|
||
|
TWN
Bonn Climate News Update No. 1 GLOBAL TURMOIL SHADOWS BONN CLIMATE TALKS Bonn, 8 June (Meena Raman+): The 64th sessions of the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) are convening in Bonn, Germany, from 8 to 18 June 2026, presided over by SBI Chair Julia Gardiner (Australia) and SBSTA Chair Adonia Ayebare (Uganda). The intersessional meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) will advance work on the decisions adopted last year in Belem, Brazil, paving the way for the next set of decisions to be taken at the annual year end climate talks scheduled from 9 - 20 November this year, in Antalya, Turkiye. The SB meetings unfold against a backdrop of immense human suffering and devastation, driven by the ongoing illegal wars waged by the United States (US) and Israel in the Middle East. The fallout has triggered a massive energy and food crisis, affecting millions across the Global South. According to a latest report by the Energy Transitions Commission, 75% of the world’s population live in fossil fuel-importing countries. The ripple effects of war and the conflict over the Straits of Hormuz are profound. Many developing country governments are forced to divert scarce funds away from other basic needs to securing energy alternatives. Some developing countries who are facing mounting financial pressures, have even been forced to scale back their participation at the SB64 sessions, as part of austerity measures. The current energy shock arrives at a perilous moment for the UNFCCC process. In the short term, energy scarcity, rising fuel prices and consequent pressures have pushed some governments toward emergency fixes: coal restarts, long‑term liquefied natural gas contracts, and fuel subsidies that can lock in emissions for years. At the same time, the crisis has also generated pressures to recast renewables, storage and grid resilience as instruments of national energy and economic security, rather than only climate policy. The current moment has laid bare that transitioning away from fossil fuels is far easier said than done. To succeed, it must be carried out in a way that ensures the burden does not once again fall on the poor, but instead advances transitions that are just, orderly and equitable. However, just when climate finance is most needed from developed countries, there have been significant cut backs of funds to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The latest replenishment to the GEF saw a 27% cut from the previous period from US$ 5.33 billion (for the period 20222-2026) to US$ 3.9 billion (for 2026 to 2030). Also, the United Kingdom (UK) has reduced its pledge to the GCF by about 50% from GBP 1.62 billion to GBP 815 million for the period 2024-2027. Clearly, all these cuts do not bode well for the GCF's forthcoming replenishment cycle for the period 2028-2031. Also deeply troubling is the surge of climate denialism in many parts of the Global North, fuelled by the US—the world’s largest historical polluter—refusing to be bound by the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement (PA) to curb its emissions or to provide climate finance. Adding salt to injury, the Trump administration has just announced a US$ 700 million federal support to boost the country’s coal industry! At the same time, extreme weather events are unfolding across the globe with unbearable heat waves scorching entire regions, while massive torrential rains unleash floods and destruction, compounding human suffering even further. These contrasting events all happening simultaneously, reinforce the challenges faced on adapting to climate impacts and in addressing loss and damage, especially in developing countries who are already cash-strapped. These developments will inevitably frame the debates at the two‑week climate talks. What remains uncertain is whether the entrenched North–South divide will once again overshadow the negotiations, or whether a new spirit of cooperation can finally break through—closing the gap and driving real implementation of commitments under the climate regime. The following are highlights of some of the key issues at SB64. ADAPTATION In the spotlight on the adaptation is on advancing the Belem decision 12/CMA.7 in respect of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). An important aspect of this is the Baku Adaptation Road Map (BAR) which was launched in 2024 at CMA 6, with the aim of advancing progress in line with Article 7.1 of the PA on the GGA. [The CMA is the Conference of Parties to the PA]. [The Belem decision, through para 28, decided that the work under the BAR “shall be guided by the following: (a) Aligning adaptation action with adequate adaptation responses in the context of the temperature goal of the PA, ensuring that national and global adaptation strategies and actions reflect the risks and needs arising from different warming increments within the temperature goal; (b) Strengthening implementation of the (adaptation) targets …; (c) Enhancing knowledge-sharing (d) Ensuring access to means of implementation for adaptation, for adequate, predictable and accessible financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support, including from developed country Parties to developing country Parties, in accordance with Article 9.1, and Articles 10–11, of the PA.] [Para 29 of the Belem decision decided that the first phase of the BAR covering the timeframe of 2026-2028 shall focus on initial implementation of activities, consisting of two workshops per year organised by the SB Chairs, and the preparation of a technical paper by the secretariat. Para 30 invited Parties to make submissions on the focus of the workshops and the technical paper.] The first workshop under the BAR is scheduled to take place on 9 June. The information note of 26 May states that the SB Chairs have selected the topic for the workshop to be on “Coherence across the UNFCCC adaptation architecture, and Means of Implementation (MOI) for adaptation”. According to sources, several developed countries objected to the workshop's focus on MOI for adaptation during the consultations convened by the SB Chairs prior to the Bonn session. Some developing country groups were also of the view that instead of the focus on coherence across the adaptation architecture, the workshop should focus on the more important issues of specific gaps, obstacles and challenges of the GGA and possible solutions, for effectively addressing the difficulties encountered in the implementation of adaptation actions by developing countries. Exactly what workshop will focus on given the divergent views aired by Parties remains to be seen. Further, the SB Chairs have proposed that the technical paper will consider the following topic - “Strengthening implementation of the GGA targets through enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening cooperation and facilitating adaptation planning and implementation”. During the consultations with the SB Chairs, sources said that several countries both from the developed and developing world expressed the view that the topic of the technical paper proposed was too broad and that they will provide further reflections on this during the Bonn session. On the issue of indicators for the GGA, in Belem, work on them concluded with the adoption of a list of 59 indicators, developed by technical experts, named the “Belém Adaptation Indicators”. Belem also established the Belem-Addis Vision (BAV), which comprises a two-year policy alignment process, aimed at developing guidance for operationalising the indicators, which will be considered at CMA 9 in 2027 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. MITIGATION WORK PROGRAMME (MWP) Continuation of the MWP By decision 13/CMA.7, para 15 recalled the mandate which decided that the MWP will continue until CMA 8 (2026) with a view to adopting a decision on the continuation of the MWP at that session. Submissions were invited for Parties to provide their views on the continuation of the MWP. From a review of the various submissions by Parties, although there is no divergence on the continuation of the MWP, key differences revolve around proposals for the imposition of prescriptive, top-down mitigation targets, with linkages to the implementation of the global stocktake outcomes (GST), in particular on the global mitigation efforts especially on para 28 on the “transitioning away from fossil fuels”. It also remains to be seen how the European Union’s idea [in their submission] of exploring the setting up of a ‘Mitigation Advisory Committee’/‘Facilitative Mitigation Action Mechanism’ would be received by developing countries, given the developed countries’ emphasis on using the MWP as a ratcheting mechanism for mitigation ambition. Developed countries throughout the MWP discussions in the past, have expressed unhappiness in the MWP not being effective enough in scaling up ambition on mitigation. Several developing country groupings on the other hand have stressed that the mandate of the MWP is in being “non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances and will not impose new targets or goals.” Hence, how the MWP will continue post 2026 is expected to be contentious. MWP Projects & Non-Market Approaches Platform (NMA Platform) In Belem, para 10 of decision 13/CMA.7 encourages Parties to “record projects” that they identify under the MWP on the NMA Platform under the Article 6.8 work programme under the framework for non-market approaches. The idea of using the NMA Platform arose from several developing country groupings, for having a digital platform as a facilitative tool that could help support the matchmaking activities that are undertaken in MWP, to ensure that MOI is provided to mitigation projects that are brought to the MWP’s global dialogues and investment focused events. [According to the UNFCCC website, “The NMA Platform is designed to record and exchange information on non-market approaches under Article 6.8 of the PA. It …enables participating Parties and non-Party stakeholders to identify, develop and implement non-market approaches. The platform includes information on finance, technology and capacity-building support available or provided for these initiatives”.] Para 11 from the Belem decision requests SBSTA 64, in the context of the Article 6.8 work programme, to “consider ways to implement additional functionalities in the NMA Platform” that would enable Parties to record the projects through their national focal points for Article 6.8 and “enable interconnection” between the NMA Platform and other platforms, including national platforms for Parties that request it, with a view to the SBSTA recommending a draft decision on this matter for consideration by CMA 8. Further, para 12 requested the secretariat to prepare a “technical paper” exploring options for the operationalization of the additional feature and functionality of the NMA Platform for consideration. The technical paper which has been produced by the secretariat provides two options for consideration viz. option 1 provides for no changes to the NMA Platform while option 2 provides for changes to the Platform. Under option 1, the technical paper states that “No distinction would be made on the NMA Platform between projects identified…” under the MWP “and NMAs recorded under the framework for them. The Platform would continue to function exclusively as a tool for recording and exchanging information on NMAs within the current scope.” Under option 2, “changes would be made to the NMA submission form and associated functionalities of the NMA Platform to accommodate the recording of a broader range of projects identified…” under the MWP, “beyond those that would be eligible for recording under option 1 above, while retaining the overall focus of the Platform on NMAs.” [Meanwhile, it is also relevant to note that para 10 of decision 4/CMA.3 as regards the Article 6.8, the SBSTA was requested to review the work programme, including its activities, at SB 64 and SB 65 “...with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the work programme, … and to make recommendations for consideration and adoption by CMA 8.” As the NMA Platform is a key tool for implementing the work programme under the framework for non-market approaches, this will be another matter to watch in Bonn as to its progress]. JUST TRANSITION WORK PROGRAMME (JTWP) In Belem, the landmark decision 2/CMA.7 on the just transition work programme (JTWP), decided to develop a “just transition mechanism” (JTM), hailed as a resounding victory for developing countries given a history of tough negotiations in this regard. (See Belem TWN Update). The G77 and China had made a strong and united call for a JTM in Belem. At SB 64, Parties are supposed to advance work on three important and interrelated mandates: reflections on implementation of the JTWP; terms of reference (TOR) for the review of the JTWP; and operationalization of the JTM. While this year’s focus is on operationalising the JTM with the key issues expected to centre on the governance and the critical MOI needed for just transitions as called by developing countries, the main point of contention in Bonn is likely to be the sequencing of work, and on how to advance work on the three mandates in a balanced manner. [Under para 24 of the JTWP decision from Belem, Parties requested “the secretariat to map relevant instruments, initiatives and processes under the Convention and the Paris Agreement and relevant entities in the United Nations system to support the implementation of the work programme and as input to the review…” and for “the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report….”.] The mapping exercise has been a contentious issue because developed countries had used it as a justification for rejecting developing country proposals to establish the JTM last year. This year, from the submissions by Parties on the process for operationalisation of the JTM, the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) and the EU have again stressed the importance of the mapping exercise to serve as the foundation for the development of the JTM. According to sources, the SB Chairs had informed Parties that the secretariat will soon publish an initial version of the report of the mapping to support the work in Bonn, which at the time of writing, is not available yet. Sources informed that during the informal virtual consultations convened by the SB Chairs on 1st June ahead of SB64, developing countries led by the G77 and China called for the TORs for the review of the JTWP to be finalised in Bonn and for progress be made towards operationalising the JTM, while continuing to strengthen international cooperation and mobilise MOI. In contrast, developed countries, notably the EIG and the EU, stated that their immediate priority is to discuss the findings of the secretariat’s mapping exercise, stressing that this should inform the review of the JTWP and the operationalisation of the JTM. FINANCE There are two sub-agenda items on finance: (i) Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund (AF) and (ii) Second review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). According to sources, this matter on the SCF is expected to be deferred. Apart from these two agenda items, also in the spotlight are mandated events from Belem. One is on how to meaningfully advance work on the “two-year work programme on climate finance” (known as the ‘Climate Finance Work Programme’ or CFWP) established by the “Global Mutirão” decision in para 54, (which is viewed by developing countries as key to the implementation of Article 9.1 of the PA on the mandatory provision of climate finance by developed countries to developing countries) and the other being the “Veredas Dialogue” on Article 2.1(c) of the PA. (Article 2.1(c) refers to “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.) Climate Finance Work Programme, including on Article 9.1 of PA By the “Global Mutirão” decision in Belem, para 54 decided “to establish a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1 …in the context of Article 9…as a whole” [with a footnote “without prejudging the process on the implementation of the new collective quantified goal]. [The CFWP was the result of grueling negotiations led by the COP 30 Presidency. It was a compromise from the original agenda item proposal by the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) and backed by the G77 and China. The watered-down formulation was driven by developed countries who made clear that they were willing to discuss Article 9.1 but within the entirety of Article 9 – largely in the context of the mobilisation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG). (See Belem TWN Update).] The appointed Co-Chairs of the CFWP, Yolando Velasco (the Philippines) and Apollonia Miola (European Union) invited submissions, to initiate work as soon as possible. The G77 and China have called for a dedicated space for Parties to discuss how to achieve the implementation of Article 9.1 including a clear outcome for the CFWP. Following virtual informal consultations on 28 May, the Co-Chairs released their work plan for 2026-2027, outlining the objective, expected outcomes, proposed themes, overall approach, timelines, milestones and outputs. The work plan provides for “engagement workshops in conjunction with SB 64”. This approach is likely to raise concerns among some developing countries on how the substance and status of the work will formally feed into CMA 8 to be held in Antalya. According to sources, the G77 and China is also expected to request a modification to the mode of work at SB 64 as regards the CFWP work plan, and for a dedicated space to be provided to Parties to gather views on the scope and modalities of the work programme, with the view to adopt a decision at CMA8, regarding the modalities of the work programme, that that will decisively lead towards the fulfilment of obligations under Article 9.1. Developing countries have raised that the CFWP is of critical importance to them, especially in the context of further depletion of already minimal financial resources in the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism (such as the GCF, the GEF and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage), with no ambitious replenishments in sight, putting in jeopardy the amount of climate finance available. The recent announcements of cuts in climate finance by the UK, Canada and Germany add fodder to such concerns, made worse by the withdrawal of the US altogether from both the Convention and the PA. Further, the work plan for the CFWP does not clearly indicate formal consideration of work at CMA 8. In addition, there is no specific CFWP agenda item indicated in the elements of the provisional CMA 8 agenda in the document (Annex IV) in relation to the “Arrangements for intergovernmental meetings” (AIM) for consideration by Parties in SBI 64 in Bonn. It can be expected that the G77 and China will raise the need for a specific agenda item on the CFWP on the provisional agenda of CMA 8. Veredas Dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the PA The first meeting of the “Veredas Dialogue” on the implementation of Article 2.1(c) of the PA and its complementarity with Article 9 of the PA, is scheduled on 9-10 June, for one-and-a-half days, co-chaired by Debra-Lee Swanepoel (South Africa) and Ralien Bekkers (the Netherlands) As there is no common understanding on the scope of Article 2.1(c) or the manner of its implementation, discussions under the Veredas Dialogue can prove contentious unless duly guided by the “safeguards” provided for in para 3 of the Belem decision, which was secured collectively by developing countries. Developing countries view the safeguards as “guardrails” which are foundational for any consideration of the matter, outlining the scope of the safeguards as being “bottom-up, nationally determined; that there is no common interpretation of Article 2.1(c); [that the dialogue should be] non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative exchange of views; respectful of national sovereignty, including fiscal and monetary sovereignty, will not place additional burden; is consistent with the principles and provisions of the PA – with CBDR&RC [common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities] as a key element, equity, country-driven and owned, sustainable development and poverty eradication”. Their concerns and challenges stemmed from the push by developed countries for top-down, “prescriptive”, “common” or “global” implementation of Article 2.1(c), thus infringing national sovereignty and undermining different national circumstances of developing countries. (See Belem TWN Update). In Bonn, it will be keenly watched whether deliberations will indeed be guided by the safeguards. The co-chair’s workplan outlines the organisation of work in 2026, including expected outputs, summary of milestones and timeline, and reflections on the Veredas Dialogue process going forward, which sets out areas that may be addressed in 2026 and beyond with the concerns and safeguards as a cross-cutting element. Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund (AF) There are three matters under consideration: arrangements of the AF to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement (PA); membership of the AF Board and the fifth review of the AF. The CMP [Conference of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (KP)] and the CMA [Conference of Parties to the PA] requested SBI 64 to continue consideration of the three matters on the basis of the “work” (that resulted in a draft negotiating text) undertaken at SBI 63 in Belem. (See Belem TWN Update). Ensuring the AF’s smooth transition to exclusively serve the PA is seen as an urgent priority by developing countries under the G77 and China. This time sensitive matter has been in a deadlock since SB 62 (June 2025) on a largely procedural issue. Developing countries have maintained that the matter should not be held hostage by developed countries by linking it to the issue of membership of the AF Board, which is a separate matter under consideration with political implications. The key contentious issue is whether there should be three separate decisions or a single decision on the three matters under consideration. Developing countries prefer the former, while developed countries prefer the latter. The draft negotiating text from SB63 reflects the positions in the “titles”(in brackets, denoting not agreed) of the three matters. The substance of the matters have been agreed to in principle. Developing countries view the institutional arrangements (new trustee arrangements; memorandum of understanding regarding secretariat services; governance-related decisions) necessary for the smooth transition of the AF to exclusively serve the PA, as a matter of urgent priority, with a stand-alone separate decision, and likewise on the other two matters. On the other hand, developed countries have linked the institutional arrangements to the membership of the AF Board, as a “package”. [The AF Board membership matter is politically controversial as it relates to the change in “terminology” from “Annex 1/non-Annex 1” (referring to developed and developing countries respectively under the Convention) to “developed” and “developing” countries [as referred to, generically in the PA]. It is to be noted that any change in the composition and numbers of the Board in the garb of change in terminology is seen as “non-negotiable” by developing countries. The G77 and China is expected to raise the matter to the SBI Chair with a request to separate the three matters into three separate sub-items so that it leads to three separate decisions without any linkage to each other. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER Among the sub-agenda items on technology include: (i) the Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre (CTC) and Network; (ii) Alignment between processes pertaining to the review of the CTC and Network and the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism; (iii) Host of the CTC; and (iv) Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism. One of the priority issues is the new host of the CTC. According to the evaluation report by the host selection panel, six proposals were considered for the evaluation of the total 22 proposals received by the panel. Of these, two proposals have been shortlisted by the panel for consideration of Parties at the SB session viz: (i) the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and (ii.) the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation- United Nations Office for Project Services (UNIDO-UNOPS) consortium. According to sources, a key issue that will shape discussions on this matter is the proposed host’s ability to mobilise funding for its activities. The other critical issue which was not concluded in Belem is on the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism. SBI 63 could not conclude on the matter and COP 30 requested SBI 64 to continue consideration of the matter on the basis of the draft text [in brackets denoting not agreed] prepared at SBI 62 in Bonn last year. What progress will be made in this regard remains to be seen. GLOBAL STOCKTAKE (GST) There are two mandated events arising from the outcomes of the first GST agreed to in Dubai in 2023: (i) The UAE dialogue in relation to on para 97 of the GST decision and the (ii) Annual GST dialogue in relation to para 187 of the decision. [Para 97 decided that there be a “UAE dialogue on implementing the global stocktake outcomes”, which is placed under the section on “Finance” in the decision. The scope of the UAE dialogue had been a matter of intense contention. Para 187 relates to the “sharing of knowledge and good practices on how the outcomes of the global stocktake are informing the preparation of Parties’ next nationally determined contributions (NDCs)…” . In Belem, compromises were reached on these matters. (See Belem TWN Update for details in this regard). UAE dialogue on para 97 of the GST decision Decision 3/CMA.7 para 2 decided that the modalities of the dialogue will “facilitate the sharing of experience and of information on opportunities, challenges, barriers and needs, including with a focus on the provision of finance, capacity-building, and technology development and transfer, as well as strengthened international cooperation as key enablers, in implementing the global stocktake outcomes”. By para 1, Parties also agreed that the dialogue will take place “in the spirit of international cooperation, be facilitative and non-prescriptive, and respect the nationally determined manner and different national circumstances, pathways and approaches”. CMA7 also decided that the dialogue will be held annually in conjunction with SB 64 and SB 65 after which it will conclude. The SB Chairs have appointed Rita Mishaan (Guatemala) and Johanna Lissinger Peitz (Sweden) as Co-facilitators of the dialogue for 2026-2027. Further, it was decided that the reports of the dialogue will serve as inputs to the second GST (which will conclude in 2028). At SB 64 in Bonn, the first UAE dialogue is scheduled to take place on 10-11 June. Parties provided their views via submissions, which show that the scope of the dialogue still remains divergent viz. whether the focus should be on the implementation of only finance-related elements (given the dialogue’s placement in the GST decision under “finance” section and also considered as a finance agenda item under the CMA) or on all elements of the GST decision and be used as a tracking mechanism, with a focus especially on the contentious ‘homeless items’ in the mitigation component contained in para 28 on global efforts to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems. Many developing countries also want the dialogue to serve as a space for discussing ways for enabling implementation of Parties’ NDCs, instead of focusing on “ambition signalling”, to ensure scaling up of delivery of MOI. They are also keen to have a discussion on ways by which international cooperation can be enhanced and unilateral trade related climate measures like Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) can be scaled down. Annual GST Dialogue on Paragrah 187 of the GST decision Decision 3/CMA.7 paragraph 14 decided that the “annual global stocktake dialogue will conclude” at SB 64 in June 2026 and that it will “consider the resumption of the dialogue in the context of its consideration of the outcome of the second global stocktake”. The mandate for the annual GST dialogue stems from paragraph 187 of the GST decision is placed under “guidance and way forward” section and refers to facilitating sharing of knowledge and experiences on how the GST outcomes inform Parties’ next NDCs. In Belem, CMA 7 considered the summary reports of the 2024 and 2025 dialogues. The contentious issue was over the purpose and continuation of the dialogue when NDCs have already been prepared and submitted by Parties. At SB 64, the concluding annual GST dialogue is scheduled for 16 June. It is seen as an important opportunity and space by developing countries, as highlighted in their proposals for topics for the dialogue, to discuss the critical issue of MOI for the implementation of NDCs, which lie at the core of climate action and ambition. CLIMATE AND TRADE DIALOGUE Para 57 of the “Global Mutirão” decision from Belem requested the SBs to hold a dialogue at SB 64 (2026), SB 66 (2027) and SB 68 (2028), with the participation of Parties and other stakeholders..... “to consider opportunities, challenges and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade, taking in account para 56…” and decided “to exchange experiences and views on related matters at a high-level event in 2028. The decision also requested the SBs to present a report summarising the discussions at the high-level event. Para 56 of the decision (which anchors Article 3.5 of the Convention) reaffirmed “that Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change and also reaffirms that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.” This climate and trade dialogue was the result of very intense negotiations in Belem, led by the COP 30 Presidency, and was a compromise from the original agenda item proposed by the LMDC. Nevertheless, the Belem outcome in this regard was still seen as an important win, given that the matter was vehemently opposed by developed countries, especially the European Union who did not want unilateral measures such as CBAMs from being discussed. The holding of a high-level event in 2028 with the SBs presenting a report summarising the discussions at the high-level event, elevates the dialogue to the political level, which is viewed as significant. (See Belem TWN Update).] As mandated, the first climate and trade dialogue at SB 64 is scheduled on 13 June. A concept note on the dialogue has been prepared by the secretariat under the guidance of the SB Chairs which states that “The dialogue will provide an opportunity to hear from relevant international organizations and other non-Party stakeholders, and to initiate discussions among Parties and other stakeholders under the above mandate.” The concept note provides for presentations from the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International Trade Centre (ITC) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) with discussions to follow after each presentation among Parties and observers. According to sources, developing countries are not happy with the way the dialogue has been designed and are expected to raise their concerns to the SB Chairs. One concern is the lack of opportunity for Parties to engage in a dialogue among each other and on how to capture the outcome of the discussions. GLOBAL IMPLEMENTATION ACCELERATOR AND BELEM MISSION 1.5 SB64 will also see the first session of two initiatives that were launched at COP30 through the Mutirao decision. Para 41 of this decision launched the Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA) “as a cooperative, facilitative and voluntary initiative” to “to accelerate implementation across all actors to keep 1.5 °C within reach and supporting countries in implementing their NDCs and national adaptation plans [NAPs].” According to a note circulated by the secretariat, an ‘information session’ on the GIA will be held on June 12 in which Parties and non-Party stakeholders are invited to share their responses on how the Accelerator “can best integrate tools, actors and resources that remain fragmented today with a view to producing exponential and cascading global effects” and can add value to other voluntary action agendas. Work under the GIA will happen under the guidance of Presidencies of COP30 (Brazil) and COP31 (Turkiye and Australia). A second information session of the GIA will be held at SB65. Following which the Presidencies will present a summary report to CMA8. The ‘Belém Mission to 1.5’, launched by the COP30 Mutirao decision’s para 42. A call for submission was sent out for this Mission earlier this month and a consultation will be held during SB64 as a ‘Presidency event’ on June 12 with Parties and non-Party stakeholders. This Mission is “aimed at enabling ambition and implementation of NDCs and NAPs, to reflect on accelerating implementation, international cooperation and investment in NDCs and NAPs across mitigation and adaptation.” Work under this Mission will take place under the guidance of three Presidencies: Azerbaijan (CMA6), Brazil (CMA7), and Turkiye & Australia (CMA8). At CMA8, it will conclude following the presentation of a summary report by the three Presidencies at CMA8. FOSSIL FUELS AND DEFORESTATION ROADMAPS On the sidelines of SB 64, there will be some COP 30 Presidency-led events on the ‘roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels’ to be held on June 12 and another on the ‘roadmap on addressing deforestation’ which will be held on 8 June. The COP-30 Presidency, on its own initiative, had invited Parties and non-Parties to make submissions giving their views on these topics. These roadmaps are not on the negotiating agendas of the SBs, as there was no consensus in Belem to discuss them because they were not a part of the negotiation agenda at COP30. However, the Brazilian COP-30 Presidency at the closing plenary in Belem did indicate that it will convene high-level dialogues on these topics. (See TWN Update.). It can also be expected that some Parties will also highlight the outcomes of the recently concluded Santa Marta ‘Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels’ which was co-hosted by Colombia and Netherlands and held from April 24-29, 2026. [+With inputs from Radhika Chaterjee, Hilary Kung and Jinghann Hong]
|
||
