TWN Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues (Jul26/13)
22 July 2026
Third World Network

Trade: Wealthy nations "dismantling" WTO in plurilateral power play?
Published in SUNS #10485 dated 20 July 2026

Geneva, 17 Jul (D. Ravi Kanth) -- South Korea - a leading architect of the World Trade Organization reform agenda - on 16 July floated a seemingly provocative proposal, titled "Revitalizing the WTO's negotiating function: A structured pathway for plurilateral agreements and a responsible practice of consensus," in what appears to be a fierce battle that is unfolding at the WTO over the future of global trade, said people familiar with the development.

Increasingly, the WTO reform discussions are devolving into a rigid segregation of "us versus them."

The "us" camp demands that only written proposals be recognized, while the "them" camp - comprising many developing countries advocating for oral submissions - is being systematically sidelined.

This polarization is a calculated manoeuver to lock in a predetermined decision by the time the WTO's 15th ministerial conference (MC15) convenes in 2027, said people familiar with the development.

Although the official venue for MC15 has yet to be announced, indications suggest that it could be convened in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia - unless Israel exercises a veto, said people familiar with the development.

Ahead of the meetings on WTO reform commencing on 20 July, South Korea's text was joined by a barrage of other proposals circulated by key members of the WTO "reform casino."

The proposals include:

1. Korea's "Revitalizing the WTO's negotiating function: A structured pathway for plurilateral agreements and a responsible practice of consensus" (WT/GC/Reform/W/10) on 16 July;

2. Argentina's "Further reflections on Argentina's proposal (WT/GC/W/1001) regarding a procedural mechanism for the incorporation of plurilateral agreements into Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement (WT/GC/Reform/W/9)" of 13 July;

3. Japan's "Designing together a fairer and more dynamic system" (WT/GC/Reform/W/8) of 13 July;

4. The European Union's "WTO reform: Further reflections on the WTO's governance" (WT/GC/Reform/W/7) issued on 13 July;

5. The European Union's "WTO reform: Further reflections on foundational issues following the fourteenth session of the ministerial conference" (WT/GC/Reform/W/6) on 13 July;

6. The European Union's "WTO reform: Further reflections on disciplines, subsidies and industrial policy" (WT/GC/Reform/W/5) on 13 July;

7. The United Kingdom's "Levelling the playing field through multilateral reform" (WT/GC/Reform/W/4) on 10 July;

8. Switzerland's "Non-paper - Delivering through flexible multilateralism - A contribution to the WTO reform (WT/GC/Reform/W/3)" on 2 July;

9. Australia's "Improving WTO rulemaking" (WT/GC/Reform/W/2) on 25 June;

10. Australia's "Improving WTO decision-making" (WT/GC/Reform/W/1) on 19 June; and

11. Argentina's proposal on "Perspectives on the WTO reform" (WT/GC/W/1001) on 26 May.

Barring the European Union, the proponents appear to belong to the "Friends of the System" coalition - a bloc of so-called industrialized and middle-income countries coordinated by Switzerland.

According to several members who spoke to the SUNS, these proposals do not exist in a vacuum; they seem to be based on a coordinated strategy, discussed collectively among the reform proponents, said people familiar with the development.

More importantly, they revolve around two highly contentious themes. First, how to fundamentally alter the principle of "decision-making" by consensus. Second, how to force controversial plurilateral outcomes into Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement - the legal framework that established the WTO in 1995 - said people familiar with the development.

Korea has reportedly issued a stern caution: WTO reform discussions must be narrowly confined to these two issues based on the written proposals submitted, deliberately deferring deeply controversial topics such as changing the self-designated framework for availing of special and differential treatment (S&DT) by developing countries, said several trade envoys, who asked not to be quoted.

"Like-minded members, with Korea being very vocal, are trying to push back on development and foundational issues versus decision-making and level playing field, claiming that the first two are not ready or have no concrete proposals," said an Asian trade envoy, who asked not to be quoted.

"This plays into the hands of those seeking nothing more than to get flexible decision-making for plurilateral agreements among the subsets of willing members of the reform casino," the trade envoy said.

Underpinning this strategy is a seemingly controversial conceptual shift - "the idea of adding "development" to Article XXI exceptions, on a par with "essential security" or environment," said another trade envoy, who asked not to be identified.

The grand strategy, the envoy noted, is to build an impenetrable fence around "written [submissions] only" - a dictate pushed by the two dominant members of the system.

Under this framework, "orally delivered positions or proposals, general conceptual considerations, etc are to be ignored by the facilitators."

Meanwhile, China indicated at the General Council meeting on 15 July that it actively supports the proposed reforms, suggesting that Beijing will be floating its proposals soon.

KOREA'S PROPOSAL

In its proposal (WT/GC/Reform/W/10), Korea argues that the WTO has provided a stable, predictable and rules-based foundation for international trade. Its negotiating function, however, has not kept pace with the rapidly changing needs of the global economy in areas such as digital trade, artificial intelligence and supply chain resilience."

While developing countries are desperately seeking the promised outcomes to address their core issues as outlined in the Doha work program, Korea's proposal appears designed to engineer an exclusive new regime of plurilateral agreements for a small "us" coalition of the willing.

This regime would have absolutely no relevance for the "them" category, said several people who asked not to be quoted.

"In this context," says Korea in its proposal, "plurilateral approaches may provide a practical means of addressing this institutional gap."

Contrary to the hard facts and explicit mandates of the WTO's 14th ministerial conference, Korea seems to argue unabashedly that plurilateral approaches "have long formed part of the WTO's negotiating architecture and have gained renewed attention as Members seek practical ways to sustain the WTO's rule-making function in areas where consensus among all Members remains difficult to achieve."

Without ever explaining why the industrialized countries - including highly farm-defensive nations like Korea - seemingly blocked the mandated issues while pivoting to controversial plurilateral agreements that allegedly violate the existing rules, Korea makes a highly dubious claim.

It argues that "keeping such rule-making efforts connected to the WTO can be especially important for smaller economies with limited negotiating capacity because doing so provides greater transparency, access to information and opportunity to influence emerging rules" - a narrative that strikes many as deeply disingenuous.

According to people familiar with the development, it is countries like Korea, Japan, Australia, Argentina, and the EU that are pushing these plurilaterals to institutionalize the highly controversial Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) processes.

Korea maintains that "recent initiatives such as the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA) and the Agreement on Electronic Commerce (ECA) show that Members can make substantial progress through open and broadly supported plurilateral processes".

However, Korea concedes, "despite such broad support, neither agreement has yet been incorporated into Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement. This experience underscores the importance of a credible and workable pathway for concluded plurilateral outcomes."

For Korea and other members of plurilateral initiatives, it seemingly does not matter that such initiatives allegedly violate the core provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement both procedurally and substantively, said several trade envoys, who asked not to be quoted.

Furthermore, Korea's claim directly contradicts the WTO Director-General's justification for letting her office act as a depository for the ECA - an agreement that glaringly lacks the crucial legal requirement of complying with paragraph 9 of Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement, said people familiar with the development.

Korea notes: "A key element of such a pathway is the way consensus is exercised at the point of incorporation. Consensus remains central to the legitimacy of the WTO. At the same time, its exercise should allow Members' specific concerns to be identified and addressed without turning the consideration of broadly supported outcomes into an open-ended process. The objective is therefore not to dilute consensus, but to support a more responsible exercise of consensus in the consideration of plurilateral outcomes."

In short, Korea states, "to sustain political momentum towards MC15, Members could take stock of progress at the appropriate level and at the appropriate time."

"Such a review would help identify blockages early and provide direct guidance to delegations in Geneva. Korea stands ready to work with all Members, in an open and inclusive manner, towards concrete outcomes at MC15," it concluded.

ARGENTINA'S PROPOSAL

Argentina argues, "the pathway below organizes existing plurilateral practice and ideas put forward by Members in their submissions into transparent and predictable stages."

Argentina said: "It is prospective in nature, does not limit or condition Members' existing ability to negotiate, and could provide a workable basis on which concluded agreements may be considered for incorporation into Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement."

In its earlier proposal, Argentina proposed "to establish a procedural mechanism to allow plurilateral agreements to be incorporated into Annex 4, provided that they meet the following criteria or requirements:

a. Consistency with WTO objectives: The agreement under consideration must be compatible with the objectives of the Marrakesh Agreement and the WTO legal framework.

b. Critical mass: An assessment should be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific discipline or sector covered by the agreement. To provide guidance in this regard, Members could consider whether the agreement is supported by a substantial proportion of the Membership (for example, two-thirds of the Membership), or whether participating Members represent a significant share of trade in the sector covered by the agreement (for example, 66%).

c. Disciplined use of consensus/objection: A Member opposing the incorporation of a plurilateral agreement that enjoys broad support among the Membership should be required to do so only by submitting a written communication setting out the reasons for its position, including an indication that the matter concerns a vital national interest. In such cases, the Member concerned would bear the burden of proof to justify its veto and demonstrate the existence of such a vital national interest.

d. Open accession: The agreement must provide for accession by any WTO Member."

Ultimately, all these proposals seem to share a singular, destructive target: the evisceration of the WTO's core provisions as enshrined in the Marrakesh Agreement.

By dismantling these foundational rules, the proponents aim to pave the way for excluding a vast swath of developing and least-developed countries from a once member-driven, rules-based organization - replacing it with a proverbial "forest of lawlessness", said people familiar with the development. +