions to be taken where consensus cannot be achieved."

The facilitator concluded that "consensus should facilitate decision-making rather than become a mechanism through which a few Members can indefinitely prevent progress."

Regarding the "tools to strengthen and facilitate consensus-based decision-making," the facilitator said that he "heard a clear call for these to be examined systematically and individually."

Ambassador Nagai noted that "several Members emphasized that the tools do not all serve the same purpose," and that "several Members supported a structured mapping or stocktaking exercise before considering operationalization."

Regarding plurilaterals, it is widely understood that the push to change the practice of consensus-based decision-making is being primarily driven by major industrialized countries, as well as the "Friends of the System" group.

In contrast, countries like India have suggested that the incorporation of plurilateral agreements into Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement must strictly follow the established rules. +