

ADP: Developed countries can close 'emissions gap' by raising pledges

Bonn, June 8 (Alejandro Raza) – Two “roundtable” sessions under workstream 2 (WS2) of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) were held on the 5th of June, titled “Building a practical and results-oriented approach to increasing pre-2020 ambition.”

The sessions were chaired jointly by Mr Jayant Mauskar of India and Mr Harald Dovland of Norway and included a presentation from Dr. Joseph Alamo of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), who also took questions.

Developing countries, such as **Mali, Kenya, South Africa, China, and India** highlighted that developed countries could “close the gap” by moving to at least 40% emission reductions on 1990 levels by 2020 and emphasized that this should occur under the Kyoto Protocol second commitment period (CP2) and a comparable process for non-Kyoto developed country Parties under the Convention. They said this was because developing countries were already proposing more in their mitigation pledges than developed countries. They highlighted that the provision of finance, technology, capacity building and the operationalising of the GCF would also attract more, and more ambitious, actions in developing countries. The **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** continued to elaborate on its proposal for structured and focused work on mitigation opportunities in the renewable energy and energy efficiency sector.

Developed countries, particularly the **European Union (EU)**, indicated it would be a technical process to review conditions on current pledges and wanted to focus on the treatment of Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and other “international cooperative initiatives.”

Co-Chair Mauskar began the session by noting that it was held on World Environment Day, calling on Parties to advance ‘concrete’ outcomes. He noted there would be further workshops and that the focus of Saturday’s session (June 8) would be finance, technology and capacity building.

Dr. Joseph Alamo (UNEP) presented the “gap” reports, which suggested global emissions pathways in order to limit warming to 2C. The ‘gap’ is how far projected emissions are from this pathway. He suggested that emissions would need to peak by 2020, be 23% lower than today in 2030 and 56% lower in 2050 to meet the median-pathways to limit warming to 2C. [He did not state the probabilities related to these pathways]. He said current 2020 targets suggested there was a gap of between 8 and 14 gigatonnes of CO₂e emissions from a 2C emission pathway (which required global emissions to be at 44Gt in 2020). He noted that a failure to meet the gap and limit warming to 2C would require much greater adaptation efforts. He also outlined the 17Gt of mitigation potential that UNEP had identified, focused on particular sectors such as transportation, buildings, and forestry. He said each showed there were significant co-benefits to taking mitigation actions. He warned that failing to take action now would “lock-in” inefficient buildings, power plants and buildings. He concluded that stringent emission reductions “could not wait” until 2020 and that the priorities of Parties should be to tighten rules, move to their high pledges and realize mitigation potential in line with national and local priorities.

Dr. Alamo was asked about the mitigation potential of “urban planning” by **Nauru on behalf of AOSIS** and he replied that cities in

general used fewer emissions but had not been explicitly considered by UNEP.

China asked several inter-related questions on the fact that a specific time-point target (such as 44Gt in 2020) obscured the stock of emissions and that the cumulative concentration of emissions needed to be considered otherwise people would be “looking at the tree rather than the forest.” It also asked if the sectoral roadmap considered the social-economic implications of mitigation in particular sectors or places. It said that having the technology was not enough as “technology does not take action, stakeholders do”, and asked if thought had been given to how to close the ‘gap’ in Annex 1 pledges, which were below the 25-40% range it said as recommended by the IPCC. It noted that independent analysis suggested that if Annex 1 targets were 40% the ‘gap’ identified by UNEP would be closed.

Venezuela asked if there was potential for shifting consumption patterns and who should lead on that.

The **EU** asked about whether the “tidying up” of rules at the Doha conference had an impact on the ‘gap.’

Dr. Alcamo responded that although cumulative emissions were important as there was a long-term impact and a ‘legacy effect’ with emissions from the past causing warming now, that did not change the fact that there was a ‘gap’ to be closed. He said that scientists could not say “why, when, how” specifically for emission reduction policies, but said that UNEP supported a holistic approach, with policies forming a part of the ‘green economy.’ On consumption he suggested that the assumptions relating to the building sector and consumption related to energy intensive appliances were relevant. He said there were still questions relating to the ‘rules’, particularly what it meant that surplus emissions were carried over into CP 2 of Kyoto and that Parties without Kyoto commitments had few land use and land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) rules. He did not address China’s question of whether Annex 1 moving to 40% reductions would ‘close the gap.’

Bangladesh asked about how to engage political will and the private sector.

Brazil described its success in managing deforestation policies leading to a 83% decrease in deforestation rates since 2004. It said it had increased crop production by 28% but only

increased the land area used by 5%. It said this was an example of developing countries taking the lead and bridging the ‘gap’ and so it expected those with historical responsibility and better “ways and means to assume their role as leaders.”

Kenya asked what the implications for adaptation were under different scenarios and encouraged UNEP to undertake such analysis. It said that “even if we stopped missions today we would still have high level of adaptation requirements” and that UNEP should consider this.

Slovenia asked about problems with stakeholders and mobilizing finance for policy responses in the transport sector.

Saudi Arabia was surprised that the sector with the highest potential listed in the UNEP report was agriculture (higher than transport or forestry) and so asked what options were available to respond to agriculture.

China offered to share a copy of its analysis of how increasing A1 pledges could close the gap and hoped the secretariat would put it on the website.

Dr. Alcamo responded that 2C of warming would be 3-4C in the Arctic and Argentina and would lead to more flooding globally. He noted that more intense changes would occur with higher temperature rises and that keeping rises as low as possible would save money and lives. He said it was clear that higher temperature would have higher adaptation costs. He noted Brazil’s experiences as an example of how mitigation policies provided ‘multiple benefits.’ On agriculture he said the range of potential was 1.5Gt-4Gt for mitigation because of the relationship between agricultural development and fertilizer dependent on nitrous oxide emissions. He said the aim was to replace the amount of kilograms of fertilizer used per hectare to get the same yield with lower emissions. On transport he encouraged Slovenia to join various international initiatives and alliances for clean fuels and vehicles and for sustainable cities.

China asked a follow up question on the importance of understanding the drivers of different trajectories. It said the ‘gap’ reached across mitigation and connected to finance and adaptation levels and called for the closing of the ‘gap’ in all respects. It reiterated that assessments

showed that by removing conditions and moving to high end of pledges the gap got smaller and that by Annex 1 Parties moving to 40% of their 1990 levels, the gap closed.

Dr. Alcamo said it was important to increase well-being while addressing energy and food as drivers of emissions. He said it raised the question of ‘what style of development’ Parties were interested in and that they should ‘pay attention’ to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) arising out of the Rio+20 process. He again did not address China’s question as to the effect on the ‘gap’ of Annex 1 Parties adopting 40% reductions as proposed by the IPCC.

The **Co-chairs** then invited selected parties to present ‘ice-breakers’ to start the broader session.

Nauru on behalf of AOSIS presented a slide to outline how it envisaged a ‘different way of working’ that was more results orientated and ‘realized urgency.’ It said the ‘window for enhancing short-term mitigation is closing and that will put 1.5C beyond reach.’ It said the workstream should find specific mitigation solutions and then deploy them to build confidence for Parties to remove conditions on their targets or to propose new actions to be supported by the provision of the means of implementation. It said that its slide showed larger responsibility for Annex 1 Parties and called on them to identify untapped mitigation potential and a greater provision of finance, technology and capacity building. It asked for non-Annex 1 Parties to identify development priorities that aligned with ‘climate solutions.’ It said none of the actions would be prescriptive for developing countries and called for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to play a role in delivering the means of implementation.

The **EU** said it knew Parties were falling short and thanked the Secretariat for preparing a technical paper on mitigation options. It said Parties should look at barriers to prevent action such as the ‘high cost of capital.’ It said the three priority areas should be: ‘new pledges’, that it hoped would be submitted by COP 19 in Warsaw; ‘increasing ambition’ of existing pledges by ‘adding new sectors’ or ‘actions’ or increasing to the higher end if ‘the conditions are right’, which for the EU is 30%; and ‘initiatives in other areas’, such as on HFCs. It said it agreed with the part of the AOSIS proposal that involved bringing in ‘experts’ and reminded Parties that ‘workstream 2 will not end in Warsaw’ and so

asked ‘how do we take it forward?’ It said the UN Secretary-General’s summit should be considered an opportunity to secure ‘high-level political direction.’

Indonesia said that common challenges such as barriers to finance, technology transfer and capacity showed a ‘need to engage stakeholders.’ It said that this was ‘connected and not separate’ from ambitious mitigation action. It suggested that the workstream should consolidate technical information and engage experts. It noted the link between international and national actions and said it was imperative to have in place a genuine commitment. It said that developing countries were ready to do their part but were waiting for action from developed countries. In following up the UNEP presentation it suggested that the workstream could consider: how the proposed scenarios in UNEP could be differentiated among Parties with respect to CBDR and developed countries taking the lead; what timeframe was necessary to take the actions to meet the targets; and the links across the pre and post 2020 streams of work.

Iran’s presentation highlighted that tools exist to increase ambition but that ‘the problem is implementation.’ It outlined how to increase pre-2020 ambition based on the Convention including: under Article 2 (its objective) and Article 4 (7) and via the principles of the Convention with CBDR; and by acknowledging the historical responsibility of the Parties because the economic and emissions conditions have “not substantially changed” since 1992. It said action on mitigation in developing countries will not be feasible if there is no technology, finance and capacity building. It said that the means of implementation, from public sources, with concrete provision should be a part of a ‘new agreement.’ It said the key was for developed countries to clarify their commitments and increase them.

India highlighted that there cannot be a shifting of responsibility from Annex 1 to non-Annex 1 Parties and that work in workstream 2 was under the principles of the Convention, including CBDR. This meant that ‘practical and result-oriented’ approaches supported the primary approach, which is for Annex 1 Parties to meet their commitments in order to enhance action, and not solely on mitigation. It said that If Annex 1 Parties increased their pledges to 40%, as required by science, the gap would be closed

as developing countries have already pledged more action, as reports from the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) show. This ambition needs to be locked in to a ratified CP 2. It suggested that the ‘discussion of options’ had only arrived because basic commitments have not been met, as demanded by convention and science. It reminded Parties that “maximum results” could be achieved with respect to the ‘gap’ if Annex 1 Parties ratcheted up their targets.

On the means of implementation, India said it was “obvious that highest priority should accord to it” but called on Parties to use the words the ‘provision of finance’. It noted that the common wording was ‘new and additional’, which had shifted to “adequate and predictable” but Parties now used ‘enablement’, ‘enhancement’, ‘investment’, which are terms that are hard to understand. It reaffirmed that it wanted the provision of finance, as per the Cancun decision, which says, “scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding shall be provided to developing country Parties.” India said that despite that agreement now, “when we are discussing this we are hesitating to use the words ‘provision of finance’”; it concluded that “we don’t need new language, we need new finance.”

On technology transfer, India said that this was one of the most challenging areas for developing countries and that flexibilities in the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime were needed. It said that patents based on low scientific thresholds were limiting competition and deployment. It suggested concessional technology acquisition and transfer and called for Parties to look at innovative approaches to issues like the long-term payment for royalties, such as through the Convention’s financial mechanisms.

On sectoral approaches it expressed regret that Parties “did away with the entire draft text” from Doha but noted that many were outside of the UNFCCC, and so it would cause a problem to count them as a part of the UNFCCC. It reiterated that unilateral action and measures have no place in the global response to climate change and that national priorities and actions should not be restricted.

On HFCs, India pointed out that they are non-ozone-depleting, and therefore their emissions are controlled under UNFCCC and Kyoto and not the Montreal Protocol. It said that HFCs

emerged as the main option after the phase out of Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) and that they are used widely in developing countries. It said that due to the phase out of HCFCs, only HFCs were left. It said there was no case to legally shift the issue to Montreal, and did not understand the anxiety to send the issue there. It likened the situation to saying: ‘I love you very much but you have no place in my house.’ It continued that as the UNFCCC works under CBDR but it was not clear that Montreal Protocol does; developing countries would have to take targets in that forum. It concluded that non-HFC alternatives are limited and these technologies are only in developed countries and so there’s a good business in selling these technologies to developing countries. It urged Parties that wanted to work on HFCs to “work on them here.”

On agriculture, India argued that a focus on mitigation in that sector completely ignored the reality that in developing countries millions are dependent on agriculture for life and livelihoods and undertake subsistence agriculture, not commercial, on small plots. So while it’s important to take action in agriculture it’s important to remember we’re dealing with a human being not a building or a city – so we have to be extremely careful on how we discuss it. Otherwise it will be a travesty of justice.

On energy, India highlighted Article 4.8 of the Convention, which talks about countries that are highly dependent on income from fossil fuels having difficulty switching, and so they are vulnerable Parties. It said we need to discuss these parties and to help them, but not to capture them in a net as if to say “I know you are vulnerable so I’m going to catch you”; if they are vulnerable we should take care of the vulnerabilities and not make them an object of sanctions, it added.

India concluded that despite all the constraints faced by developing countries, they were still doing more than developed countries and so the action lies with developed countries, who need to take the lead in the process. It will not accept a shifting of the burden.

Cuba said it was ‘time for political will to be shown’ and that it was ‘fundamental’ that action to increase ambition pre-2020 was guided by the Convention and its principles, particularly equity. It said that the first increase in pre-2020 ambition should be achieved through the

implementation of CP 2 or through its immediate ratification with increased targets. It said this should be accompanied by an increase in mitigation ambition targets in a comparable manner by those not under Kyoto. It said this should be followed by a ‘comprehensive’ approach to concrete actions on mitigation, finance, technology and adaptation. The support for these needed to be measured, reported and verified (MRV). With respect to mitigation it saw three priorities: recognition of historical responsibility and the need for leadership by developed countries; the priority of eradicating poverty; and the need for the means of implementation. It said a clear roadmap for finance to deliver the USD 100 billion in 2020 was ‘crucial.’

Co-chair Dovland noted that not only Annex 1 Parties were needed to ratify the Kyoto amendment but that about 144 countries were required for it to enter into force.

Nepal, on behalf of LDCs, said the three priorities of work should be the means of implementation, international cooperative initiatives and ‘building momentum.’ It said that enhanced means of implementation is fundamental to increase and step up action. It said that the GCF will be a key pillar of the new regime and that its full operationalisation was essential to pre-2020 action. It noted that it requires early and adequate replenishment and that it should ensure benefits to the most vulnerable countries. It said that international cooperative initiatives could not replace midterm or long-term objectives necessary to keep warming below 1.5C by the end of the century but could play a complementary role and alleviate concerns that increased national efforts were not possible. It said that ‘joint targets for renewable energy generation’ would send important signals. It also highlighted that the 2014 review under the KP was a ‘crucial’ way to engage political players and build momentum. It said that the release of the IPCC’s AR5 should give indicators of the relevant targets to connect with a pathway for a 1.5C warming target.

Switzerland agreed that the workstream could not shift the burden from Annex 1 to non-Annex 1 and that the work was under the Convention including all of its principles such as precaution, cost-effectiveness and CBDR. It said CBDR is not about running away from responsibilities but about common

responsibilities, differentiated by reflecting respective capabilities. It said only looking at past emissions was flawed as “we cannot undo them” and future emissions are the only thing we can stop. It also said that Switzerland never had a carbon intensive past due to the use of hydro and that as it asserted, it did not have much of a share of the past emissions that could be a way for not to doing much in the future, but that would be “wrong.” It said that blaming each other was not the right atmosphere to go forward. It also said that trying to “artificially create a divide” was an unwelcome element, for example on agriculture – it said it was not a proposal by developed countries but by developing countries such as those in the African Group. It also recognized that agriculture was about adaptation. On HFCs it argued that as an ODS substitute there was a clear link to Montreal and that the financial mechanism under the Protocol would make a strong link between finance and new obligations. It said HFCs could not be moved to Montreal without also moving finance and this was a clear understanding for Switzerland. It wanted more time to consider Nauru’s proposal but said it should focus on sectors not “in” Annex 1 or non-Annex 1 that need intervention. It said new pledges by Parties were important and there was potential increase pledges but that would “require a close technical look.”

Kenya emphasized that opportunities to reduce emissions were there but the global discussion, as indicated by Cuba, must be guided by principles, particularly the leadership of developed countries. This could be demonstrated by the enhancement of pledges and the removal of conditionalities to give a positive signal. It noted that many developing countries already had strategies and proposals but without clarity on whether there would be means to implement there was little incentive to submit more. Therefore the capitalization of the GCF should be a priority. It called for clarity on how issues outside of the UNFCCC would make a contribution and to see that they were voluntary. It concluded that a political process was necessary to help leaders understand the importance.

Australia said it was important focus on co-benefits and not just costs of action. It said this was the groundwork for 2020 and the 2C goal as decisions taken now would lock in infrastructure.

It said it was necessary to work inventory and MRV to feel confident Parties were committing to action. It said there was value in translating action into pledges and encouraged “20 of the world’s top 50 emitters” to do so. It said workstream 2 should engage at the political level including with Ministers at Warsaw.

South Africa said that leadership from developed countries was essential and that given pledges from developed countries were lower than those of developing countries, there was a need to raise pledges. This was true for Kyoto Parties and comparable efforts were necessary from non-Kyoto developed country Parties. It said that the provision of means of implementation was ‘equally important’ and that developed countries needed to commit explicitly as to how the \$100 billion by 2020 target would be reached. It suggested that \$60 billion by 2015 was a robust target. It emphasized that international cooperative initiatives were supplementary to domestic action and so accounting rules were necessary to prevent double-counting. It then proposed a range of actions, which with the provision of the means of implementation, would meet the mandate agreed in Durban. These include: phasing out fossil fuel subsidies in developed countries; enhanced capacity building to allow for the creation of more nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), national adaptation plans (NAPs) and national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs); addressing of the ambition gap; integrating climate change and risk management; identifying sectors around which developed countries could fund ‘flagship’ projects; engaging stakeholders in cities and for technology; and including women and youth in climate action.

Mexico said that developed countries should maintain leadership but that developing countries should take on effort within their respective capabilities. It agreed with the AOSIS proposal of engaging stakeholders. It said there was also value in initiatives outside of the UNCCCC – such as on black carbon or HFCs. It said it had initiated procedures to ratify to the Kyoto amendment and would be in a position to do so by September.

The **United States** said it wanted to enhance action without division but also by looking at the low-cost objective. It said grounded and technical discussions would identify

opportunities. It said it would continue to work with the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to draw attention to non-CO2 gases and the Major Economies Forum to look at the building sector. It supported South Africa’s inclusion of the ‘role of cities’ and suggested a ‘high profile event with Ministers and Mayors.’ It said it supported ministerial discussions ‘on the broad topic of mitigation ambition.’

Co-Chair Dovland said that the incoming co-chairs would be informed of the need for workshops on industry and urban-areas, including transportation.

Norway said it was important for Parties to step up individually and collectively but did not think new mitigation pledges or binding commitments would be introduced under workstream 2. It encouraged AOSIS and the EU to collaborate on getting the ‘right experts’ into the discussion. It also suggested that briefing from the Technology Mechanism could be useful.

Mali associated with Cuba and India as their approach was focused and consistent with past decisions. It emphasized that the CP2 review process was important and a similar process should be decided for all developed country Parties under the Convention. It said that honouring past commitments such as on finance, support for the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), and the operationalisation of the GCF to ensure delivery of the \$100 billion annually would attract new and ambitious NAMAs. It said that international cooperative initiatives needed to be in line with the Convention, with clear assumptions and accounting including on gases covered and expected outcomes to prevent double-counting. It agreed cities were important but questioned how they could be ‘captured’ given they are already reflected in national inventories. It reacted positively to the AOSIS proposal, noting that renewable energy could deliver 1.5-25 Gt. It concluded that a missing element was a concrete financial mechanism as UNEP suggested the cost of abatement was \$50-100 but the certified emission reductions (CERs) were at 20-30 cents and so a feed-in tariff with the price of carbon at \$10 could be one approach, if worked on collaboratively would enhance action that all parties want.

Saudi Arabia said that the actions must be conducive to sustainable development and should not shift the burden to developing

countries. It said the workshops had shown there were many sectors with great potential, with agriculture having the highest and so proposed a workshop to discuss this. It also noted that sectors such as agriculture and energy “touch on lives” and development in different ways. In this regard, it said, using the word ‘transformation’ is very dangerous and provocative. Whenever we discuss these sectors, it said, Parties need to look at the sustainable development of and not hamper people’s needs. It said the approach should be to encourage access of people to these sectors and not limit it. It concluded that the approach needed to be comprehensive in considering all gases, such as methane, nitrogen oxide and others as well as all sources, sinks and reservoirs as described in the Convention.

Co-Chair Dovland provided a “personal concluding remark” that Parties could close the ‘gap’ if they wanted to do so, but he could not understand how they could close the gap if they continued the way they have been working for year upon year. He urged them, as a personal remark, “to start stepping out of old positions.”