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Antalya Climate News Update No. 5 DEVELOPING NATIONS BACK TWO-TIER JUST TRANSITION MECHANISM STRUCTURE Antalya, Nov 12 (Hilary Kung) – “The [Just Transition] mechanism [JTM] should combine a Party-driven policy tier with a technical and implementation-support tier,” said the Group of 77 and China at the first day of the contact group of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) held on Nov 10 during the ongoing Antalya climate talks. The G77 call for a two-tier governance structure for the JTM, featuring a policy tier and an implementation-support tier, was also strongly echoed by developing country sub-groups. The just transition (JT) contact group is Co-Chaired by Federica Fricano (Italy) and Joseph Teo (Singapore). The Co-Chairs proposed to start negotiations with the operationalisation of the JTM, followed by the review of the JTWP, and then on implementation of the JTWP, which is to agree on the key messages from the 5th and 6th JTWP dialogues. [See TWN Update 1 on ‘What to expect in Antalya’ on just transition.] On the other hand, developed countries, including Norway and Japan, called for leveraging existing constituted bodies and expert groups rather than establishing a new body. The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) deferred its position, saying that the proposal should be considered within the broader context of the JTM's overall functions and forms. The United Kingdom (UK) and Canada suggested expanding the role of the UNFCCC Secretariat, while the European Union (EU) emphasised that the JTM should provide the implementation dimension of the JT work, and that the political and implementation aspects should mutually reinforce each other. Additionally, several developed countries proposed that the JTM facilitate the integration of just transition considerations into sub-national and national climate policies, aligning them with the Paris Agreement (PA) implementation cycle, the Global Stocktake (GST), and the Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs). Egypt for the G77 and China outlined its expectations for the operationalisation of JTM in Antalya: Parties should agree on the mechanism's core functions and overall architecture, while mandating further work in 2027 to finalize detailed operational arrangements, including rules of procedure and arrangements for coordinating the support network, building on the agreed functions and architecture. As for the functions of the JTM, the group said that it should “support developing countries in planning and implementing nationally determined just transition pathways, reflecting national priorities and different national circumstances, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. Its work should be facilitative, demand-driven and implementation-focused, covering the full agreed scope of just transitions.” Elaborating further, it said that JTM should “strengthen international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing, including peer learning and exchanges of experience, and facilitate access to finance and technology”. Egypt also underscored that the support must respond to development gaps and structural constraints, including limited fiscal space and technology-access barriers, while fully respecting country ownership. Crucially, it stressed that facilitating support must complement, not substitute for, developed countries' obligations to provide means of implementation. The group proposed that the JTM should have a Party-driven policy tier and an implementation-support tier, with equitable and balanced Party representations. It said that these arrangements should enable countries to draw on real-world needs and experiences while facilitating targeted and practical assistance in response to developing country requests. Further, it said that the JTM should build on and complement the JTWP and relevant existing arrangements, while avoiding duplication and external conditionality. To ensure accountability and effective delivery, its activities and support must be reported annually for Party consideration, backed by adequate and predictable resources. The group called for a sustained momentum towards practical delivery of country-requested support and the effective implementation of the mechanism’s functions. Chile for the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) also called for a decision to establish a two-tier governance structure for JTM: a political tier and a support tier, while saying that it remains flexible on the naming of these tiers. In general, it expects the policy or political tier to provide oversight through the contact group, host annual dialogues, and guarantee compliance of the mandates of just transition. As for the support tier, it said it would have a secretariat unit and coordinate different bodies and address the purpose of the JTM as per para 25 of decision 2/CMA.7. Commenting on the review of the JTWP, it said the group sees JTM as the he “next phase” of the JTWP and there should be a “constructive institutional bridge” before the full operationalisation of the JTM. It is also of the view that the JTWP should continue for a maximum of 2 years until the functions and modalities of the JTM are fully operational. Once the JTM is fully operationalised, the current budget allocated to the JTWP could be reallocated to the two-tier structure to have predictable resources for its functioning. Voluntary and external financial contributions shall complement, and not substitute for, core budget resources. It also called for a decision to clarify on the timeline of the work in the coming years and also its near-term relationship with the JTWP. Ghana for the African Group noted that there is now more support for a two-tier governance structure on JTM. It then said that it has a document which incorporates inputs from various sub-groups and intends to forward it as a basis for discussion. It expects that the functions, architecture and timeline of the JTM will be decided at COP 31 and the JTM will be fully operationalised by the next CMA in Addis Ababa. Elaborating further on the architecture, it said that Parties should decide here that the JTM consist of two-tiers: a policy tier and a support tier. It also welcomed AILAC’s proposal that the “JTWP should not end without an operational JTM”. It emphasised supporting developing countries in adding value to domestic resources, participating in global supply chains, and assisting local industries and informal economy in meeting some of the international standards - preventing these criteria from becoming trade barriers, and the challenges and barriers from unilateral trade measures, saying that all these are not abstract but real and that support is needed. Reacting to a proposal by Norway, Ghana said that its proposal on integrating JT into constituted bodies is useful, but that is only one of the functions of the JTM. It added that “a just transition without means of implementation is not a just transition”, and that support must be provided by developed countries in accordance with Article 9.1 of the PA. (Article 9.1 of the PA obliges developed countries to provide financial resources to assist developing countries in mitigating and adapting to climate change) Fiji for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) also echoed the call for a two-tiers governance structure: a policy tier and a technical tier and provided further descriptions of the policy and technical tier, including a steering or advisory committee acting as a constituted body under the policy tier, which would develop a rolling 5-year workplan endorsed by the CMA. The representation should be equitable, including dedicated seats for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and open to civil society members to participate as observers. As for the technical tier, it would either be “a secretariat or host” and “draws on a network of relevant institutions, organizations, networks, technical experts, and civil society experts, including Indigenous Peoples, local communities and experts from the global South, acting on country requests. It would build on and complement existing arrangements, including the readiness support of the operating entities, without duplication, and report to the CMA”. AOSIS also proposed establishing links between JTM and other mechanisms including the existing financial mechanism. Ethiopia for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) said many of its proposals are aligned with the African Group, emphasising that the JTM should be implementation focussed and means of implementation must be central for the JTM. Commenting on the structural inequality in clean energy access, the LDCs said the design of JTM should respond to LDCs' specific needs in addressing poverty, energy-access gaps, high-debt burdens, limited fiscal space and institutional capacity. It also said that it finds value in renewing the JTWP here, as a forum for exchange and dialogue, which could help in parallel with some refinement after the operationalisation of the JTM. Saudi Arabia for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) also envisioned the development of a two-tier structure: a party-driven tier and a support tier. It views that the most effective way is that the mechanism be situated under the JTWP. Elaborating further, it said the functions under the party-driven tier would include steering the support tier workplan, sharing experience and good practices; while the support tier will include an advisory board to oversee the mechanism's network and support functions, and to submit an annual report of its activities for consideration by the Parties. Some of the functions mentioned by Saudi Arabia for the support tier include catalyzing demand-driven technical assistance, facilitating access to action and support (means of implementation) and addressing barriers, including climate related unilateral trade measures. It also clarified that the group does not support a JTM that provides guidance to other processes within the UNFCCC and outside bodies or entities (i.e. financial entities). Responding to other proposals by developed countries, Saudi Arabia said the JTM should not be linked to the PA implementation cycle, particularly where, doing so would create additional reporting burdens and top-down mandates, or create new requirements for preparation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and Biennial Transparency Reports for developing countries. Regarding the mention of the outcome of the mapping report to justify that there is no need for a constituted body or limit the role of JTM as merely coordinating, the LMDC said it “cannot accept that this document be used in the deliberations under the JTM, adding that based on decision 2/CMA.7, para 24, it was mandated as an input to the review of the JTWP. It also does not support any mandate on a state of just transition report, as just transitions are nationally driven, and based on national circumstances and priorities, and pathways of each country are included within their own NDCs and relevant reporting instruments. It then highlighted that in order to achieve the goals of the PA, developed countries should intensify their emission reduction efforts and achieve emissions neutrality well before 2050. Botswana for Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) also supported the two-tier structure of the JTM, and called for additional consideration and explicit recognition of the structural constraints faced by LLDCs. It also cautioned that not all dimensions of the just transitions can be turned into bankable projects. Qatar for the Arab Group also echoed the two-tier structure and cautioned against JTM being top-down prescriptive guidance. Norway proposed that para 25 of 2/CMA.7 should be the purpose and scope of JTM. As for the timeline, the term of JTM should be until 2036, with an initial 5-year period, followed by another 5-year period renewal subject to the review of its effectiveness, adding that the first review should be at the 69th session of the Subsidiary Bodies. On the institutional arrangement, it proposed that existing constituted bodies and expert groups be mandated to implement the functions of the JTM. It proposed that the Secretariat compile relevant work and inputs from respective bodies into an annual report, which would be considered by the contact group to provide further guidance, ensuring a Party-driven process. It also proposed global dialogues and high-level ministerial roundtables in the JTM. Under this proposal, the UNFCCC Secretariat would compile annual information for consideration by the contact group. Additionally, it highlighted the value of preparing a 'State of Just Transition' report to feed into the Global Stocktake (GST) process. Japan said that the “creation of new body is inappropriate from an efficiency and sustainable” point of view, and it is “ready to engage with each country to achieve nationally determined JT pathways”. It commented on the deteriorating backdrop of declining fiscal contributions and international organizations scaling back financing, saying that it is clearly unrealistic and unsustainable to create a new body without considering the budget implications. It also appreciated the 200-page long mapping report and noted that numerous initiatives and instruments already exist to promote just transition, both within and outside of the UN. It expects JTM will play a facilitative role. It also commented that the scope of the Mitigation Work Programme could include JT and its investment-focused event to unlock finance including for JT. Switzerland for the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) said that the essential outcome for its group is a JTM that supports a 1.5°C-aligned NDCs at national level, increase adaptation capacity, have a human rights approach and transition to low emissions that leave no one behind. It said that best available science and limiting warming to 1.5 C are central and the minimum outcome should be a common understanding on the function and timeline of the JTM. As for the two-tier governance and the future of the JTWP and JTM, it said it would defer to consider these in the broader context of the function and forms of JTM. It stressed that the JTM should provide practical support for and enable developing countries to develop or implement just transition pathways at the national and sub-national levels, enhancing climate action to align with the 1.5°C warming limit, and increasing capacity to adapt to climate change while strengthening international cooperation. The EIG also echoed the “non-prescriptive, facilitative and fully respecting nationally determined nature of the NDCs”, while emphasising that achieving highest possible ambition remains essential. As for finance for JT, the EIG said it “does not consider the JTM to operate as a finance [mechanism], while recognising finance as an enabler, mobilising existing [ones] will be more effective and efficient. [The JTM could help] Parties approach [different] sources of finance and encouraging just transition consideration into their project portfolio”. It then said that given the close linkage between JTM and JTWP, any decision on JTM should be closely linked to the future of the JTWP. The European Union (EU) said just transition is the enabler of ambitious 1.5°C aligned climate action and Parties should leave Antalya having agreed on what JTM will do and how it will do it. It then said that the high-level ministerial roundtable under the JTWP should be preserved, with more implementation and clearer link to the PA implementation cycle and GST. It sees that the JTM will provide the implementation dimension of the JT work, and that the political and implementation aspects should be mutually reinforced. Some of the proposed mutually-reinforcing functions include providing space for Parties to implement socially just inclusive NDC aligned with PA and efforts to limit 1.5C warming and provide relevant guidance to other workstreams under the PA; and facilitate integration of JT considerations into the design of climate policies and relevant sectoral implementation plans, in line with the PA implementation cycle, the BTR and the GST-cycle. As for the institutional arrangement, the EU proposed that the JTM should operate on a 5-year work plan with concrete output and timeline, in which the workplan should be informed by Parties and non-Party stakeholders and adopted at CMA9. Further, the EU proposed that the Secretariat should have a clear role in facilitating the various implementing actors, with a report process to CMA. The EU also commented on the mapping report released by the Secretariat, saying that the report demonstrated that there are experts already exist and that they should be invited to implement the activities in the workplan. It then proposed to organise annual global in-session high level inclusive space for exchange between Parties, and non-Party stakeholders. United Kingdom (UK) said that “JT is fundamentally about how we deliver climate ambition that leaves no one behind” and “they must centre limiting 1.5°C warming first, feature GST implementation” and “green industrialisation”. It also called for operationalisation of the JTM at this COP, and sees it as a complete package – the JTWP review, and a clear relationship with JTWP as the political element. The UK proposed that the JTM enhance implementation of nationally determined pathways, national policies and roadmap, provide recommendations to integrate JT into other bodies and work programmes. It also commented on the final mapping report, saying that it demonstrates ongoing work, knowledge, capacity building, technical support available, such as the NDC Partnership, International Labour Organisation (ILO), Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), etc and further emphasised the necessity of establishing a coordination unit to enhance coherence across existing initiatives. It then suggested that the Secretariat can play a critical role here. As for the institutional arrangement, it highlighted the need for coherence and operationalise JTM under the JTWP as a technical implementation hub. The lessons learned from JTM can be fed back into JTWP, it said further. Canada said Parties should agree on a single decision to conclude the JTWP review and to operationalise the JTM fully. It noted that Parties appreciate the space provided by the “JTWP contact group and the High-level Ministerial Roundtable on Just Transition”. With “a few tweaks”, Parties could reach a decision to connect the mechanism with the JTWP. It further observed that numerous Parties proposed the need for the JTM to play a coordination role, highlighting that the mapping exercise demonstrated that existing gaps stem from fragmented coordination rather than capacity issues. Elaborating further, Canada said the “secretariat could perform many of these functions”. It further proposed the establishment of an online repository and knowledge hub, requesting the Secretariat to compile relevant dialogue summaries and reports from constituted bodies that incorporate just transition elements. It said “experts are already here [and we just need] to connect them”.
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