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Belém Climate News Update No. 19 COP30 marks milestone on adaptation agenda Kuala Lumpur, 4 December (Eqram Mustaqeem) – COP30 and the seventh session of the meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement [CMA7] will be remembered as an important milestone on the adaptation agenda, with key decisions on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), and National Adaptation Plan (NAPs), along with the establishment of a new adaptation finance goal. On the GGA, Parties had three mandates to deliver. First, is the two-year ‘UAE-Belém Work Programme (UBWP) on indicators’ as per decision 2/CMA.5; second, is to develop the modalities for the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) as per decision 3/CMA.6; and lastly to continue consideration on ‘transformational adaptation’ as per decision 2/CMA.5. [In Dubai in 2023, via decision 2/CMA.5 Parties agreed that the GGA thematic targets will cover water, food and agriculture, health, ecosystems and biodiversity, infrastructure and human settlements, poverty eradication and livelihoods and protection of cultural heritage, while the dimensional targets are impact, vulnerability and risk assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring, evaluation and learning.] It was an arduous task, particularly on finalising the list of indicators through the UBWP which were undertaken through discussions in ‘informal-informals’ format [among Parties only and closed to observers], that went on hours on end, on top of informal consultations that dealt with other aspects of the GGA decision. Ultimately, the GGA decision delivered on all three mandates. The UBWP was concluded with a finalised list of indicators, attached as an annex to the decision. Further guidance was given to the BAR, and transformational adaptation was given consideration in the decision text. [See details below]. On the NAP negotiations, which has not seen a decision since COP27, Parties were able to arrive at a decision in Belem, largely due to the compromise of developing countries. The compromises and bridging proposals advanced by developing countries—from June 2023 through to COP30 in Belém—were pivotal in breaking the deadlock and enabling a long-awaited decision on NAPs. This outcome came after nearly three years of stalled negotiations, largely due to developed countries’ resistance to language affirming their obligation to provide finance for the formulation and implementation of NAPs. [See further details below]. Further, a new adaptation finance goal was reached to triple adaptation finance by 2035. The proposal, put forward by a united bloc of developing countries received vehement opposition from developed countries from the very start of the GGA negotiations until the final day of Mutirão negotiations on 22nd November, as part of the Belem Political Package, which dealt with the adaptation finance decision. [See TWN Update 18 for further details] This article provides a breakdown on the key aspects of the GGA and NAP decisions, along with the new adaptation finance goal. GLOBAL GOAL ON ADAPTATION The adoption of the GGA decision at the closing plenary on Nov. 22nd attracted much controversy with several countries expressing concerns with the indicators list. However, as the objections came after the gavelling of the decision, no changes could be made to the decision adopted. Countries who raised objections included Colombia for the Independent Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean States (AILAC), Panama, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, the European Union [EU], Switzerland and Canada. [See TWN Update 13 for further details] The Belem Adaptation Indicators The work of the UBWP on indicators concluded with a list of 59 indicators based on the final list of 100 indicators, developed by the technical experts, named the “Belém Adaptation Indicators”. The indicators were adopted as an annex in the main decision text. A thorough list of disclaimers was made on the indicators as outlined in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the text. Para 7 states that the indicators “are voluntary, non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, global in nature, respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances and country-driven, and that the indicators should not create additional reporting burdens, particularly for developing country Parties, are not intended to serve as a basis for comparison among Parties, shall not become a barrier and shall not be used under any circumstances as a condition for developing country Parties to access funding under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.” Para 8 states that “the Belém Adaptation Indicators do not create new financial obligations or commitments, nor liability or compensation.” Para 9 “affirms that the Belém Adaptation Indicators are intended to inform national approaches to tracking adaptation action and progress and shall not create new obligations for developing country Parties, benchmarks or evaluation criteria, nor establish global standardized methodologies or data-collection processes, nor establish any compliance frameworks, nor prejudice any Party’s position or imply acceptance of elements inconsistent with national circumstances or with the principles and provisions of the Convention and the Paris Agreement.” The indicators through paragraph 10 also emphasised “the importance of cross-cutting considerations, including by acknowledging the contributions of children, youth, people with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, people of African descent and migrants to adaptation, and the importance of consideration of gender, human rights, intergenerational equity and social justice, and participatory and fully transparent approaches.” Paragraph 11 “Encourages Parties, as appropriate and at their discretion, to test the Belém Adaptation Indicators, including in consultation with relevant practitioners and other stakeholders.” Paragraph 12 “Invites Parties to integrate the targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5 and the Belém Adaptation Indicators into, and to make use of these indicators as appropriate and as relevant in, their reporting and planning processes, including with regard to their biennial transparency reports, adaptation communications, national adaptation plans, nationally determined contributions and national communications”. Further, the annex to the decision carrying the list of indicators outlined that the indicators may be disaggregated by; (a) Social categories; (b) Climate-related hazards (with this category remaining flexible to reflect the different hazards faced by countries); (c) Geographical characteristics, accounting for different physical and regional contexts; (d) Ecosystems; (e) Administrative and settlement levels; (f) Type of adaptation measures; (g) (1) to disaggregate the dimensional target indicators referred to in paragraph 10 of decision 2/CMA.5, in order to reflect the full adaptation cycle characteristics of each thematic sector and (2) disaggregation by thematic sector under the thematic target indicators to capture interlinkages between different thematic targets; (h) Subcomponents of the targets referred to in paragraph 9 of decision 2/CMA.5. Further, as outlined in paragraph 16, the secretariat will prepare a technical paper, to be considered by CMA8, on “the targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5, and the Belém Adaptation Indicators, by 30 September 2026, which will (1) consider the use of the indicators; (2) include a mapping of existing synthesis report processes on adaptation information relevant to the global goal on adaptation; (3) identify synergies as well as gaps and potential ways to fill those gaps; and (4) analyse guidelines, tools and methodologies for aggregating the Belém Adaptation Indicators.” Through paragraphs 17, 18 and 19, the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund were all invited to support developing countries in implementing the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience. Lastly, paragraph 13 emphasised that the Belém Adaptation Indicators will constitute a source of input, including through reporting by Parties, to the global stocktake. Belém-Addis Vision The Belém-Addis Vision (BAV) was established through paragraph 21 of the decision adopted. It comprises of a two-year policy alignment process by Parties and technical work aimed at developing guidance for operationalising the indicators under the BAV. [If the UBWP was intended to establish the indicators, the BAV can be seen as post-indicator establishment work, for the purpose of operationalising the indicators.] It was also agreed in paragraph 22 that the work under the BAV on adaptation will be carried out jointly by the subsidiary bodies [SBs]. As per paragraph 23, the SBs are requested “to undertake technical work on improving metadata and methodologies for the Belem Adaptation Indicators, to be considered by CMA.9 (November 2027), including by establishing a technical taskforce to contribute to that work.” On the review of the indicators The review of the indicators will be undertaken as part of the review of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience after the second global stocktake in 2029 as outlined in paragraph 32 of the decision. Further in paragraph 33, it is decided that the terms of reference for the review shall be developed and agreed by the SBs in 2026–2027. Baku Adaptation Roadmap [BAR] The BAR was launched with the aim of advancing progress in line with Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement, and to support the implementation of the elements outlined in paragraph 38 of decision from Dubai on the GGA [Decision 2/CMA.5.] The SBs were requested to develop modalities for work under the BAR. Understanding the work mandate of the BAR is critical in understanding how the GGA decision will further guide the BAR work. [Article 7.1of the PA states that “Parties hereby establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2.”] “Paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5 requests “the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to initiate consideration of matters… focusing on, inter alia: a) The exchange of knowledge, experience and information related to implementing the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, including in relation to efforts to achieve the targets…, with the aim of fostering implementation; b) The identification of potential inputs to future global stocktakes related to achieving the global goal on adaptation, including by considering how the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience can facilitate the analysis of information required for assessing progress towards the goal; c) The enhancement of understanding of, inter alia, the risks and impacts associated with different temperature increases across different regions; d) The opportunities for building on the best available science, including collaboration with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other organizations, to provide information relevant to facilitating implementation of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, including in relation to the targets…; to developing indicators, metrics and methodologies; and to identifying adaptation capacity gaps, challenges and the needs of developing countries; e) The development of terms of reference for reviewing the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, including the time frame for the review.] In the GGA decision adopted in Belem, Parties decided in paragraph 28 “that the work under the BAR shall be guided by the following: a) Aligning adaptation action with adequate adaptation responses in the context of the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, ensuring that national and global adaptation strategies and actions reflect the risks and needs arising from different warming increments within the temperature goal; b) Strengthening implementation of the targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5; c) Enhancing knowledge-sharing; d) Ensuring access to means of implementation for adaptation, for adequate, predictable and accessible financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support, including from developed country Parties to developing country Parties, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 1, and Articles 10–11, of the Paris Agreement.” Paragraph 29 decided that the first phase of the BAR, covering 2026–2028, “will focus on initial implementation of activities consisting of two workshops per year organized by the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies, and the preparation of a technical paper by the secretariat, aimed at enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening cooperation and facilitating adaptation planning and implementation in line with different national circumstances and in the context of Article 2, paragraph 1(a), of the Paris Agreement [which relates to the temperature goal].” The decision invites Parties to submit views on the focus of the workshops and the technical paper. Transformational adaptation In relation to the issue of ‘transformational adaptation’ paragraph 31 of the Belem decision emphasised that “no single adaptation approach shall be presented as the default, superior or universally applicable pathway, recognizing the essential role of diverse, nationally led, context-specific adaptation approaches that reflect national circumstances, priorities and needs in achieving the global goal on adaptation and strengthening global climate resilience.” The evolution of the NAPs draft text—especially in the sections addressing finance—alongside the compromises advanced by developing countries to secure consensus, underscores their strong commitment to achieving progress on the NAPs agenda.Despite sustained attempts by developed countries to dilute or eliminate references to the gaps and needs for finance in relation to NAPs, key provisions on this issue remained embedded in the final decision text. Below are the highlights from the decision text encompassing the assessment of the NAP process and further work. From the decision text, the needs and gap for NAP financing that has been an issue for developing countries was made clear. Amongst them is paragraph 9 which noted “with concern that funding provided to developing country Parties for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, bilateral and multilateral programmes, and other channels, remains inadequate and that the resulting significant financial gap remains a barrier to the effective and timely implementation of national adaptation plans”. Paragraph 10 also noted with concern “despite efforts made by relevant actors to streamline and simplify access to finance for the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans, delayed access to such finance continues to significantly hinder progress in adaptation action and resilience, including towards achieving the global goal on adaptation.” The importance of effectively tracking the provision of adaptation finance for the formulation and implementation of NAPs by developing countries is also noted in paragraph 11. Paragraph 12 “Requests the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to compile from relevant reports, in collaboration with the Adaptation Committee and the Standing Committee on Finance, an overview of climate finance flows and financial support provided by developed country Parties to developing country Parties for formulating and implementing national adaptation plans for inclusion in the 2026 report on progress in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans to be prepared for consideration at the sixty-fifth session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (November 2026)”. The importance of the NAP as a channel for the achievement of the thematic and dimensional targets of the GGA was reiterated in paragraph 23. On further work, paragraph 17 noted “the gaps and needs referred to in the 2024 synthesis report by the secretariat on progress towards the achievement of the objectives of the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, including in terms of the provision of adequate and predictable finance, technology transfer and capacity-building support, and in relation to access to adequate data on downscaled and localized climate scenarios for use in impact, vulnerability and risk assessments, and to tools for collecting and assimilating national data on climate variables and on socioeconomic risks and vulnerabilities and for designing adaptation actions to address medium- and long-term needs.” Through paragraph 18, the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group were requested to enhance their work on addressing the gaps and needs referred to in paragraph 17 above and to include information thereon in their annual reports. Further, paragraph 24 decided that the next assessment of progress in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans will take place at COP35 [2030]. Paragraph 25 then requests the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to make recommendations on the actions and steps necessary for it to initiate the assessment at SB70 (June 2029) for consideration and adoption by COP34 (November 2029). NEW ADAPTATION FINANCE GOAL Undoubtedly, the biggest political fight in the adaptation agenda at COP30 was over the new adaptation finance goal was fiercely contested and opposed by developed countries in both GGA and the Mutirão negotiations. The need for a new adaptation finance goal was critical, particularly as the original goal outlined in the Glasgow Climate Pact was due to expire in 2025. The goal was outlined in paragraph 18, decision 1/CMA.3 and reads as follows: “Urges developed country Parties to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources, recalling Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement” The original proposal on the new adaptation finance goal made by developing countries called upon developed country Parties to at least triple their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2025 levels by 2030 reaching at least to USD 120 to 150 USD billion per year by 2030… in line with Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. However, due to the strong resistance by developed countries who made it clear that the new adaptation finance goal was their “super-red line”, the final agreed upon language in the GGA decision was as follows; “34. Takes note of paragraph 53 of decision -/CMA.7 [which refers to the Global Mutirao decision of Belem], in which it reaffirms the doubling by 2025 in paragraph 18 of decision 1/CMA.3 [which refers to the Glasgow decision], calls for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of decision 1/CMA.6 [which refers to the Baku decision last year on the new collective quantified goal on finance(NCQG) ], including paragraph 16 thereof, and urges developed country Parties to increase the trajectory of their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties.” [Paragraph 16 decision 1/CMA.6 from Baku reads: “Decides that a significant increase of public resources should be provided through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund and also decides to pursue efforts to at least triple annual outflows from those Funds from 2022 levels by 2030 at the latest with a view to significantly scaling up the share of finance delivered through them in delivering on the goal contained in paragraph 8 above.] [Paragraph 8 decision 1/CMA.6 reaffirms …Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and decides to set a goal, in extension of the goal referred to in paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP.21, with developed country Parties taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action: a) From a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources; b) In the context of meaningful and ambitious mitigation and adaptation action, and transparency in implementation; c) Recognizing the voluntary intention of Parties to count all climate-related outflows from and climate-related finance mobilized by multilateral development banks towards achievement of the goal set forth in this paragraph.”] It is evident that, compared to the original proposal from developing countries, the decision on the new adaptation finance goal was significantly diluted. Whereas the initial proposal set a clear target to triple adaptation finance by 2030 relative to 2025 levels, the final agreement is vague on the baseline year and pushes the timeline back to 2035. Further, while the original draft contained clear language on tripling adaptation finance—specifically as provision from developed to developing countries, amounting to a minimum of USD 120–150 billion annually—the final text shifts this commitment into the framework of the Baku NCQG decision. This reframing emphasizes mobilisation from a broad mix of sources—public and private, bilateral and multilateral—without establishing any concrete target for the provision of finance. [See also TWN Update on the Global Mutirão decision.]
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