Some reflections on the Ukraine crisis

While much of the focus of analysis of the Ukraine crisis has been on the relationship between the West and Russia, the role of the Ukrainian ruling elite is often ignored. In this article, T Rajamoorthy shows how this elite's conduct of foreign policy in complete disregard of Ukraine's contested national identity, the fragile basis of its nationhood and geopolitical realities provided the catalyst for the crisis.

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WHAT is one to make of the Ukrainian crisis which has now reached a new flashpoint with the outbreak of insurrections in Eastern Ukraine?

The depiction of the crisis by the Western media has followed predictable patterns: Russia is pursuing a course of military expansion which threatens the territorial integrity of its neighbours and Eastern Europe.

This analysis has given rise to calls from hawks in the US and Europe to NATO to 'contain' Russia in what some analysts have dubbed Cold War 2. However, as in the case of the earlier Cold War, a policy of containment may be based on a grand illusion.

The truth is that, far from pursuing a policy of territorial expansion, Russia's recent actions seem designed to forestall and preempt Western and NATO attempts to encircle it. Ukraine has been caught up in this struggle because sections of its ruling elite have chosen to play a surrogate role in the West's crusade against Russia.

In electing to align itself with the West by seeking membership in an anti-Russia military alliance like NATO, this elite appears to have been completely oblivious of the fragile foundations of Ukrainian nationhood.

Weak national identity

 

If there is one central fact about Ukraine on which most historians are agreed, it is that it has been dogged by a weak national identity and its bonds of nationhood have always been tenuous.

For much of their history, the Ukrainian people have been divided and ruled principally by three imperial powers: the Austro-Hungarian empire, the kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, and Czarist Russia. Long years of division and foreign rule have left significant cultural/ethnic and religious imprints on different regions of the country.

Eastern Ukraine, which was long under Russian rule, has been heavily Russified. In contrast, Western Ukraine, long under the rule of Austria and Poland, has been more influenced by Western Europe. These cultural/ethnic faultlines have also been underpinned by a religious divide, with the Catholic Church and Orthodox Church (both Russian and Ukrainian) vying for influence.

In a word, there are two Ukraines: one looking towards Europe, the other towards Russia.

When the Ukrainian national movement emerged at the beginning of the 20th century, it was largely based in Western Ukraine and it failed to articulate a political programme which could unite all Ukrainians. As Mark von Hagen puts it: 

'It is important to re-emphasise that "Ukraine" in the first two decades of the twentieth century was a political, territorial, ethnic and cultural symbol that was contested and was therefore constantly changing. In other words, there was no Ukraine on which all the concerned parties could agree at any given time, and even individual parties often had at best inchoate platforms. The Ukrainian movement itself was bifurcated between organisations and institutions with a fairly sophisticated and long-term political experience in the Habsburg lands of eastern Galicia [Western Ukraine] and more hesitant ones in the Russian provinces .'1

In fact, it was only after the Second World War under Soviet rule that Ukrainians scattered in different lands and imperial jurisdictions came together in a single national state within the USSR. Western Ukraine, wrested from Poland by the Soviet Union in 1939, was united with Eastern Ukraine, which had been incorporated within the Soviet Union as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic since 1922. Subsequently, both Czechoslovakia and Romania had to cede ethnic Ukrainian lands under their domain to complete the process of Ukrainian nationhood.2

Under Soviet rule, Ukraine as a state was not merely restored but its borders were extended. As is now well known, in 1954 the largely Russian-populated Crimean peninsula (which was never part of historical Ukraine but formed part of the Russian Federation, a component state of the USSR) was incorporated into the Ukrainian state. While the absence of an organic link with Ukraine was no problem so long as both territories were part of a larger federation, problems began as soon as the Soviet Union began to unravel.

When the Ukrainian national movement revived in the 1980s under the banner of various civil society groups, its regional limitations and weak social basis were once again evident. Taking advantage of the liberal political atmosphere under Gorbachev, these groups sought to utilise the issues of language, education and culture as a platform for secession and independence. However, despite their best efforts at mass mobilisation, the movement remained a movement essentially of the intelligentsia centred largely in the main urban areas of Western and Central Ukraine.

Attempts to broaden the support base of the movement through the formation of a national front called Rukh did not significantly alter the regional basis of its membership. In fact, even within Western and Central Ukraine, Rukh was not successful in enlisting to the nationalist cause the  anti-nuclear groups which had emerged after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and drew their main support from this region. As Jane I Dawson noted in her book Eco-nationalism:

'In Ukraine, anti-nuclear activists were reluctant to tie their demands too closely to Ukrainian nationalism. While the opponents of nuclear power referred frequently to Moscow's colonial treatment of Ukraine, activists were also quick to point out that they were not advocating Ukrainian independence. Even in early 1991, the leadership of Zelenii svi [the Ukrainian network of anti-nuclear groups] explicitly dissociated itself from more radical calls for Ukrainian secession.'3

Support for calls for independence was barely evident in Eastern Ukraine even though there was no lack of grievances against the central government in Moscow. Regional fissures were compounded by differences of class. A striking illustration of this was the powerful wave of miners' strikes in July 1989 which spread from the Kuzbass in Siberia to the Donbass in Eastern Ukraine. Although these workers were a potentially powerful force who could have provided a mass base for the national movement, despite overtures, they viewed the movement with hostility and refused to have any truck with it. 'The strikes ... exposed a fundamental weakness of the Ukrainian national democratic movement - the lack of support, and frequently even of understanding, for it in the heavily Russified, industrialised south-east.'4   

In short, the national movement was not sufficiently strong or broad-based to successfully challenge the power of the central government in Moscow. In the end, what proved decisive was the decision by the Ukrainian communist elite, for its own survival in the face of the unravelling of the USSR, to usurp the nationalist platform and, using the full resources of the state and Party, to successfully mobilise the people (including those from the eastern regions) into the drive for  independence. '[I]t was the national communists' jumping onto the opposition bandwagon that finally created sufficient momentum towards independence.'5

Russian concerns

When Ukraine emerged as an independent state in 1991, given its geography, history and economic and security needs, it should have been self-evident to its rulers what course it should pursue in foreign affairs. In view of its proximity to Russia, its historical and cultural links, especially those between Russia, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, it was imperative to maintain good relations with its big neighbour. In fact, good relations were and are crucial for Ukraine's economic survival. Russia is Ukraine's main trading partner and the latter depends on Russia to meet 80% of its energy needs. Its more populous eastern and southern regions (where all the industry and 80% of Ukraine's productive capacity is) are dependent on Russian markets for their exports. With so much at stake, it was in Ukraine's own interests to ensure that it pursued a foreign policy that was not perceived as a threat to Russia's security.

The Ukrainian ruling elite was fully aware of Russia's fears of an eastward expansion of NATO, especially after the unravelling of the Socialist bloc in Eastern Europe. The Socialist bloc had been regarded by the USSR 'as a military buffer zone, protecting the Soviet homeland against any potential Western attack and providing in the event of a general war in Europe a concentration area for troops intended for an offensive against Western Europe'.6 With the buffer now gone and with three of the former Socialist countries (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) becoming NATO members, Russia naturally felt threatened.

Moreover, Moscow felt bitter at what it saw as Western perfidy, as, according to Mikhail Gorbachev, the last President of the USSR, 'during the negotiations on the unification of Germany they [i.e., the West] gave assurances that NATO would not extend its zone of operation to the east'.7 The assurances were purely verbal and Gorbachev, a Moscow State University law graduate, was evidently dumb enough to believe that the West would honour them. Not surprisingly, the West soon began to deny that any such assurances had been given and in April this year, NATO put out a fact sheet claiming that 'no such pledge was made, and no evidence to back up Russia's claims has ever been produced'.8

This is a bare-faced lie, as a Der Spiegel article in 2009 drew attention to the fact that newly released German Foreign Ministry documents confirmed that such assurances were in fact given.9 However, to buttress its case against such disconcerting evidence, the NATO fact sheet includes the following clincher: 'Should such a promise have been made by NATO as such, it would have to have been as a formal, written decision by all NATO Allies.'10 (emphasis mine)

While the drift of East Europeans into the North Atlantic alliance was disconcerting, attempts to draw former member states of the USSR, such as Georgia and Ukraine (which share common borders with Russia), into this alliance were a cause for alarm. Ukraine was important because Russia's Black Sea Fleet was based in Crimea. The nightmare of the Russians was the emergence of a hostile government in Kiev which would evict the Black Sea Fleet and open up the facilities in Crimea to NATO.   

Judging by the provisions of Ukraine's constitutional legislation, it would appear that there was, initially at any rate, some sensitivity to Russian concerns. The 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, on which the Ukrainian Constitution is based, states that the country has the 'intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs.' (Article IX). However, except for Ukraine's decision in 2006 to become an associate member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), there was no real move until 2010 (see below) to give substance to this declaration of intent.

In fact, very soon after independence in 1991, Ukraine's leaders, led by the country's first President Leonid Kravchuk, began moving in the direction of NATO membership. In March the following year, Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and in 1994, Ukraine became the first post-Soviet state to join NATO's Partnership for Peace programme.

In 1997, Ukraine, now under President Leonid Kuchma who had defeated Kravchuk in the 1994 presidential elections, signed a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO. As its links with NATO grew, Ukraine in 2002 proclaimed NATO membership as its official foreign policy goal.

The whole process was intensified with the election of Viktor Yushchenko in 2005, largely as a result of the Western-sponsored so-called 'Orange Revolution'. It culminated in the declaration at the Bucharest NATO summit in 2008 that Ukraine was now a candidate member of the military alliance.

This headlong drive into NATO by the Kiev leadership has found little support among the people, especially in Eastern Ukraine. Popular opinion in Ukraine has consistently been opposed to NATO membership. Every poll conducted from 2002 to 2014 has shown more Ukrainians opposed to NATO membership than supporting it.11

Policy shift

It was only with the election of President Viktor Yanukovych in 2010 that a decisive policy shift away from NATO took place. Although Yanukovych, whose electoral base was Eastern Ukraine, is often characterised as 'pro-Russian', the reasons for the policy shift were more likely grounded in political and economic realities rather than allegiance to a big power. The truth is that, with its economy in such a dreadful state, Ukraine simply could not afford to turn its back on Russia. Moreover, the 2008 Russo-Georgia war had demonstrated that under President Vladimir Putin, Russia was prepared to defend its security interests, if necessary by force. But even as he shifted course, Yanukovych's conduct of foreign policy was still vacillating.

Yanukovych had run his election campaign on a pledge to arrest the country's drift towards NATO. On his inauguration, he declared that his goal was to make Ukraine a neutral country. He moved to fulfil his pledge in June 2010 when he prodded the Ukrainian parliament into passing a bill which barred Ukraine's membership in any military bloc.12 This move, which would have prevented the country from becoming a  NATO member and consolidated its non-aligned status as envisaged by its constitution, was denounced by ex-president Yushchenko's party. Interestingly, the other critics included former European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, who opined that the concept of neutrality in foreign policy was a concept of the past, not of the present day. In a similar vein, former US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott noted that with time the concept of neutrality was starting to lose its topicality.13

Although the criticism appeared muted, there could be little doubt about Western concern over the direction of Yanukovych's foreign policy. This concern had been heightened by his decision on 21 April 2010 to extend Russia's lease of the Sevastopol naval base in Crimea by a further 25 years after it expires in 2017, i.e., to 2042.

In a bid to steer Ukraine back on to a transatlantic course, in November 2013, the European Union offered Yanukovych an EU association agreement which, while allowing Ukraine free trade with the continent, would have put the country on course for NATO membership. After vacillating for a week, Yanukovych finally rejected it in favour of Russia's proposed customs union and Eurasian Economic Community.

That decision probably sealed his fate. On 22 February 2014, armed anti-Russian protesters backed by the West seized power in a violent, illegal coup d'etat in Kiev. The new interim regime which took power pending national elections on 25 May was based mainly on power brokers in Western Ukraine. It included parties from the far right, including some with neo-Nazi leanings.

But what really made Russia nervous was the direction of the foreign policy of the new regime. Ukraine's parliamentary media service reported on 5 Marchthat Ukrainian lawmakers had introduced a bill that would abrogate the country's non-aligned status and allow it to join military alliances. If the parliament approves the bill, it would lead to 'intensification of cooperation between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and will help to strengthen the national security of Ukraine', said an explanatory note to the bill.14 Confirmation of this move was provided by acting President Oleksandr Turchynov who, while on a trip to the village of Novye Petrovtsy, was reported to have said that Ukraine was considering the possibility of revising its non-aligned status and that a draft law to this effect had been submitted to the Ukrainian parliament.15 It was clear that the authorities in Kiev intended to resume Ukraine's march towards NATO. 

Rather than wait for the denouement, Putin decided to strike first.

Crimean secession

Crimea, with its Russian majority, provided fertile ground for his project as pro-Russian feeling had been building up over the years in the peninsula in response to the growth of Ukrainian nationalism.16 In the 1990s this pro-Russian sentiment had manifested itself in calls to restore the peninsula's autonomous status which it had enjoyed until 1945 under the Russian Federation.   To back up this call, in January 1991 a referendum was held in the peninsula in which 93.3% of the participants voted in support of such restoration.17 In response, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a law providing for autonomy for Crimea within Ukraine in February 1991.

However, the Russian-speaking majority in Crimea became more anxious as to their future as the Soviet Union began to unravel. In the 1991 referendum on the future of the USSR, they had voted overwhelmingly to preserve the Soviet Union. When despite this, the USSR came to an end, it was inevitable that secessionist tendencies would come to the fore. In 1992 the Crimean legislature adopted an Act on State Independence and a new constitution. It also decided to hold a referendum on independence in August of the same year. However, central government intervention forced the Crimean authorities to abort the proposed referendum.18

Undaunted, in 1993 the Crimean parliament passed a number of laws and resolutions to strengthen its autonomy, including the establishment of a Crimean presidency. Presidential elections were slated for January 1994 and they were won by Yuri Meshkov, who had campaigned on a platform of union with Russia. One of his first steps was a decree on a referendum for independence. Again the central government intervened and not only forced the cancellation of the proposed referendum but also initiated in 1995 a legal move through the Ukrainian legislature to abolish both the 1992 constitution and the presidency.

Kiev had succeeded in temporarily putting the lid on secessionist agitation but this was only possible because Russia under President Boris Yeltsin was prepared to acquiesce. But Putin was not.

After Yanukovych was ousted, pro-Russian Crimeans demonstrated in the streets calling for secession from Ukraine. Armed men, many in ski masks, surrounded Ukrainian military bases in Crimea. Others took over the Crimean parliament building and legislators voted in a new pro-Russian government which decided to hold a referendum on Crimea's future.

While it is difficult to establish how much of this was the handiwork of Putin, it is safe to say that, in the light of the history of pro-Russian agitation in Crimea, he was knocking on an open door. Using the justification of the renewed agitation, he moved in his elite troops on 27 February and organised a referendum on 16 March. The result was overwhelmingly in favour of reunion and Crimea reverted to Russia.

Kiev has denounced all this as 'illegal' but has failed to appreciate that this is the outcome of its own folly. The Russians had made it clear all along that all they expected from Ukraine was that it pursue a policy of neutrality. The then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, during a visit to Kiev in May 2010, stated that although he would like to see Ukraine join the Russian-backed Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Russia was not opposed to Ukraine choosing a path of neutrality. He further pointed out that'if it would be an absolutely neutral, independent state, we would be quite satisfied'.19

As for Crimea, the fact that in April 2010 the Russians had successfully negotiated an extension of the Black Sea Fleet lease until 2042 was a clear indication that they had no interest in challenging Kiev's sovereignty over it.

Having lost Crimea because of its misguided foreign policy, Ukraine now stands in danger of losing the eastern half of the country. Already insurgencies have erupted in this part of the country and Ukraine is lurching into a full-scale civil war. While it is true that the developments in Crimea have provided impetus to this revolt, it is ridiculous to claim that the crisis in Eastern Ukraine is being orchestrated by Putin. As noted above, the differences are rooted in the history of the country and these have been aggravated by years of indifference and neglect of the east by the pro-Western elite in Kiev.

The current chasm between Western and Eastern Ukraine cannot be papered over by elections which have only exposed how fractured the country is. In the recent presidential elections, only 20% of polling stations were operational in the eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk which have declared themselves independent 'people's republics'. In Donetsk, not a single vote was cast. The claim by the winning candidate Petro Poroshenko that he now has a popular mandate for a resumption of efforts to join the EU - a drive that triggered the whole crisis six months ago - is spurious. His declaration that he will not negotiate with the insurgents is a recipe for a prolongation of the conflict.

Rather than accuse the insurgents of being 'terrorists', it is time for Kiev to engage with them and seriously consider their demands such as federalisation. Above all, Kiev should stop being sanctimonious about the issue of secession. After all, Ukraine is itself the product of secession from the USSR!     

T Rajamoorthy, a member of the Malaysian Bar, is an Editor of Third World Resurgence.

Endnotes 

1      M. von Hagen (1997), 'Ukraine', in E. Acton, V.I. Cherniaev and W.G. Rosenberg (eds.), Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution 1914-1921, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, p. 730.

2      B. Nahaylo (1999), The Ukrainian Resurgence, University of Toronto Press, Toronto and Buffalo, p. 17.

3      J.I. Dawson (1996), Eco-nationalism: Anti-nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, Duke University Press, Durham and London, p. 171.

4      Nahaylo, op. cit., p. 209.

5      T. Kuzio (2000), Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, Second Edition, St. Martin's Press, New York, p. 216.

6      P. Dibb (1986), The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, Macmillan, Houndmills, p. 35.

7      M. Gorbachev (1996), Memoirs, Doubleday, London, p. 675.

8      North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2014), 'Russia's accusations - setting the record straight', Fact Sheet, April.

9      U. Klussmann, M. Schepp and K. Wiegrefe (2009), 'Did the West break its promise to Moscow?', Der Spiegel, 26 November.

10    North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, op. cit.

11    'Ukraine-NATO relations', Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine-NATO_relations (accessed 29 May 2014).

12    'Ukraine Parliament Ok's neutrality bill', Kyiv Post, 4 June 2010.

13    'Solana, Talbott criticize concept of Ukraine's neutrality proposed by Yanukovych', Interfax-Ukraine, 31 March 2010.

14 'Lawmakers move to cancel Ukraine's nonaligned status', Xinhua, 5 March 2014.

15    'Ukraine's foreign policy can damage cooperation with Russia - Foreign Ministry', ITAR-TASS, 1 April 2014.

16 On the history of Crimean separatism, see: E. Mizrokhi (2009), 'Russian "separatism" in Crimea and NATO: Ukraine's big hope, Russia's grand gamble', Chaire de recherche du Canada sur les conflits identitaires et le terrorisme and Programme Paix et securite internationales, Institut quebecois des hautes etudes internationales, Laval University; and N. Belitser (2000), 'The constitutional process in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the context of interethnic relations and conflict settlement', paper presented at the 'Fuzzy Statehood and European Integration in Eastern Europe' conference, University of Birmingham, UK, 10 March.

17    Mizrokhi, op. cit.

18    Ibid.

19    Cited in V. Potapkina (2010), 'Ukraine's neutrality: A myth or reality?', E-International Relation

        s, http://www.e-ir.info/2010/11/30/ukraine%E2%80%99s-neutrality-a-myth-or-reality/

*Third World Resurgence No. 285, May 2014, pp 37-41