TWN Info Service on Climate Change (Oct26/03)
28 October 2026
Third World Network

Suspended 65^th session of the IPCC to resume in December

Kathmandu, 28 Oct (Prerna Bomzan): The 65th session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC-65), held from 12 to 16 October in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was suspended by IPCC Chair Jim Skea (United Kingdom) after governments failed to reach consensus on the work plan of the Seventh Assessment Report (AR7), particularly the schedule for delivering the three Working Group reports underpinning it.

In a letter dated 26 October, the IPCC Secretariat, on behalf of the IPCC Chair, informed delegates to reserve 1-3 December 2026 for the resumed 65th session, which will be held virtually. The session will focus on the two agenda items that remained unresolved following the suspension of IPCC-65: the AR7 work plan and the IPCC Trust Fund Programme and Budget.  [The three WG reports of AR7 are: WG I report on ‘The Physical Science Basis’; WG II report on ‘Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’; and WG III on ‘Mitigation of Climate Change’.]

Although the AR7 timeline decision remained elusive yet again in Ethiopia, Chair Skea, in closing, acknowledged “positive achievements”, stating that the Panel has “made progress...we have identified four options”  on the timeline of the work plan, reflecting views of Panel members. The past sessions had been deadlocked faced with only “two options” proposed by the IPCC Co-Chairs.

Skea established a contact group, co-chaired by Pedro Ferraz da Silva (Brazil) and Frank McGovern (Ireland), only on the second day of the session. It was only on the penultimate day that the contact group engaged beyond its allotted time, leading to the emergence of seven options including bridging proposals, which eventually were reduced to four options as follows:

-          Option 1: WG I in May 2028; WG II in July 2028: WG III in September 2028.

-          Option 2 : WG I in May 2028; WG II in September 2028; WG III in February 2029.

-          Option 3:  WG I in May 2028; WG II in April 2029; WG III in July 2029.

-          Option 4. WG I in April 2028, WG II in July 2028; WG III in October 2028.

Given the obvious time crunch for arriving at any consensus decision, the session was suspended. (See details below).

[Since the last five sessions, the major bone of contention over the AR7 timeline is whether the three WG reports should be completed in 2028 to feed into the second global stocktake (GST-2) process under the Paris Agreement (PA), which will see an unprecedented compressed timeline of of less than 3 years, considering the selection of authors only in August 2025, with commencement of work on the reports and the conclusion of the technical phase of GST-2 in June 2028; or whether the three WG reports be produced at a reasonable pace over 2028 and 2029 without “politicising” climate science to align with the GST-2. (See P-60 TWN Update, P-61 TWN Update, P-62 TWN Update, P-63 TWN Update, P-64 TWN Update).

The GST is a process under Article 14 of the PA, to periodically assess the collective progress towards achieving the PA’s long-term goals, to be held every 5 years. The first GST (GST-1) concluded in 2023 at the UNFCCC’s 28^th Conference of Parties (COP28) in Dubai, UAE, while GST-2 is scheduled for COP 33 in 2028. GST-1 saw inputs from the IPCC’s  AR6.

According to the P-65 information document submitted by IPCC Interim Secretary Ko Barrett (United States) on behalf of Chair Skea, or the “Chair’s paper” which takes stock of the situation of the AR7 timeline conundrum to date, it is clear that there is no Panel consensus on the alignment of the IPCC’s assessment cycles with the GST. It mentioned that as early as P-46 in 2017 during the AR6 cycle, the Panel gave consideration to “mismatches” between IPCC assessment cycles and the 5-year GST intervals, and considered three options for alignment: shortening the assessment cycle to 5 years; lengthening the cycle to 10 years with interim 5-year updates; and maintaining the 7-year cycle and issuing targeted Special Reports for the GST. However, the task group established to look into the matter ultimately ended up “deadlocked” and could not recommend a “single unified path forward”.]

Evolution of seven options; narrowed down into four options

On the first day of P-65, Chair Skea made a presentation based on the information document  or the “Chair’s paper” which took stock of the AR7 timeline conundrum to date and which also contained three proposed options for the Panel’s consideration as follows:

-          Option 1 (proposed by the IPCC Co-Chairs at P-61): WG I in May 2028; WG II in June 2028; WG III in July-August 2028.

-          Option 2 (proposed by the IPCC Co-Chairs with slight revision at P-63): WG I in May 2028; WG II in July 2028: WG III in September 2028.

-          Option 3 (based on submissions made by Saudi Arabia and India, in response to the survey by Skea on the “criteria” for assessing timeline options): WG I in May 2028; WG II in April 2029; WG III in July 2029.

Skea made clear that the authority of the AR7 timeline “rests with the Panel” and that no option is perfect so “compromises are unavoidable”. He also informed about a new option proposed by Antigua and Barbuda, in response to the Chair’s survey: WG I in February 2028; WG II in March 2028; WG III in April 2028.

India noted the options paper and appreciated the Chair’s initiative, but underlined that the options would have served better without the labelling of particular ownership and that “this labelling is also unfair to governments which have expressed their preference to the elements of these options, without developing their opinions over all aspects”. It reiterated that its consideration of the timeline were “not mechanical or logistical but stemmed from profound concerns over the meaningful participation of developing countries’ scientific communities, and the need to ensure that the scientific work of these nations are appropriately represented”. India further said, “We have also maintained and emphasized that the IPCC’s work goes beyond narrow concerns of monitoring and evaluation of particular climate governance processes and rests on providing rigorous, accurate and robust scientific information for the global challenge of anthropogenic global warming. These were also recorded by several developing countries during the several plenaries we discussed the issue”. It pointed out that the options paper itself noted that calls made at P-61 to have all three WG reports published before June 2028 [conclusion of the GST-2 technical phase] no longer looked feasible.

Saudi Arabia while also appreciating the Chair’s initiative, voiced “serious concerns” regarding the “factual accuracy, transparency and procedural basis of the options” presented in the paper. It reaffirmed that the workplan and its assessment must be “firmly grounded in the rules governing IPCC work”, and questioned the “feasibility of compressed schedules” given concentrated approval sessions, overlapping reviews, competing UNFCCC commitments and limited government capacity that hampers inclusivity and full participation of developing countries at AR7. “We therefore support a schedule that retains WG I approval in May 2028, places WGs II and III in 2029 with sufficient spacing, adjusts adequate internal gaps, preserves substantive and inclusive government reviews, and minimizes overlaps with other international processes”. It also underscored that “we cannot have a workplan driven by the political priorities of a select group at the expense of equitable developing country participation and that the workplan must remain firmly anchored in the Panel’s agreed mandate, established procedures and collective decision-making authority”.

Russia also reiterated its principles of sufficient time for authors to prepare the final drafts and for review of the reports by both governments and experts, with no overlaps to harm the review. It stated that “Option 3 is the ideal one” to complete AR7 and argued that the risk of losing authors and outdated literature as indicated in the document would be “minimal” and unlikely to have a negative impact and hence, there was no need to dramatize the issue.

Kenya reaffirmed that fundamentally it has remained guided from the outset by certain “principles” and strongly believes that any timeline or detailed schedules the Panel adopts should be guided by the need to “ensure or enable adequate representation and inclusivity of developing countries” in the work of the IPCC. It highlighted important elements and “conditions” such as no overlapping government reviews, no back-to-back reviews, no clash with UNFCCC or the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) session, full review periods by governments running at least 8 weeks, no approval during an open government review, all of them stemming from the IPCC Principles (Appendix A).

China called for a “mature, authoritative AR7” and reiterated its principled approach of guaranteeing the quality of the report, effective participation of developing countries, balanced workload avoiding overlaps, reviews and clashes with the UNFCCC and SBs, sufficient time for comments and revisions. “We share the same goal of a timely and robust AR7”, it said, and suggested to focus on existing convergence of all three options.

Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Burundi, Tanzania, Algeria, Malaysia, Indonesia, Syria, Morocco, Belarus, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Libya, Cuba, Argentina, supported previous speakers demonstrating consistency of their positioning on a prinicipled approach as in the past sessions.

Although developed countries have supported all three WG reports in 2028 as vital inputs to the GST-2, Portugal supported for a longer timeline at P-65.

Divergence was also seen among the least developed countries (LDCs) with Burundi, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Guinea supporting a longer timeline, while, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Malawi, Benin, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Haiti, Mali, and Sierra Leone, backed the compressed timeline to feed into the GST-2. The Democratic Republic of Congo called for a realistic timeline while calling for deliverables for GST-2 and Zambia also stated about safeguards with no overlaps, no back-to-back reviews and for ensuring inclusivity, while supporting all three WG reports in 2028. Interestingly, Mozambique, also an LDC, provided a bridging proposal later of WGs I and II in 2028, while WG III in 2029, which is one of the four options that was eventually captured. (See below).

South Korea, Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Kiribati, Jamaica, Palau, Ukraine, Turkiye, Sri Lanka, Dominican Republic, Barbados, Singapore, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, were also vocal for all three WG reports to be produced in 2028 to feed into the GST-2, while Brazil albeit supporting the GST-2 timeline, also urged moving towards a negotiated solution.

On the second day, Skea established the contact group co-chaired by Ferraz da Silva and McGovern, “to agree a schedule of work for the delivery” of AR7 WG reports. It was given a “mandate to propose and consider arrangements, such as avenues for providing inputs to the UNFCCC or recommendations for enhanced developing country inclusion and participation, that enable the Panel to reach consensus on this matter”.

On the issue of “inclusivity”, those supportive of a longer timeline anchored their arguments taking a principled approach based on key elements, such as inclusion of global South literature and meaningful inclusion in terms of developing country participation in the expert and government reviews with no overlaps, no back-to-back reviews and approval sessions,  also adhering to the IPCC Principles (Appendix A). Meanwhile, the proponents of a compressed timeline, posed the issue of inclusivity primarily based on “additional” developing country participation.

On the penultimate day, late into the night at the contact group, “seven” options emerged reflecting various views including bridging proposals, which were captured in a conference room paper (CRP) in the form of a “non-paper” prepared by the Co-Chairs Ferraz da Silva and McGovern under “their own responsibility”, aiming to provide a starting point for discussion among Panel members with a view to enabling the Panel to “reach consensus” on the matter.

The seven options were as follows:

1. Option A (by Antigua and Barbuda): WG I in February 2028; WG II in March 2028; WG III in April 2028.

2. Option B (Option 2 of Chair’s paper; proposed by the IPCC Co-Chairs with slight revision at P-63): WG I in May 2028; WG II in July 2028: WG III in September 2028.

3. Option C (bridging proposal by Mozambique): WG I in May 2028; WG II in September 2028; WG III in February 2029.

4. Option D (by Iceland): WG I in February 2029; WG II in May 2028; WG III in September 2028.

5. Option E (by China): WG I in September 2028; WG II in March 2029; WG III in April 2029.

6. Option F (Option 3 of Chair’s paper; based on submissions made by Saudi Arabia and India): WG I in May 2028; WG II in April 2029; WG III in July 2029.

7. Option G (Option 1 of Chair’s paper; proposed by the IPCC Co-Chairs at P-61): WG I in May 2028; WG II in June 2028; WG III in July-August 2028.

When members started to respond with merging or dropping of options, India and Saudi Arabia urged for a detailed analysis of the options, and eventually Co-Chair McGovern informed that they have spoken to the WG Co-Chairs for such an analysis, which was brought to the contact group the next final day only in the afternoon. It still lacked the factoring in of back-to-back reviews which has been an important concern of those who have argued for a longer timeline.

Next, Haiti proposed to merge Option B and Option C, with WG I in April 2028, WG II in July 2028 and WG III in October 2028, which was supported by developed countries as a “compromise” and also backed by Panama, Timor-Leste, Singapore and Gautemala. India noted that references to a “compromise” were inappropriate, when the countries concerned were trying to dispose off other member’s options while keeping their own options intact.

Mozambique [the proponent of Option C], opposed the merging proposal by Haiti, stating that its proposal was based on “principles”. Option C was also supported by Kenya, Chad, Algeria, Burundi, and Zimbabwe, as a bridging proposal.

Eventually, Co-Chair Ferraz da Silva appealed for support of having some options agreed in the contact group to bring them to the plenary, and suggested the “four” options, which were then brought to the plenary for further discussion.

Unexpected turn of events

However, an unexpected turn of events took place at the plenary when Chair Skea  presented instead a draft decision with three options on the timeline: the first option stating “ ...and agrees to the timeline of the remainder of the activities of AR7 as included in the annex to this decision”, while the second and third options both requesting the Co-Chairs of the three WGs to “continue work on their reports in 2027, as included in the proposed 2027 budget, without prejudging the Panel’s agreement on the timing of the respective approval sessions” and “agrees to continue consideration of the timeline of activities [taking into account the CRP/non-paper annexed prepared at P65]...”. The third option contained language, “to fund a second delegate from eligible developing countries and countries with economies in transition...”. The draft decision also contained three options on “inclusivity and avenues for providing input”.

[The key issue with the proposed 2027 budget as well as with the forecast budget for 2028 and the indicative budget for 2029 contained in the P-65 document IPCC-LXV/Doc. 2, Rev.1 was the assumptions regarding the sequencing and implementation of the AR7 workplan, hence, directly linked to the AR7 timeline which had not been resolved yet.

When the agenda item was opened, India said that this was “putting the cart before the horse”, as it called for discussions on a budget for 2027 that included many budget lines that required a preceding decision on the timeline. This argument was supported by Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, China, Syria, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Yemen, and Tunisia. Following consultations, it was agreed that  the Financial Task Team (FiTT) will temporarily work based on a non-status sheet that contains the content of IPCC-LXV/Doc. 2, Rev.1 with the purpose of reaching agreement on those items where agreement is possible; changes from the non-status document would be incorporated into IPCC-LXV/Doc. 2, Rev.1 to prepare a CRP if agreement is reached on the non-status document; and the non-status document would remain in the FiTT.

Saudi Arabia stated that the established practice is agreeing on the timeline before the budget but it was showing flexibility and hoped that the workplan would be ready this session. It also questioned why the secretariat presented only “one” timeline option which was “blatant bias” and requested  reflection of its intervention on the record.]

In response to the draft decision presented by Skea, Saudi Arabia stated that the draft decision is “not a basis” for work given the budget discussion was still taking place in another room under the FiTT, without reaching a conclusion on the matter. Russia sought “clarity” on the proposed 2027 budget as well. India re-stated its understanding that the contact group  narrowed down the options to four, to take them up further in the plenary and hence, found it surprising to be faced with such a draft decision, stating that it “cannot be the way forward”. It also expressed its inability to engage with the options since it referred to an “annex” that members had not seen yet [the Chair and the Interim Secretary later clarified that the annex refers to the four options].

China also questioned the second and third options linked to the proposed 2027 budget, pointing out that the FiTT had not reached any conclusion yet and hence, reference to the 2027 budget is “questionable”. Argentina stated its preference for “Option F” which was not reflected in the draft decision. Kenya expressed its difficulty in choosing a workable option as the draft decision contained neither “agreed” budget nor an agreed timeline which was also echoed by Iraq. Morocco said that the draft decision did not reflect “progress” made in the contact group. Syria said that there is “no clarity” on the options since no agreement on the timeline. Algeria said the process was “confusing” as “we were expecting to discuss the timeline and the decision here is without our involvement”.

On the other hand, those who were supportive of the compressed timeline, namely, the developed countries, Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Palau, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Mexico, and Kiribati, were engaging on the draft decision by stating their preferred options. Switzerland and the Netherlands specifically said that the funding of the additional second delegate is “contingent on availability of resources”.

India intervened again and said there was “lack of transparency at this point... some seem to know more than we do” in relation to the ongoing process. It made clear that all three options on the timeline in the draft decision was “confusing” with no agreed timeline and no agreed proposed 2027 budget, which was echoed by Kenya.

Russia also came in reminding the need to be “open and transparent” and reiterating its question about the proposed 2027 budget, further stating its preference for “Option F”.

The interim Secretary Barrett explained that the draft decision was a “reflection of process of the contact group” and that since there was no agreement on the timeline, “so what do we do for 2027?”. Chair Skea then intervened saying that the secretariat will take the draft text offline to “fix” it.

When the plenary resumed, Skea announced “we are not planning to put any decision on the workplan; we do have a proposed decision on the budget” and displayed the draft decision which read, “Approves the revised budget for 2026, and the proposed budget for 2027, as contained in IPCC-LXV/Doc.2, Rev.1 ”.

Soon after the display of the draft decision, Skea set on to gavel it. However, Saudi Arabia swiftly raised a point of order and stated that the draft decision was attempted to be “gavelled quickly, by the Interim Secretary [gesturing to Skea]” and to “put it on record”. It said that it took the floor on a “point of procedure” recalling the agreement by the Panel on the work on the budget by the FiTT and that “several budget lines for 2027, 2028 and 2029 remain marked as not agreed in the FiTT’s own working sheet”. It pointed to the IPCC’s financial procedures where “Appendix B, paragraph 11, is unambiguous: the Panel shall adopt a budget by consensus before the start of the financial year it covers. Paragragh 6 gives the FiTT the role of reviewing the budget and developing recommendations for the Panel’s consideration. The budget comes to this plenary through the FiTT, not around it. Paragraph 14 provides that adopting the budget authorizes the Secretary to incur obligations for the purposes approved”. It added, “That is the heart of our concern. The AR7 timeline is still before this Panel, and it is unresolved. The budget lines in question assume one particular answer to that question. Adopting them would authorize expenditure on a schedule the Panel has not decided, and would take that decision indirectly, through the budget, when the Panel has not taken it directly. The budget should follow the Panel’s decisions on its work programme, not anticipate them...Saudi Arabia is not in a position to join consensus on the lines concerned”, it explained.

India also stated to put on record that there has been “no agreement on the timeline” and about “attempts not to go throught the FiTT but around it”. It said that it is “not in a position to accept” the proposal which “goes against the rules and procedures” and that the “only viable option is to reconvene the FiTT”. It underlined, “we will not accept this decision”.

Russia said that earlier it had questioned about the proposed 2027 budget since there was “no consensus” on the timeline and hence, “if we cannot decide on the workplan, then we need to reconsider the 2027 budget”.

Following a short recess, the plenary was resumed with Skea stating that “the four options will help us to get a resolution. Unfortunately, this resolution cannot be found here, (and) many delegations are leaving”, next announcing that he will “suspend” the session. Most developed countries who took the floor “accepted” the Chair’s decision as well as some expressed “disappointment”.

India also shared its “disappointment” stating that “we were prepared to work but this opportunity was closed; on the budget, our request was to follow a process that had been agreed by the plenary and when this process was not followed. We registered concerns, but it was your decision not to proceed further with the budget”. It also pointed out that “the work in the last hours in the contact group was an opportunity we had been pleading for more than a year since Hangzhou [P-62, Feb 2025]”, noting that “we repeatedly asked for a process that was not delivered...and finally, that the concerns we articulated on inclusivity and participation repeatedly and echoed by others represent the voices of more than 40% of the population of the world; some of them the most vulnerable in the world”. It reiterated  that it is “ready to work together and complete the work of AR7”.

China stated that it was “very candid and active in our work to consult with each other, hoping to reach flexible consensus” and that the AR7 timeline is the “IPCC’s urgent priority”. It regretted about no agreement on the timeline and hoped “future sessions will improve the organisation of work and improve efficiency”. It also conveyed its commitment to “work with all Parties”.

Saudi Arabia also expressed “profound disappointment with the outcome” sharing “we came to Addis in good faith….to agree on a timeline for AR7, strengthen regional participation, and safeguard the independence, credibility and scientific integrity of the IPCC… At P-64, we strived to ensure that discussions on the timeline would be guided by scientific and procedural considerations, independent of external political processes. The credibility of the IPCC must never become the price we pay for political compromise”. It added, “we saw this assessment cycle as an opportunity to make meaningful progress towards a more inclusive IPCC, where all developing countries have an equitable opportunity not merely to participate, but to genuinely shape and contribute to its scientific outcomes. Yet, throughout this session, we have been disheartened to see developing country participation and inclusivity treated as bargaining chips, rather than fundamental principles that should guide our collective work”. Moving forward, it “sincerely hoped that this Panel will remember that the credibility of the IPCC rests not only on the science it produces, but also on whose voices have a meaningful opportunity to shape it”.

The DRC proposed whether there is a “possibility on exceptional basis, perhaps online, simply to vote on the budget”, to which Belgium said there were “precedents in 2020, 2021”.

Chair Skea in conclusion asked delegates “to look at positive achievements” and that “we have made progress, (and) we have identified four options”.

The session was then suspended.