Overview of key issues in the Rio+20 outcome document

This is a Third World Network analysis written by Alex Rafalowicz, Meena Raman, Lim Li Ching and Chee Yoke Ling.

AT a time when international cooperation is weak and developed countries are effectively backing off from their commitments made in 1992 at the summit on environment and development, the Rio+20 outcome document, 'The Future We Want', was still significant in preserving key principles of sustainable development.

Third World Network identified nine key issues for the Rio+20 conference:

1. Political commitment to sustainable development

2. Reaffirming the 1992 Rio Principles

3. Reaffirming rights

4. Implementing existing commitments

5. 'Green economy'

6. Sustainable development goals

7. Reform of the institutional framework for sustainable development

8. Effects on trade

9. Regulation of corporations

In this article we assess how these were addressed. In addition we also look at some of the critical issues under several thematic areas in the framework for action and follow-up.

On the whole, the outcome of the Rio+20 conference may not have set the paradigm for a real vision of 'the future we want', but given the obstacles and difficulties faced during the negotiations in the multilateral process, it was not the step backwards from the Rio summit of 1992 that was initially feared. 

In fact, it provides some opportunities for further work ahead to shape and chart the future course of the vision we want.

1. 'The focus and mandate of the conference is to review and recommit to sustainable development.'

This was ultimately achieved at the conference, with paragraph 15 reaffirming 'all the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development' (the 'Rio Principles'). Similarly, paragraph 16 provides for a 'commitment to fully implement' a range of agreements on sustainable development, including Agenda 21 and the 2002 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.

Paragraph 20 is also particularly important in both recognising the 'multiple crises' that humanity faces and acknowledging 'insufficient progress' on sustainable development. Although the 'principle of non-regression' as proposed by the Group of 77 and China  (and supported by the European Parliament) was not accepted in the text, it was agreed that states 'do not backtrack' from their previous commitments.

The finally agreed paragraph 20 reads:

'We acknowledge that since 1992 there have been areas of insufficient progress and setbacks in the integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development, aggravated by multiple financial, economic, food and energy crises, which have threatened the ability of all countries, in particular developing countries, to achieve sustainable development. In this regard, it is critical that we do not backtrack from our commitment to the outcome of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. We also recognize that one of the current major challenges for all countries, particularly for developing countries, is the impact from the multiple crises affecting the world today.'

Poverty eradication is underscored in paragraph 2 as an 'indispensable requirement for sustainable development'. It is recognised that 'poverty eradication, changing unsustainable and promoting sustainable patterns of consumption and production and protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social development are the overarching objectives of and essential requirements for sustainable development'.

2. 'Reaffirming commitments to the Rio Principles and to common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) is essential to preserve the global partnership on sustainable development.'

As described above, the Rio Principles were reaffirmed in paragraph 15. They were also invoked with respect to: 'policies for green economy' which 'should be guided by and in accordance with all the Rio Principles' (paragraph 57); the institutional framework for sustainable development, where it was agreed that 'an improved and more effective institutional framework for sustainable development should be consistent with the Rio Principles' (paragraph 76); and sustainable development goals which should 'fully respect all the Rio Principles' (paragraph 246).

Specifically, CBDR was recalled particularly in paragraph 15, which reads:

'We reaffirm all the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, including, inter alia, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, as set out in principle 7 of the Rio Declaration.'

It was also recalled in the section on climate change in paragraph 191, which reflects the language in Article 3(1) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and reads, '...parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.'

The reaffirmation of equity and CBDR in relation to the climate regime is particularly important for developing countries since these two principles were notably absent in the decision at the climate talks in December 2011 on starting negotiations on the Durban Platform under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Other Rio Principles were not recalled directly but their substance is reflected in many parts, including particularly: principle 2 (the sovereign right of states to exploit their own resources) in defining 'green economy policies' in paragraph 58(b), and in paragraph 227 on 'mining'; principle 3 (the right to development) included in paragraph 8 on 'common vision'; principle 10 (public participation) in Section C of Part II, particularly paragraph 43 on 'engaging major groups and other stakeholders'; principle 12 (against restrictive and unilateral trade measures) is partially reflected in paragraph 26 on 'advancing integration, implementation and coherence' and is elaborated under what 'green economy policies' should do in paragraph 58(h).

In the further work on sustainable development goals (SDGs) it would be crucial to ensure that the Rio Principles are fully incorporated. Paragraph 246 on SDGs calls for 'taking into account different national circumstances, capacities and priorities'.

3. 'Governments must also reaffirm the right to food, safe drinking water and sanitation, health and education and respect human rights-based approaches.'

'The Future We Want' provides some affirmation of human rights-based approaches including generally in paragraphs 8 and 9, and gives some recognition to rights that are particularly important to sustainable development.

The right to food is affirmed with complete integrity ('the right to food') in paragraph 8. The US strongly resisted 'the right to food' language and after protracted negotiations it was agreed to draw from the language in Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Paragraph 108 in the section on framework for action and follow-up now reaffirms 'commitments regarding the right of everyone to have access to safe, sufficient and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger'.

After a long struggle (with Canada showing the strongest resistance), the right to safe drinking water and sanitation was also 'reaffirmed' in paragraph 121 but some analysts are concerned about the appendage of the words 'commitments regarding', given very few are elaborated at an international level. The paragraph reads:

'We reaffirm our commitments regarding the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, to be progressively realized for our populations with full respect for national sovereignty.'

The right to education is recognised in a similar manner in paragraph 229 which begins:

'We reaffirm our commitments to the right to education and in this regard, we commit to strengthen international cooperation to achieve universal access to primary education, particularly for developing countries.'

The right to health, in paragraph 138, is recognised in the following form:

'We call for the full realization of the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.'

The importance of indigenous peoples' interests and knowledge is recognised throughout the document and paragraph 49, in the context of 'engaging major groups', reads:

'We stress the importance of the participation of indigenous peoples in the achievement of sustainable development. We also recognize the importance of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the context of global, regional, national and subnational implementation of sustainable development strategies.'

However, there is a significant setback for sexual and reproductive health rights, and this was heavily criticised by women's organisations (see boxed statement 'Governments gamble with our future'on p. 24).

4. 'Existing commitments need to be implemented - the words at this conference must be followed up with by action.'

One of the greatest failings of 'The Future We Want' is that it does not provide any concrete 'means of implementation' or new and additional resources in order to achieve sustainable development. Thus the developed countries failed to maintain their level of commitments of 20 or even 10 years ago on finance and technology for sustainable development.

However, it was agreed in paragraph 255 that 'an intergovernmental process under the auspices of the General Assembly' would be established to 'assess financing needs, consider the effectiveness, consistency and synergies of existing instruments and frameworks, and evaluate additional initiatives, with a view to preparing a report proposing options on an effective sustainable development financing strategy'.

Similarly, states requested 'relevant United Nations agencies to identify options for a facilitation mechanism that promotes the development, transfer and dissemination of clean and environmentally sound technologies' in paragraph 273, suggesting a longer-term outcome of Rio+20 may be a 'facilitation mechanism' for technology transfer.

(a) 'New, additional, predictable and public finance from developed countries is needed.'

On finance for developing countries specifically, the developed countries watered down their previous commitments, refusing to use the agreed terms 'new and additional financial resources' that are one of the foundations of international development cooperation.

Instead, there are references to getting funds from a 'variety of sources' (paragraph 191) and 'new partnerships' (paragraphs 71 and 253), which are code for the reduced importance (and quantum) of public finance and the elevation of private sector finance. The private sector cannot generate predictable or sufficient finance for the essential sustainable development actions that are needed and so it is deeply concerning that it became the focus of 'The Future We Want' section on finance.

Developing countries had proposed specific finance levels ($30 billion per year from 2013-17, and to enhance the mobilisation to $100 billion per year from 2018 onwards) for sustainable development, particularly given the context of UN studies that show that at least $1.9 trillion per year is needed by developing countries for sustainable development actions; yet this was not recognised in the text due to stiff resistance from the developed countries.

As a compromise, developing countries proposed the setting up of a financial mechanism and the proposal evolved to what is in the text now: the establishment of an intergovernmental process under the UN General Assembly to propose options on an effective sustainable development financing strategy. At the least, this process, which has a proposed time frame and stipulates that there will be a report requiring action from the General Assembly, could help put in motion implementation and follow-up to realise the necessary resources for financing sustainable development. 

A weak recognition of the ODA (official development assistance) target of 0.7% of gross national product (GNP), which has been previously and repeatedly agreed to by all UN member states, was given in paragraph 258, which labelled it a 'commitment by many developed countries'.

There is a worrying increase in references to 'South-South' solidarity financing in paragraph 260 ('We reiterate our support for South-South cooperation, as well as triangular cooperation, which provide much needed additional resources to the implementation of development programmes'), which poses the risk of shifting existing commitments from rich countries to the developing world, but this is at least limited by agreed language:

'We recognize the importance and different history and particularities of  South-South cooperation and stress that South-South cooperation should be seen  as an expression of solidarity and cooperation between countries, based on their shared experiences and objectives.South-South cooperation complements rather than substitutes for North-South cooperation.'

This is preferable to a reference to the OECD's Busan Declaration, as proposed by the United States, which had not been agreed at the global level. (The Busan Declaration sets out guidelines for 'aid effectiveness', with the OECD countries seeking to include developing countries in adopting similar standards, a move that was resisted by the latter as this would significantly change the notion of ODA as primarily a North-South commitment.)

There is insufficient commitment to scaled-up resourcing for the United Nations in general and no elaboration of truly innovative forms of public financing such as international financial transaction taxes and Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund; nor are there any concrete actions to address debt and financial crises.

(b) 'The transfer of technology to developing countries to enable sustainable development is an essential element of any outcome and is an existing commitment of developed countries.'

On the last day of negotiations, the US agreed to language that 'recalled' the technology text in the Rio+10 summit in Johannesburg in 2002, including technology transfer on favourable terms to developing countries (paragraph 105 of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation). The US had insisted throughout on replacing agreed technology transfer commitments with 'voluntary transfer of technology, on mutually agreed terms and conditions'.

However, the final compromise has appended language noting 'further evolution'. The agreed language appears in the sections on 'green economy' and 'technology' of 'The Future We Want' (paragraphs 73 and 269) and reads:

'We emphasize the importance of technology transfer to developing countries and recall the provisions on technology  transfer,  finance,  access to information, and intellectual property  rights  as  agreed  in  the  Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, in particular its call to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, access to and the development, transfer and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies and corresponding know-how, in particular to developing countries, on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed. We also take note of the further evolution of discussions and agreements on these issues since the adoption of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.'

As noted above, calls for a technology mechanism were not accepted although a process that may lead to such a mechanism has been set in train by paragraph 273, which reads as follows:

'We request relevant United Nations agencies to identify options for a facilitation mechanism that promotes the development, transfer and dissemination of clean and environmentally sound technologies by, inter alia, assessing the technology needs of developing countries, options to address those needs and capacity-building. We request the Secretary-General, on the basis of the options identified and taking into account existing models, to make recommendations regarding the facilitation mechanism to the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly.'

That the text fails to address 'intellectual property' and the negative effects that monopoly can have on sustainable development, is a major gap in the outcome. However, language referring to the need to explore modalities in the relevant fora for enhanced access to such technologies by developing countries was retained in paragraph 270, opening the door to future action on the issue. That paragraph reads:

'We stress the importance of access by all countries to environmentally sound technologies, new knowledge, know-how and expertise. We further stress the importance of cooperative action on technology innovation, research and development. We agree to explore modalities in the relevant forums for enhanced access to environmentally sound technologies by developing countries.'

This retains the flexibilities that are contained in the intellectual property agreement of the World Trade Organisation that countries can ensure in their national laws.

On 'technology assessment', or the independent assessment of the real impacts of technologies, there is recognition of the importance of strengthening international, regional and national capacities in research and technology assessment in paragraph 275 that reads:

'We recognize the importance of strengthening international, regional and national capacities in research and technology assessment, especially in view of the rapid development and possible deployment of new technologies that may also have unintended negative impacts, in particular on biodiversity and health, or other unforeseen consequences.'

This provides a window of opportunity for further work on technology assessment.

5. 'The "Green Economy" cannot be agreed without being defined; and it must be defined in accordance with the Rio Principles and with the backing of new and additional resources.'

'The Future We Want' does not adopt 'green economy' as a distinct concept but as one of many 'approaches, visions, models and tools' (paragraph 56) to achieve sustainable development, with the focus of the section being 'green economy policies' (or just 'green economy' but not 'a green economy'). This is to be welcomed as it does not constrain choices of governments, with agreement that green economy 'could provide options for policymaking but should not be a rigid set of rules' (paragraph 56).

In the elaboration of what green economy policies should be and do, it is also welcomed that they 'should be guided by and in accordance with all the Rio Principles, Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation' (paragraph 57) and that they '[r]espect each country's national sovereignty over their natural resources' [paragraph 58(b)] and 'not constitute' restriction on international trade and 'avoid' unilateral trade measures [paragraph 58(h)].

Of concern is that the section provides no 'new and additional' resources, merely noting that developing countries 'should be supported', not that developed countries should provide this support. Further, the reference to support does not include 'finance' but only 'through technical and technological assistance' (paragraph 74). Similarly, there is language throughout the section which indicates an intention by developed countries to shift resourcing obligations to the private sector, for example, in paragraph 71 that begins:

'We encourage existing and new partnerships, including public-private partnerships, to mobilize public financing complemented by the private sector .'

This paragraph also includes an exhortation to governments to support initiatives including 'promoting the contribution of the private sector'.

Many in civil society will be relieved that the final adopted text does not contain the words 'ecosystem services', which were seen as conferring legitimacy on policies that 'financialised nature' at great risk to local communities and environmental integrity (see the article by Sian Sullivan in this issue).

Vigilance is still needed, however, as many are concerned that paragraph 66 may create a hook for the establishment of some international body that will continue to promote this agenda as it invites 'the United Nations system, in cooperation with relevant donors and international organizations, to coordinate and provide information' on 'matching interested countries' with support and 'toolboxes in applying green economy policies'.

6. 'Sustainable development goals (SDGs) represent a risk if they are not developed in an open, democratic and transparent manner.'

The adopted SDG process outlined in paragraph 248 of 'The Future We Want' is to be welcomed. It avoids the pitfalls of prematurely 'listing' themes to be focused on and provides for an intergovernmental process that will not be susceptible to 'high-jacking' by the Secretary-General or appointed 'experts'. It is agreed that '[t]he development of these goals should  not  divert   focus  or  effort from the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals' (paragraph 246) and 'should be coherent with and integrated  into  the  United  Nations development agenda beyond 2015' (the target for meeting the MDGs is 2015).

Although states agreed that the resulting SDGs should 'fully respect all the Rio Principles', the principle of CBDR is not reproduced in its entirety, although it can be assumed to apply given its inclusion in paragraph 15. In earlier versions of the negotiation document the G77 had wanted to include specific reference to CBDR in the SDG section.

7. 'Reform of the "institutional framework for sustainable development" must not lose sight of strengthening the effective institutions we already have.'

The progress made on agreeing to institutional reform in 'The Future We Want' is to be welcomed as it does not discard existing institutions before proposing replacements - the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) will continue its work until it is 'subsequently' replaced (paragraph 84) by a new 'high-level political forum'. The process (in paragraph 86) to develop this high-level forum bears risks that states will not agree to a sufficiently ambitious and comprehensive new body, but it also provides the opportunity to shape and improve the new institution. If the new forum can have a comprehensive agenda, a wide enough mandate to act, a dynamic process of discussion and decision-making, a strong secretariat and high political backing, then the institutional framework for sustainable development would be greatly strengthened.

The invitation to the UN General Assembly to broaden the mandate of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and increase its resources (in paragraph 88) is a positive step, as is the affirmation of the mandated role of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in sustainable development (paragraph 83).

It is disappointing that no serious measures to reform international financial institutions, which are integral to sustainable development, were countenanced and that paragraph 92 states only the following:

'. reiterate the importance of the reform of the governance of those institutions in order to deliver more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions.'

8. New 'green' trade barriers cannot become the 'blocks' to sustainable development; sustainable consumption and production revived

'The Future We Want' is clear in its prohibition against countries using their own terms to justify trade measures, as outlined in paragraph 26:

'States are strongly urged to refrain from promulgating and applying any unilateral economic, financial or trade measures not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations that impede the full achievement of economic and social development, particularly in developing countries.'

This is similarly applied and elaborated with respect to 'green economy policies' in paragraph 58(h) as discussed above.

The corollary to changing and limiting unsustainable production patterns is addressing unsustainable patterns of consumption, so it is welcome that the text acknowledges that 'changing unsustainable.patterns of consumption and production' is an 'overarching objective of, and essential to, sustainable development' (paragraph 4). Similarly the adoption of the '10-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production patterns' in paragraph 226 is a step forward. However, it is concerning that recognition of the North's previously agreed responsibility to lead, given their historical responsibility, is not adequately and explicitly reaffirmed anywhere in the text.

The phasing out of 'harmful and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies' was a subject of intense debate, with the many developed countries advocating strong language and developing countries expressing concerns that there are widespread impacts on the poor when subsidies are removed without safeguards and alternatives such as affordable and sufficient renewable energy are not available. The agreed paragraph 225 calls for policies that phase out such subsidies to take 'fully into account the specific needs and conditions of developing countries, with the aim of minimising the possible adverse impacts on their development and in a manner that protects the poor and affected communities.'

9. 'If governments want to enable sustainable development, then they must regulate transnational corporations which are major drivers of unsustainable development.'

'The Future We Want' is a missed opportunity on this issue as it does not significantly address the role of transnational corporations in driving unsustainable development (the word 'corporation' does not even appear in the text as the term 'private sector' is used, subsuming transnational corporations, small and medium-sized enterprises). This remains a serious gap in the international framework for sustainable development and should be a priority for governments and campaigners and should be included as an issue in the ongoing processes on the SDGs and the work of the 'high-level political forum'.

The weak language in paragraphs 46 and 47 is not sufficient and retains a 'corporate social responsibility' approach, which is voluntary and allows for corporations to 'monitor' themselves with no binding enforcement.

A UN global framework, or international binding code, for regulating and disciplining transnational corporations is unfinished business - the first Rio summit in 1992 saw a strong business presence and opened the way for transnational corporations to be 'partners in sustainable development', and in the months afterwards the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations was effectively dismantled.

The 2012 Rio outcome is weak on this issue even as public and community demands for corporate regulation increase with the financial and environmental crises. There is a need for this vital issue to be on the UN agenda. Similarly, there must be agreed global rules on corporate advertising and public relations activities that corporations use to promote consumption and drive forward the wasteful consumerist development model that generates corporate profits but that also threatens the well-being and even survival of present and future generations. 

10.  Food security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture

The section on 'food security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture' is generally positive in that it includes language on the right to food, access of small farmers, women and indigenous peoples to credit, markets and land tenure, promotion of sustainable agriculture, recognition of the importance of traditional sustainable agricultural practices and the need to address the root causes of food price volatility. The section does not however address the critical problem of developed countries' agricultural subsidies. Nonetheless, the reaffirmation of these key issues in the Rio+20 outcome document underlines and augments the gains that have been already made on these same issues in other relevant processes and fora.

The right to food is reaffirmed in paragraph 108: 'We reaffirm our commitments regarding the right of everyone to have access to safe, sufficient and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.' Together with the reaffirmation of the 'right to food' in paragraph 8, this sets the stage for addressing hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition within a human rights framework that encompasses the full range of the meaning of the right to food.

The role and needs of rural communities are recognised and rural development emphasised in paragraph 109. In particular, there is recognition of the need for enhanced access by 'small producers, women, indigenous peoples and people living in vulnerable situations to credit and other financial services, markets, secure land tenure, health care, social services, education, training, knowledge and appropriate and affordable technologies'.

In addition, the 'importance of traditional sustainable agricultural practices, including traditional seed supply systems, including for many indigenous peoples and local communities', is recognised. This is important in light of the threats that undermine and marginalise such systems and the increasing takeover of seed supply by a few large multinational corporations. This also implicitly recognises farmers' rights to plant genetic resources, where farmers save, reuse and exchange seeds, and farmers' role in conserving and sustainably using agricultural biodiversity.

Crucially, paragraphs 110-113 emphasise the importance of sustainable agriculture, including crops, livestock, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture, and the need for increased investment in sustainable agricultural practices. The links between sustainable agriculture and food security, biodiversity and climate resilience are rightly highlighted. In paragraph 111, the need to 'maintain natural ecological processes that support food production systems' is recognised, which is a nod towards agro-ecological principles and processes such as nutrient cycling, biological nitrogen fixation, biological control via promotion of diversified farming systems and harnessing functional biodiversity.

The need to enhance agricultural research, extension services, training and education is addressed in paragraph 114, to improve productivity and sustainability. While falling short of calling for a transition from the current unsustainable models of industrial/conventional agriculture, the language is sufficiently supportive of sustainable agriculture approaches.

In paragraph 115, the important work and inclusive nature of the reformed Committee on World Food Security (CFS) is reaffirmed, although it does not explicitly refer to the path-breaking participation schemes adopted by the Committee such as its Civil Society Mechanism. Still, this is in line with calls from civil society to recognise the CFS as the governing body for food, agriculture and rural development policy and related financial issues at the global level. Some of the progressive work of the CFS is highlighted: the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security and the ongoing discussions on responsible agricultural investment.

The issue of food price volatility is addressed in paragraphs 116 and 117. The text stresses 'the need to address the root causes of excessive food price volatility, including its structural causes, at all levels, and the need to manage the risks linked to high and excessively volatile prices in agricultural commodities and their consequences for global food security and nutrition, as well as for smallholder farmers and poor urban dwellers'. Mention is made of the Agricultural Market Information System hosted by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), which is limited to the market information aspects, but no other concrete solutions are offered. This is surprising given that there have been several UN processes that have extensively debated the issue, including the CFS and the General Assembly, with the latter adopting the resolution 'Addressing excessive price volatility in food and related financial and commodity markets'.

The final paragraph of the section, paragraph 118 on trade, is regrettably weak. This is because developed countries did not want to discuss their agriculture subsidies, which are adversely affecting food security, livelihood security and rural development in developing countries. Similarly, attempts to address agriculture subsidies in the means of implementation/trade part of the outcome document came to naught, despite pleas from the G77 and China that this was a critical issue for developing countries.

 

Governments gamble with our future: South feminists demand responsible action now The following is the statement on Rio+20 released by the gender justice network Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) on 22 June. WHILE governments were locked in their semantic battles in the Rio+20 process, women's and other social movements continue to fight on multiple fronts for human rights, justice and sustainability. These struggles take place on diverse territories and geographies including the body, land, oceans and waterways, communities, states, and epistemological grounds. Each of these terrains is fraught with the resurgent forces of patriarchy, finance capitalism, neo-conservatism, consumerism, militarism and extractivism. An understanding of the deeper structural roots of the crises we face today and analytical clarity on the interlinkages between different dimensions are both critical. There is no core recognition that the multiple crises we face are caused by the current anthropocentric development model rooted in unsustainable production and consumption patterns, and financialisation of the economy that are all based on and exacerbate gender, race and class inequities. In sharp contrast to 20 years ago at the historic Earth Summit (also in Rio de Janeiro) when linkages between gender and all three pillars of sustainable development were substantively acknowledged, the Rio+20 outcome document has relegated women's rights and gender equality to the periphery without recognition of a wider structural analysis. Over the past few months we have witnessed and confronted attempts by a small group of ultra-conservative states (with the strong support of an observer state - the Holy See) to roll back hard-won agreements on women's rights. We are outraged that a vocal minority have hijacked the text on gender and health and blocked mention of sexual and reproductive rights, claiming that these have nothing to do with sustainable development. Meanwhile most states concentrate on what they considered their 'big ticket' items of finance, trade and aid with little interest to incorporate a gender analysis into these macroeconomic issues. There is a reference to women's 'unpaid work' but without recognising the unequal and unfair burden that women carry in sustaining care and well-being (paragraph 153 of the outcome document titled 'The Future We Want'). This is further exacerbated in times of economic and ecological crisis when women's unpaid labour acts as a stabiliser and their burden increases. For example, reference to the root causes of excessive food price volatility, including its structural causes, is not linked to the risks and burdens that are disproportionately borne by women (paragraph 116). Development is not sustainable if care and social reproduction are not recognised as intrinsically linked with the productive economy and reflected in macroeconomic policy-making. Reference is made to the critical role that rural women play in food security through traditional sustainable agricultural practices including traditional seed supply systems (paragraph 109). However these are under severe threat unless governments stop prioritising export-oriented agribusiness. The reason why such wrong-headed policies are not adequately addressed is because of corporate interests that are protected in the Rio+20 outcome. Northern governments advocating for such corporate interests have warped the sustainable development paradigm in the so-called 'green economy' that is skewed toward the economic pillar, emphasising sustained economic growth over equitable development and without any ecological limits. Within this section women are regarded as either welfare recipients or as a supplier of labour for the green economy, but not acknowledged as rights holders, especially of economic, social and cultural rights [paragraph 58(k) & (l)]. The 'green economy' concept is somewhat challenged in the text by an affirmation of diverse visions, models and approaches to development as well as the policy space to integrate all three dimensions of sustainable development (paragraph 56). While the recognition of policy space and sovereignty over natural resources is important, there is a need to deeply question a development model that is based on extractivism and that fails to take into account social and ecological costs. While the Rio principles including common but differentiated responsibilities are reaffirmed at Rio+20, the outcome is imbalanced across the three pillars of sustainable development without sufficient attention to gender and social justice, including women's rights. It fails to tackle the systemic inequities of the international monetary, financial and trading systems; and prioritises economic growth over the ecology and equity. Feminists across the global South will continue to demand that governments stop regressing on their commitments and begin to seriously address the structural transformations that are required for genuine sustainable development.                                   Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) is a network of feminist scholars, researchers and activists from the economic South working for economic and gender justice and sustainable and democratic development.

Other thematic areas in the framework for action and follow-up Chee Yoke Ling IN addition to the highlighted thematic areas in the main article, the following were also included in 'The Future We Want'. 'Access to sustainable modern energy services':  There is a commitment 'to facilitate support for access to these services by 1.4 billion people worldwide who are currently without them' (paragraph 125). However there is no concrete commitment, but only an emphasis on 'the need to take further action to improve this situation' (access for the poor who are unable to afford services even when they are available), 'including by mobilizing adequate financial resources' (paragraph 126). The energy mix listed in paragraph 127 is a mixed bag: 'increased use of renewable energy sources and other low-emission technologies, the more efficient use of energy, greater reliance on advanced energy technologies, including cleaner fossil fuel technologies, and the sustainable use of traditional energy resources'. The UN Secretary-General's initiative on 'Sustainable Energy for All' was quite controversial in the Rio+20 process. This initiative involves almost all major transnational corporations in the energy sector and is heavily criticised by civil society groups and several developing-country government delegations for its reliance on the biggest fossil fuel extractors and contributors to global warming to deliver sustainable solutions. The privatisation of energy in many countries and the profit orientation of these corporations, according to critics, are a major driver of the lack of access to energy by the poor.  The final agreed text in paragraph 129 therefore 'note[s] the launching of the initiative' whereas earlier drafts sought a stronger endorsement, while several states asked for deletion of this reference to the initiative. 'Sustainable tourism': The two paragraphs 130 and 131 had been agreed to before delegates arrived in Rio. This topic did not receive much attention from civil society participants in the Rio process, and there is an assumption that 'well designed and managed tourism' can contribute to all three pillars of sustainable development. 'The Future We Want' accordingly 'encourage[s] the promotion of investment in sustainable tourism, including eco-tourism and cultural tourism'. Third World Network was the only organisation that disseminated analyses that strongly critiqued tourism at the World Tourism Organisation side event held in Rio. (For details see the article by Alison Johnston in this issue and a new TWN publication The Politics of Tourism, Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development by Anita Pleumarom.) 'Oceans and seas': This thematic area received considerable attention from organisations that work with fisherfolk and conservation, as well as countries with extensive marine resources. Urgency was also escalated with new data on the unabated depletion of marine resources and the impact of global warming and glacial melting on ocean and sea levels, and massive marine pollution (the Rio+20 document highlights marine debris, especially plastic, persistent organic pollutants, heavy metals and nitrogen-based compounds). There is a commitment 'to intensify our efforts to meet the 2015 target as agreed to in the [2002] Johannesburg Plan of Implementation to maintain or restore [fish] stocks to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield on an urgent basis' (paragraph 168). 'The Future We Want' document also notes the decision of the 10th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) that 'by 2020 10% of coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services, are to be conserved'. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans and seas, and its importance, is recognised, as is the 'near universal adoption by States' of the Convention (paragraphs158 and 159) - the United States is still not a Party. There is commitment 'to protect, and restore, the health, productivity and resilience of oceans and marine ecosystems, and to maintain their biodiversity' and 'to effectively apply an ecosystem approach and the precautionary approach' in the management of activities that impact on the marine environment. Paragraph 162 recognises the importance of the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction. It notes the ongoing work under the General Assembly of an ad hoc open-ended informal working group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of such marine biodiversity. There is a commitment 'to address, on an urgent basis', this issue, 'including by [the General Assembly] taking a decision on the development of an international instrument' under the UNCLOS before the end of the 69th session of the General Assembly (2015). An issue that has emerged in the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilisation (concluded in 2010 as a protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity) is the need for a regime to govern marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction as bioprospecting, patenting of marine resources (especially microorganisms) and commercialisation are already taking place with the benefits accruing to a minority of entities from developed countries. Developing countries had sought to include this in some form in the Nagoya Protocol but developed countries countered that this is a matter addressed at the General Assembly ad hoc working group. In the meantime the dominance of a few Northern corporations and research entities over these resources will continue. It is significant that concern is expressed at this high level about 'the potential environmental impacts of ocean fertilisation' and that governments 'recall the decisions related to ocean fertilisation adopted by the relevant intergovernmental bodies' (the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity has a decision that is a de facto moratorium on ocean fertilisation), and 'resolve to continue addressing with utmost caution ocean fertilisation, consistent with the precautionary approach' (paragraph 167). There is also a commitment 'to eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing as advanced in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (paragraph 170), and a call upon states to ratify the FAO agreement that addresses this challenge. There is in paragraph 173 a reaffirmation of the commitment in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 'to eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and overcapacity, taking into account the importance of this sector to developing countries .'. Subsidies in the fisheries sector is a complex and contentious issue that is addressed in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and so the Rio+20 conference reiterates its commitment 'to conclude multilateral disciplines on fisheries subsidies that will give effect to the WTO Doha Development Agenda and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration mandates' on this issue, 'recognising that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part' of the WTO negotiations, 'taking into account the importance of the sector to development priorities, poverty reduction and livelihood and food-security concerns'. There is encouragement to states 'to eliminate subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, and to refrain from introducing new subsidies or from extending or enhancing existing ones'. This is a reflection of the different realities and situations in developing and developed countries. Importantly, there is a commitment 'to observe the need to ensure access to fisheries and the importance of access to markets, by subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fisherfolk and women fish workers, as well as indigenous peoples and their communities, particularly in developing countries, especially small island developing States' (paragraph 175).    'Biodiversity':  The intrinsic value of biodiversity and 'its critical role in maintaining ecosystems that provide essential services' are reaffirmed (paragraph 197). Several developing countries concerned about the adverse impacts of market mechanisms such as payment for ecosystem services did not want the term 'ecosystem services' to be used in certain contexts in the outcome document (see the article by Sian Sullivan in this issue). Recognising the severity of global loss of biodiversity and the degradation of ecosystems that undermine development, biodiversity conservation is 'highlighted' (paragraph 197) and governments 'reiterate our commitment to the achievement of the three objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and call for urgent actions that effectively reduce the rate of, halt and reverse the loss of biodiversity' and 'affirm the importance of implementing the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and achieving the Aichi Biodiversity Targets' adopted in 2010 by the CBD's Conference of the Parties (paragraph 198). The contribution of the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous peoples and local communities is recognised.  The term 'indigenous peoples' is used in the document, as opposed to the term 'indigenous and local communities' in the CBD - this is a significant step. The resource mobilisation strategy in support of the achievement of the CBD objectives is welcomed in paragraph 200 and this itself was a hard-fought outcome of the 2010 meeting of the CBD Parties. The document 'note[s] the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilisation' and 'invite[s]' CBD Parties to ratify or accede to the Protocol. The language is not stronger as many developing countries have concerns over gaps and weakness in this new treaty. Promoted by developing countries that sought to prevent biopiracy and ensure fair and equitable benefit sharing (the third objective of the CBD), the final stage of the negotiations in 2010 in Nagoya, Japan was controversial as the ultimate compromise was reached by a very small group of countries and political pressure was strong on all Parties to then agree to it. Other thematic areas in 'The Future We Want' include sustainable transport; sustainable cities and human settlements; health and population; promoting full and productive employment, decent work for all and social protection; disaster risk reduction; forests; desertification, land degradation and drought; mountains; chemicals and waste; small island developing states; least developed countries; landlocked developing countries; Africa etc. In most cases there was reiteration of existing international agreements and work programmes at the global and regional levels. However, as discussed in the main article, the means of implementation, especially financial resources, remain elusive as there were no concrete commitments to honour the agreement to provide new and additional financial resources for sustainable development (implementing Agenda 21 and the three 'Rio Conventions' of 1992).

     

*Third World Resurgence No. 262, June 2012, pp 19-27