Key challenges for Southern Sudan after split

The release of referendum results for Southern Sudan’s historic independence showing that 98.83% voted for secession means formal independence is scheduled for 9 July 2011, but key challenges still remain to be negotiated.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has asked the international community ‘to assist all Sudanese towards greater stability and development’, while US President Barack Obama welcomed the ‘successful and inspiring referendum’ but urged north and south to work quickly on post-referendum arrangements.

These issues, observers say, must now be hammered out by the two ruling parties – the north’s National Congress Party (NCP) and the south’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).

The often rocky relationship between the two parties has been eased by the swift acceptance of the results by President Omar al-Bashir, but observers note that progress on negotiations has so far been slow, with the south accusing the north of dragging its heels. Some fear the north will now seek to extract a high price from the south for its separation.

Below are some key issues that have to be negotiated between now and July:

Abyei - The contested border region was due to hold a separate referendum at the same time as the south, when its residents would decide whether to become part of the north or south. But progress on that vote remains in deadlock, with the largely northern-supported Misseriya community – who travel through the region annually to graze their cattle – demanding a right to vote. The largely southern-supported Dinka Ngok people reject that demand, and southerners say only permanent residents should be allowed to vote. The area’s future is expected to be wrapped into the huge negotiations ahead, with the south demanding it be ceded directly to join the new nation (see accompanying article).

Oil and water - A new deal must be agreed to renegotiate the current equal sharing of oil pumped in the south. The economies on both sides depend hugely on oil – forming 98% of the southern government budget. Oil reserves lie mainly in the south but all pipelines run north. For once, observers hope oil can provide a factor for peace, as for either to benefit, the future two states will be forced to cooperate post-secession.

In addition, negotiations will have to be agreed on the future sharing of Nile river water, an issue that neighbouring Egypt will be watching keenly, reluctant to see its share of the river cut. 

Debt - Sudan’s crippling debt, estimated at $38 billion, remains a major concern. It is an emotional issue: the southerners say Khartoum spent the cash on arms during the 1983-2005 civil war. The north wants to obtain international debt forgiveness to allow fresh loans, but that would still take many years. Persuading the south to take on some of that will be hard, but the north hopes that the south could then expect to have it written off more easily.

Citizenship - Concern remains for the many Sudanese living in the border areas, as well as southerners and northerners based in the ‘other’ side of Sudan. Hundreds of thousands of southerners remain in Khartoum, but the north has so far appeared reluctant to accept any dual nationality status. The south would reportedly like people to be able to choose.

Sudan’s giant north-south border remains un-demarcated, with progress slow on fixing the boundaries. Negotiations are based on colonial-era maps as the border stood at Sudan’s independence in 1956, but with the frontier crossing oil- and mineral-rich areas, the issue is contentious.

Common problems

Returnees - More than 180,000 southerners have returned from the north in the past three months, adding pressure to communities already struggling to cope. Major humanitarian and development problems remain. According to Refugees International, 22,000 southerners are stranded in and around Khartoum still waiting for transportation to the south.

Conflict - The south proved the critics’ warning of war wrong: the voting period was peaceful. Acceptance of the result by the NCP has allayed fears of north-south conflict. However, tensions remain in the volatile south. Clashes in early February between armed factions in the south’s oil-rich Upper Nile state left over 50 dead, and showed the potential for violence. Southern Sudan has been accused of hosting Darfuri rebel leaders fighting Khartoum, while the north is accused of backing militias battling the southern army. Both deny the charges. 

Economy - Sudan’s economy is struggling, with high demand for foreign currency, rising inflation and a recent slide in the value of the Sudanese pound. Price hikes on basic goods are hitting the poorest the hardest, while Khartoum remains concerned about political unrest, following popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. The two sides must also fix their currency, and decide whether a replacement for the Sudanese pound will be introduced. Rumours in early February that the north plans to scrap the pound saw its value plummet.

Building a southern identity - Without a common northern enemy, many fear fractures within the south. Leaders must work to bring together often disparate groups, including opposition forces and those outside the mainstream SPLM movement. 

Tackling corruption - Southern Sudan will rely on international donors to rebuild a land left in ruins by years of war. But it will have to ensure it strengthens its efforts to curb corruption to avoid losing wider support.

A mislaid land

Ethnic tensions and the scramble for oil reserves may lead to a confrontation in Abyei and adjacent borderline areas between northern and southern Sudan, cautions Gamal Nkrumah in this article written before the referendum outcome was announced.

SPARE a thought for Abyei. Prospects for peace in Sudan in the next month or two depend as much on peace and prosperity in Abyei as they do on the result of the referendum on southern Sudan. Abyei, a territory of 10,000 square kilometres in the heart of Sudan, is of vital strategic importance and symbolic significance to both northern and southern Sudanese. The ethnic and religious composition of its inhabitants is of critical consequence to the political future of Sudan - north and south.

All politics is local, and Abyei is no exception to the rule. A fresh wave of violence has hit Abyei. The death toll is estimated to have reached 40 in mid-January.

The British colonial authorities, it must be noted from the outset, created the crisis of Abyei when in 1905 they forcibly transferred the administration of nine ethnic Dinka Ngok chiefdoms to Kordofan.

No political or religious opinion, no matter how strongly held at the time, justified the transfer of Abyei to Kordofan. The result of this heinous colonial crime was to perpetuate the suffering of the people of Abyei for more than a century.

Arab Misseriya tribesmen moved into Abyei in search of greener pastureland for their livestock, displacing in the process the indigenous Dajo people now dispersed in Darfur and other parts of Kordofan and Blue Nile provinces, all technically parts of northern Sudan. A substantial number of the local ethnic Dinka Ngok people also migrated to Khartoum in search of better employment opportunities, swelling the numbers of the slum-dwelling residents of the shantytowns surrounding Khartoum.

The burning question at the moment is who exactly is eligible to vote to decide the political future of oil-rich Abyei. The inhabitants of Abyei were not permitted to vote in the January referendum deciding the political future of southern Sudan.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration based in The Hague, Netherlands, gave the Misseriya tribesmen grazing rights in Abyei together with the Dinka Ngok pastoral peoples. The settled Dinka Ngok people also have grazing rights according to the 2004 Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudanese government headed by President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) in 2005. Under the terms of the CPA, the people of Abyei are to decide in a 'popular consultation' whether the region is to remain administratively part of northern Sudan or whether it is to become part of southern Sudan.

Abyei is a hydrocarbon-rich area sandwiched between northern and southern Sudan. Both north and south Sudan therefore covet Abyei. At present the oil-rich enclave has special administrative status. Yet, its political status is untenable. South Sudan sees Abyei as an integral part of the region. Khartoum, in sharp contrast, firmly believes that it is northern territory.

Given the history of Abyei, it is hardly surprising that the brewing fight between the Dinka Ngok people and the Misseriya Arab tribesmen can only escalate in the coming months. It is a conflict that in turn will cast a long shadow of doubt over the peaceful coexistence of northern and southern Sudan. The Dinka Ngok people are strong supporters of the SPLM, while the Misseriya back the NCP of Al-Bashir.

The Misseriya militias are said to be armed to the teeth by the Sudanese armed forces and to have encroached on Dinka Ngok lands massacring defenceless villagers. The SPLM has threatened retaliation.

The Abyei crisis has moved online, with Dinka Ngok activists bringing down pro-Sudanese government sites and the Al-Bashir regime facing accusations of disrupting Facebook accounts sympathetic to the cause of Abyei joining southern Sudan.

The political future of Abyei hangs in the balance, and so does the future of other borderline areas that straddle the 1,500km faultline between northern and southern Sudan. Abyei is the barometer, but other equally combustible areas such as southern Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile could easily follow suit and turn into potential trouble spots that would mar the lessons learnt from the southern Sudanese referendum. The inhabitants of these areas are administratively governed as integral parts of northern Sudan, but it is clear that their political loyalties lie with their kith and kin in southern Sudan and with the SPLM.              

This article is reproduced from Al-Ahram Weekly (No. 1031, 13-19 January 2011).

*Third World Resurgence No. 245/246, January/February 2011, pp 47-49