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Pentagon ecstatic over new Chinese 'threat' The recent
publication in unofficial Chinese websites of photographs of what appears
to be a Chinese stealth fighter plane has proved to be a godsend to
the US 'military-industrial complex' in its fight to increase defence
spending. Andrew Cockburn comments on this attempt to invoke
the 'threat' of ONCE upon a
time, as the FY (fiscal year) 1964 defence appropriations bill was making
its way through Congress, there came a sombre moment when it looked
as if the US Navy might actually receive a lesser increase in its appropriation
than its hated Air Force rival. Then, just when all seemed dark, a Soviet
November class nuclear attack submarine surfaced a few miles off For much of
the 1990s, luck deserted our military-industrial complex. Its formerly
reliable Soviet partners ceased to play their part, leaving the Pentagon
to scour the world for a 'peer or near-peer competitor'. There were
hopes, always futile, for a reconstituted Help finally came from the CIA's former jihadi ally Osama bin Laden, whose 9/11 attack sufficiently traumatised society to allow the Pentagon to spend any money it wanted on anything it wanted, relevant to the task at hand or not. Even so, old hands yearned for the days when a military spend-up could be justified by whatever the other guy was up to, especially with ominous talk circulating in Washington about restraining (not cutting, of course) the defence budget. Now, just like that long-ago Soviet sub captain, the Chinese have stepped up to the plate. Our Asian
friends have suddenly offered a titillating peek from an airfield in
The reaction from some quarters has been predictably enthusiastic. 'From what we can see, I conclude that this aircraft does have great potential to be superior in some respects to the American F-22, and could be decisively superior to the F-35,' claims Richard Fisher, a senior fellow on Asian military affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, a Washington-based security think-tank. Other denizens of the military-industrial complex have pushed hyperbole further, with predictions that the plane - though it looks enormous in the photographs - may be pretty much invisible to radar. 'You can tell it has some serious stealth technology,' proclaims one former Navy pilot now in the defence investment business quoted by Fox News. 'My F-18 looks like an 18-wheeler on radar. That thing might not even show up.' Arriving in
We should not have to wait too long before some obliging member of Congress calls for the reopening of the F-22 production line, cut off by Gates in 2009 after a mere 187 planes had been built. To those with
fond memories of the Cold War, when it seemed that the arms race was
a two-nation affair, things are moving in a familiar pattern. Reading
Aviation Week & Space Technology in those days left you with your
heart in your mouth, as it regularly broadcast the news that Soviet
techno-military ingenuity was on the point, again, of overwhelming our
own puny and underfunded efforts. 'The Soviet Union is producing and
fielding inventory aircraft with major performance improvements at twice
the It was never
true. Soviet warplanes always suffered from a fundamental deficiency
of 'short legs' - insufficient range - due to heavier airframes - retarded
(deficient metalworking technology) - and shorter-lived engines (ditto),
not to mention myriad other deficiencies. Whenever actual examples of
some highly touted Soviet warplane arrived on public view in the West,
the reality invariably fell far short of the advance billing. When the
MiG-25 Foxbat, once promoted in Aviation Week and elsewhere as a wonder
plane that could fly vast distances at 3-1/2 times the speed of sound,
was inconveniently delivered by a defecting pilot to Anyone speculating that the Chinese turn out a better product should know that their efforts to rip off the Russians by copying Russian engines have produced only engines that make the Russians look good, forcing them to rely on the original product, deficient as that may be. One characteristic
of Soviet military aviation culture that the Chinese may indeed be emulating
was deference to American technological fashion. Thus, just as the US
Air Force was concluding that the 'swing-wing' technology of the 1960s
F-111 bomber had been a technological misstep, the Soviets produced
their own even more unwieldy Su-24. Other bad ideas - especially in
the field of electronics - were also regularly and dutifully duplicated
on the other side of the Iron Curtain. (An official in the CIA's Office
of Strategic Analysis swore to me in the 1980s that the entire contents
of Aviation Week were transmitted in encrypted form from the Soviet
Embassy in If the Chinese have indeed invested the necessarily vast sums that an F-22 lookalike programme would require, those disposed to fear the Middle Kingdom need only rejoice. The F-22s now in service with the US Air Force cost at least $355 million each (the total cost is probably higher); it is doubtful whether the F-22 can achieve 'supercruise' - the ability to fly faster than the speed of sound without afterburners, once touted as a distinguishing feature - for more than a few minutes. Most tellingly, its vaunted stealth performance has proved sadly disappointing. Although it is indeed less visible (though never actually invisible) to tracking radars such as that carried on other fighters or air defence missiles, longer wavelength search radars can detect its presence at considerable distances. In 1999, the Serbs used radar defences to down one F-117 stealth fighter and severely damage another. Unfortunately, while some may applaud a Chinese initiative to spend the money that Wal-Mart sends them on a weapon of dubious utility, we too may end up paying a price, as the 'threat' of China's J-20 is invoked to justify further increases in our own obscenely bloated defence budget. Andrew Cockburn
published The Threat in 1983, the only accurate assessment of Soviet
military potential in the 20 years before the fall of the *Third World Resurgence No. 245/246, January/February 2011, pp 54-55 |
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