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Info Service on Finance and Development (Apr08/02) IMF MAKES ONLY MARGINAL CHANGES IN ITS GOVERNANCE REFORM The shareholders of the IMF have squandered the political will for governance reform of the institution by making marginal changes that will fail to shift the balance of power. Last month, the IMF’s Executive Board approved a resolution on a package of reforms that has been sent to the Fund’s Board of Governors, its political governing body, for approval. The Board of Governors still must agree to the deal within 30 days. In
the final vote on 28 March, the Russian, Saudi Arabian, and Iranian-led
constituencies all opposed the deal while the Egyptian and Argentinean
Executive Directors abstained from the vote because of differences within
their constituencies. And because it alters the IMF’s Articles of Agreement,
it must also be ratified by legislatures in some member states, like
the The total increase for developing countries is only 1.6 percentage points, meaning that rich countries, representing about 15% of the membership of the IMF, will continue to wield nearly 60% of the voting rights at the institution. Part of the problem is that the quota reform is being discussed in isolation from other elements of governance reform. Below
is an analysis by Peter Chowla from the Bretton Woods Project in With
best wishes IMF Makes Only Marginal Changes in Its Governance Reform By
Peter Chowla, The shareholders of the IMF have squandered the political will for governance reform of the institution by making marginal changes that will fail to shift the balance of power. Last month, the IMF’s Executive Board approved a resolution on a package of reforms that has been sent to the Fund’s Board of Governors, its political governing body, for approval. The Board of Governors still must agree to the deal within 30 days. In the final vote on 28 March, the Russian, Saudi Arabian, and Iranian-led constituencies all opposed the deal while the Egyptian and Argentinean Executive Directors abstained from the vote because of differences within their constituencies. And
because it alters the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, it must also be ratified
by legislatures in some member states, like the The
Fund’s members have been debating how to revamp the formula that sets
voting rights at the institution for more than two years. Much of the
rancour has been directed at The total increase for developing countries is only 1.6 percentage points, meaning that rich countries, representing about 15% of the membership of the IMF, will continue to wield nearly 60% of the voting rights at the institution The final quota formula included the use of GDP measured at purchasing power parity (PPP), a key demand of developing countries, as part of the increase of the weight of GDP in the formula to 50%. But PPP-weighted GDP will only make up 40% of the new GDP measure, with the balance continuing to use GDP weighted by market exchange rates. Additionally, the use of PPP in the formula has only been approved for 20 years, after which it must be reassessed. The new formula continues to give a 30% weight to trade openness, which the G24 group of developing countries has repeatedly called flawed because it is highly correlated with GDP and it tends to favour small rich countries with lots of trade. The balance of the formula is made up of 15% variability and 5% international reserves. The variability factor, which measures the volatility of trade and investment flows, has also been highly criticised by the G24 because it is not scaled by the size of the economy. A small compression factor of 0.95 has been introduced as a mechanism to shrink the dispersion in calculated quotas, as it will slightly increase the quotas of the smallest countries and slightly shrink the quotas of the largest. The total size of quotas will be increased by about 9.5% in this round of share increases, with only the new shares being distributed along the lines of the new formula and several mechanisms being used to determine which countries are eligible for more shares. This
increase brings the total increase in quota for the reform process to
11.5%, as some increases were handed out to However, if the entire quota were adjusted to the new formula automatically, it would actually shift voting weight to rich countries at the expense of middle- and low-income ones, a problem identified as early as 2006. The new formula gives advanced economies over 67% of the quotas. To achieve the committed goal of increasing the voting weight of developing countries, several additional one-off measures had to be taken to adjust the outcome. Fiddling with basic votes Basic votes, which are given in a set amount to every member of the IMF, are set to treble from 250 to 750 votes and henceforth be indexed to the overall level of quota. However, though basic votes are set at 2.1% of the total now, they will only go up to 5.5% of the total after the deal, as the quota increase has further diluted the strength of basic votes. The 5.5% level for basic votes is still far below their original level at the founding of the IMF of close to 12% or their highest level of almost 16%. The
compromise actually runs against the spirit of the The
The
In the final bargaining, Washington-based official sources told the Bretton Woods Project that they accepted remaining at their slightly lower current quota share, called the post-Singapore level, but that in return they expected all the other countries on the board to not publicly complain about the final compromise. This attempt to silence the losers from the deal seems to have worked as there has been little official negative reaction despite the marginal nature of the change. One of the few officials willing to comment was the director of the South Centre, a Geneva-based inter-governmental think tank for developing countries, Yash Tandon. He said that the proposed changes “while positive in recognising the need for such changes, do not however go far enough to remedy the governance imbalance in the IMF”. “What is being proposed is too little and preserves developed-country control over the IMF. To be genuinely about sharing governance power in terms of votes, the increase should be much more substantial. “Genuine IMF governance reform will not occur simply through marginal increases of voting rights. The real issue is how developing countries can have a stronger voice’ in IMF governance and actually shaping how the institution is run. This means that other aspects of IMF governance must also be dealt with, for example, enhancing developing- country collective action and voice in the IMF by making the constituency system more representative and strengthening the multilateral and developing-country institutions that support them.” The Indian Executive Director at the IMF, Adarsh Kishore, was willing to talk to the news agency Reuters, which reported his comments just before the deal was agreed: “We’re not happy about the proposal because it falls short of what we had expected, hoped for and we had strived for. “We had two choices: some forward movement; the other is no movement at all. It has to be seen against a very real threat that unless we have real movement now, then we are in a real danger of eroding whatever is left of our legitimacy, obviously it is not entirely satisfactory, obviously, we are not gung-ho about it, but we do see some forward movement”. Ralph Bryant, a scholar at the Washington-based Brookings Institution, called the compromise pallid and inadequate: “The image to have in mind is that of a decades-old building in need of major repairs and renovation. The plumbing is ancient and badly needs updating. The roof is leaking in places. Termites have been found in the support joists in the basement. What steps are being recommended to renovate the building? What is on offer is, essentially, a fresh coat of paint in the entrance hallway and the fixing of some broken glass panes in the windows facing the street.” Bryant was one of a number of well-known US-based academics that wrote to the IMF board in advance of the final vote, urging them to reject the deal. The letter - also signed by Nancy Birdsall of the Centre for Global Development; Colin Bradford, Homi Karas, and Johannes Linn of the Brookings Institution; Ted Truman and John Williamson of the Peterson Institute for International Economics; and Jo Marie Griesgraber of the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition - said “the proposed reforms fall far short in addressing the challenges facing the IMF in its evolution toward a truly global institution with more balanced and inclusive representation and voting power”. Truman,
a former US Treasury official and fellow at the Observers
have been surprised that the deal is going through at all. News reports
in mid-March indicated opposition from some emerging markets who stand
to lose out on the deal, notably, IMF board chairs from It seems that most developing countries think that this is the best deal that they could get at this time so have resigned themselves to the minor changes. Bryant would prefer that the developing countries showed a bit more vocal opposition, saying in a G24 technical paper: “For the short run, nothing’ is a better gamble than an inadequate something’”. Board reform still off the table Part of the problem is that the quota reform is being discussed in isolation from other elements of governance reform. While European government may not like it, their dominance of the board is becoming a hot political issue. But officially, the quota reform was agreed without any compromise on the issue of board representation. In a February speech in Washington, US Treasury undersecretary for international affairs David McCormick fired a shot across the bow of the Europeans: “The executive board is simply too large, too inefficient, too costly, and too unrepresentative of the world in which we live ... For this reason, we call on other nations to work with us to reduce the number of chairs in the IMF board from 24 to 22 seats in 2010, and to 20 seats in 2012. “In doing so, the number of developing and emerging market country chairs should be preserved. To allow for greater voice of emerging markets and low-income countries, we also advocate an amendment to the Articles so that all executive board members are elected,’ abolishing the current practice of appointed seats’ for the five largest shareholders.” Without
mentioning These
American voices are not alone, as civil society organisations across
Europe have been pressing this point both in their capitals and with
European Union (EU) institutions in The European Parliament concurred in 2006 and now the EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Joaquin Almunia, the closest the EU has to a finance minister for the 27 EU member states, gave a speech in January recognising the need for faster movement. “Achieving a single euro area chair in international fora has so far been considered an objective for the longer term. But the world is moving faster and we need to reconsider our timetable. The first step is to work for greater coordination and dialogue within the Eurogroup and between institutions in order to better form common positions on external issues, but we cannot avoid pressing member states to move forward on this issue. I will come in the spring with more specific proposals on all of these areas when I present the report on ten years of the European Monetary Unit for the anniversary in May”. But Almunia’s timetable for actual change, measured in years not months, is too timid for many observers. Truman
speculated on why Europeans have been so reticent to embrace reform:
“First, the larger countries in Europe, which want to preserve their
relative positions in the IMF pecking order, are in an unholy alliance
with the smaller countries in A few other governance issues have yet to be sorted out. African Executive Directors were promised more than one Alternate Director, thereby increasing the capacity of their offices to handle large work loads. But the IMF’s budget freeze means that this will likely be offset by fewer advisor posts in the African EDs’ offices. Tommaso
Paddoa-Schioppa, the former Italian finance minister, recently resigned
from the post of chair of the International Monetary and Finance Committee
(IMFC), in the wake of his government’s collapse in Finally, the delay of a review of the Fund’s transparency policy has rankled civil society. Since IMF managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn took over in November, he launched five internal working groups and ten internal task forces, but has given no indication that they will consult with external stakeholders or even publish their final reports publicly. This has prompted a group of 17 organisations from 10 countries to write to Strauss-Kahn to complain of being shut out of the process of Fund reform. * Peter Chowla, who contributed
this article, is a policy and advocacy officer with the Bretton Woods
Project, an NGO monitoring the World Bank and IMF in
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