TWN Info Service on Climate Change (Apr26/01)
2 April 2026
Third World Network

IPCC’S AR7 TIMELINE IMPASSE PERSISTS  OVER ‘SCIENCE’ VERSUS ‘POLITICS’ DIVIDE

Kathmandu. 2 April (Prerna Bomzan): The 64th session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (P-64) which met on 24-27 March in Bangkok, Thailand, continued to witness a deadlock on the most crucial “timeline” issue over the production of its 7^th Assessment Report (AR7) and related reports. The impasse occurred due to deeply entrenched divergences among governments in a battle over science versus politics divide, with the AR7’s controversial linkage to the conduct of the second global stocktake (GST2) in 2028 process under the Paris Agreement (PA).

To start with, the provisional agenda surprisingly did not contain the unresolved timeline or “workplan” of the AR7, which triggered an “agenda fight” eventually leading to its inclusion in the adopted agenda, however, concluding with “no decision” on the matter.

In the absence of a decision, India registered that the P-64 report include the discussion on the addition of the timeline in the agenda for the record which was supported by Saudi Arabia. The next P-65 provisional agenda will definitely be watched in relation to this critical issue.

Divergences over the AR7 workplan as regards respective timelines for the production of the three Working Group (WG) reports as contributions to the AR7, have centred on whether the reports should be completed in 2028, to feed into the GST2  with “mitigation” centric “political” signals, or produced at a reasonable pace by 2029, without “politicising” climate science by compromising on its “robustness” and “integrity” by compressing the timelines to align with GST2. This deep divide without any breakthrough in “consensus” yet, is already into the third year of the AR7 cycle, starting from P-60 in Istanbul (see TWN Update), P-61 in Sofia  (see TWN Update), P-62 in Hangzhou (see TWN Update), and at P-63 in Lima (see TWN Update).

[The GST is a process under Article 14 of the PA, to periodically assess the collective progress towards achieving its long-term goals, and is to be held every five years. The first GST concluded in 2023 at the UNFCCC’s 28^th Conference of Parties (COP28) in Dubai, UAE, while GST2 is scheduled for COP 33 in 2028.

The IPCC is the UN body for assessing the science related to climate change. It traditionally produces three WG reports: WGI report on ‘The Physical Science Basis’; WGII report on ‘Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’; and WGIII report on ‘Mitigation of Climate Change’. A Synthesis Report (SYR) is usually produced integrating information from the WG reports and also based on any Special Report/s – assessment on specific issue – produced during the assessment cycle. Methodology Reports are also produced by the IPCC which provide practical guidelines for the preparation of national greenhouse gas inventories.

For the current AR7 cycle, besides the three WG reports and SYR, the following suite of products has also been agreed to: a Special Report on Climate Change and Cities (SR-Cities), a Methodology Report on Short-Lived Climate Forcers (MR SLCF) and a Methodology Report on Carbon Dioxide Removal Technologies, Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage (MR CDR/CCUS), all to be delivered by 2027. Further, an updated IPCC Technical Guidelines on Impacts and Adaptation has also been agreed as a separate product to be developed in conjunction with the WGII report. The timeline or the AR7 workplan of the three WG reports therefore has to factor in these products, with adequate time and space throughout the process of the AR7 cycle.]

Agenda fight over inclusion of timeline or AR7 workplan

Upon presentation of the provisional agenda by the IPCC Chair Jim Skea (United Kingdom) and inviting members for comments, Saudi Arabia expressed surprise and disappointment that the timeline issue was not on the agenda, and that it is not merely a minor “procedural” matter for the Bureau to consider, but a “substantive” issue to be decided by Panel members by “consensus”. It highlighted that continued reliance on “ad-hoc” planning on a yearly basis [current practice in the absence of a timeline] undermines the quality and credibility of the AR7 work, and requested an agenda item address the matter rather than postponing it. It also pointed out that the last decision of P-63 had deferred the consideration of the matter to “future sessions” hence, behoves its inclusion in the P-64 agenda.

India supported the request expressing dismay that such an important task is missing, adding that it had been engaging in “good faith” by providing “detailed proposals” on the matter, instead of the accelerated proposals by the Co-Chairs [seen as linking the process to the GST2 timeline] and lamented that its requests and concerns have been completely disregarded. It reiterated that the “rush” will negatively impact developing countries the most, benefiting only those with resources. It expressed inability to go with the agenda if the timeline is not included.

Kenya requested clarity on why the matter was not included in the agenda mentioning past practice past, and sought further “clear guidance” on how to address it moving forward. South Africa echoed the need for clarity on the exclusion of the matter, further supporting its inclusion as an agenda item.

China noting the proposals raised by previous developing countries, stated that according to the general principle of agenda-setting, an unsettled issue from a previous session should automatically appear in the agenda of the next session. It stressed that the AR7 timeline issue is very important to the current cycle, and the “limited capacity” of developing countries must be taken into account. It underlined that the matter should be discussed by the Panel in a transparent manner and settled by “consensus” in a government-driven manner.

Russia, Egypt, Algeria, Venezuela, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco, shared similar sentiments, underscoring the importance of the timeline and the need to discuss it for a consensus decision, further extending support for its inclusion in the agenda.

Antigua and Barbuda representing the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), agreed with the provisional agenda however, and wanted to place on record that the “workplan” was not included. It reiterated its support to the “leadership” and the secretariat for timely and transparent consultations to reach agreement at P-65. Nepal sought “guidance” on how the workplan will be advanced, which was supported by Panama.

Brazil said that the exclusion of the matter from the agenda came as a surprise and sought the reason for this from the Chair. Malaysia stated that many members had raised concerns regarding the “feasibility and implications” of the proposed timeline (accelerated timeline by the Co-Chairs) and called for a practical and realistic timeline that allows inclusive and meaningful participation of particularly developing countries, and hoped for a “balanced outcome” at the session.

The Netherlands said that the discussion requires countries to have the “mandate” to engage on it, given that the matter is not on the agenda. Germany acknowledged the decision of the “leadership” to not include the matter in the session’s agenda, further entrusting the Chair to make progress in an effective manner. The United Kingdom (UK) also supported the provisional agenda while Switzerland suggested “informal consultations” instead of opening a new agenda item.

Chair Skea then proposed to conduct informal consultations to “detect the basis for any flexibility”, also in the light of new information emerging on the SR and MR timelines that would inform Panel discussion on the issue. He proposed opening the matter under “any other business (AOB)” on the agenda, with a view to reaching conclusions at P-65. He also provided reasons for its exclusion in the provisional agenda stating that “we didn’t detect flexibility that would allow us to reach a conclusion” having failed in previous sessions, and that the “risk” of opening the matter and failing to reach conclusions is problematic.

India said that it did not understand the flexibility detecting mechanism and that the Panel cannot proceed on contentious issues by first detecting flexibility. Reiterating its frustration about the constant “refusal” by the “leadership” to consider “substantive proposals” presented with “careful argument”, it was not willing to accept a discussion under AOB and in informal consultations with “no status”. It was “mystified” to hear that governments do not have the mandate to discuss it when it is the most important issue at hand, and urged again to formally place the timeline on the agenda and not leave it as an afterthought to AOB.

Saudi Arabia said that a matter of such magnitude requires a dedicated agenda item and that discussions elsewhere will not encourage flexibility and “consensus building”. It insisted on the agenda item at the session and cautioned that P-65 is “too risky” to discuss it given also “budget” discussion of the coming year/s, and that it wanted to “avoid the scenario of not approving the budget”[if there is absence of consensus on the timeline matter].

Chile said that it is available to participate in a timeline discussion for proper planning, while Belgium supported the Chair’s proposal to have informal discussions and take it up under AOB, preferring a “clear way forward until P-65”.

Chair Skea then intervened that since there’s no consensus on the agenda, his proposition is to suspend the agenda item, have informal discussions over lunch, and next bring back the “provisional agenda” when the session resumes in the afternoon. Russia sought clarification on consideration and adoption of agenda items when the when there’s no consensus on the provisional agenda itself. Skea responded that it is a matter of “pragmatism” given some agenda items are not so controversial to be adopted.

India responded that agenda items cannot be “cherry-picked” and the fact that it is a “provisional” agenda means the possibility of adding items to the agenda, hence urging the Chair to find “time and space” for the timeline matter. Saudi Arabia underlined that the Chair’s proposal is procedurally not correct”, that all agenda items need to be approved before any discussion.

New Zealand, Ireland, Germany, Luxembourg, , Turkey, Sweden, France, Panama, Norway, Finland, Singapore, France, Canada, Colombia, and Chile supported the approach of informal consultations proposed by the Chair, with a view to reach conclusions at P-65.

South Africa stated that informal consultations may not be “inclusive” and expressed placing on record that the timeline is an important issue. It said that understanding the various concerns, it will try to be “flexible where possible” in order to reach a decision at the session. Burundi extending support said that the matter should figure on the agenda to agree upon it by “consensus”. Kenya echoed about inclusivity issue as regards informal consultations, underscoring that members have indicated a lot of “willingness” to discuss constructively and hence, urging to start discussion on the matter.

Vice-Chair Ladislaus Chang’a (Tanzania) next suggested a “break”, to which Chair Skea requested him to convene a “huddle” on the issue. In his report back, Vice-Chair Chang’a stated about reaching an agreement to include “progress” on the timeline in the agenda and to also establish a contact group (CG) on how to make progress.

Following some divergences over whether the focus is on merely “process” or also “substance” [which later played out in the contact group and plenary] of the timeline, the final agreed language on the CG mandate was: “To advise the Panel on the progress with the timeline of the AR7”. Further, the terms of reference agreed that the CG will start the next day on 25 March, with a view to report back to the panel on 26 March. On resources, the CG will build on but not be limited to documents produced on the AR7 timeline at P-61, P-62, P-63.

An information document providing snapshots on the timeline discussion from P-60 through current P-64, with the terms of reference in annex, was also made available by the secretariat to members to inform the discussions.

[It is to be noted that despite absence of consensus on an accelerated timeline, at P-61, the strategic planning schedule proposed delivery dates of the reports were as follows: WGI report in May 2028, WGII report in June 2028 and WGIII report in July-August 2028. Further, at P-62, the proposed implementation plans of WGI, WGII and WGIII continued in showing the same timeline of the delivery of the reports. And, at P-63, the workplan of the three WG reports was presented with placeholders for the schedule. The conference room paper [CRP02] which presented the three WG timelines in a tabular format by the Co-Chairs, displayed only minimal changes with the timeline still ending in 2028, leaving majority of vital concerns of key proponents like India, Saudi Arabia, China, Kenya, and South Africa not being accommodated, who argued for a reasonable timeline to complete in 2029.]

Deadlock at contact group over “process” versus “substance”

Next day on 25 March, at the contact group co-chaired by Brazil and Canada, a key dispute arose over whether the mandate on “progress” of the timeline meant only on the “process” issue of moving forward or also on “substantive” elements.

India said that the mandate is not restricted to the process issue, but this space is an opportunity for “alternative proposals,” that it was ready and be allowed to present its proposal on the screen – a table of alternative timeline and milestones [with completion of WGI in 2028 and WGII, WGIII in 2029], which can then be compared and reasoned out vis-à-vis existing proposal by the Co-Chairs. It laid out three broad “principles” on which the timeline is based – allowing sufficient time for governments to conduct reviews with no back-to-back reviews; allowing for non-overlaps of reviews with sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies and the COP; providing minimum period to authors to absorb review comments given volume of comments expected between end of reviews and subsequent lead author meetings. It highlighted “inclusivity” of perspectives, work and contributions from developing countries as a crucial issue.

Saudi Arabia supported India’s proposal as a constructive way forward  to have a “structured” discussion on the matter towards an agreement that allows for the adoption of the budget at the next session.

China agreed with the sentiments expressed and said that the mandate is not procedural only and highlighted the importance of “solidarity” under current international circumstances and that agreement on this crucial matter would demonstrate significant progress in “multilateralism”. It pointed out that the divergence has both political and technical aspects – keeping the political aside, focusing on the technical entails “feasibility” and “inclusiveness” as two key criteria especially for developing countries who face capacity constraints and hence, need more time for government and expert reviews to ensure a solid AR7. With a focus on the two key criteria, solutions can then be found “collectively and cooperatively”.

Kenya also stated its understanding to discuss the matter substantively, supporting the “principles” outlined by India on the timeline and its proposal as the “basis”, stressing on “balance” between timelines and inclusivity.

Russia agreed with the option of India’s proposal to be projected on the screen for discussion, and was further reiterated by Saudi Arabia who pointed out that now is the time and space to consider member’s proposal as opposed to only the Co-Chairs proposal on the table. India requested again for its proposal on the screen, to unlock the impasse, and to start “factual” discussion based on its detailed analysis of the Co-Chairs’ proposal and the rationale behind its alternative timeline.

However, Antigua and Barbuda, Switzerland, Panama, UK, Germany, Sweden, Australia, Italy, France, Korea, and Belize, showed little or no interest in talking about the substance, arguing that such talks in “circles” on member proposals would be pointless and expressed preference for the Co-Chairs’ proposal, confining the mandate to only the “procedural” aspect of progress on the timeline in terms of the way forward. Chile even suggested exploring “alternatives” going back to the decision of P-60 in Istanbul on the “sequence” of the WG reports and explore “different sequencing” as alternative options, which was supported by Panama as well as Antigua and Barbuda.

China intervened to highlight the principles raised by India as the “starting point” of the timeline discussion and suggested comparison of the proposals for a “reasonable and rational” debate based on inclusiveness and feasibility. It urged for “equal flexibility” from all to address the issue pragmatically, and made clear that the sequencing of the WG reports should not be changed. Kenya also registered that flexibility is being asked “disproportionately”, further supporting India’s proposal as the way forward.

Saudi Arabia pointed out that in practice, proposals are put on the screen for discussion and hence, expressed utter dismay at partners were “blocking efforts to engage” with their flexibility out of question. This “risks the budget next year”, and cautioned on leaving next year’s activities in limbo.

India requested to put all proposals on the screen including of Chile [on the sequencing of reports] for discussion with “confidence”. China next suggested a “bridging proposal” as a “middle ground” – that proposals are not put on screen but the secretariat summarises the key points and the rationale of options, in the form of a “conference room paper or a non-paper”, which would form the basis for talks. South Africa suggested to have “options” on the table to consider them between now and P-65.

In conclusion, Brazil as the co-chair of the contact group stated that there is “no convergence” on the matter having heard many “different” proposals, and that he would consult Chair Skea on the way forward, which it reported back at the plenary.

Saudi Arabia made clear to the Chair about the “resistance to engage” on the different proposals, which was seconded by Russia and India.

Chair Skea responded that he would discuss with the co-chairs of the contact group on the concerns raised by Saudi Arabia, with the contact group meeting again later in the afternoon.

 However, no substantial movement or progress was made in the session with no change in entrenched positions. Singapore considering views of members and to cater to those who were absent at the session [addressing the key issue of inclusivity], suggested “call for submissions” for the secretariat to compile and present at P-65 as the basis for discussion.

However, with no clear agreement in sight on the way forward of the matter, Canada as the co-chair of the contact group announced in closing that there is “far from consensus on the next contact group”, which it reported back in the plenary and subsequently, the contact group mode of work was dropped in the process.

No decision adopted due to lack of consensus

On 26 March, a report back of the contact group to the plenary was conducted as agreed, where members elaborated and stuck to their firmly held positions. Chair Skea opened floor for members to comment on the process of way forward towards P-65 and also on any specific ideas on the timeline issue.

Saudi Arabia requested for a “task group” to be formed at this session in terms of process towards effectively reaching an agreement on the timeline, which was supported by Egypt, Russia, India, Libya, Kenya, Algeria, Bahrain, Belarus and China. This proposal however was faced with stiff opposition.

Chair Skea next proposed that the Panel will decide to entrust the Chair and the secretariat for an “options paper” to circulate to members to reach a decision at P-65. He also requested Vice-Chair Chang’a to conduct a huddle on the matter.

On the concluding day on 27 March, a draft decision by the Chair was presented to the Panel for consideration, entrusting the Chair and the secretariat “to facilitate an exchange on the timeline of the AR7 with the view to reach a decision at IPCC-65 including through overseeing a Task Group established by the Panel” with a terms of reference containing the mandate, modus operandi, composition [of the Task Group], and resources which included a “compilation of views collected on the timeline”.

The option of “no text” was called by Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Chile, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Colombia, Nepal, Cook Islands, Sweden, France, Turkiye, Finland, Switzerland, Italy, Belize, Germany, New Zealand, Haiti, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Estonia, Palau, Australia, UK, Samoa, Ukraine, Maldives and Vanuatu.

While on the other hand, the draft decision was supported by India, Brazil, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, China, Belarus, Egypt, Libya, Angola, Tanzania, Venezuela, Cuba, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Nigeria, Bahrain, Botswana, Tunisia, Azerbaijan, Iraq and Turkmenistan. South Africa emphasizing on its sole purpose of being constructive and finding solutions, expressed that it agreed to the Chair’s proposal of an options paper.

The next revised proposal of a draft decision, was put forward by Vice Chair Chang’a, “to defer further consideration of the workplan.....to the sixty-fifth session of the IPCC”. 

Seeing that the two draft decisions neither gained “consensus” nor ended up in “firm conclusions”, Chair Skea, therefore, stated that he regretfully is forced to “conclude without a decision” recalling relevant principle 10 on the use of all best endeavours to reach consensus.

India registered that the P-64 report include the discussion on the addition of the timeline in the agenda for the record which was supported by Saudi Arabia.

The next P-65 provisional agenda will be closely watched on whether the timeline of the AR7 reports will be included in the agenda and how to reach a balanced agreement by the Panel by consensus.