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Info Service on Climate Change (May26/01) Land based mitigation increases risk of hunger in developing countries Kuala Lumpur, May 4 (Hilary Kung): At a recent dialogue held under the UNFCCC’s Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) held in Yeosu, Republic of Korea from 24 and 25 April 2026, India highlighted that the 6th Assessment Report [AR6] of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), warned that “1.5°C [mitigation] pathways could increase the risk of hunger and worsen food security by mid-century, especially in Africa and South Asia due to more land being used for mitigation projects like Bioenergy Carbon Capture and Storage [BECCS] in the Global South, as well as rising global food prices driven by increased pressure on land. India conveyed this message at the 5th hybrid JTWP dialogue, which provided a space for Parties and non-Party stakeholders to exchange on opportunities, best practices, solutions, challenges, and barriers related to “Just transition pathways for holistic approaches to food security, including with a focus on agriculture and oceans, in the context of element (c) paragraph 2 of decision 3/CMA.5”. Reacting to the one of the guiding questions on “What financing approaches and partnerships can accelerate nationally determined just transitions toward resilient, low-emission, and sustainable food systems consistent with 1.5°C pathways, while safeguarding livelihoods and ensuring food security” under the thematic discussion “International cooperation and climate finance as an enabler for just transition pathways to food security”, India emphasised the need to critically examine and clarify what is meant by “resilient” and “sustainable” food systems aligned with limiting warming to 1.5°C. India said that all the global mitigation pathways in the IPCC’s AR6 rely on huge amounts land-based mitigation and “over 70% of the land-based mitigation happens in developing countries. This results in the highest near term mitigation burden on Africa, followed by Latin America and Asia. Europe and North America have the least burden in this kind of framework”. “These pathways are therefore completely violating the basic tenets of climate justice. Large amounts of land are converted to land-based mitigation projects because this provides better revenue due to ‘a better carbon price’ as compared to other uses that may be self-determined by indigenous peoples and local communities in the Global South,” said India further. India also called on “developed countries with high historical responsibility to take the lead in mitigation in all of their sectors while protecting the rights and cultures of their own indigenous populations. They must reach net-zero emissions far earlier than mid-century and make carbon space available for developing countries to ensure poverty eradication and sustainable development, of which food security is a critical and fundamental component.” It also said that, “A key element of international cooperation is the obligation of developed countries to support developing countries, not just in addressing risk, but addressing key dimensions of climate action in a manner that is just and equitable and in line with the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). Poverty eradication and food security in the context of increasing climate impacts is a key element here. Support adaptation… [and] provide loss and damage compensation. This is not about derisking. This is about developed countries’ obligation under Article 9.1 [of the Paris Agreement].” [Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement provides that “Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention”.] India also emphasised that, “the focus of justice-based approaches should be on how investors and multilateral development banks should be made more aware and sympathetic to considerations of justice at both the international and national levels. To ask projects to be more “investible” is to absolve “investors”, many of whom are in fact high emitters themselves, from all responsibility in ensuring that their financing mechanisms and portfolios are just and equitable”. Delegates from other developing countries also shared their perspectives on international cooperation and climate finance as enablers for just transition pathways to food security. Kenya highlighted Article 2.1(b) of the Paris Agreement, which links climate adaptation, resilience, and low-emissions development with the fundamental role of food production in livelihoods. It emphasized that the agri-food system is central to the country and the question is how to “mainstream that [referring to climate actions] in the context of the development blueprint of the country”. Explaining further, Kenya said “the challenge we've had so far, is making sense of how to integrate just transition costing in the identified priority areas that are mapped in the different climate plans that we develop.” It also referred to the Needs Determination Report (NDR) [prepared by the UNFCCC’s Standing Committee on Finance] and commented that just transition costs are not reflected in the report, saying further that is because it requires countries to go beyond the direct expenses or costing of the climate measure, or involves assessing the broader impacts of that measure, both upstream and downstream. It added that many developing countries are still grappling with the basics of how to cost these measures. It also said that these challenges are compounded by the complexity of incorporating multiple variables into macroeconomic modeling, which are influenced by factors including inflation and external global dynamics that are often beyond a country’s control. Kenya also said that “one of the biggest barriers it now dealing with in the context of the implementation of nationally determined contribution (NDC)” is the insufficient resource availability for the conditional components for NDCs. It said that there is need to understand “that carbon finance is not really a financial instrument, but a mechanism of cooperation that could, be leveraged only to the extent possible, depending on how the NDCs are developed within countries”, adding that “how we package the additionality of just transition pathways in the context of the agriculture sector would be quite key from here to point us to the direction that can facilitate countries to be able to make sense of the discussion, but also leverage the additional resources that would be required to deal with the impact of measures in the context of just transition in food system. Kenya also flagged concerns regarding unilateral trade measures. South Africa said that “the challenge is that finance is often organised around bankability rather than the developmental impact, and this is particularly problematic in food systems where many priority interventions such as smallholder support, ecosystem restoration, resilience building, social protection and local value chain development - generate high social and economic value, but do not produce immediate or predictable commercial returns.” It stressed the need for an “alternative framing [of the discussion] rather than focusing on mobilising capital”, which “emphasises aligning finance with developmental outcomes, including resilience and equity, reshaping risk allocation, particularly for vulnerable sectors, integrating public, concessional and private finance in ways that reflect real world transition needs, recognizing value beyond profit, including ecological and social outcomes”. “So, for this discussion, this implies that food system transitions cannot be financed through conventional approaches alone. Instead, there's a need to expand the policy and institutional discussion on means of implementation, including how finance itself must evolve to support whole of economy and whole of society just transitions. Here, the just transition mechanism could play an important role in shaping guidance on how financial institutions integrate equity within this food system value chain, supporting the development of investable non-traditional pipelines and helping connect countries to appropriate financing approaches,” said South Africa further. Ghana, for the African Group also noted that the guiding questions were inappropriately framed, as they assumed that access to climate finance is already in place. However, it said that in its experience, the central issue is not access, but the provision of finance itself. It reiterated Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement and said that this “obligation [of developed countries] has not been met at the scale, quality and speed required to support food security and just transition”. “So, any meaningful discussion of international cooperation must begin by asking whether that obligation is being fulfilled,” it said further. It also called for linking discussions on food security and just transition to the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) and Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs), particularly regarding developed countries’ reporting on finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building support. It stressed that the gap between what is provided by developed countries and what is received by developing countries is not merely technical, and urged a shift from abstract commitments to measurable accountability. It also emphasised the need for grant-based finance. “If we're going to talk about concessional loans, as small as it is, it's going to be a debt burden for these smaller groups [referring to subsistence farmers in Africa], said Ghana further. It also said that, “We wish to reject proposals that introduce carbon markets, [the] World Bank’s delivery instruments and greenhouse gas performance conditionality into the just transition pathway discussions for food security, agriculture and oceans. These three proposals share a common structure. Each one shifts the finance obligation away from its legal foundation in Article 9.1, towards instruments that carry no binding provision requirement, impose costs on receiving communities or attach emission performance conditions to nations that have contributed least to the crisis driving the transition.” Palau, for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), said for Small Island Development States (SIDS), international cooperation and climate finance must address the structural dependence of SIDS on external finance through predictable flows. “Because what that means is that over 80% of our SIDS’ NDCs are conditional on international finance, technology and the capacity-building support. So, there is heavy reliance on external cooperation and that structural dependence needs to be addressed.” It added further that SIDs “rely heavily on grants and concessional finance due to limited fiscal space and high vulnerability.” Burkina Faso, for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), said that most LDCs have already “embedded food system agriculture, fishery and climate resilience objectives in their NDCs and NAPS [national adaptation plans], which are a ready national framework for just transition implementation….However, these plans remain largely underfunded due to structural constraints. International cooperation is therefore essential to ensure that national determined just transition pathways are fully operationalised”. The Indigenous Peoples Organisation cautioned that, “when countries translate NDCs, NAPs and food system strategies into investable pipelines, Indigenous Peoples' priorities must be included from the outset. This also requires rethinking what is considered investable. As many Indigenous-led approaches, including those that sustain food sovereignty and ecosystems, may not necessarily fit conventional financing models but are essential for just transition. These pipelines must include Indigenous-led food systems, strong safeguards, free prior and informed consent, and mechanisms to track whether finance is actually reaching and benefiting Indigenous Peoples. Without these safeguards, scaled-up finance risks accelerating projects that undermine the very food systems, ecosystems, and rights acclaimed to support.” It then emphasized that just transition pathways should operationalise human rights, including Indigenous Peoples' Rights to self-determination and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), as affirmed in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which is now reflected in paragraph 12(i) of the JTWP outcome from COP 30. It also called for “direct finance towards supporting Indigenous Peoples' food systems, including through direct access modalities and support for Indigenous-led initiatives…through dedicated arrangements for Indigenous Peoples and simplified access and accreditation modalities” and recognise that Indigenous Peoples' food systems already sustained by diversity, protect lands, waters and seas. On innovation and technology transfer, Burkina Faso for the LDCs, commented that access to climate-resilient and appropriate technologies remains highly unequal, slowing the pace of transition and limiting adaptive capacity in food systems and livelihoods. Many LDCs also lack the necessary infrastructure and technical capacity for effective climate data systems, with weak data undermining prevention, early warning, and risk-informed decision-making - all of which are critical for protecting food system security and livelihoods. “Technology must be context appropriate and locally relevant. Adaptation is often constrained by outdated, costly or unsuitable technologies, especially when [the technology] transfer is not aligned with local realities. LDCs have at time experienced technology dumping where obsolete technology are transferred without delivering meaningful resilience outcome. Equitably, access to technology also requires addressing structural barriers including intellectual property rights,” added Burkina Faso Ghana, for the African Group commented that most African smallholder farmers, artisanal fishing communities do not need sophisticated digital tools. “Technology transfer that replicates developed countries’ high input and high capital agriculture systems without adapting to Africa resources environment does not benefit Africa….The circular economy of a West African smallholder farming household is not the same as the circular economy imagined by the European Commission's legislative agenda and the former should not be evaluated against standards of the latter,” said Ghana further. India noted that in developing countries, where small and marginal farmers make up the majority of cultivators, mitigation is not the primary concern. Instead, the priority is adaptation—protecting these farmers from climate shocks to safeguard their incomes and livelihoods. It added further that “much of the focus has been on mitigation which is relevant in the context of industrial agriculture in developed countries; however, the context in the Global South is quite different, where adaptation plays a far more central role.” The early warning system and decision support system for farmers [presented by Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) during the scene setting segment] was cited by India as an example of technology that is key for developing countries. “[However], these are not bankable or investable projects in almost all countries. These have been supported by large-scale public programmes driven by governments and significant gaps remain, particularly in developing countries due to lack of financing and technology support,” said India further. Moreover, it is also essential for developing countries to possess the capacity to develop technologies tailored to their specific contexts for innovation, added India saying further that such technologies remain inaccessible to many due to barriers created by intellectual property rights, which drive up costs and place them beyond the reach of developing countries, particularly for vulnerable groups such as smallholder farmers and fishing communities. South Africa also said that, “Context-appropriate technologies matter, but also does delivery models and institutional capacity and the ability to adapt those tools to local realities and local-led solutions.” It added that “where technology transfer and innovation is concerned, it's important to make a very intentional linkage to development and value-chain objectives and not to treat the technology aspects of the discussion isolated and only linked to mitigation tools.” It said further that “it is important to reflect the all of society, all of the economy framing but also to balance it squarely with an adaptation lens.” As for the thematic discussion on enabling environment, South Africa said it is “important to treat an enabling environment rather as an outcome of international cooperation and support, as opposed to a prior condition which has been the experience for most developing countries that an enabling environment is viewed as a prior condition that developing countries must satisfy before support is unlocked.” South Africa further noted that while policy and regulatory frameworks are important, the dialogue should avoid shifting the full burden onto developing countries, especially on how risk is defined and framed. It is also essential to recognise that many of the constraints developing countries face are structural and systemic, including high costs of capital, limited fiscal space, restricted access to technology, and challenges in the viability of value chains and that these dimensions need to be properly reflected in this part of the discussion. It also noted that food system transitions cannot and need not rely on conventional approaches or “business as usual” ways of working. There is a need to reframe and broaden the scope of the discussion, including how policy and framework considerations are defined. This requires more intentional alignment between finance and development objectives and outcomes, alongside a rethinking of how risk is understood, allocated, and managed, as well as a shift in how finance is structured globally and broadly to better reflect development priorities and transition needs. Many developing countries raised concerns about barriers to just transitions, including unilateral trade measures such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms, as well as global inequality and the weakening of the CBDR-RC principle which reduce developing countries’ ability to pursue just transitions domestically. Several other topics were also discussed during the dialogue, with parallel breakout rooms covering areas such as agriculture, agroecology, agroforestry, circularity, and ocean-based actions in nationally determined transition pathways that enhance food security, as well as a World Café session on holistic, people-centred, and inclusive approaches to just transition pathways for food security. Parties also exchanged views on the potential roles of the JTWP and just transition mechanism. All of these discussions will be reflected in the informal summary of the dialogue, which would be published ahead of the 64th sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB64) in June 2026, according to the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation [SBI]. During the closing plenary, SBI Chair Julia Gardiner [Australia] acknowledged that several issues elicited strong and divergent views, and assured participants that the SB Chairs would carefully consider all perspectives and ensure they are fully reflected in the informal summary of the dialogue. She also noted calls for the JTWP agenda item to be allocated sufficient time at SB64 to address all mandates. Meanwhile, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) presentation during the scene-setting noted that 90% of the new NDCs include just transition considerations, 42% feature a dedicated just transition chapter, and 94% include concrete just transition measures. It also found that 60% integrate social and equity indicators into Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) systems, while 47% apply a socio-economic lens to climate finance.
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