TWN Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues (Jul26/17)
23 July 2026
Third World Network

WTO: South declares consensus rule "non-negotiable' amid reform tensions
Published in SUNS #10488 dated 23 July 2026

Geneva, 22 Jul (D. Ravi Kanth) -- Tensions flared as discussions continue this week on the controversial issue of "decision-making" within the broader "World Trade Organization reform" framework.

Several members cautioned that facilitators cannot selectively limit discussions to only the first few agenda items, citing a contentious precedent set on 20 July during the session on "foundational" issues, said people familiar with the development.

"CHAOS" IN FOUNDATIONAL SESSION

During the meeting on 20 July on "foundational issues", several countries including Brazil and India protested against an alleged attempt by the facilitator, Ambassador Sumathi Balakrishnan of Malaysia, to restrict floor time to only the first three proposals on the agenda.

These initial proposals represented the positions of the United States, the European Union, and China, effectively sidelining the subsequent submissions from India and Brazil, said people familiar with the development.

According to attendees, Ambassador Balakrishnan allegedly altered the procedures, abruptly deciding that only three of the remaining twelve requests for the floor would be permitted to speak, said people familiar with the development.

Proposals from India and Brazil are listed eighth and ninth on the agenda, with the two countries raising points of order while arguing that the facilitator's move was "unacceptable".

An African trade official, speaking on condition of anonymity, explained the gravity of the objection.

The official said that India and Brazil argued that such a manoeuver would create not just two categories of members - those presenting written submissions and those presenting them orally - but also a third tier: those allowed to speak and those barred from doing so, and being forced instead to submit statements via email after the session to save time for the presentation of submissions.

Faced with stiff opposition, the facilitator relented, allowing all members to speak and present their proposals.

However, tensions persisted when Ambassador Balakrishnan allegedly attempted to cut short Namibia, which was speaking on behalf of the African Group.

Nigeria opposed this move, lodging a strong complaint about the chair's allegedly "obstructive" procedures, and reportedly thanked India and Brazil for their earlier points of order, the African official said.

"The meeting on foundational issues was seemingly chaotic, with positions clearly all over the place," said a trade envoy who asked not to be quoted.

"[As] a group of countries are intent on forcing something with strong arms and unfair practices, I don't know how this can ever succeed, or be conducive to an orderly discussion with an outcome," the envoy said.

Despite the procedural friction, substantive themes emerged during the discussion on foundational issues.

Many members highlighted dispute settlement and the enforceability of disciplines as key systemic elements.

Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment and non-discrimination were described by many as sine qua non conditions for any foundational reform.

Brazil and several other developing nations emphasized "development" as a core pillar, urging members to re- examine whether the current rules truly support development as mandated by the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement.

Notably, while addressing foundational issues, countries like Brazil did not directly engage with the US submission calling for the termination of unconditional MFN, said people familiar with the development.

Colombia is understood to have said that it has consistently maintained that members are already witnessing a "de facto" reform of the WTO's founding principles, according to people familiar with the development.

In this regard, it highlighted several manifestations. Firstly, it said the fundamental principle of progressive liberalization has been structurally modified by a large number of new trade tools and remedies with which, actively and passively, members are progressively accepting increasingly higher tariffs.

Second, it said the founding principle of most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment has also been clearly reformed in practice.

Beyond the constant use of the exception in free trade agreements over the last 30 years, a significant and growing number of mini-agreements have recently been seen - bilateral, group, and "club-type" - on reciprocity, critical minerals, data, etc., that do not comply with the conditions of the initially negotiated MFN exception, it added.

According to Colombia, the foundational principle of equal treatment is no longer the general rule in practice.

Third, it is understood to have said that the foundational principle of the national security exception, which was like a last resort - a final measure for the most serious cases - is now the norm. Exceptions that should have been strict and interpreted narrowly are now, in practice, the rule, according to people familiar with the development.

Fourth, according to Colombia, the foundational principle of a dispute settlement system based on "negative consensus", which was one of the fundamental changes from the GATT to the WTO, is, in practice, at this point, once again a dispute settlement system based on "positive consensus", because it depends entirely on the will of the country whose arguments did not prevail.

According to Colombia, a great deal of time is dedicated to negotiations on reforming the founding principles "as if we were working in a vacuum", but it would be far more accurate and reasonable to do so recognizing that the founding principles have been reformed in practice and are no longer what were seen in 1995.

Today, Colombia is understood to have said, these founding principles are much more flexible and porous than before, and the balances and equilibrium achieved at that time no longer correspond to the current reality.

Furthermore, Colombia is understood to have said that the structural changes that have been seen weaken the founding principles: it is the largest economies that can more easily make use of the security exception, that can maintain non-liberalization measures, that can sustain "an appeal to the vacuum", and that can more easily engage in bilateral deals with a large number of countries simultaneously.

Therefore, it said that this is a new, reformed balance that works against small- and medium-sized countries, according to people familiar with the development.

DECISION-MAKING

Attention now shifts to another flashpoint: "decision-making." Facilitator Ambassador Katsuro Nagai of Japan informed members that the "work [will] be driven by Members' written and oral contributions. I will invite Members to introduce their submissions."

In a restricted email (ICN/GC/Reform/2) reviewed by SUNS, the facilitator outlined the order for taking up the proposals on decision-making:

1. Fundamentals for WTO reform - Communication on behalf of the ACP Group (WT/GC/W/975);

2. EU submission on WTO reform - Communication from the European Union (WT/GC/W/986) and WTO reform: Further reflections on the WTO's governance - Communication from the European Union (WT/GC/Reform/W/7);

3. WTO reform considerations - Communication from Paraguay (WT/GC/W/987);

4. China's position paper on WTO reform under the current circumstances - Communication from China (WT/GC/W/989);

5. WTO reform: Development-centred priorities for a balanced WTO - Communication from the African Group (WT/GC/W/992);

6. More relevant, more flexible, more accessible - Communication from the United Kingdom on WTO reform (WT/GC/W/993);

7. LDC submission on WTO reform - Communication from The Gambia on behalf of the LDC Group (WT/MIN(26)/17-WT/GC/W/991/Rev.1);

8. Further perspectives on WTO reform - Communication from the United States (WT/GC/W/998) and On WTO reform - Communication from the United States (WT/GC/W/984);

9. Perspectives on WTO reform - Communication from Argentina (WT/GC/W/1001) and further reflections on Argentina's proposal (WT/GC/W/1001) regarding a procedural mechanism for the incorporation of plurilateral agreements into Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement - Communication from Argentina (WT/GC/Reform/W/9);

10.  Improving WTO decision-making - Communication from Australia

(WT/GC/Reform/W/1) and WTO reform - Improving WTO rulemaking - Communication from Australia (WT/GC/Reform/W/2);

11. WTO reform - Non-paper - Delivering through flexible multilateralism - A contribution to the WTO reform - Communication from Switzerland (WT/GC/Reform/W/3); and

12. Designing together a fairer and more dynamic system - Communication from Japan (WT/GC/Reform/W/8).

The basket of proposals appears to be dominated by the industrialized nations and some developing countries, such as Argentina, who are reportedly determined to shift from consensus-based decision-making to "flexible consensus," a stance reportedly shared by China, said people familiar with the development.

With a few proposals originating from the Global South, these nations face a "Herculean task" not only in defending consensus-based decision-making but also in demonstrating the threat to their legitimacy within the global trade body if the system is altered by the industrialized powers.

A snapshot of the first four proposals exposes a sharp divide: industrialized countries seek to modify the consensus principle to facilitate the adoption of controversial plurilateral agreements, while developing countries view consensus as their sole mechanism to ensure they are counted as equal members.

Following the presentations, the chair stated that he "will open the floor for Members to have an exchange on these papers, share oral contributions and raise any issue they may wish to."

However, given the paucity of time for elaborate discussion - and referencing the three hours consumed by foundational issues on 20 July - members will likely discuss only three or four proposals on decision-making, said people familiar with the development.

ACP GROUP DEFENDS CONSENSUS

The ACP group proposal (WT/GC/W/975), scheduled for discussion first, explicitly states that it "supports decision-making by consensus."

As the largest coalition of African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries in the WTO, the ACP group reiterated its May 2024 communication (WT/GC/W/932).

That document unambiguously cited Article IX, paragraph 1 of the Marrakesh Agreement, which states that the WTO "shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947," a tradition dating back to the conclusion of the GATT in Geneva in 1948.

The ACP argued that "except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting," emphasizing that "at meetings of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council, each Member of the WTO shall have one vote."

The ACP coalition framed consensus not merely as treaty law but also as customary international law verified by constant practice over three-quarters of a century.

They noted that the WTO stands out among international organizations for allowing every member, "irrespective of its size or level of development, the wherewithal to secure certain outcomes in its interests through consensus- based decision-making."

"By comparison," the ACP noted, "other key international organizations rely on power dynamics or other approaches such as quota-based systems as the basis for decision-making."

Pushing back against industrialized nations seeking to discard the consensus principle, the ACP reminded members that the Marrakesh Agreement does not qualify consensus with terms such as "responsible," "constructive," or "flexible."

"Therefore, it does appear that the letter, spirit and intent of the Marrakesh Agreement provide for an approach to consensus-based decision-making which is unqualified," the ACP group argued, emphasizing that the "current consensus system is a representation of equity in the WTO."

The group asserted that the system sends a vital message of equality, ensuring that even the smallest, poorest, and most vulnerable members have a stake in favourable outcomes, protecting them from "the vagaries of power dynamics."

Consequently, the ACP and African Groups expressed "systemic concerns regarding any attempt to alter the status quo with respect to the consensus system in WTO decision-making."

In short, the ACP maintained that "the consensus principle goes to the heart of the WTO system and it provides a fundamental guarantee which is a non-negotiable for the ACP and African Groups."

The coalition argued that rather than altering rights, members should focus on trust-building.

"Where trust exists and is reciprocated - where there is confidence in institutions and systems - all Members will achieve more. To alter the status quo would be to undermine trust and ultimately achieve less."

Rebutting claims that consensus causes gridlock, the ACP insisted that "members must avoid institutionalizing informal or selective participation that risks undermining the multilateral character of the WTO. In essence, the consensus rule is not the problem because consensus- based decision-making has allowed WTO Members to converge on many elements where Members achieved success in delivering on key outcomes."

In sharp contrast, in its proposal (WT/GC/Reform/W/7), the European Union claims that "the WTO reform discussions have shown a readiness to consider differentiated decision-making for procedural and operational day-to-day matters to avoid blockages over procedural questions."

A trade envoy, speaking anonymously, dismissed this claim as being false, stating that only a small clique of reformers from industrialized countries has discussed such proposals without majority support.

Acknowledging the differences highlighted by the ACP, the EU argues that differentiated decision-making is "in line with the practice in most international organizations where a different decision-making procedure is applied for daily operations based on majorities."

The EU suggested that the scope could include agenda-setting, adoption of agendas, blocking individual items, ad hoc participation, and aspects of deliberative and monitoring functions.

More controversially, the EU proposed amending the rules of procedure or introducing a new practice of "reform by doing."

Under this model, a chairperson would test for a majority; if found, an objecting member would be expected to withdraw their objection.

The EU suggested subjecting this "novel practice to a trial period for the membership to gain experience." +