

Bonn Climate News Updates

(June 2026)

TWN
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NOTE

This is a compilation of News Updates prepared by the Third World Network for and during the June UN Climate Meetings – encompassing the 64th sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 64) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 64) – held in Bonn, Germany, from 8 to 18 June 2026.

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Bonn Climate News Update

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Global turmoil shadows Bonn climate talks

Bonn, 8 June (Meena Raman*) – The 64th sessions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)'s Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) are convening in Bonn, Germany, from 8 to 18 June 2026, presided over by SBI Chair Julia Gardiner (Australia) and SBSTA Chair Adonia Ayebare (Uganda). The intersessional meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) will advance work on the decisions adopted last year in Belém, Brazil, paving the way for the next set of decisions to be taken at the annual yearend climate talks scheduled this 9–20 November in Antalya, Türkiye.

The SB meetings unfold against a backdrop of immense human suffering and devastation, driven by the ongoing illegal wars waged by the United States and Israel in the Middle East. The fallout has triggered a massive energy and food crisis, affecting millions across the Global South. According to a recent report by the Energy Transitions Commission, 75% of the world's population live in fossil-fuel-importing countries. The ripple effects of war and the conflict over the Strait of Hormuz are profound.

Many developing country governments are forced to divert scarce funds away from other basic needs towards securing energy alternatives. Some developing countries which are facing mounting financial pressures have even been forced to scale back their participation at the SB 64 sessions as part of austerity measures.

The current energy shock arrives at a perilous moment for the UNFCCC process. In the short term, energy scarcity, rising fuel prices and consequent

pressures have pushed some governments towards emergency fixes: coal restarts, long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) contracts and fuel subsidies that can lock in emissions for years. At the same time, the crisis has also generated pressures to recast renewables, storage and grid resilience as instruments of national energy and economic security, rather than only climate policy.

The current moment has laid bare that transitioning away from fossil fuels is far easier said than done. To succeed, it must be carried out in a way that ensures the burden does not once again fall on the poor, but instead advances transitions that are just, orderly and equitable.

However, just when climate finance is most needed from developed countries, there have been significant cutbacks of funds to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The latest replenishment to the GEF saw a 27% cut from the previous period, from \$5.33 billion (for the period 2022–26) to \$3.9 billion (for 2026–30). Also, the United Kingdom has reduced its pledge to the GCF by about 50%, from GBP1.62 billion to GBP815 million for the period 2024–27. Clearly, all these cuts do not bode well for the GCF's forthcoming replenishment cycle for the period 2028–31.

Also deeply troubling is the surge of climate denialism in many parts of the Global North, fuelled by the US – the world's largest historical polluter – refusing to be bound by the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement (PA) to curb its emissions or to provide climate finance. Adding insult to injury, the Trump administration has just announced \$700 million in federal support to boost the country's coal industry!

At the same time, extreme weather events are unfolding across the globe, with unbearable heatwaves scorching entire regions, while massive torrential rains unleash floods and destruction, compounding human suffering even further. These contrasting events, all happening simultaneously, reinforce the challenges faced in adapting to climate impacts and in addressing loss and damage, especially in developing countries which are already cash-strapped.

These developments will inevitably frame the debates at the two-week climate talks. What remains uncertain is whether the entrenched North-South divide will once again overshadow the negotiations, or whether a new spirit of cooperation can finally break through, closing the gap and driving real implementation of commitments under the climate regime.

The following are highlights of some of the key issues at SB 64.

Adaptation

The spotlight on adaptation is on advancing the Belém decision 12/CMA.7 in respect of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). An important aspect of this is the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR), which was launched in 2024 at CMA 6 with the aim of advancing progress in line with Article 7.1 of the PA on the GGA. (The CMA is the Conference of Parties to the PA.)

The Belém decision, through paragraph 28, decided that the work under the BAR “shall be guided by the following: (a) Aligning adaptation action with adequate adaptation responses in the context of the temperature goal of the PA, ensuring that national and global adaptation strategies and actions reflect the risks and needs arising from different warming increments within the temperature goal; (b) Strengthening implementation of the [adaptation] targets ...; (c) Enhancing knowledge-sharing; (d) Ensuring access to means of implementation for adaptation, for adequate, predictable and accessible financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support, including from developed country Parties to developing country Parties, in accordance with Article 9.1, and Articles 10–11, of the PA”.

Paragraph 29 of the Belém decision decided that the first phase of the BAR covering the timeframe

of 2026–28 shall focus on initial implementation of activities, consisting of two workshops per year organized by the SB Chairs, and the preparation of a technical paper by the secretariat. Paragraph 30 invited Parties to make submissions on the focus of the workshops and the technical paper.

The first workshop under the BAR is scheduled to take place on 9 June. An information note of 26 May states that the SB Chairs have selected the topic for the workshop: “Coherence across the UNFCCC adaptation architecture, and means of implementation (MOI) for adaptation”.

According to sources, several developed countries objected to the workshop’s focus on MOI for adaptation during the consultations convened by the SB Chairs prior to the Bonn session. Some developing country groups were of the view that, instead of the focus on coherence across the adaptation architecture, the workshop should focus on the more important issues of specific gaps, obstacles and challenges of the GGA and possible solutions for effectively addressing the difficulties encountered in the implementation of adaptation actions by developing countries. Exactly what the workshop will focus on given the divergent views aired by Parties remains to be seen.

Further, the SB Chairs have proposed that the technical paper will consider the following topic: “Strengthening implementation of the GGA targets through enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening cooperation and facilitating adaptation planning and implementation”.

During the consultations with the SB Chairs, sources said, several developed and developing countries expressed the view that the proposed topic of the technical paper was too broad and that they would provide further reflections on this during the Bonn session.

On the issue of indicators for the GGA, in Belém, work concluded with the adoption of a list of 59 indicators developed by technical experts, named the “Belém Adaptation Indicators”. Belém also established the Belém-Addis Vision (BAV), which comprises a two-year policy alignment process aimed at developing guidance for operationalizing the indicators, which will be considered at CMA 9 in 2027 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Mitigation Work Programme (MWP)

Continuation of the MWP

In decision [13/CMA.7](#), paragraph 15 recalled the mandate which decided that the MWP will continue until CMA 8 (2026) with a view to adopting a decision on the continuation of the MWP at that session. Submissions were invited for Parties to provide their views on the continuation of the MWP.

From a review of the various submissions by Parties, although there is no divergence on the continuation of the MWP, key differences revolve around proposals for the imposition of prescriptive, top-down mitigation targets, with linkages to the implementation of the global stocktake (GST) outcomes, in particular on global mitigation efforts especially with regard to paragraph 28 on “transitioning away from fossil fuels”.

It also remains to be seen how the European Union (EU)’s idea (in their submission) of exploring the setting up of a Mitigation Advisory Committee/Facilitative Mitigation Action Mechanism would be received by developing countries, given the developed countries’ emphasis on using the MWP as a ratcheting mechanism for mitigation ambition.

Developed countries, throughout the MWP discussions in the past, have expressed unhappiness about the MWP not being effective enough in scaling up ambition on mitigation. Several developing country groupings, on the other hand, have stressed that the mandate of the MWP calls for outcomes that are “non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances” and that “will not impose new targets or goals”. Hence, how the MWP will continue post 2026 is expected to be contentious.

MWP projects and Non-Market Approaches Platform (NMA Platform)

In Belém, paragraph 10 of decision [13/CMA.7](#) encourages Parties to “record projects” that they identify under the MWP on the NMA Platform under Article 6.8 of the PA.

The idea of using the NMA Platform arose from several developing country groupings which advocated a digital platform as a facilitative tool to support the matchmaking activities that are

undertaken in the MWP, to ensure that MOI are provided to mitigation projects that are brought to the MWP’s global dialogues and investment-focused events.

(According to the UNFCCC website, “The NMA Platform is designed to record and exchange information on non-market approaches under Article 6.8 of the PA. It ... enables participating Parties and non-Party stakeholders to identify, develop and implement non-market approaches. The platform includes information on finance, technology and capacity-building support available or provided for these initiatives.”)

Paragraph 11 from the Belém decision requests SBSTA 64, in the context of the Article 6.8 work programme, to “consider ways to implement additional functionalities in the NMA Platform” that would enable Parties to record the projects through their national focal points for Article 6.8 and “enable interconnection” between the NMA Platform and other platforms, including national platforms for Parties that request it, with a view to the SBSTA recommending a draft decision on this matter for consideration by CMA 8.

Further, paragraph 12 requested the secretariat to prepare a technical paper exploring options for the operationalization of the additional feature and functionality of the NMA Platform. The technical paper which has been produced by the secretariat provides two options for consideration: option 1 provides for no changes to the NMA Platform, while option 2 provides for changes to the Platform.

Under option 1, the technical paper states that “No distinction would be made on the NMA Platform between projects identified” under the MWP “and NMAs recorded under the framework for them. The Platform would continue to function exclusively as a tool for recording and exchanging information on NMAs within the current scope.” Under option 2, “changes would be made to the NMA submission form and associated functionalities of the NMA Platform to accommodate the recording of a broader range of projects identified” under the MWP, “beyond those that would be eligible for recording under option 1 above, while retaining the overall focus of the Platform on NMAs”.

Meanwhile, it is also relevant to note that in paragraph 10 of decision [4/CMA.3](#) as regards Article 6.8, the SBSTA was requested to review

the work programme, including its activities, at SB 64 and SB 65 “with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the work programme ... and to make recommendations thereon for consideration and adoption by CMA 8”. As the NMA Platform is a key tool for implementing the work programme under the framework for non-market approaches, this will be another matter to watch in Bonn.

Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP)

In Belém, the landmark decision 2/CMA.7 on the Just Transition Work Programme developed a “just transition mechanism” (JTM), hailed as a resounding victory for developing countries given a history of tough negotiations in this regard. (See Belém TWN Update.) The G77 and China had made a strong and united call for a JTM in Belém.

At SB 64, Parties are supposed to advance work on three important and interrelated mandates: reflections on implementation of the JTWP; terms of reference for the review of the JTWP; and operationalization of the JTM.

While this year’s focus is on operationalizing the JTM – with the key issues expected to centre on the governance and the critical MOI needed for just transitions as called by developing countries – the main point of contention in Bonn is likely to be the sequencing of work, and on how to advance work on the three mandates in a balanced manner.

Under paragraph 24 of the JTWP decision from Belém, Parties requested “the secretariat to map relevant instruments, initiatives and processes under the Convention and the Paris Agreement and relevant entities in the United Nations system to support the implementation of the work programme and as input to the review”, and for “the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report”.

The mapping exercise has been a contentious issue because developed countries had used it as a justification for rejecting developing country proposals to establish the JTM last year. This year, from the submissions by Parties on the process for operationalization of the JTM, the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) and the EU have again stressed the importance of the mapping exercise to serve as the foundation for the development of the JTM. According to sources, the SB Chairs had informed Parties that the secretariat will publish

an initial version of the report of the mapping to support the work in Bonn, which, at the time of writing, is not available yet.

Sources informed that during the informal virtual consultations convened by the SB Chairs on 1 June ahead of SB 64, developing countries led by the G77 and China called for the terms of reference for the JTWP review to be finalized in Bonn and for progress towards operationalizing the JTM, while continuing to strengthen international cooperation and mobilize MOI. In contrast, developed countries, notably the EIG and the EU, stated that their immediate priority is to discuss the findings of the secretariat’s mapping exercise, stressing that this should inform the review of the JTWP and the operationalization of the JTM.

Finance

There are two sub-agenda items on finance: (i) matters relating to the Adaptation Fund (AF); and (ii) second review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). According to sources, the item on the SCF is expected to be deferred.

Apart from these two items, also in the spotlight are mandated events from COP 30 in Belém. One is on how to meaningfully advance work on the “two-year work programme on climate finance” (known as the Climate Finance Work Programme or CFWP) established by the “Global Mutirão” decision from Belém. This is viewed by developing countries as key to the implementation of Article 9.1 of the PA on the mandatory provision of climate finance by developed countries to developing countries. The other mandate from Belém is the “Veredas Dialogue” on Article 2.1(c) of the PA. [Article 2.1(c) refers to “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development”.]

Climate Finance Work Programme, including on Article 9.1 of the PA

In the Global Mutirão decision, paragraph 54 decided “to establish a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1 ... in the context of Article 9 ... as a whole” (with a footnote stating: “Without prejudging the process for the implementation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance.”)

[The CFWP was the result of gruelling negotiations led by the COP 30 Presidency. It was a compromise from the original agenda item proposal by the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) that was backed by the G77 and China. The watered-down formulation was driven by developed countries which made clear that they were willing to discuss Article 9.1 but within the entirety of Article 9 – largely in the context of the mobilization of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG). (See Belém TWN Update.)]

The appointed Co-Chairs of the CFWP, Yolando Velasco (the Philippines) and Apollonia Miola (European Union), invited submissions to initiate work as soon as possible. The G77 and China have called for a dedicated space for Parties to discuss how to achieve the implementation of Article 9.1, including a clear outcome for the CFWP.

Following virtual informal consultations on 28 May, the Co-Chairs released their workplan for 2026–27 outlining the objective, expected outcomes, proposed themes, overall approach, timelines, milestones and outputs. The workplan provides for “engagement workshops in conjunction with SB 64”. This approach is likely to raise concerns among some developing countries on how the substance and status of the work will formally feed into CMA 8 to be held in Antalya.

According to sources, the G77 and China is expected to request a modification to the mode of work at SB 64 as regards the CFWP workplan, and for a dedicated space to be provided to Parties to gather views on the scope and modalities of the work programme, with a view to adopting a decision at CMA 8 that will decisively lead towards the fulfilment of obligations under Article 9.1.

Developing countries have said that the CFWP is of critical importance to them, especially in the context of further depletion of already minimal financial resources in the operating entities of the UNFCCC’s Financial Mechanism (such as the GCF, the GEF and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage), with no ambitious replenishments in sight, putting in jeopardy the amount of climate finance available. The recent announcements of cuts in climate finance by the UK, Canada and Germany add fodder to such concerns, made worse by the withdrawal of the US altogether from both the Convention and the PA.

The workplan for the CFWP does not clearly indicate formal consideration of work at CMA 8. In addition, there is no specific CFWP agenda item indicated in the elements of the provisional CMA 8 agenda listed in Annex IV of a document on “Arrangements for intergovernmental meetings” to be considered by SBI 64 in Bonn. It can be expected that the G77 and China will raise the need for a specific agenda item on the CFWP on the provisional CMA 8 agenda.

Veredas Dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the PA

The first meeting of the Veredas Dialogue on the implementation of Article 2.1(c) of the PA and its complementarity with Article 9 of the PA, is scheduled for 9–10 June and is to be co-chaired by Debra-Lee Swanepoel (South Africa) and Ralien Bekkers (the Netherlands)

As there is no common understanding on the scope of Article 2.1(c) or the manner of its implementation, discussions under the Veredas Dialogue could prove contentious unless duly guided by the “safeguards” provided for in paragraph 3 of the Belém decision, secured collectively by developing countries.

Developing countries view the safeguards as “guardrails” which are foundational for any consideration of the matter, outlining the scope of the safeguards as being “bottom-up, nationally determined; that there is no common interpretation of Article 2.1(c); [that the dialogue should be] non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative of exchange of views; respectful of national sovereignty, including fiscal and monetary sovereignty, will not place additional burden; is consistent with the principles and provisions of the PA – with CBDR&RC [common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities] as a key element, equity, country-driven and -owned, sustainable development and poverty eradication”. Their concerns stemmed from the push by developed countries for top-down, “prescriptive”, “common” or “global” implementation of Article 2.1(c), which it was feared would infringe upon national sovereignty and fail to take into account the different national circumstances of developing countries. (See Belém TWN Update.) In Bonn, whether deliberations will indeed be guided by the safeguards will be keenly watched.

The Co-Chairs' workplan outlines the organization of work in 2026, including expected outputs, summary of milestones and timeline, and reflections on the Veredas Dialogue process going forward, which sets out areas that may be addressed in 2026 and beyond with the concerns and safeguards as a cross-cutting element.

Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund

There are three matters under consideration: arrangements for the AF to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement; membership of the AF Board; and the fifth review of the AF. The CMP (Conference of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) and the CMA requested SBI 64 to continue consideration of the three matters on the basis of the work (that resulted in a draft negotiating text) undertaken at SBI 63 in Belém. (See Belém TWN Update.)

Ensuring the AF's smooth transition to exclusively serve the PA is seen as an urgent priority by developing countries under the G77 and China. This time-sensitive matter has been in a deadlock since SB 62 (June 2025) on a largely procedural issue. Developing countries have maintained that the matter should not be held hostage by developed countries linking it to the issue of membership of the AF Board, which is a separate matter under consideration with political implications.

The key contentious issue is whether there should be three separate decisions or a single decision on the three matters under consideration. Developing countries prefer the former, while developed countries prefer the latter. The draft negotiating text from SB 63 reflects the positions in the headings (which are in brackets, denoting lack of agreement) of the three matters. The substance of the matters has been agreed to in principle.

Developing countries view the institutional arrangements (new trustee arrangements; memorandum of understanding regarding secretariat services; governance-related decisions) necessary for the smooth transition of the AF to exclusively serve the PA, as a matter of urgent priority necessitating a standalone separate decision. On the other hand, developed countries have linked the institutional arrangements to the membership of the AF Board, as a "package".

The AF Board membership matter is politically controversial as it relates to a change in terminology from "Annex I"/"non-Annex I" Parties (referring to developed and developing countries respectively under the Convention) to "developed" and "developing" countries (as referred to generically in the PA). It is to be noted that any change in the composition and numbers of the Board in the garb of change in terminology is seen as non-negotiable by developing countries.

The G77 and China is expected to raise the matter to the SBI Chair with a request to separate the three matters into three separate sub-items so that it leads to three separate decisions without linkage to each other.

Technology development and transfer

Among the sub-agenda items on technology are: (i) the joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre (CTC) and Network; (ii) alignment between processes pertaining to the review of the CTC and Network and the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism; (iii) host of the CTC; and (iv) linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism.

One of the priority issues is the new host of the CTC. According to the evaluation report by the host selection panel, six proposals were considered for evaluation, out of the 22 proposals received by the panel. Of the six, two proposals have been shortlisted by the panel for the consideration of Parties at the SB session: (i) the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); and (ii) the United Nations Industrial Development Organization–United Nations Office for Project Services (UNIDO-UNOPS) consortium. According to sources, a key issue that will shape discussions on this matter is the host's ability to mobilize funding for its activities.

The other critical issue which was not concluded in Belém centres on the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism. SBI 63 could not reach a conclusion on the matter and COP 30 requested SBI 64 to continue consideration on the basis of the draft text prepared at SBI 62 in Bonn last year. What progress will be made remains to be seen.

Global stocktake

There are two mandated events arising from the outcomes of the first GST agreed to in Dubai in 2023: (i) the UAE dialogue in relation to paragraph 97 of the GST decision; and (ii) the annual GST dialogue in relation to paragraph 187 of the decision.

Paragraph 97, which is placed under the section on “Finance” in the decision, decided that there be a “UAE dialogue on implementing the global stocktake outcomes”. The scope of the UAE dialogue had been a matter of intense contention. Paragraph 187 relates to the “sharing of knowledge and good practices on how the outcomes of the global stocktake are informing the preparation of Parties’ next nationally determined contributions (NDCs)”. In Belém, compromises were reached on these matters. (See [Belém TWN Update](#).)

UAE dialogue

Paragraph 2 of decision [3/CMA.7](#) decided that the modalities of the dialogue will “facilitate the sharing of experience and of information on opportunities, challenges, barriers and needs, including with a focus on the provision of finance, capacity-building, and technology development and transfer, as well as strengthened international cooperation as key enablers, in implementing the global stocktake outcomes”. In paragraph 1, Parties also agreed that the dialogue will take place “in the spirit of international cooperation, be facilitative and non-prescriptive, and respect the nationally determined manner and different national circumstances, pathways and approaches”.

CMA 7 also decided that the dialogue will be held annually in conjunction with SB 64 and SB 65, after which it will conclude. The SB Chairs have appointed Rita Mishaan (Guatemala) and Johanna Lissinger Peitz (Sweden) as co-facilitators of the dialogue for 2026–27. Further, it was decided that the reports of the dialogue will serve as inputs to the second GST (which will conclude in 2028).

At SB 64 in Bonn, the first [UAE dialogue](#) is scheduled to take place on 10–11 June. Parties provided their views via submissions, which show continued divergence over the scope of the dialogue, viz., whether the focus should be on the implementation of only finance-related elements (given the dialogue’s placement in the

GST decision under the “Finance” section and also considered as a finance agenda item under the CMA) or on all elements of the GST decision and be used as a tracking mechanism, with a focus especially on the contentious “homeless items” in the mitigation component contained in paragraph 28 on global efforts to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems.

Many developing countries also want the dialogue to serve as a space for discussing ways to enable implementation of Parties’ NDCs, instead of focusing on “ambition signalling”, to ensure scaling up of delivery of MOI. They are also keen to have a discussion on ways in which international cooperation can be enhanced and unilateral trade-related climate measures like Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) scaled down.

Annual GST dialogue

Paragraph 14 of decision [3/CMA.7](#) decided that the “annual global stocktake dialogue will conclude” at SB 64 and that it will “consider the resumption of the dialogue in the context of its consideration of the outcome of the second global stocktake”.

The mandate for the annual GST dialogue stems from paragraph 187 of the GST decision, which is placed under the “Guidance and way forward” section and refers to facilitating sharing of knowledge and experiences on how the GST outcomes inform Parties’ next NDCs. In Belém, CMA 7 considered the summary reports of the 2024 and 2025 dialogues. The contentious issue was over the purpose and continuation of the dialogue when NDCs have already been prepared and submitted by Parties.

At SB 64, the concluding [annual GST dialogue](#) is scheduled for 16 June. It is seen as an important opportunity and space by developing countries, as highlighted in their topic proposals for the dialogue, to discuss the critical issue of MOI for the implementation of NDCs, which lie at the core of climate action and ambition.

Climate and trade dialogue

Paragraph 57 of the Global Mutirão decision from Belém requested the SBs to hold a dialogue at SB 64 (2026), SB 66 (2027) and SB 68 (2028), with the participation of Parties and other stakeholders, “to consider opportunities, challenges and

barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade, taking into account paragraph 56”, and decided “to exchange experiences and views on related matters at a high-level event in 2028”. The decision also requested the SBs to present a report summarizing the discussions at the high-level event.

Paragraph 56 of the decision (which anchors Article 3.5 of the Convention) reaffirmed that “Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change and also reaffirms that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”.

The climate and trade dialogue was the result of very intense negotiations in Belém, led by the COP 30 Presidency, and was a compromise from the original agenda item proposed by the LMDC. Nevertheless, the Belém outcome in this regard was still seen as an important win, given that the matter had been vehemently opposed by developed countries, especially the EU, which did not want unilateral measures such as CBAMs to be discussed. The holding of a high-level event in 2028, and with the SBs presenting a report summarizing the discussions at the high-level event, elevates the dialogue to the political level, which is viewed as significant. (See Belém TWN Update.)

The first climate and trade dialogue at SB 64 is scheduled for 13 June. A concept note on the dialogue has been prepared by the secretariat under the guidance of the SB Chairs which states that “The dialogue will provide an opportunity to hear from relevant international organizations and other non-Party stakeholders, and to initiate discussions among Parties and other stakeholders under the above mandate.” The concept note provides for presentations from the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International Trade Centre (ITC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), with discussions to follow after each presentation among Parties and observers.

According to sources, developing countries are not happy with the way the dialogue has been designed and are expected to raise their concerns with the SB Chairs. The issues of concern include the lack of opportunity for Parties to engage in a dialogue among each other, and how to capture the outcome of the discussions.

Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA) and Belém Mission to 1.5

SB 64 will also see the first sessions of two initiatives that were launched at COP 30 through the Global Mutirão decision. Paragraph 41 of the decision launched the Global Implementation Accelerator as “a cooperative, facilitative and voluntary initiative” to “accelerate implementation across all actors to keep 1.5°C within reach and supporting countries in implementing their nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans [NAPs]”.

According to a note circulated by the secretariat, an “information session” on the GIA will be held on 12 June in which Parties and non-Party stakeholders are invited to share their responses on how the Accelerator “can best integrate tools, actors and resources that remain fragmented today with a view to producing exponential and cascading global effects”, and can add value to other voluntary action agendas.

Work under the GIA will happen under the guidance of the Presidencies of COP 30 (Brazil) and COP 31 (Turkiye and Australia). A second information session on the GIA will be held at SB 65, following which the Presidencies will present a summary report to CMA 8.

The “Belém Mission to 1.5” was launched under paragraph 42 of the Global Mutirão decision. A call for submissions was sent out for the Mission earlier this month and a consultation will be held during SB 64 as a “Presidency event” on 12 June with Parties and non-Party stakeholders. The Mission is “aimed at enabling ambition and implementation of NDCs and NAPs, to reflect on accelerating implementation, international cooperation and investment in NDCs and NAPs across mitigation and adaptation”. Work under the Mission will take place under the guidance of three Presidencies:

Azerbaijan (CMA 6), Brazil (CMA 7), and Türkiye and Australia (CMA 8). It will conclude at CMA 8 following the presentation of a summary report by the three Presidencies.

Fossil fuel and deforestation roadmaps

On the sidelines of SB 64, there will be COP 30 Presidency-led events on the “roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels” (12 June) and on the “roadmap on addressing deforestation” (8 June).

The COP 30 Presidency, on its own initiative, had invited Parties and non-Parties to make submissions giving their views on these topics. These roadmaps

are not on the negotiating agendas of the SBs, as there was no consensus in Belém to discuss them because they were not a part of the negotiation agenda at COP 30. However, the Brazilian COP 30 Presidency at the closing plenary in Belém did indicate that it would convene high-level dialogues on these topics. (See [TWN Update](#).)

It can be expected that some Parties will highlight the outcomes of the Santa Marta Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, which was co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands and held on 24–29 April 2026.

** With inputs from Radhika Chatterjee, Hilary Kung and Jinghann Hong.*

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Parties convey their expectations at Bonn climate talks

Bonn, 9 June (Jinghann Hong) – Parties conveyed their expectations at the Bonn climate talks following the adoption of the agendas of the 64th sessions of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Bodies (SB 64) on 8 June. The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) will conclude their work on 18 June.

Uruguay, on behalf of the **G77 and China**, expressed concerns over the insufficiency, inaccessibility and very low availability of climate finance as well as the lack of ambition from developed countries to provide and mobilize committed and pledged climate finance resources to developing countries. It stated that it expected the full operationalization of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement through the Climate Finance Work Programme. It affirmed the “importance of discussing the scope and modalities of the work programme ... to ensure that they are developed in a Party-driven and inclusive manner”. It also reiterated its concern with the delayed transition of the Adaptation Fund to serve the PA exclusively and urged Parties to make progress on the matter.

On mitigation, the G77 and China reaffirmed its commitment to contribute to the ultimate objective of the Convention and the goals of the PA including the temperature goal, holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, on the basis of equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in the light of different national circumstances. It expressed the need for urgent progress on mitigation, with developed countries taking the lead, and to also

take into account the increasing impact of climate change in developing countries, which requires the provision of support from developed countries and an enabling international economic system. It called on Parties to engage in discussions under the Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme in a constructive manner in line with its mandate.

On adaptation, it reaffirmed the central role of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and the Belém-Addis Vision in advancing the implementation of the Global Goal on Adaptation. It highlighted that adequate, predictable and accessible means of implementation, including finance, technology transfer and capacity-building from developed country to developing country Parties, must be ensured across all discussions on adaptation. It reiterated the call for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 and emphasized that MOI must also anchor the work under the BAR. The Group expressed regret that the SB 64 agenda does not include an item on national adaptation plans and looked forward to an ambitious outcome in SB 65.

On agriculture, it stated that its priority in 2026 is to secure the future of the “agriculture and food security” agenda item through a COP 31 decision, as the Sharm el-Sheikh joint work ends this year.

China, for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, observed that the process is shifting from negotiation to implementation, and pointed out that implementation includes mitigation, adaptation, MOI and international enablers for cooperation, in particular, a supportive and open international economic system. It stressed

that it is vital to resolve longstanding issues such as lack of ambition on mitigation and MOI, and to address the new challenges of unilateralism and protectionism which pose barriers to collective efforts and international cooperation in the second decade of the PA.

On negotiating topics, key priorities include the adaptation workshop, the Just Transition Work Programme and Mechanism, the climate and trade dialogue, and the Climate Finance Work Programme. It stated that the CFWP and the climate and trade dialogue must be intentionally designed for meaningful engagement and concrete outputs, and the need for improved work to happen in this direction. It also highlighted that the finance gap should be urgently filled and pointed to the current Global Environment Facility replenishment as the lowest in the last 16 years, and also pointed to the reneging from signed contributions to the Green Climate Fund.

The LMDC stressed that it is crucial to note the difference between “consensus-based processes under the Convention and its PA” and “initiatives outside the process”, where global collective action and international cooperation should be agreed through consensus-based negotiations to ensure inclusiveness. As such, “initiatives outside the Convention process should remain voluntary in nature”, as “introducing sensitive issues into the Convention process could generate more complications for the process”.

It closed by expressing its highest commitment to ambitious climate action: “We stand for ambition, and we want real ambition. For this, the goal and the means should go hand-in-hand. We should be activating real enablers for climate action, which is MOI, and do away with protectionism and unilateralism.”

Referencing the World Meteorological Organization, which issued a warning on an 80% likelihood that an El Niño event will develop between June and August, **Ghana**, speaking for the **African Group of Negotiators (AGN)**, said that a warming of conditions is “catastrophic” and of “great concern”. “Yet in a process of urgency, we do not even have an agenda item on loss and damage and on national adaptation plans. We find this process insensitive to Africa’s situation and deeply worrying.”

On adaptation, it reiterated that the primary purpose of agreed GGA indicators is to ensure clear and usable information feeds into the global stocktake with respect to adaptation actions and support needed and provided. The Group added that it looked forward to progress on composition and modalities of the technical task force, and stressed that the BAR workshop must be informed by and built upon agreed mandates particularly in respect to MOI.

On finance, it expressed grave concerns that the CFWP is not reflected in a CMA agenda under the “arrangements for intergovernmental meetings” agenda item. It added that this needs to be corrected. The AGN urged that the work must also advance a clear operational definition of climate finance, including grants equivalence, accessibility, predictability and accountability.

(During the adoption of the agenda on “climate and trade”, the AGN took the floor to request clarity from the SB Chairs on how they intended to present the report from the dialogue summarizing the discussions at the high-level event in 2028. It urged the SB Chairs to use this opportunity in SB 64 to craft procedures for outcomes to capture Party discussions on the matter.)

Saudi Arabia, for the **Arab Group**, said that all negotiation tracks must abide by the principles of equity and CBDR-RC, and that negotiations must always be led by Parties, adding that initiatives, roadmaps or processes outside the official track that have not gained consensus must not be included. It also rejected unilateral measures including cross-border taxes. Stating that current developments in the global energy markets highlight the need to ensure energy security and safeguard energy supply chains, it called for access to energy, energy affordability as well as the security of supply chains, together with climate action that must be managed reasonably and in a balanced manner. It stated that the PA is the best venue for this as it is independent from the imposition of unilateral measures.

South Africa, for **BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China)**, reminded Parties that “the Belém political package was a fine balance of key priorities” and that Parties must “reaffirm the political commitment to address climate change through solidarity and cooperation, and to narrow

the North-South development gap”. It emphasized that the longstanding issue of lack of mitigation, ambition and financial support by developed countries, as well as new challenges imposed by unilateralism and protectionism, must be resolved. It expressed concern over Article 9.1 not being given due consideration and stated that “it is unacceptable that it is not in the CMA 8 agenda”. It welcomed the convening of the first dialogue on climate change and trade. On mitigation, BASIC called for developed countries, in line with the principle of historical responsibility, to take the lead. It also looked forward to agreeing on the modalities of the just transition mechanism and to the review of the JTWP and the Mitigation Work Programme, as well as the implementation of the Belém-Addis Vision on adaptation and the completion of the host selection process for the Climate Technology Centre and Network.

Palau, speaking for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, called the 1.5°C temperature limit its “North Star” and lamented that climate finance is “at a point of systemic collapse”. Amongst its key priorities are the provision of and enhancement in access to climate finance and the operationalization of the GGA. It also stressed the GST as a central tool for implementation and for keeping 1.5°C within reach, and stated that it would like to see substantive and meaningful reports from both dialogues under the process that can serve as useful inputs to the GST. Emphasizing that “science remains fundamental to the robustness and scientific integrity of the GST”, it called for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s Seventh Assessment Report to be incorporated into the next GST cycle. As for the MWP, it stated that it must address both ambition and implementation gaps and move beyond dialogue towards action-oriented approaches.

Timor-Leste, for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, laid emphasis on the need to achieve the 1.5°C goal. Stating that it is “deeply concerned by the inadequacy of global mitigation efforts”, it called for countries to step up on the MWP to respond to this urgency, including implementation of the GST-1 outcome. It also acknowledged challenging international circumstances but stated that “this cannot be used to delay or backtrack on existing climate finance commitments”. Other priorities include delivering “clear and strong modalities” for the Belém-Addis Vision on

adaptation, an LDC-responsive, implementation-focused and supported-by-MOI just transition mechanism, the continuation of the JTWP beyond 2026, the finalization of the host of the Climate Technology Centre and the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism. It lamented the lack of an agenda item on loss and damage and said it would “ensure loss and damage is considered in the upcoming GST dialogue”.

Panama, for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, said that “science must continue to inform our decisions”, including that of the GST, and so “any attempt to weaken, delay or undermine the integrity and independence of the IPCC is unacceptable”. It said that the CFWP must focus on the operationalization of Article 9.1, and that CMA 8 should provide clear guidance to a concrete outcome at the conclusion of the work programme. On the AF, it regretted the lack of an outcome at COP 30, and called for a decision to ensure its smooth transition to exclusively serving the PA. Other priorities include the MWP, the operationalization of the Belém-Addis Vision, and the JTM. It also welcomed the Belém Gender Action Plan as a critical milestone for inclusive gender-responsive climate action.

Iran pointed out that climate action cannot be talked about in a vacuum. Stating that it remained committed to reducing emissions and adapting to climate change, it pointed out that it is simultaneously struggling under devastating economic instability and a brutal energy crisis directly caused by military aggression, illegal blockades and sanctions, and cyber and civilian attacks on infrastructure and people. Iran recalled the massacre of 168 schoolgirls in its city of Minab by the United States and the Israeli regime. It pointed out that “pursuing a green transition while all critical infrastructure and lives are under assault is nearly impossible”. Further highlighting the catastrophic failure of climate finance by pointing to the GEF receiving less than the previous replenishment cycle, it stressed that developed countries are slashing contributions and leaving developing countries to drown “literally and economically”. It also highlighted that “because of unilateral trade restrictions and the broken pledges of developed nations, the entire climate action effort of the Global South is being sabotaged”, and that “developed countries cannot demand

that developing nations reduce emissions while simultaneously denying them access to finance and technology”.

Cuba condemned the US government as “deliberately undermining the United Nations and multilateralism, including this Convention”, and highlighted the energy blockade on Cuba as “an act of war” and the “executorial nature of blockage against foreign investors” as “part of the same edifice”. It underscored that this affects Cuba’s capacity not just to rise to development challenges as a small island developing state but also to rise to climate change challenges. It added that it will focus on important agenda items including the CFWP and the dialogue on unilateral measures and trade. It reaffirmed Cuba’s right to live in peace, independence and sovereignty, and emphasized that it will continue the commitment to and consensus achieved under the PA and UNFCCC.

India said it is important that SB 64 reinforces confidence in the multilateral process and upholds the Party-driven and consensus-based character of climate negotiations. The concerns and priorities of developing countries must remain central to this work. It added that no new issues or obligations beyond agreed mandates should be considered. Initiatives outside the UNFCCC process should remain voluntary in nature. It said that the international climate agenda must now focus on implementation.

It also stressed that equity and historical responsibility must continue to guide this phase. Developing countries need adequate carbon space to eradicate poverty, expand energy access and meet their sustainable development goals. Therefore, developed countries must lead through accelerated emissions reductions, including negative emissions as necessary. It also asked that the Article 9.1 CFWP receive the prominence and dedicated agenda space it deserves to enable substantive progress. It expressed concern over declining levels of climate finance, including replenishment and support and the growing adaptation finance gap. Discussions on the implementation of Article 9.1 should address these realities directly.

It looked forward to the operationalization of the JTM based on equity and CBDR-RC, by nationally determined pathways, ensuring means of implementation and addressing structural challenges. It added that the dialogue on unilateral

trade measures should address their negative impacts on climate actions of developing countries and be based on Article 3.5 of the Convention and provide substantive space for Parties to exchange their views. On the future of the MWP, India said that its current scope and modalities and facilitative and non-prescriptive nature must be preserved. It also said that the work on the GGA should remain balanced, Party-driven and implementation-oriented, with focus on MOI for developing countries.

Cyprus, for the European Union, said that the UAE dialogue under the GST is an important opportunity to reflect on collective progress and strengthen implementation efforts. It said that “the implementation of GST-1 outcomes and ambitious nationally determined contributions are essential for closing both the ambition and the implementation gaps, and to keeping the 1.5°C [goal] within reach”.

On just transition, the EU stated that it will work towards a JTM that enables the implementation of 1.5°C-aligned domestic climate policies by addressing the social and economic dimensions of the transition and ensuring that no one is left behind. On climate and trade, it stated that “trade can be a powerful enabler of climate action by facilitating access to clean technologies”, and encouraged all Parties to work on their positive interlinkages.

On climate finance, the EU reaffirmed commitments to “delivering on our collective commitments”, including the implementation of the new collective quantified goal, and recognized the urgent need to scale up finance from all sources, particularly for adaptation and for the most vulnerable countries, as well as to improve access to climate finance. It also noted that “climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries reached \$132.8 billion in 2023 and \$136.7 billion in 2024, exceeding the \$100 billion goal for the third consecutive year”. It added that achieving the goals of the PA requires broader efforts to align all financial flows with low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways, and to strengthen enabling environments that can mobilize public and private investment at scale.

Switzerland, for the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), said that “the International Court of Justice has affirmed that Parties must exercise due

diligence, so that their NDCs, taken together, are capable of achieving the 1.5°C goal”. It called upon Parties that have not done so to submit outstanding NDCs before COP 31. It supported the adoption of a global commitment on electrification, energy grids and clean energy investments at COP 31, encouraging Parties to develop, on a voluntary basis, national roadmaps on the transition away from fossil fuels, and also inviting the private sector to develop corporate roadmaps.

On adaptation, the EIG said that it looked forward to operationalizing the newly adopted adaptation indicators. It added that it aimed to build a shared understanding to improve metadata and methodologies, and to agree on timelines that support adaptation goals with scientific rigour, which will help ensure that the indicators can be meaningfully applied by Parties.

Stating that the IPCC findings are not always easy as they “ask more than is politically comfortable”, which is “precisely why they must guide the decisions we make”, the EIG made it clear that any attempts to delay the essential scientific inputs needed for the next GST would be “unacceptable”.

The **United Kingdom**, for the **Umbrella Group (UG)**, elaborated that the current energy crisis presented challenges in relation to energy supply through security or increasing costs, but that it also presented opportunities to accelerate the energy transition through electrification and clean energy deployment. Calling for “strengthening the mitigation architecture in the UNFCCC to respond to the diminishing window of opportunity to keep 1.5°C in reach”, it welcomed discussions on the future of the MWP to ensure it can provide practical, usable output that can help inform nationally determined policies grounded in the urgency to enhance climate action.

The UG said that discussions on the review of the JTWP and the development of a JTM must enhance ambitious action aligned with 1.5°C, accelerate just energy transitions, and be guided by inclusive action and processes. On adaptation, it stated that work on the Belém-Addis Vision needed to advance through Party piloting and through the technical task force, and that it stood ready to engage on the BAR.

It welcomed the first UAE dialogue here at SB 64, as well as the third GST NDC dialogue. Stating that “the GST NDC dialogue will end here at SB 64, creating a gap in the mitigation architecture”, it encouraged Parties to look for “new avenues” to discuss NDC preparation and implementation.

It reaffirmed the critical role of the best available science to inform decision making, and the IPCC as the global authority on climate science, and called on the IPCC to ensure that reports from its seventh assessment cycle are delivered in time for the second GST.

In this first year of NCQG implementation, it emphasized its commitment to NCQG delivery and reaffirmed the role of developed countries to take the lead in the delivery of the goal of at least \$300 billion by 2035, while working with all actors to scale finance to at least \$1.3 trillion. It added that it would play its part in efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035, in the context of the NCQG. Stating that “access to finance remains a priority, as does resolving the transition of the AF”, the UG also welcomed the launch of the Veredas Dialogue and hoped to have constructive discussions in the CFWP focused on practical outcomes.

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Divergences over Climate Finance Work Programme

Bonn, 9 June (Radhika Chatterjee) – The first session for discussing the Climate Finance Work Programme (CFWP) on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement was held on 8 June during the 64th session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies and saw strong divergences between developing and developed countries over the programme’s scope and modalities.

Presided over by Co-Chairs Apollonia Miola (European Union) and Yolando Velasco (Philippines), the session asked Parties to share their views on the scope and modalities of the CFWP. (In paragraph 54 of the Global Mutirão decision from Belém, Parties had decided “to establish a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1 of the PA in the context of Article 9 of the PA as a whole”.)

At the start of the session, the **G77 and China** expressed its strong dissatisfaction with the Co-Chairs’ workplan prepared for the CFWP and said that it was not in a position to accept it or use it as a basis for further work, calling for a Party-driven process in the work of the CFWP. It stressed the need to discuss the implementation of Article 9.1 which relates to the mandatory obligations of developed countries to provide climate finance to developing countries for their climate action. The Group stressed the importance of having concrete outcomes from the CFWP. (The Co-Chairs’ workplan comprised “engagement workshops” over two years from 2026 to 2027.)

Developing countries like the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** and the **Arab Group** also stressed the need for discussing the implementation of Article 9.1 and called for the

development of an “Action Plan” for COP 33 that would enable the tracking of implementation of developed country obligations under Article 9.1 with clear milestones. (COP 33 in 2028 is when the second global stocktake will be held, during which Parties will assess the collective progress towards achieving the PA’s goals.) They also stressed the need for including the CFWP on the provisional agenda of the 8th session of the Parties to the PA (CMA 8). The Arab Group emphasized the need for using the CFWP as a much-needed ratcheting mechanism for scaling up the delivery of climate finance from developed to developing countries.

Developed countries led by the **European Union, Switzerland, Canada, Norway, New Zealand and Japan** on the other hand said the scope of the CFWP had already been decided in paragraph 54 of the Global Mutirão decision and was broad. They also said that the work programme had already commenced with its establishment last year in Belém. Japan added that only one and a half years of the work programme remained, while others said a lot of work had already happened with the appointment of the Co-Chairs and the submissions by Parties in this regard. Developed countries also said that there was no need for including the CFWP in the agenda of CMA 8 as the Belém decision did not provide for that.

In terms of substance, developed countries emphasized that the CFWP should discuss Article 9.1 in the context of the whole of Article 9, on issues relating to mobilization of finance from the private sector, and questions relating to expanding the donor base. Japan and Norway also stressed that discussions relating to the work should keep in mind the budgetary constraints that the UNFCCC was facing.

Highlights of the interventions

The **G77 and China** said it was “not in a position to accept nor use” the Co-Chairs’ workplan “as a basis for discussions”. Sharing its views and expectations on the work programme, it said it is crucial to have a discussion on the delivery of obligations of developed countries under Article 9.1 taking into consideration the evolving needs and priorities of developing countries. It said enhanced support through Article 9.1 is vital to ensuring that financial flows go through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, as referred to in Article 4.3 of the Convention. It added that “the PA aims to enhance climate action in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and on the basis of equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, taking into account different national circumstances”.

It highlighted Article 3 of the PA which recognizes that the collective global effort to address climate change will require support to developing countries for effective implementation, and pointed out that developed countries have the obligation “to provide financial resources to support developing countries in both mitigation and adaptation efforts under Article 9.1. This obligation remains a continuation of their existing obligations under the UNFCCC’s Article 4.3.”

Spotlighting issues of transparency in delivery of finance obligations, it said that “present reporting by the developed countries does not provide adequate clarity on the extent of support provided by them in terms of quantity, quality and project-based assistance under Article 9.1. The use of different accounting methodologies by developed country Parties does not make it possible to effectively assess the ex-ante and ex-post support levels. The CFWP would serve as an avenue to identify options for enhancing transparency in the measuring, reporting and verification of finance provided.”

It also pointed out the need for considering the “burden-sharing arrangements between developed country Parties regarding their provision of climate finance in the discussions” and stressed that the work programme should provide “additional dedicated spaces for Parties to discuss how to achieve the implementation of Article 9.1 of the

Paris Agreement including a clear outcome for the work programme”.

The **LMDC** said it could work with the Co-Chairs’ workplan because Parties are yet to discuss and finalize the modalities and scope of the CFWP. It said “the Mutirão decision reflects a carefully negotiated balance ... with a significant compromise from developing countries. Its text must not be reinterpreted. The mandate must be implemented faithfully, in letter and in spirit. Any attempt to reshape, narrow, or expand its scope beyond what was agreed by Parties would undermine the integrity of this process and erode the trust that multilateralism depends upon.” It stressed the need to develop the work programme in a Party-driven manner.

It also said that the scope of the CFWP “must be anchored firmly in Article 9.1 of the PA” and that it should address “the mandatory nature and implementation status of Article 9.1, including its linkages to Articles 4.3 of the Convention, and Articles 3, 4, 7, 9.5, 10, and 11 of the PA”. Other important issues which it said should be discussed under the work programme relate to the quality and predictability of finance flows from developed to developing countries, including the role of grants, concessional finance, and guarantees as the basis for broader mobilization and “the accountability deficit in current reporting by developed countries, including inconsistent accounting methodologies, the inflation of reported figures through market-rate loans and export credits, and the absence of an operational climate finance definition”. It also pointed out that the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) has been agreed to and has its own processes and mechanisms. It said a discussion of issues related to Article 9.1 “would enable financing of climate action by developing countries in line with their nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans”.

In terms of modalities of the work programme, it said the initial phase in 2026 should focus exclusively on agreeing to the modalities, thematic priorities and institutional arrangements, and the two-year period of the work programme should commence from the date of adoption of the modalities of the work programme and not before. It called for the establishment of a contact group at CMA 8 for a clear decision on the modalities and thematic priorities of the work programme.

It asked for assigning the Standing Committee of Finance a “clear and prominent role in providing technical inputs to the work programme” and said decisions should be taken annually, reflecting upon findings from the technical dialogues and the SCF reports. This, it said, would ensure that the work programme “generates a cumulative record of progress rather than a single end-of-period outcome”. It proposed the launch of an Action Plan for the implementation of Article 9.1. “This Action Plan should provide a structured pathway for operationalizing the provision obligation, with concrete milestones, accountability mechanisms, and linkages to the NCQG review cycle.”

The **Arab Group** pointed out the “underwhelming delivery of climate finance and ambition from developed countries” and said the “Global Environment Facility (GEF) recently published that \$3.9 billion has been announced for its 9th replenishment, nearly 27% lower than its last replenishment and the lowest we’ve seen in 16 years. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) recently announced that a developed country [an apparent reference to the United Kingdom] will cut its signed contribution for 2024–27 in half – estimated at approximately \$1.1 billion in cuts. This all comes after another developed country [an apparent reference to the United States] rescinded nearly \$4 billion in pledges to the GCF.” Expressing concerns over these trends, it stressed the need for reversing this decline and called the work programme “the mechanism for course correction”.

The Arab Group also said it was not in a position to accept nor use the workplan by the Co-Chairs as a basis for any discussions. It elaborated three key concerns about the workplan. First, “one round of submissions is not nearly enough to give the Co-Chairs an idea of the full expectations of Parties over the span of this work programme, nor is it enough to gauge responses to different proposals”. Second, the workplan proposed is currently in a very weak state, undermining the central role of Article 9.1 as a mechanism for the delivery of climate action in developing countries. It also stressed that discussions relating to Article 2.1(c) of the PA and the NCQG should be avoided so as to not prejudice ongoing and future deliberations on such matters. It pointed out that the “workplan actively platforms these topics and dilutes discussions surrounding an obligatory provision in an international treaty”. It added that “there was no formal mandate for the Co-Chairs to develop a draft workplan, nor

to frame the workshop as a mandated event. The workplan should be developed by the Parties, for the Parties. The work programme will commence following a decision agreeing to the workplan and modalities initiating the two-year period mandated by the Mutirão decision.”

On the scope of the CFWP, the Group said it “must act as a house for those provisions that are yet to be operationalized through the COP and CMA decisions, particularly focusing on Article 9.1 and operationalizing its linkages with Articles 4.5 and 7.13 of the PA. The primacy of the Convention must also be duly respected, and in that sense, Article 9.1 must be guided by and set in the context of Article 4.3 of the Convention and the obligations placed on developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II of the Convention. This includes through establishing fair burden-sharing arrangements amongst developed Parties and ensuring that the full incremental costs agreed to between a developing country and an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism are covered by developed countries.”

It also said the “work programme must not dilute the obligations placed on Annex II Parties nor should it shift the financing burden to developing countries. Neither should it be a mechanism for the top-down prescription of policies and regulatory frameworks in developing countries.” These “approaches are inconsistent with the principles of CBDR and equity and discount the historical responsibilities of developed country Parties with regard to emissions”.

On the scope, it said further that “the work programme should not be limited to a retrospective review of historical finance flows but should also consider the extent to which developed country Parties are providing clarity and predictability regarding future flows under Article 9.1”. It called for “the development of an Antalya–COP 33 Action Plan that would act as an in-house tracking and ratcheting mechanism, setting the trajectory for the scaled-up provision of climate finance from developed country Parties”. It cautioned against the CFWP becoming any means for altering the architecture of UNFCCC finance negotiations and intergovernmental processes and expressed disagreement with proposals “calling for streamlining or clustering the climate finance agenda. This work programme should in fact aim to fill the existing gaps in climate finance

negotiations, exploring the unmarked territory of Article 9.1.”

It said the sessions of the work programme should produce summary reports for consideration by the Parties and feed into other relevant processes like the global stocktake, and review of modalities, procedures and guidelines for the enhanced transparency framework. Elaborating further, “it said this work programme should be informed by and inform reports developed by the Standing Committee on Finance, including, upon consideration by Parties, a standalone annual report on the delivery of Article 9.1 of the PA”.

It asked for an “engagement roadmap” to Antalya from the Co-Chairs and called for at least two more informal discussions amongst Parties in the intersessional period during which “Parties should discuss and have the ability to propose additional matters relating to the modalities and workplan, exchange views and ensure readiness for the work programme to be launched in a formal contact group in Antalya”. It invited the Co-Chairs to synthesize views expressed by Parties in those informal sessions in an informal document, which could be accompanied by a supplementary note with the views of non-Party stakeholders.

The **African Group** made clear that the scope, modalities and workplan of the CFWP must emerge from a Party-driven process reflecting Parties’ views, priorities and the agreed mandate. It expressed its deep alarm at the current declining trajectory of climate finance as witnessed in the latest GEF replenishment, backsliding on GCF pledges, and the complete lack of progress in the replenishment of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD). It pointed out that climate finance is not a charitable contribution, but rather a legal obligation under the Convention and the PA. It called climate finance the “means by which developing countries can implement their NDCs, build resilience, and address loss and damage”, and stressed that “its fulfilment must be treated with the seriousness it demands. We should read the Article 9.1 obligation with the legal obligation of progression on action and support.”

It added that the work programme is “not a technical platform, an investment forum, or a matchmaking mechanism. Its purpose is to facilitate substantive Party-driven discussions on the implementation of Article 9.1 – the obligation of developed country

Parties to provide financial resources to developing countries.” The central purpose of the work programme “must be to advance implementation of Article 9.1 of the PA, in the context of Article 4 of the Convention. This is the specific mandate provided by Parties and should remain the primary focus of our work. We therefore cannot agree to broaden the scope of the work programme into areas already addressed elsewhere under the Convention and PA architecture, including issues related to Article 9.3, reporting arrangements under Articles 9.5 and 9.7, or guidance to the operating entities. Such discussions have established negotiating spaces and should not be reopened through this process – including discussions related to the NCQG – which has been concluded and managed in a different session.”

It stressed that the CFWP should be reflected as a dedicated agenda item on the CMA 8 agenda. It said this demand “is not a procedural nicety” but rather is “essential for political guidance, accountability and maintaining momentum”.

The **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** said the work programme “should be a Party-driven space for enhancing clarity, examining linkages and addressing critical issues on the implementation of climate finance obligations and commitments”. It said Article 4.3 of the Convention and Articles 4.5 and Article 9 of the PA, in particular Article 9.1, should be considered in the work programme. This, it said, would “help provide further clarity on the \$300 billion goal by 2035 under the NCQG and the obligation of the developed countries, especially the provision part. This would also help implement the tripling of adaptation finance and tripling the outflows from the operating entities and the Funds.” It added that the work programme should consider provision of climate finance by developed countries, and the needs and special circumstances of LDCs and small island developing states (SIDS) in the provision of finance. In the context of access to finance, it said channels, instruments and conditions for accessing finance provided should be discussed. On the quality of finance, it said trends and the share of grants in the provision of public finance, balance between finance for mitigation and adaptation, and support for addressing loss and damage should be discussed. Finally, it said, reporting of provision of climate finance and the definition of climate finance should be considered. It also asked for the discussion of elements that need to be updated in the upcoming enhanced

transparency framework review on the modalities, procedures and guidelines.

The **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** said the test of the work programme lies in answering the question: “Does it help finance reach the countries that need it most, in a form they can actually use?” It called the geopolitical retreat by developed countries “an unlawful default on binding historical and legal obligations under Article 9 of the PA, UNFCCC and general obligations under international law”. It added that “the compounding impacts of this legal breach are actively dismantling the ability of SIDS to implement our NDCs, NAPs and climate priorities, creating an unprecedented crisis of state compliance”. It also said that “multilateral development banks are being politically coerced to freeze and halt funding for core climate targets, compromising the independence of these institutions. This coordinated erosion of the international financial architecture completely shatters our confidence, leaving a dark shadow over the implementation of the NCQG and rendering its implementation dead on arrival if these flagrant breaches of legal duty are not immediately reversed.”

It said its priority is “the accessibility and delivery of grant-based and highly concessional finance to SIDS and to the LDCs. Too often, the constraint is not the existence of finance but our ability to access it – through complex procedures, slow disbursement, and instruments that add to debt burdens already straining limited fiscal space.” It asked that the CFWP give attention to access and to adaptation finance to identify common solutions.

It said mobilizing finance from a wide range of resources only complements the provisioning of finance, not substitute for it. “Public, grant-based finance remains indispensable for the most vulnerable, and we would caution against a scope so broad that it diverts attention from delivery to those with the greatest needs.” It supported the work programme producing “a practical plan to improve the provision, access and delivery of finance for SIDS and LDCs, identifying barriers, instruments, channels and milestones. We wish to be clear that this is the implementation of commitments that already exist, and of the NCQG – not the creation of new targets.”

The **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)** said the workplan

for the CFWP has to be developed and established in a Party-driven manner leading to a concrete outcome at the CMA. It said the scope of the work programme should be on the implementation of Article 9.1, ensuring developed countries are held accountable in delivering on their obligations so that grant-based finance from developed and developing countries can be scaled up. It also stressed the need for avoiding any kind of duplication of discussions taking place in existing workstreams of the CFWP.

China said the diversity of views expressed at the session confirmed the need for a dedicated CFWP to discuss these issues in a structured and balanced manner. Given the severe loss and damage that developing countries are facing, along with increasing adaptation needs and the declining trend of climate finance from all directions, “it is difficult for developing countries to accept an approach that shifts focus away from developed countries’ responsibility and focus on private mobilization”. It said the issue may be important but cannot substitute for the discussion on Article 9.1. It stressed that the CFWP “cannot be treated merely as a workshop-driven exercise” and asked for it to be a firmly Party-driven process.

Egypt and **Algeria** expressed views similar to those of the G77 and China, LMDC, Arab Group and African Group.

The **European Union** said it has provided and will continue to provide public finance, adding that the scope of the work programme is a very broad one. It said the Co-Chairs’ workplan lacks sufficient focus on mobilizing private finance, issues related to contributor base and implementing the NCQG decision. It stressed that the scope of the work programme is already “clearly defined” in the Belém decision and that there is no need to have an elaborate discussion on it. It added that though Article 9.1 is an important part of climate finance and an important part of the NCQG, there is still a need to look at the broad spectrum of climate finance and look at Article 9 in its entirety.

The **UK** said the scope of the CFWP is to focus on Article 9, including Article 9.1, and the NCQG. Calling the NCQG a key climate finance decision for 2025–35, it said it is looking for discussion of the \$300 billion, unlocking of the \$1.3 trillion, and easing access to finance. It said the work programme has already commenced and highlighted that the

Co-Chairs' workplan lacks elements on Article 9.2 of the PA (which states: "Other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily.") and private finance. It said Article 9.1 is already being implemented and what is required is a discussion of mobilization of private finance. It pointed out that the NCQG recognizes the role of developed countries taking the lead and welcomed a conversation on Article 9.1 in the context of the whole of Article 9.

Switzerland said the scope of the CFWP as contained in paragraph 54 of the Global Mutirão decision is a broad one which requires a focus on climate finance including Article 9.1 in the context of the whole of Article 9. Responding to the G77 and China's call for more transparency in tracking climate finance delivery obligations of developed countries, it said it would like to address how more visibility can be given to having climate finance come in from all contributors, referring to Articles 9.2 and 9.3 of the PA in this context. It also highlighted the need for having more discussions around private finance and access-related issues. It said it would like to see the issue around the contributor base included in the discussions under the work programme.

Japan said it is completely unacceptable to say that developed countries are not moving on their obligations under Article 9.1, adding that such claims undermine mutual trust. It said the scope of the CFWP should be to discuss the entirety of climate finance, including Article 9, and that it should not be a forum to discuss Article 9.1 in isolation. It said it remains committed to delivering

on its obligations under Article 9.1 but that there is also a need to focus on mobilizing climate finance to meet needs of adaptation and mitigation and on the implementation of the NCQG.

Norway said the scope of the CFWP is broader than Article 9 and that it should facilitate exchanges on how climate finance can be scaled up, including a focus on the private sector, especially the question of how to scale up investments aligned with climate goals. It said there is a need to discuss issues related to creation of enabling environments to attract climate finance and to increase capacity. It also pointed to the need for streamlining finance-related processes under the UNFCCC and said that the work programme should produce a practical recommendation for a more consolidated agenda towards scaling up climate finance.

Canada said the scope of the CFWP is a straightforward question which can be answered from the Belém decision. It said the conversation needs to be broadened such that it focuses on climate finance at large. It said that while Article 9.1 is an important part of the climate finance architecture, there should also be a focus on other parts of Article 9. It said some elements that it would like to see strengthened and included in the Co-Chairs' workplan relate to issues of private finance and Articles 9.2 and 9.3.

New Zealand shared similar views as other developed countries.

Two more workshops will be held on the CFWP later this week.

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Differences of view on continuation of Mitigation Work Programme

Bonn, 12 June (Radhika Chatterjee) – Differences of view emerged over the continuation of the Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme [referred to as the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP)] at the ongoing UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies sessions (SB 64) in Bonn. While giving their views on the assessment of the MWP, Parties also addressed the question of how it should be continued, at informal consultations presided over by co-facilitators Ursula Fuentes (Germany) and Maesela John Kekana (South Africa).

The key areas of divergence that have surfaced are: the manner in which the MWP's continuation takes place; whether the enhancement of the work programme should lead to a translation of its outputs into policy guidance; whether there should be any linkage between the MWP and the first global stocktake (GST-1) decision adopted in Dubai at COP 28 in 2023; whether the MWP should be a vehicle for implementation of the mitigation section of the GST outcome; the relationship between the MWP and the nationally determined contributions (NDCs); and the need for enhancing investment-focused events (IFEs) to ensure that mitigation projects of developing countries are able to secure funding and be translated into reality on the ground. The importance of means of implementation (MOI) as a crucial element of raising mitigation ambition and implementation was also highlighted.

Many developing countries like the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, the **Arab Group**, the **African Group**, **China**, **South Africa** and **India** said that an essential starting point for

any kind of discussion on the continuation of the MWP should be that the “safeguards” under the programme’s mandate on respecting national sovereignty and national circumstances are retained in its new form. They also said the continued MWP should remain within that mandate and should not be used to impose national mitigation targets and that it should not undermine the nationally determined nature of NDCs, highlighting also the importance of MOI in raising their ambition.

Developed countries like the **European Union (EU)**, the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, the **United Kingdom**, **Canada**, **New Zealand** and **Japan** and some developing countries like the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)** and the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, on the other hand, expressed a strong desire for making the MWP’s outputs “more consequential” by translating them into policy guidelines for decision-makers and for Parties’ national plans like their NDCs and long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies (LT-LEDS). They also stressed the need for using the MWP as a vehicle for implementing the outcomes of GST-1, particularly the mitigation efforts related to the energy transition, including tripling of renewable energy and doubling energy efficiency, and halting deforestation. Some also suggested the need for setting up a “technical expert committee” that could help translate outputs of the dialogues held under the MWP into policy guidance.

China, for the **LMDC**, said Parties had submitted views related to the continuation of the MWP in

response to paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7 and that discussions at SB 64 should not be confined only to the continuation issue but also focus on the global dialogues held under the MWP. It pointed out that the top guiding principles of the MWP are about it being non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative and respectful of national sovereignty, as also contained in paragraph 16 of the Belém decision, and must be kept in mind in the current discussions. It said it should not be assumed that Parties have already agreed to continuing the work programme just because they made submissions on the matter, adding that Parties should not rush to draft text in this regard but focus first on understanding the submissions made.

It said the Belém decision on the MWP reflects the LMDC's "maximum compromise" and said paragraph 16 of the decision should be understood in a comprehensive manner. It said the safeguards related to the principles of the MWP are the "starting point for our conversation on the continuation of the work programme". Sharing its suggestion for the continuation of the MWP, the LMDC insisted on the strict mandate that Parties regard as the principles of the MWP. It added that the MWP should not be used to prescribe climate targets for Parties.

It said the continued MWP could take the form of dialogues or roundtables and workshops, indicating flexibility on the format, to build on the positive experiences gained, and emphasized that it should remain Party-driven in nature. It said regional formats should be avoided as they can be exclusive in nature. It pointed out that many Parties have limited willingness and ability to participate in "climate weeks" in person, something that was seen at the seventh global dialogue when many could not participate in light of the existing geopolitical circumstances. It said dialogues can be held during COPs/CMAs to ensure more participation and accessibility. It said the outcome of the MWP may be presented in the form of summary reports but stressed that these reports cannot become policy guidance without any negotiated outcome. It wanted to see more progress in IFEs so that Parties could share more on their needs in relation to projects and hear from donors and multilateral development banks. It stressed that future rounds of the MWP should have "pitch-hub events" and that the IFEs can be

improved in a manner so that pragmatic funds can go to support projects of developing countries.

It also pointed to the need for focusing on tools like the Non-Market Approaches Platform (under Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement) to facilitate financing, adding that developing countries should receive help in preparing their project concept notes to increase their ability to get funding. Responding to calls for setting up "expert groups", it pointed to budgetary constraints that the UNFCCC is facing.

It said messages from the MWP's dialogues are well captured in annual reports and there is no need for further messages to be identified for policymakers in the decision. It said the continuation of the MWP does not mean its redesign and made clear that there is no mandate for including the MWP as a permanent agenda item.

It said further that the mandate of the MWP does not provide links to GST-1 and found the calls by others to produce concrete outcomes of the GST to fit national planning prescriptive and intrusive to national policy space. It said proposals for a technical committee for the MWP challenge the current mandate. Responding to calls for focusing future global dialogues on specific topics relating to the energy transition, it said the selection of topics cannot be prejudged now. It added that the MWP is not designed for guiding NDCs, and information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding already exists to facilitate Parties to deliver clear messages in NDCs. The LMDC stressed the importance of ensuring the global nature of the MWP's dialogues and agreed to the idea of enhancing expert participation, but without any outcome. It also added that engagement with the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the MWP is out of its mandate and could be discussed under other agenda items.

Saudi Arabia, for the **Arab Group**, said discussions should be exchanges of view and that it was not in a position to support views on a draft decision text as it wanted the text to be informed by a complete record of interventions. It called for two rounds of exchange where Parties can share their views on the functioning of the MWP. It pointed out that Parties made submissions on the continuation of the work programme in response

to paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7, but not to predetermine any outcome on the question of continuation. It stressed that its submission did not provide unconditional support for the continuation of the MWP, but rather outlined the principles for continuation. Underlining the need to recognize the substantial progress that has been achieved so far in the MWP, it pointed out that the global dialogues held under the programme provided a valuable space for learning and helping to strengthen solutions across the board, and to help in understanding opportunities and barriers in national contexts. It expressed appreciation of knowledge sharing without imposing prescriptive approaches. It stressed these achievements did not occur by accident but through the carefully crafted principles and parameters established in decision 4/CMA.4, especially its paragraph 2.

It expressed concerns over calls for links to the GST and said that paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7 “does not establish a mandate to strengthen such linkages but rather it has dropped that linkage altogether”. It added that while paragraph 186 of the GST outcome refers to relevant work programmes integrating GST outcomes, it does so only “in line with their mandates”. This qualification is essential and cannot be used to expand the MWP, create new functions, or transform it into a GST implementation mechanism.

On proposals to extend the MWP’s tenure beyond 2030, it said it did not support that and pointed out that the work programme’s objective, mandate and timeline are intrinsically linked to the period up to 2030. It said it cannot support the idea of establishing a technical expert committee “as it would fundamentally change the nature of the MWP from a Party-driven exchange into a process that could develop top-down recommendations, identify priorities, or shape policy direction. This would go beyond the principles of this work programme.” It cautioned against proposals to produce “strengthened usable outputs for policymakers” if this means developing recommendations, toolkits, policy menus or guidance for national planning. “The MWP is not a policy advisory body. It is not mandated to tell policymakers what they should do. It can summarize what was shared in the global dialogues. It can identify practical barriers and support needs. It can highlight examples on a non-prescriptive basis. But it cannot become an indirect

mechanism for shaping domestic mitigation policies.”

Zimbabwe, for the **African Group**, said it still needs to be convinced about the need for continuation of the work programme. It said the support provided in the IFEs has largely remained technical, while no funds have actually flowed to projects under the MWP. It highlighted that Parties had till COP 31 to demonstrate whether the MWP is working, adding that the global dialogues were an educative space for exchanging views. It said these may justify the continuation of the MWP but there is a need for enhancements to ensure the work programme is relevant. It said the MWP should continue under the agreed principles and safeguards of: common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), equity, respect for the nationally determined nature of NDCs, and remaining non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative and respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances.

It also stressed that the MWP should support more implementation, as ambition was already there. It said there is a need to support countries to develop mitigation proposals into fundable proposals that can support developing countries in accessing financing. It said the need is to ensure that mitigation actions do not remain on paper but also become a reality on the ground.

Sierra Leone, for the **LDCs**, expressed strong support for the continuation of the MWP. Stressing the urgency of keeping the 1.5°C goal alive, it said the MWP must evolve beyond being a dialogue platform and should enhance mitigation ambition and implementation. It said the MWP should become a permanent agenda item under the UNFCCC while maintaining its current mandate. It proposed the formation of a technical mechanism or committee to ensure the programme’s mandate is translated into concrete action, adding that the MWP should be assessed not only by the quantity or quality of discussions but also by the number of projects it translates into reality on ground.

Cook Islands, for **AOSIS**, said the collective efforts need to be focused on scaling up mitigation ambition in a manner that complements the GST. It said the mitigation agenda should be aimed at limiting global warming to 1.5°C, which it called the “North Star”. It said the MWP has not delivered

on its mandate and that any future MWP should contribute to GST outcomes and that the MWP should accelerate the GST-1 outcomes including tripling renewable energy and doubling energy efficiency. It added that the MWP should operate in a facilitative manner and that there is a need for more substantial outputs like technical reports from the programme that can be translated into guidance for implementation.

Expressing support for a strong mitigation space, it said the future MWP should become more “implementation-oriented” and move beyond dialogues so that mitigation ambition and implementation can be raised. In terms of strengthening the MWP’s modalities, it said IFEs would have to respond better to the needs of SIDS and deliver tangible value. It asked for a workplan for the global dialogues and IFEs and suggested that IFEs could be held where there is a greater involvement of financial institutions. It expressed a preference for having a multi-year thematic programme for the MWP and said criteria proposed by the IPCC to achieve 1.5°C pathways should be kept in mind in its work. It said lessons learnt could be documented in a report containing available policy options.

Colombia, for **AILAC**, said it wants a solution to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade, adding that the MWP is not meeting its objectives. It said Parties need guidance from the CMA to remove barriers to delivering on the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. It said a great enabler of mitigation action is international cooperation, multilateralism and solidarity. It said there is a need for results that are oriented towards action and that the proliferation of workstreams was making the CMA “work-heavy”. It called for the MWP to draw on the outcomes of GST-1 and serve as an input to subsequent GSTs. It referred to the mitigation goals in the GST-1 outcome related to transitioning away from fossil fuels and halting and reversing deforestation. It said transitioning away from fossil fuels implies a phase-in of renewables and pointed out that both are integral parts of paragraph 28 of the GST decision. It said there are barriers to massive deployment and global scaling up of renewable energy and stressed the need for talking about international cooperation to discuss how Parties can transform their national pathways.

It said it is important for Parties to ensure that the MWP actually results in the provision and mobilization of support for implementation to keep global warming below the 1.5°C limit. It said the IFEs have had no consequence and are nowhere close to mobilizing finance on the required scale. It pointed to the need for a programme that is capable of identifying barriers to taking action. It said the MWP should include not only calls to action but also commitments on MOI and international cooperation. It said paragraph 186 of the GST-1 decision must be the basis of these conversations and the focus should not be only on the mitigation section of the GST but also on the MOI elements. It considered this to be the operationalization of CBDR and equity.

India said it heard some say that the MWP has not delivered on its objective of enhancing mitigation ambition and acceleration, but added that it is unable to see how this will be addressed by the setting up of another committee. It said that “in the case of Parties that have high historical responsibility and also high capacities, the lack of ambition requires deeper introspection that cannot simply be addressed by setting up another committee”. “In the case of developing countries, even where higher ambition than countries can manage actually exists, implementation is often impeded by the lack of support and backtracking on obligations on providing the MOI.” India said “these issues must be discussed and multiple platforms within the process already exist to do so. The financial and technology mechanisms already exist and stronger linkages with these mechanisms can in fact begin to bridge the gaps that many have identified.”

South Africa said it views the NDCs as the main mechanism for ambition in mitigation in a nationally determined manner and that this is clearly articulated in various provisions of the Paris Agreement. The MWP is therefore additional to this and should not replace, displace or duplicate the key mechanisms under the agreement, including the GST and the NDCs. Calling the current phase of the MWP useful, it proposed that “rather than looking at reforms of the mandate and principles that are foundational to the MWP, we should consider improvements and enhancements to the MWP that will assist in the provision of support for mitigation projects, especially in

developing countries”. It said the MWP is “more than just a matchmaking platform”; instead, it is “a mechanism that can bring the role-players that lead on mitigation ambition, provision of finance/support/investment and mitigation project implementers into the same space. We understand that the MWP cannot provide direct financing for mitigation projects/programmes but can be that bridge builder between mitigation ambition, provision of finance and implementation on the ground.”

The **EU** said there is a need to ensure adequate space for mitigation ambition and strengthen alignment of NDCs with the 1.5°C goal, and that the MWP is the only space for this. Pointing out that the MWP has fallen short on delivering on its mandate after four years of work, it supported continuation of the work programme “if we can make it fit for purpose”, as is being done for the Global Goal on Adaptation and the Just Transition Work Programme, “with the establishment of a mechanism”. It said the MWP should be extended till 2030, followed by a review of functioning effectiveness. It said the objective is to scale up mitigation ambition and implementation covering the current round of NDCs. It added that the Global Climate Action Agenda, the biennial transparency reports, synthesis reports of NDCs, the UN Environment Programme’s Emissions Gap Report, and the IPCC’s 7th Assessment Report could be inputs to the MWP.

It said the MWP should be complementary to the GST, integrate outcomes of GST-1, and that MWP outcomes should inform GST-2. In terms of modalities, it said, the programme should have a multi-year thematic work with a more regional focus. It said the MWP should provide inputs to the CMA to provide political signals to close the ambition and implementation gaps to enhance mitigation in this critical decade.

Switzerland, for the **EIG**, said the Paris Agreement has delivered real progress but the window for limiting warming to 1.5°C is closing. It said the MWP is one of the places where Parties can reflect on how they can accelerate mitigation ambition. It stressed the need to do more on emission reductions. In terms of improvements to the work programme, it said there is a need to strengthen exchange with experts who could meet practitioners around the

year virtually, and suggested maintaining a roster of technical experts. It said the continued MWP should have a thematic structure with multi-year thematic tracks with a workplan.

It said the MWP should respond to the GST and support countries in their energy transition efforts and in the fight against deforestation. It said outputs of the MWP should be a text that informs policymaking documents. It added there is a need to ensure the functioning of IFEs is improved. Suggesting the formation of a technical expert group, it said this group could work in a non-prescriptive manner alongside other bodies like the Standing Committee on Finance and the Technology Executive Committee and provide the analytical backbone that is lacking in the current MWP. It affirmed the MWP’s role in maintaining the 1.5°C goal, adding that MWP reports should be recognized as inputs to the GST, and that paragraph 186 of the GST-1 decision should be operationalized and a space created in the MWP to facilitate implementation. It further said that discussions must remain facilitative and avoid finger pointing.

The **UK** said the future MWP should be action-oriented so that the 1.5°C goal is kept within reach. It wanted more substantive and useful outcomes that would be of value to policymakers. It supported improvements to the IFEs and greater coherence and complementarity with the GST and the Action Agenda. It said there is a need to deepen and broaden the sectoral focus and supported the EU and EIG’s proposal on having longer-term considerations. It said ambition and implementation are what drives real-world outcomes and helps close ambition gaps. It said there is a need to make the MWP more effective for practical support for learning.

Canada said that the MWP has been a useful space for sharing knowledge but that Parties are not making full use of the global dialogues in informing climate action plans like NDCs and LT-LEDS. It said there is a need to think how the MWP can better inform these objectives and become more relevant to policymakers and produce actionable outcomes for decision makers. Supporting the idea of voluntary technical expert groups proposed by Switzerland, it said more exchanges among experts would foster more candid and technically rich conversation. It stressed the need for more sharing

and coordination of technical work, among not just governments but also non-state actors including experts and Indigenous Peoples.

New Zealand said that the MWP can and must facilitate action in a way that can help us go further and faster, and that a continued MWP is needed and must be “more effective and facilitative” than what it is today. It highlighted the importance of the MWP as a space up to 2030 and beyond and called it an important accelerator for action. It said there is a need to ensure its working complements outcomes of GSTs.

The **Republic of Korea** said that the MWP has not lived up to its founding objective. It called the MWP a unique important space where barriers,

challenges, solutions and opportunities to scale up mitigation implementation can be discussed. It said the MWP should facilitate implementation of mitigation outcomes of GST-1, which should inform its global dialogues, and that the MWP should provide useful inputs to the GST, thus creating a reinforcing ambition cycle. It also said that the outputs of the continued MWP should be in the form of annual summary reports that make the learnings from the dialogues more useful for domestic mitigation planning. It said there is a need for a greater link between mitigation actions and market realities.

The next informal consultation on the MWP is scheduled for 12 June. To assist Parties in their discussions, the co-facilitators have shared a [list of three guiding questions](#).

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Developed countries attempt to stall just transition mechanism

Bonn, 12 June (Hilary Kung) – At the ongoing Bonn negotiations on the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), developing countries presented various proposals to operationalize the just transition mechanism (JTM), following last year's landmark decision in Belém to establish the mechanism. This progress, however, is being undermined by attempts from developed countries to delay and restrict the JTM through insisting that a mapping exercise on relevant arrangements under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement as well as other entities in the UN system on just transition be considered first, to see if a JTM is needed.

The **G77 and China** proposed guiding principles and functions for the JTM, which were then elaborated further by subgroups including the **African Group**, the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, the **Arab Group** and other developing country Parties.

The **African Group** said it expects the JTM to be a “fully constituted CMA body”, “modelled on the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), empowered to provide high-level normative guidance across all the main pillars of means of implementation (MOI)”, stressing that this is non-negotiable for the Group.

However, **Japan** said the mapping exercise by the secretariat is “critically important”, especially on the “necessity of such a new mechanism in the first place”, adding that discussions should “start with the mapping” to “avoid duplications”. It also

proposed to expand the mandate of the mapping exercise by calling for submissions from Parties and non-Party stakeholders before Parties “can assess whether a mechanism is necessary”.

The **United Kingdom** and **Norway** said that a new body is not possible given the UNFCCC's budgetary constraints. Norway also said that Parties should consider whether the JTM can just “provide existing bodies with guidance to implement just transition work” or have a “workplan”. **Canada** was also of the view that it is better to align and strengthen what already exists instead of creating a new additional structure.

Along a similar vein, the **European Union** said that the 90-page mapping output by the secretariat demonstrated the challenge is not “institutional scarcity but fragmentation”, and suggested that the JTM, “rather than creating parallel track, should coordinate existing actors and resources”. It then suggested that the JTM should operate under a three-year workplan that feeds into the next cycle of the global stocktake (GST) with well-defined activities, relevant entities, timeline and level of implementation.

[Meanwhile, in the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) negotiation track, developed countries are proposing to establish a new arrangement for mitigation, without mention of budgetary constraints.]

There were many interventions especially from developed countries and some developing countries on the need for nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to be aligned with limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C and best available science, which elicited

a strong response from **India**. It stressed that “any assessment of whether or not a Party’s NDC is aligned with a fair contribution to the global burden of limiting warming to the temperature goals of the PA must be based on estimating whether the cumulative emissions implied by the NDC are in keeping with that Party’s fair share of the carbon budget. All such analyses clearly show that no developed country’s NDC is aligned with the PA goals.” It also highlighted that an equity assessment of the scenarios assessed in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s 6th Assessment Report (AR6) “showed that a higher mitigation burden was allocated to developing countries, with Africa bearing the highest burden of mitigation even in the current decade”.

Highlights of the interventions

Egypt, for the **G77 and China**, highlighted “the importance of taking structured steps towards advancing the development and operationalization of the JTM by COP 31”. On governance and functions, it proposed that the JTM must serve as an institutional home for supporting countries’ just transitions under the PA, operating under the authority and guidance of the CMA. It then outlined the purposes which should be in line with decision 2/CMA.7, which are: “enhance international cooperation and support, such as provision of finance and other means of implementation for nationally determined just transition pathways”; “provide technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing responsive to national circumstances and local priorities”; “support equitable, nationally driven and inclusive just transitions across sectors and dimensions of climate action”; and “build on and complement relevant workstreams under the Convention and the PA, including the JTWP”.

The Group underlined that “the necessary enabling environments for just transitions must respond to the concrete realities faced by developing countries, including by addressing structural constraints, such as limited fiscal space and access to technology; the rise of climate-related unilateral trade measures [UTMs]; need to strengthen social protection systems and development pathways; and promoting a supportive and open international economic system. These are essential enablers for equitable and inclusive just transitions, and should therefore be reflected in the operationalization of

the mechanism alongside international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge sharing.”

It also highlighted guiding principles for its operationalization, including: (1) equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC); (2) nationally determined and non-prescriptive approaches, social protection to mitigate potential impacts associated with the transition, and avoiding new external benchmarks or conditionalities; (3) whole-of-economy, whole-of-society, multi-stakeholder, equitable, inclusive and participatory just transitions; (4) adaptation and climate resilience should be fully reflected in just transitions including through support for social protection systems, resilience building and responses to structural constraints and loss and damage faced by developing countries; (5) MOI, including grant-based and non-debt finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and technical assistance, are essential to support equitable and inclusive just transitions in developing countries; (6) sustainable development, poverty eradication and the right to development should remain central to all just transitions, also narrowing the North-South development gap and promoting global sustainable development; (7) promotion of decent work, quality jobs and meaningful social dialogue as fundamental enablers of just transition pathways, which shall consider the informal sector, the care economy, unemployed people and future workers, small-scale farmers and agricultural communities in transition; and (8) inclusion and participation.

Ghana, for the **African Group**, said it expects the governance of the JTM to be a “fully constituted CMA body” empowered to provide high-level normative guidance across all the main pillars of MOI, and “not a dialogue platform”. This, it said, is “non-negotiable”.

In its submission on the JTM, the African Group explained that its proposal for the JTM to come under the CMA’s authority instead of the Subsidiary Bodies is essential, because “only a CMA body holds the mandate and the legitimacy to provide authoritative guidance to the Financial Mechanism and Technology Mechanism and to inform Parties’ assessment of the adequacy of existing and emerging finance channels”.

Ghana also said that the Group proposed a two-tier governance model. One of the core functions is that the JTM should provide normative guidance to international cooperation systems such as trade systems and intellectual property regimes to address systemic barriers to accessing support for just transition, and that it must be firmly grounded in the relevant Articles of the PA for developed countries to provide MOI to developing countries.

On finance, it proposed that the JTM provide normative guidance to inform the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and its replenishment processes and “integration and mainstreaming of equity considerations across international financial institutions”. It remarked that the existing climate finance channels including the GCF, Global Environment Facility (GEF), Adaptation Fund (AF) and bilateral instruments “have not been designed to address the people-centred dimensions of just transitions [such as] the formalization of informal economies, social protection for affected communities, and the economic diversification of fossil-fuel and trade-exposed developing economies”.

It also commented that all financing instruments must be assessed against the principles of “additionality, grant equivalence, non-debt-creating”, while also noting that “Parties may, over time and in light of evolving needs and experience, assess the financial arrangements for just transitions”.

In general, the African Group proposed five interconnected elements – purpose and scope, guiding principle, governance and institutional arrangement, core functions, MOI and operationalization process and timeline – requesting that the Co-Chairs reflect and address all the five elements in the draft decision text.

Chile, for **AILAC**, said the JTM should be under the CMA, but to effectively implement just transitions, it should establish clear linkages with other constituted bodies under the COP and the CMA and “it will become the central venue of mainstreaming just transitions within and outside of the Convention”. It also said the JTM should support Parties in integrating just transition considerations into the planning, implementation and monitoring of national climate and development policies, including nationally determined contributions (NDCs), national adaptation plans (NAPs) and

long-term low emission development strategies (LT-LEDS). The main objective for the JTM is to enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity building and knowledge sharing for enabling equitable and inclusive just transitions to achieve the goals of the PA.

Ethiopia, for the **LDCs**, also proposed a two-tier governance model and said the JTM should be implementation-focused with both international and national dimensions. It also said that just transitions must be understood within the context of “high debt burden and limited fiscal space” and underscored the need for the JTM to facilitate discussion on “debt reform”. It also stressed on the special needs and circumstances of LDCs, and called for this unique context to be taken into account in the design of the JTM to enable LDCs to leapfrog to clean and renewable energy systems.

On linkage between the JTM and the JTWP, it said the JTWP “must continue beyond three years as negotiation space, [while] the JTM turns these issues into outcome, operationalized at COP 31, alongside renewal of the JTWP”.

Fiji, for **AOSIS**, proposed that the JTM be “Party-driven and informed by strategic experts”, and “implementation-focused”. It said that “the objective of the JTM is to identify and facilitate capacity building, technology transfer and institution strengthening of 1.5°C-aligned just transition pathways”, tailored to developing countries based on their “specific vulnerability” and resource base.

In terms of governance, it proposed a “just transition technical expert body arm” of the JTM which would provide “demand-driven technical assistance for countries to implement just transition in NDCs, NAPs and LT-LEDS, as well as assisting developing countries to identify their needs and type of support needed”. The JTM “will then coordinate with constituted bodies and match the existing UNFCCC bodies to the countries requesting technical assistance”. It also said that there is value in the JTM being hosted in the secretariat and called for dedicated seats for Small Island Developing States (SIDS), relevant bodies, experts and constituencies.

Saudi Arabia, for the **LMDC**, said that the JTM should function as a facilitative and demand-driven cooperation network that strengthens international

cooperation, supports developing countries in addressing structural barriers to development-oriented transitions, and enhances access to MOI, which would allow developing countries to plan for and implement their national just transition pathways. “The governance of the JTM must ensure equitable representation for developing countries, with due consideration for the needs and priorities of developing countries,” it said further.

It also proposed that the mechanism focus on “ensuring equity and the right to development of countries”, and “fostering an international rules-based, non-discriminatory, fair, open, inclusive, equitable, sustainable, and transparent multilateral trading system”, among others.

It highlighted some key principles that should guide the operationalization of the JTM, including “nationally determined and bottom-up approaches”, “emphasizing the broad scope of just transitions in a manner that promotes a comprehensive understanding of just transitions, including adaptation and building resilience to the impacts of climate change”, “non-prescriptive and non-conditional approaches, as the mechanism should not introduce standards or benchmarks for transitions, metrics or indicators, sectoral transition pathways nor new reporting obligations or recommendations”, and “narrowing the North-South development gap and promoting sustainable development”.

Qatar, for the **Arab Group**, echoed similar guiding principles.

South Africa proposed the need for SB 64 to create a space to practically unpack what “international cooperation” means. It saw the opportunity to reflect on the mapping exercise but said “the design of the JTM should not be constrained by what currently exists ... if we want the JTM to do what is required”.

India said the JTM should not become an expert-driven and top-down process. It said that “in a world that is characterized by deep-rooted structural inequalities between countries, the principle of preserving sovereignty is extremely important for developing countries and this recognition is also the basis for strengthening international cooperation”. One important objective for the JTM is to “identify and explore ways to address the barriers and challenges to achieving just transitions

both globally and nationally. It is important that we have fair and frank discussions about climate-related UTMs, assess their impacts, and establish methods of addressing the imposition of such measures themselves, as well as their impacts on developing countries.”

On the linkages between the JTM and the JTWP, India said “it is implied in this structure” and that “both the JTWP and the JTM have distinct but coordinated roles to play”. India added that the JTWP has built an understanding that “recognizes development as the core lens through which climate action must be viewed, particularly in developing regions, which do not have the advantage of years of economic growth undertaken in a manner that has already depleted a large share of the global carbon budget. The JTM must support for the development of this understanding, and operationalizing it in the way in which we think about climate action, the distribution of the mitigation burden, and eventually achieving the long-term goal of the Convention itself.”

India explained that “It is precisely due to the lack of reference to concrete ways to operationalize climate justice in the way in which climate action is implemented that led to the creation of the JTWP ... We also do not think that completing the mapping exercise is a condition for developing the mechanism. The COP 30 decision clearly mandates us to discuss this at SB 64 with a view to its establishment at COP 31. We cannot accept any renegotiation of that decision, and so do not agree that the discussion should begin from whether or not we need the mechanism itself.”

On NDC alignment with the 1.5°C target, India said: “The key question here is how one determines whether an individual country’s NDC is aligned with a global goal of limiting warming to a specific temperature level, since the NDC is national in nature and the temperature target is global. Any assessment of whether an individual country’s NDC is ‘aligned’ with the temperature targets of either 1.5°C or 2°C must use some metric to correlate the country NDCs to this global target. Therefore, one must determine what this metric should be. When being discussed under the UNFCCC and its PA, guided by their principles and provisions, any such metric must incorporate elements of equity and CBDR-RC. We know from the latest scientific assessment of the IPCC that global warming is directly proportional to cumulative

CO2 emissions. The world therefore has a carbon budget within which global cumulative emissions must be limited. According to the same assessment of the IPCC, about four-fifths of the carbon budget available to the world to limit warming to 1.5°C (50% probability) and about two-thirds of the carbon budget to limit warming to 2°C (67% probability) has already been exhausted by 2020 itself. Developed countries are responsible for a large majority of these historical cumulative emissions from pre-industrial times till 2020. The very limited remaining carbon budget is also being rapidly exhausted by continuing emissions from developed countries (which continue to emit far above their fair share of emissions even in this decade).” It said further that “The assessment of whether or not a Party’s NDC is aligned with a fair contribution to the global burden of limiting warming to the temperature goals of the PA must be based on estimating whether the cumulative emissions implied by the NDC are in keeping with that Party’s fair share of the carbon budget. All such analyses clearly show that no developed country NDC is aligned with the PA goals.”

It added: “There are many other scenarios and pathways that seek to provide benchmarks for correlated national or regional pathways to global temperature targets. However, most of these scenarios, especially those that have been part of IPCC assessments so far, are based on cost optimization approaches, and far from operationalizing equity, they project continuing inequality and lack of even basic development into the future.” India said that an equity assessment of the scenarios assessed in the IPCC’s AR6 showed that a higher mitigation burden was allocated to developing countries, with Africa bearing the highest burden of mitigation even in the current decade. The IPCC report itself says that the more stringent mitigation scenarios, relying on high amounts of land-based mitigation, led to projections of higher risk of hunger and food insecurity in developing countries, particularly in South Asia and Africa. “It is important therefore to carefully assess any claims to ‘alignment’ to the temperature goal of the PA, and the uncritical use of any benchmark – particularly given our enhanced understanding through discussions over the past few years on critical issues underlying just transitions.”

Emphasized India, “While we are in complete agreement that all our work should be based on

scientific evidence, we must do so in a manner that engages with the substance of the science. Science should not be just a slogan, but something that we actively engage with and incorporate in the way in which we design the mechanism.”

Ghana, speaking in its national capacity, said that in the fifth JTWP dialogue, documents showed that “trade rules, sustainability standards and market structures imposed by developed country Parties shape transition pathways in developing countries; that transition-related standards without commensurate support create barriers rather than enablers; and that the distributional and cross-border effects of climate measures are not peripheral, they are central to what 'just' means”.

It referred to a case study which found that “carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAM), deforestation compliance requirements (EUDR) and supply chain due diligence (CSDD) obligations impose measurable, material negative impacts on Ghana’s trade competitiveness, export revenues, and fiscal space present-tense economic injuries inflicted on an economy responsible for less than 0.1% of cumulative global emissions. The Africa regional study found that Africa’s transition employment and GDP gains are only fully realized when local content is embedded domestically; without it, Africa replicates in the green economy the extractive position it has occupied in the fossil economy.”

In response to claims of budgetary constraints, it said that “the question is one of political priorities, not institutional capacity. Ghana will not allow a budgetary argument to accomplish what a substantive argument could not.”

Norway said it agrees that the JTM should be under the PA and under the CMA. It then highlighted the interim output of the mapping exercise and said the JTM “should make use of this document to avoid duplication with existing work”. It then suggested that Parties should use the mapping exercise to “develop how they can do what they can do”. It cited budgetary challenges, saying “we must be cautious when we do our work on the JTM as [there is] no funding available” and “that’s why [we have to] use existing bodies”. It said the JTM can “provide existing bodies with guidance to implement just transition work” or “this can be done by [having a] workplan”. “We are happy with this new mechanism, [but] it cannot fix or solve

anything wrong in the system, [and we] need to be precise on what the JTM can do,” cautioned Norway.

Japan proposed that the discussion should “start with the mapping” exercise and “then only discuss the functions” of the JTM to “avoid duplications”. It suggested that the mapping exercise is “critically important” and “necessary” to the discussion, especially on the necessity of such a new mechanism in the first place. It proposed further “elaboration of the mapping exercise ... including call for submissions ... to present a comprehensive and refined synthesis report for CMA 8. After evidence established, Parties can design the JTM in a timely and effective manner.”

The **UK** envisioned that the JTM can guide and enhance the journey of getting to the “destination”, which is “to keep 1.5°C alive” and “enhance accelerated actions” towards a 1.5°C-aligned just transition pathway. On governance, it proposed that the JTM come under the JTWP, which is under the CMA. On institutional arrangements, it said it does not agree that a new body is possible given the budgetary constraints.

It also commented that the finance and MOI proposals go far beyond what can be achieved, and this is not what the JTM is about. It said there is “no mandate for a fund or a funding window ... and also no mandate for consideration of individual Party policy of trade-related issues”, adding that it was “baffled” with Parties bringing back the climate and trade issue given that they “already agreed in Belém to have a climate and trade dialogue”.

Canada concurred that the JTM is not a venue for climate finance but instead needs to respond to what Parties have learnt from the GST, from the review and the mapping exercise. It also welcomed the output of the mapping, which it said demonstrated the breadth of UN instruments and processes, as well as wealth of experience. Hence, instead of creating an additional structure, it was of the view that it is better to align and strengthen what already exists.

The **EU** said the mapping output demonstrated that a broad array of international actors are already integrating just transition into their work and the challenge is not “institutional scarcity but fragmentation”. It hence suggested that the JTM, “rather than creating parallel track, should coordinate existing actors and resources”. It further suggested that the JTM operate under a three-year workplan that feeds into the next GST cycle with well-defined activities, relevant entities, timeline and level of implementation.

It proposed that the JTM “serve as concrete enabler for strengthening and implementing 1.5°C-aligned climate policies by addressing the social and economic dimensions of the transition ... and it should operationalize rights-based approach in cross-cutting manner – respect and fulfil all human rights and social protection”.

One of the priority functions is to “foster the promotion and consideration of key just transition elements in the design and implementation of NDCs, NAPs and LT-LEDS that are grounded in scientific evidence and align with the outcomes of GST-1 and the relevant provisions of the PA. Its regular progress assessment within biennial transparency reports and the next GSTs could be encouraged and guide the next round of NDCs, NAPs and LT-LEDS, thus feeding into the entire implementation cycle...”

Switzerland, for the **EIG**, also highlighted that the purpose of the JTM should be to support an inclusive and equitable just transition to enhance climate action to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C, increase the ability to adapt and enhance the resilience of all ecosystems to the adverse effects of climate change, in line with the principle of CBDR. It then proposed convening experts, facilitating and coordinating supports, creating capacity building and disseminating best practices and tools, including fossil fuel phaseout strategies, social protection and economic diversification.

New Zealand echoed many of the points made by others such as Canada, AOSIS, the EIG and the UK.

TWN

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Developing countries warn of widening adaptation finance gap

Bonn, 15 June (TWN+) – Developing countries made strong interventions at the first workshop under the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR), which was convened on 10 June at the ongoing climate talks in Bonn. They highlighted concerning trends over adaptation finance that was falling far short of the needs of developing countries, while the costs of adaptation are increasing as temperatures rise. They also called for improving access to funds and the use of grants instead of loans.

Developed countries on the other hand spoke about the importance of enabling environments in developing countries to attract climate finance.

The workshop under the BAR was titled “Advancing progress in line with Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement: supporting implementation of the Global Goal on Adaptation and the aim of the first phase of the BAR (decision 12/CMA.7, para 29) and in this context, the coherence of the UNFCCC adaptation architecture”. According to sources, the topic for the workshop was agreed after much wrangling behind closed doors (see further details below).

[Paragraph 29 of decision 12/CMA.7 from Belém on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) decided that the first phase of the BAR, covering the timeframe of 2026–28, shall focus on initial implementation of activities, consisting of two workshops per year organized by the Chairs of the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Bodies, and the preparation of a technical paper by the secretariat.]

Developing countries also requested for the outcomes of the BAR workshop to be reflected in a report.

In a scene-setting presentation to kick off the discussions, **Oman** gave the example of applying for adaptation funding from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) for an early warning system project in 2025. It said 42 adjustments were requested by the GCF to Oman’s project proposal and that it had responded to each of them, including reducing the grant amount applied for from \$25 million to \$15 million as well as increasing co-financing from \$4 million to \$35 million. However, even with these changes, new concerns were raised by developed country members on the GCF Board who voted against funding the project. (According to sources, the developed country Board members rejected Oman’s proposal based on it being a “high-income” country, despite the fact that all developing countries are eligible to access the Fund’s resources.)

Wrangle over workshop topic

The workshop had kicked off after much debate before the formal start of the Bonn session (that began on 8 June). In an “information note” by the SB Chairs on 26 May, the workshop had been titled “Coherence across the UNFCCC adaptation architecture, and means of implementation for adaptation”. During consultations convened prior to the Bonn session, developed countries had expressed their reservations on MOI featuring as part of the workshop, while developing countries had supported retaining the MOI component. Some developing country groups had expressed reservations on the aspect of coherence (see Update 1).

On 5 June, the SB Chairs released the “concept note” for the workshop, the title of which read,

“Advancing progress in line with Article 7.1 of the PA: the role of the UNFCCC adaptation architecture, its strengths, coherence and how it can best support implementation of the GGA and the elements outlined in para 38 of decision 2.CMA.5”. The MOI session was titled “Ensuring access to finance for adaptation, including implementing the UAE framework panel of climate funds, MDBs and others”. The concept note featured contentious terms such as “other Parties in a position to do so” in the context of provision of adaptation finance support. (Under Article 9.1 of the PA, developed countries are obligated to provide finance support for mitigation and adaptation to developing countries. Phrases such as “other Parties in a position to do so” have been used by developed countries in the past as an attempt to dilute differentiation in obligations between developed and developing countries.)

Following the release of the concept note, sources said, several developing country groups wrote to the SB Chairs to express their reservations and opposition to the note because it ignored the mandates in decision 12/CMA.7. Developing countries stressed in their communication that any discussions related to MOI under the BAR must be anchored strictly and exclusively upon the legal and operational foundations of Articles 9.1, 10 and 11 of the PA, as per paragraph 28(d) of the Belém decision. [Paragraph 28(d) decided that the work under the BAR “shall be guided by ... Ensuring access to means of implementation for adaptation, for adequate, predictable and accessible financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support, including from developed country Parties to developing country Parties, in accordance with Article 9.1 and Articles 10–11 of the PA”.]

Following the concerns expressed by developing countries, the concept note was revised on 7 June to make the workshop more balanced and aligned to the mandate of the Belém decision. The MOI section was redrafted to read, “Means of implementation in line with paragraph 28(d) of decision 12/CMA.7”.

Highlights of interventions during the MOI session of the BAR workshop

Sri Lanka, for the **G77 and China**, said implementation of the GGA cannot be realized without adequate, predictable and accessible

support and that MOI must anchor the work under the BAR. It said that developing countries continue to face structural, institutional and procedural barriers in accessing support, including through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, and that adaptation finance remains insufficient and is too often provided in the form of loans at market rate rather than grants or concessional loans. It called for support with simplified and expedited access modalities and for a substantial scaling up of provision of adaptation finance proportionate with the needs and priorities of developing countries. It stressed that provision and expedited access to MOI is essential to implement the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience (on the GGA) and to achieve its targets. It also underscored that the work should be guided by and fully reflect the principles of equity and CBDR-RC. It requested that the discussions in the workshop be captured in a report.

China, for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, quoted numbers from the UN Environment Programme’s Adaptation Gap report to establish that adaptation finance fell way short of the needs of developing countries. It said the adaptation finance gap stands at \$284–339 billion per year until 2035, with needs that are 12–14 times as much as current finance flows, adding that international public adaptation finance flows from developed to developing countries were tracked at \$26 billion in 2023, a slight decline compared with 2022. It referred to the quality of finance delivered as poor and said, “Non-concessional loans continue to increase ... this means developing countries have to pay the money back – that too at market rates. Imagine the burden this must put on developing countries who are dealing with sustainable development, poverty eradication efforts as well as adapting to climate change, mostly on their own.” It added that technology transfer was slow and conducted primarily through market transactions, with limited scale of application and diffusion in developing countries. Developing countries must be supported via real technology transfer, without intellectual property imposing barriers, it said, adding that developing countries cannot be asked continuously to demonstrate readiness and enabling conditions. Rather, it should be on developed countries and relevant institutions to facilitate the timely provision and mobilization of MOI. On the question of access, China said that developed countries should not attempt to

transfer their obligations to the private sector since adaptation actions do not generate predictable financial returns and therefore fail to attract private investment at the scale required. “It must be driven by public, grant-based finance in line with the obligations of developed countries under Article 9.1 of the PA,” said China.

Saudi Arabia, for the **Arab Group**, also expressed concern that adaptation finance is declining, adding that as warming levels increase, adaptation needs, costs and implementation challenges will also increase. Explaining further, it said higher temperatures mean greater heat exposure, water stress, impacts on agriculture, higher pressure on systems, greater infrastructure vulnerability and inevitably higher costs of protecting lives and livelihoods. Yet, developed country finance commitments are declining, it said, adding that at the 9th replenishment of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), \$3.9 billion was pledged, which was nearly 27% lower than the previous replenishment and the lowest level in 16 years. As regards the GCF, it said that one developed country (the United Kingdom) had cut its signed contribution for 2024–27 by half, while another developed country (the United States) rescinded nearly \$4 billion in pledges. Referring to developed countries voting against the Oman project in the GCF, Saudi Arabia said that the concerns raised were arbitrary and discriminatory. It lamented that “early warning for all” does not seem to apply to Arab people, adding that the region was being denied climate finance and the right to develop. It said further that the GGA cannot be implemented if the temperature increases and finance falls, and called on developed countries to reverse the decline in adaptation finance commitments.

Botswana, for the **African Group**, said GDP losses across agriculture, water, infrastructure, coastal systems and public health sectors are mounting in the continent, and that the trajectory is worsening as global temperatures rise beyond the agreed temperature goal. It added that adaptation finance flows to Africa are “chronically and systematically inadequate”; compared with mitigation, adaptation makes up less than a third of total climate finance flows. Estimates peg adaptation needs to \$56 billion per year, which is an underestimate to begin with, due to methodological challenges of costing adaptation needs. “Yet actual flows remain a fraction of this, and a disproportionate share

arrives as loans rather than grants, incurring debt to respond to a crisis that Africa did not cause, and this is structurally unjust,” said Botswana. It also underscored the need for adaptation finance to be provided as public, grant-based, new and additional finance. It called for simplified access via direct access; predictable, multi-year financing arrangements linked to implementation of national adaptation plans (NAPs); adaptation communications and long-term resilience strategies and strengthening technology transfer mechanisms required for achieving the GGA. It said adaptation actions such as restoring wetlands, building early warning systems, supporting climate-resilient agriculture and protecting coastal communities create resilience, not financial returns. “They cannot service loans and cannot meet the conditions of blended finance,” it said further, adding that finance instruments are misaligned with adaptation realities.

Sudan, for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, said direct access remains limited because accreditation of entities is slow and costly, leaving many countries dependent on internationally accredited entities. It said this reduces national ownership, increases transaction costs and slows delivery to local communities. The group emphasized that adaptation should be grant-based because it is a public good that does not generate revenue streams, and loan-based financing would deepen debt stress.

The **Dominican Republic**, for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, stressed the importance of access and said that adaptation finance reaching SIDS is around two-tenths of 1% of global climate finance. “That’s only 20 cents for each \$100 mobilized through adaptation finance, while our needs run to at least 12 times the public finance now flowing. That gap is still widening instead of closing.” It also referred to the barriers as “structural, institutional and human, and they compound”, adding that nearly half of public adaptation finance to SIDS still arrives as debt. It called for simplifying accreditation and reporting, to make grants and deeply concessional finance for the most vulnerable the default, and to move to programmatic, multi-year financing, “so we can plan beyond the life of a single grant”. It also said the task of the BAR is to take solutions to scale, and to turn the commitment to triple adaptation finance into an accountable mechanism for delivery.

Chile, for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, said implementation of adaptation cannot be separated from the provision of adequate, predictable, accessible and grant-based finance in accordance with Article 9.1 of the PA. It said MOI is needed to create enabling conditions, and highlighted the complexity of procedures and requirements in accessing funds. It called for the issue of finance to be again considered as a standalone priority topic in a future BAR workshop.

The **EU** said it wants to resolve the issue on access to finance particularly for SIDS and LDCs.

Canada too said it sees great value and efforts in making access easier for developing countries, particularly for LDCs and SIDS. It added that facilitating access is not just about finance but also about building capacity.

The **UK** agreed that the existing systems to access funds are too complex, fragmented and slow. It cautioned that the BAR is not a separate finance tracking mechanism, and that it should not duplicate work mandated to the Standing Committee on Finance or other finance-related bodies or negotiations.

New Zealand said public finance would not be sufficient for adaptation goals and there is a need to mobilize all sources of finance and align broader financial flows with low emissions and climate-resilient development.

Japan emphasized the need for strong enabling conditions in developing countries, adding that many countries are unable to identify priorities, develop plans and identify stakeholders. It suggested that during discussions on MOI, Parties should consider not just quantity but also the conditions that enable countries to utilize the support.

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Means of implementation key for delivery of global stocktake outcomes

Bonn, 15 June (Radhika Chatterjee) – Developing countries emphasized the need for delivery of means of implementation (MOI) by developed countries during the “UAE dialogue on implementing the global stocktake outcomes” held on 10–11 June in Bonn.

According to developing countries, the most important barriers to the implementation of the first global stocktake (GST-1) outcomes included a declining trend of delivery of climate finance from developed countries; lack of developed countries taking the lead in reducing their emission reductions and achieving net neutrality well ahead of 2050; and dis-enablers like unilateral measures and intellectual property rights that constrain technology transfer and international cooperation. While some developing countries laid emphasis on the need for implementing efforts related to the energy transition reflected in paragraph 28 of the GST-1 outcome, they too acknowledged the critical role that delivery of MOI by developed countries had to play towards achieving them.

Developed countries on the other hand emphasized the importance of strengthening international cooperation through various initiatives both inside and outside the UNFCCC.

The discussions were focused on three thematic areas: implementation of mitigation and response-measures-related GST outcomes; implementation of adaptation and loss-and-damage-related GST outcomes; and strengthened international cooperation and identification of key enablers in implementing the GST outcomes. On both days, the sessions were presided over by the co-facilitators

of the UAE dialogue, Rita Mishan (Gautemala) and Johanna Lissinger Peitz (Sweden).

[In decision 3/CMA.7 from Belém (paragraph 2), it was agreed that the modalities of the dialogue will “facilitate the sharing of experience and of information on opportunities, challenges, barriers and needs, including with a focus on the provision of finance, capacity-building, and technology development and transfer, as well as strengthened international cooperation as key enablers, in implementing the global stocktake outcomes”. In paragraph 1, Parties also agreed that the dialogue will take place “in the spirit of international cooperation, be facilitative and non-prescriptive, and respect the nationally determined manner and different national circumstances, pathways and approaches”.]

Highlights of interventions

The **G77 and China** said GST-1 showed that while progress has been made towards the achievement of the purpose and goals of the Paris Agreement, its level is not yet sufficient. “For developing countries, this is reflected in intensifying climate impacts, rising adaptation costs, growing loss and damage, fiscal pressures, and continuing challenges in eradicating poverty and achieving sustainable development, while international cooperation is under strain. At the same time, considerable ambition is shown in our various nationally determined contributions (NDCs), national adaptation plans (NAPs), mitigation technologies, resilience-building efforts, and nationally determined pathways towards sustainable development. A key challenge,

however, is the persistent gap between the scale of action required to implement GST-1 outcomes through these nationally determined efforts, the level of international cooperation, and the scale, quality, accessibility and predictability of support provided.”

It said the UAE dialogue must be implementation-focused and provide a space to discuss actions and global opportunities, overcome barriers, and enhance nationally determined implementation progress and transformation. It pointed out that “finance is consistently identified as the key enabling condition. It must be adequate, predictable, accessible, new and additional, concessional and grant-based, particularly for adaptation and loss and damage. Fragmentation needs to be reduced, access simplified, project preparation supported, and debt burdens not deepened.”

It said “technology development and transfer must be strengthened in a practical and needs-based manner, and should focus on affordable and appropriate technologies, capacity to operate and maintain them, support for national institutions, regional cooperation, and the development of endogenous and locally appropriate technologies”. It added that “capacity building must be sustained and long-term, institutional rather than project-based, and be country-driven, especially to support national planning and implementation”.

It said international cooperation under the Convention and the PA “should be multilaterally strengthened and supportive partnerships with non-Party stakeholders encouraged. These efforts should be needs-based and country-driven, undertaken through enhanced North-South cooperation, complemented by voluntary South-South and regional cooperation, and better coordination across funds and institutions, and should not weaken, impede or discourage implementation by Parties of their climate actions”.

Saudi Arabia, for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, said the key challenge facing developing countries is not a lack of plans, commitments or ambition but rather the MOI gap. The scale of support currently being provided falls significantly short of what is required, it said, adding that the provision and mobilization of financial support must be commensurate with the level of ambition expected from developing countries.

It further said that “technology development and transfer continues to be constrained by limited access and intellectual property barriers. Technology transfer should take place on the most favourable terms possible for developing countries and support long-term deployment and local capacity development across all technology needs.” It called capacity building essential for implementation and stressed that sustainable climate action “requires strong institutions, skilled workforces and national systems capable of planning, implementing and scaling climate action over time”.

It said “the international environment itself is becoming a barrier to implementation. Unilateral measures, trade restrictions, carbon border adjustment mechanisms [CBAMs], taxes and levies can reduce competitiveness, constrain fiscal space and divert resources away from climate action and sustainable development”.

The LMDC referred to analysis by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) “which found that a CBAM based on a carbon price of \$44 per ton could increase income in developed countries by approximately \$2.5 billion while reducing income in developing countries by approximately \$5.9 billion. The International Monetary Fund similarly found in a report, dated September 2025, that CBAM implementation in one region, starting 2026, forecast an annual welfare gain of \$141 billion in developed countries, and a loss of \$106 billion in developing countries while only addressing less than 0.2% of global emissions.”

It said operationalizing enablers “requires a renewed focus on delivery rather than additional expectations on developing countries”. This, it said, would mean that developed countries deliver on their existing commitments on finance, technology transfer and capacity building before creating new frameworks and initiatives, and calls for scaled-up support through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, including through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF), Adaptation Fund and Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), to triple their outflows and adaptation finance respectively. It also said there is a need for “addressing barriers to technology transfer, including intellectual-property-related barriers where they impede implementation”. It also called

for “ensuring climate finance remains aligned with nationally determined priorities rather than externally imposed classifications, taxonomies, regulatory frameworks or pathways, consistent with the Belém Safeguards on the implementation of Article 2.1(c) of the PA”. [Article 2.1(c) refers to “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development”.]

It also stressed the need for “addressing unilateral measures and other policies that reduce developing countries’ ability to implement climate action. Enhanced international cooperation is fundamental to implementation. Cooperation should be guided by equity and CBDR-RC, and support nationally determined pathways. They should never impose a single pathway, initiative or approach at the international level or extraterritorially inflict national standards and regulations on other countries. We are seeing attempts at both, causing severe strain on multilateralism and barriers to developing countries’ implementation of their nationally determined climate action.”

It said the UAE dialogue “must remain fully consistent with its mandate as a facilitative, non-prescriptive space with a focus on finance”, and reiterated the need for the co-facilitators to “ensure that the summary report remains a factual summary as per the mandate, without introducing recommendations, interpretations or progress assessments of implementation. The report must confirm that the GST outcomes implementation occurs through different nationally determined pathways, approaches and technologies and does not establish global targets to be tracked. While some Parties may choose to pursue specific roadmaps, initiatives or approaches, others may contribute through alternative approaches, including diverse technologies such as renewable energy, carbon management and removals and other cooperative initiatives. Respecting this diversity makes this dialogue consistent with the PA.”

The **Arab Group** said predictable and accessible finance is one of the key enablers where action is needed, and asked for scaling up of financial support through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, stressing also the need for country ownership. This, it said, would enable the implementation of NDCs and NAPs. Underlining the need for ensuring financial support is provided

to developing countries, it highlighted the way in which developed countries influence the decision of who gets finance, saying a country of the Arab Group (an apparent reference to Oman) had applied for GCF funding for an early warning system project but was rejected by the GCF Board on the grounds that it was a “high-income” country, despite being fully eligible for accessing finance.

The **African Group** said there will be different pathways towards achieving the goals of the PA depending on a country’s circumstances and priorities. International support must be tailored to national circumstances and these pathways to reflect equity. Referring to the various climate-related initiatives outside of the UNFCCC, it said “not all of these initiatives apply principles of the PA and UNFCCC”. It stressed that a successful implementation of the GST-1 outcome requires international cooperation, and pointed to the need to significantly scale up access to predictable finance. It highlighted the need for addressing the high cost of capital and reforming international financial institutions. It said although the UNFCCC does not have a legal remit on other international bodies, it can send signals which have a bearing on other institutions.

The **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** said the GST-1 outcomes cannot be implemented without the delivery of MOI, adding that ambition and implementation are dependent on the scale, pace and delivery of the required MOI. It stressed the need for accessible, grant-based and predictable finance for implementation of NAPs, NDCs, and responding to loss and damage. It also expressed concerns about the decline in funding received by the GEF in its latest round of replenishment. It pointed to similar concerns related to capitalization in other funds like the FRLD and the Adaptation Fund.

It said the Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, held in Santa Marta, Colombia, in April, was a leading example of international cooperation to deliver on the GST-1 outcomes related to phasing out fossil fuels, including subsidies. It said the conference has offered to compile an inventory on fossil fuel subsidies and invited Parties to join the effort on a voluntary basis. It asked for a further maximization of the Action Agenda and for recognizing these international cooperation efforts at COP 31.

Colombia, for **AILAC** and **Uruguay**, **Mexico** and **Bolivia**, said that despite progress, the world is not on track to achieving the goals of the PA. It called the GST-1 outcome a significant one and mentioned efforts related to tripling renewable energy, doubling energy efficiency, transitioning away from fossil fuels, and halting deforestation. It pointed to the need for financial resources, capacity building and technology transfer as key enablers for the Global South to act as per the pace and scale required. It highlighted gaps in adaptation and loss and damage and said the UAE dialogue must be about provision of finance under Article 9 of the PA. It also said that the report of the first UAE dialogue should inform priorities and solutions of the second dialogue to be held in 2027. It called for addressing MOI and emphasized the need for adequate, predictable and grant-based finance, reform of international financial institutions, and bridging the gap between finance pledged and support provided.

The **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** said international cooperation and the multilateral system remain a critical enabler for implementation of GST-1 outcomes. Expressing concerns about the current trends in the multilateral system, it said there is a need to come together to advance the global fight against climate change. It said countries cannot delay critical action. It pointed out that climate finance is not sufficient to achieve the scale of action required and highlighted that the current geopolitical situation is impacting both official development assistance and climate finance. An important aspect that needs to be addressed in this context is the high cost of capital that developing countries face while accessing finance. It also stressed the need to simplify access to finance, minimize debt, deliver on the new collective quantified goal on finance, and triple adaptation finance.

China said it has for the first time set up economy-wide emission reduction target covering all greenhouse gas emissions in its NDC. It shared that the country plans to install total wind and solar power capacity that is six times more than its 2020 level. Despite these reflecting its best efforts, it said there is still a need to continuously scale up support and investment and work with all countries to address new challenges, adding that “our efforts cannot be separated from an open and supportive international political and economic

environment”. It said further that “the main barriers include developed countries not taking the lead in emission reductions and provision of MOI, and the emerging challenge is caused by unilateral measures imposed by some developed countries”.

It said “the rise of unilateralism and protectionism are emerging prominent barriers for developing countries that significantly impair capabilities and potentials to implement and enhance ambition, by undermining global green and low-carbon industrial chains and supply chains, and driving up the costs of clean energy transitions. At the same time, the withdrawal of some country from the PA and even the UNFCCC will result in increased global emissions, slow down global mitigation trends and critical gap in provision of support to developing countries” (an apparent reference to the US withdrawal from the Convention and the PA).

India said the PA’s implementation has been directed by the developed countries towards mitigation and keeping the temperature goal as the key focus, and that this has naturally led to the sidelining of adaptation in all respects including the provision of MOI. It also said that the chief barrier to the implementation of mitigation outcomes of GST-1 is “the refusal of developed countries to take the lead, who continue to appropriate unfairly the global carbon budget and constantly shift the goalposts”. It asked developed countries what specific steps and targets they have taken for achieving the mitigation efforts in paragraph 28 of the GST-1 decision and whether their actions towards them are fair. It stressed it is for countries to choose their path while delivering on their fair share of global climate action. It highlighted that “the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has yet to deliver on equitable, CBDR-RC-compliant scenarios and underlying models and reflect the needs and aspirations of the developing world. More work from the Global South is needed to fill this gap and the time needed to this is essential.”

Egypt stressed that one of the key messages that must come out of the UAE dialogue is a recommendation on how to define the fair share of mitigation efforts by developed and developing countries on the basis of equity and CBDR. It stressed the importance of scale, accessibility and quality of finance from developed to developing

countries in accordance with Article 9.1 of the PA as the key enabler for implementing the outcomes of GST-1. The ability of developing countries to implement climate action is also constrained by barriers related to intellectual property rights, while capacity building is also a key enabler. Finally, it highlighted that unilateral trade measures imposed by developed countries obstruct developing countries' efforts towards low-carbon pathways and create dis-enablers for the implementation of their NDCs.

The **European Union** said international cooperation is key to reducing emissions and also mentioned capacity building, technology development and transfer, and the need to mobilize finance from all sources in this context. It said it is committed to delivering climate finance and towards achieving the GST-1 outcome. It also said that the Action Agenda has an important role in strengthening international cooperation. It said reports from the UAE dialogue will inform the second GST.

Switzerland underscored the importance of international cooperation and said implementation of NDCs is key. It welcomed the Global Implementation Accelerator and the Belém Mission 1.5 in this context, and also capacity-building initiatives for NAPs, NDCs and the Coalition on Phasing out Fossil Fuel Incentives Including Subsidies (COFFIS). It also welcomed initiatives like the Santa Marta conference and welcomed all Parties to draw up national roadmaps on transitioning away from fossil fuels. It said that science is not always comfortable and pointed out that any attempts to undermine or delay the IPCC's 7th Assessment Report would be unacceptable.

The **Republic of Korea** said the GST outcomes need to be translated into particular actions through the instruments under the PA. It said work programmes like the Mitigation Work Programme can contribute to implementation, facilitate exchange in learning and act as a vehicle for the implementation of GST outcomes within their respective mandates. It said international cooperation plays a critical role in operationalizing these efforts. It added that processes under the Convention and the PA provide valuable platforms for sharing experiences and mutual learning among

Parties, and mentioned technical exchanges, knowledge sharing and innovative investments in this context.

Norway said a concrete area where international cooperation is vital is in enhancing efforts to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030 as mentioned in paragraph 33 of the GST-1 outcome. It said it enhanced support for the Tropical Forest Forever Facility in Belém and called the COP 30 Presidency "forest roadmap" an opportunity for further advancing work in this direction. It said reduction of non-carbon-dioxide and methane emissions is essential for keeping the 1.5°C goal within reach. It said there is a need to use all tools available for scaling up climate finance and that it found it "inspiring" to see "finance flows are increasing" and emissions declining under Article 6 of the PA (an apparent reference to carbon markets).

Canada said the important issue is how Parties use the UNFCCC and the UAE dialogue to respond to the barriers that were discussed at the dialogue. It said the role of the UNFCCC is to enhance practical cooperation among countries. It mentioned the need for sector-focused conversations in this regard, including nature-based solutions. It also emphasized the role of non-Party stakeholders, including Indigenous Peoples. It said the Action Agenda needs to translate ambition into action.

New Zealand said developed countries have achieved the \$100 billion finance goal and are continuing to increase the funding they provide. It said public finance has an important role to play in climate finance and pointed out that over 90% of funding in the Adaptation Fund is public finance that is being provided by developed countries. It said Parties are responding to the NCQG agreed to in COP 29 which has set a target of \$300 billion by 2035. It said additional focus on investment and climate finance is welcomed in the context of the NCQG.

Under the mandate of the UAE dialogue as agreed to at COP 30, the co-facilitators of the dialogue are expected to prepare a factual and non-prescriptive summary report based on the inputs provided and discussions held during the dialogue. The second dialogue under this mandate is scheduled for the 66th session of the Subsidiary Bodies, to be held in 2027.

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North-South divergences at climate and trade dialogue

Bonn, 16 June (Jinghann Hong) – The first of three climate and trade dialogues (CTD) commenced on 13 June during the 64th session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB 64) at the ongoing climate talks in Bonn. Parties provided substantive input over the desired scope, modalities and outcomes of these dialogues following presentations from the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Trade Centre (ITC) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The first dialogue, presided over by SBSTA Vice-Chair Carol Franco (Dominican Republic) and SBI Chair Julia Gardiner (Australia), saw many divergences between developing and developed countries. On the content of the dialogue, many developing countries desired to discuss and examine the compatibility of trade-climate measures with the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC [viz., Article 3.5 of the Convention, and the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC)] and its Paris Agreement, while developed countries preferred to conduct exchanges of technical knowledge and information sharing. Developed countries also stated a preference for the non-duplication of mandates given the work already happening in other international fora such as the WTO, UNCTAD and ITC.

On how to capture the outcome of the discussions, developing countries were broadly in favour of a summary report capturing the substance of each of the three dialogues to ensure continuity and accountability, whereas developed countries wanted one report summarizing the discussions to be presented in 2028 at the high-level event. Several developing countries also called for the

appointment of co-facilitators and the establishment of a work programme, and a dedicated agenda item to oversee this body of work.

The mandate for the CTD comes from paragraph 57 of the Global Mutirão decision at COP 30 in Belém, which requested the SBs to hold a dialogue at SB 64 (2026), SB 66 (2027) and SB 68 (2028), with the participation of Parties and other stakeholders, “to consider opportunities, challenges and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade, taking into account paragraph 56”, and which decided “to exchange experiences and views on related matters at a high-level event in 2028”. The decision also requested the SBs to present a report summarizing the discussions at the high-level event. (See [Belém TWN Update](#) for more.)

(Paragraph 56 reaffirmed that “Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change and also reaffirms that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”, which reflects Article 3.5 of the Convention.)

During the dialogue, **Saudi Arabia** requested the WTO for clarification on the different terminologies used such as “trade-related climate measures”, “climate-related trade measures”, “trade and climate measures” and “climate and trade measures”. The WTO said that “fundamentally, in

terms of analytical approach, what matters more is the measure itself, its actual design, its scope, and its effects”.

In response to Parties’ interventions, particularly on scope, modalities and outcomes, the SB Chairs said that they would convene consultations with Parties on the way forward in the coming week, the conclusions of which would then be presented at the closing plenary.

Key interventions from parties

Uruguay, for the **G77 and China**, welcomed the dialogue and said that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. On trade, it said that Parties should examine how trade can contribute to a supportive and open international economic system that delivers sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, so they can address climate change. Reaffirming that principles in the Convention and PA are “unambiguous”, it said that trade-related climate measures should be designed and implemented in a manner consistent with equity, CBDR-RC and the sustainable development priorities of developing countries and respecting the nationally determined nature of contributions. It said that the role of international cooperation is to serve as an enabling channel for developing countries in many ways, such as scaled-up predictable finance, technology transfer, and by facilitating access to technologies and services and low-emission infrastructure.

The G77 and China underscored the need for an objective and meaningful assessment of the impacts of such measures on implementation of the PA, and on developing countries’ capacity and potential to address climate change. It said that climate action cannot be implemented by closing markets, shifting costs, extracting revenues or imposing one-size-fits-all policy models designed elsewhere without consent. Stressing that “our multilateral system cannot hold without the mutual recognition of each other’s sovereignty and equality in status”, it called on Parties to use this dialogue to promote a focused and in-depth consideration of issues related to what Article 3.5 of the Convention requires in a concrete and balanced manner.

It also said that trade-related climate measures should avoid creating disproportionate compliance costs, reduced market access and new barriers for developing countries, and should acknowledge developing countries’ limited institutional, technical and financial capacities, and recognize the special circumstances of small island developing states and least developed countries. Highlighting the challenges faced by developing countries, including import dependence, commodity export dependence, high transport and logistics costs, reliance on maritime connectivity and vulnerability to external shocks, it said that international cooperation can seek to ensure that developing countries’ ability to engage in climate action is strengthened without shifting the costs onto countries that have contributed least to climate change and possess the fewest resources available to respond. It said further that the dialogue should serve as a constructive space for Parties to assess, analyze and discuss approaches to address trade-related climate measures’ impact on developing countries’ capacity and potential to address climate change, and looked forward to a concrete process that builds from one dialogue to the next.

The **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** stated it was deeply concerned that climate policies such as carbon border adjustment measures (CBAMs), deforestation-related import restrictions, carbon-intensity standards and corporate sustainability due diligence are increasingly being used to justify unilateral trade-restrictive climate-related measures designed and imposed by developed countries which affect exports, employment, fiscal revenues, industrial development, food security, energy security, micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), small producers, workers and communities in developing countries.

It contrasted how “these measures are often presented as promoting global climate ambition, notwithstanding that domestically, some Parties promoting them are themselves backtracking on or not complying with their longstanding obligations under the Convention and PA”. The “injury is compounded” when Parties impose costs on developing countries that contributed least to historical emissions, and when such measures are designed without meaningful consultation, privilege developed country technologies, carbon

pricing systems and regulatory models, are not accompanied by finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, and are inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of the Convention.

The LMDC described such unilateral trade-restrictive climate-related measures and unilateral coercive measures as “effectively extraterritorial regulatory projection by those with dominant market power and greater historical responsibility for global warming onto those with fewer resources and less historical responsibility”. It cautioned that such measures risk turning climate action into a new form of conditionality, protectionism and economic coercion, and that unilateral measures generate revenue for those who impose them by taking that revenue away from developing countries whose exports are adversely affected by such measures.

On the dialogue, the LMDC said that it must be Party-driven, evidence-based, development-centred and outcome-oriented; must examine the real impacts of trade-restrictive climate-related unilateral measures on developing countries by assessing whether such measures are consistent with Article 3.5 and paragraph 56; and must identify corrective actions, remedial approaches and multilateral cooperative alternatives.

On the process, it said: “At SB 64, we should begin with mapping and diagnosis: what unilateral measures exist or are being planned, what information gaps remain and where and how can these gaps be addressed, and what work is needed before SB 66. At SB 66, we should move to corrective actions such as agreements to cease these measures and cooperative alternatives: recognition of nationally determined and non-price climate policies, international cooperation in the place of unilateral action. In the case that corrective actions and cooperative alternatives are not taken forward by those imposing unilateral measures, remedial approaches must be pursued. These include developed country Parties providing financial support to developing countries at levels commensurate and proportional to economic impact arising from unilateral trade-restrictive and climate-related measures. At SB 68, we should consolidate the work and prepare recommendations for continued COP and CMA consideration.”

The **African Group** welcomed the exploration of the trade and climate nexus to help in identifying

and addressing barriers and constraints to securing the legitimate right of African countries to pursue sustainable development, economic growth and poverty eradication. It also drew on the recognition of industrialization and structural transformation as legitimate and necessary for low-carbon development pathways in Africa, and on instruments of the multilateral trade regime where the principle of sustainable development is enshrined, including through flexibilities and special and differential treatment (SDT).

The Group noted that trade-related climate measures such as CBAMs, carbon taxes, tariffs, subsidies and regulatory standards are increasingly shaping global trade conditions, with significant implications for African export competitiveness and market access through additional costs at the border and associated compliance requirements. It also noted that standards and regulatory requirements can function as non-tariff barriers where compliance costs are high or where developing country capacities are not adequately considered, thereby constraining integration into emerging green value chains and limiting access to third markets.

It also expressed concern that measures implemented to address externality concerns – such as carbon leakage, through pricing mechanisms – neglect consideration of the fundamental tenets of CBDR-RC. Similarly, market mechanisms “reinforce structural inequality, where African carbon credits and ecosystem services are consistently undervalued relative to developed country markets”. It also highlighted that “developing countries are exporting carbon sink capacity while developed countries import emissions rights”, and that these dynamics are reinforced by global finance and trade architectures. It further noted that current valuation systems do not adequately reflect environmental and climate costs, leading to the persistent undervaluation of African ecosystems and natural capital.

The African Group said that fiscal and policy space are central to Africa’s industrialization and development objectives, and that “subsidies and industrial policy tools in developed countries significantly shape global competitiveness while indirectly constraining the effective policy space available to developing countries”. It said that the trade system must leave room for developing countries, in a just transitions framework to be

agreed, to retain the ability to deploy sustainability-enhancing industrial policy tools, outlining steps such as facilitating access to requisite technologies including through liberalization of intellectual property rights, and reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers on green goods and services. It noted that the trade-climate interface reflects a broader institutional fragmentation between the multilateral trading system and the UNFCCC regime, and underscored the need for coherent coordination between these systems to ensure mutually supportive outcomes.

The Group emphasized the importance of ensuring that the dialogue considered not only the identification of adverse impacts but also appropriate institutional responses, including mechanisms to address and mitigate negative effects of trade-related climate measures on developing countries. In order to ensure continuity and accountability, it also emphasized the need for structured interim reporting from the SBs throughout the 2026–28 dialogue cycle, rather than relying solely on a consolidated report at the high-level event in 2028. It also said that it is important that the mandate is appropriately reflected in the relevant COP and CMA agendas, including consideration of the establishment of a dedicated agenda item to provide sustained political and institutional guidance for the dialogue process.

The **Arab Group** stated that its member states had suffered losses from the European Union's CBAM, and that it had already raised concerns about this, including the EU's Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, Digital Product Passport and EU Deforestation Regulation, but these concerns were not addressed. It said, "Whereas in the past countries imposed political control over the Global South, today they attempt to control sovereign decisions through economic coercion." It compared the PA's bottom-up nature and its respect for countries' different pathways against the top-down nature of unilateral trade measures which superimpose developed countries' pathways on developing countries.

It said further that the dialogues must build upon previous work to create an evolving body of work. The dialogues must also facilitate corrective action focused on ending unilateral trade measures or cooperative alternatives that ensure developing countries' concerns with these measures are

addressed; where these are not possible, there should be remedial action where developed countries provide finance to affected countries on a scale commensurate with and proportionate to impacts. It stated that each dialogue must be summarized in a report to inform the final report, and called upon the SB Chairs to appoint co-chairs to manage the dialogue and develop a workplan.

South Africa, on behalf of **BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China)**, said: "An open, inclusive multilateral trade system is a key enabler for climate action and just transitions. That, for us, is the substance of Article 3.5 of the Convention, and the test of any 'supportive and open international economic system'." It said that for developing economies, the critical challenge is that "increasingly unilateral and discriminatory trade-related climate measures are distorting normal international trade", exerting profound negative impacts on developing countries' participation in higher-value, lower-carbon industries. The international system should be adjusted accordingly to curb unilateral measures taken under the guise of climate action, and to keep normal trade channels open. This is essential to guarantee that developing countries can reliably meet global demand based on their respective advantages, supported by the predictable offtake, technology cooperation and supplier development that make industrial investment viable.

Affirming that measures taken for the climate must not quietly move the cost of the transition onto those least able to carry it, it said that unilateral trade-restrictive measures cut against the differentiated responsibilities the climate regime is built on, override the nationally determined logic of the PA, and push resources from developing economies back towards developed ones, thus setting back the very goal the regime claims to serve.

It cautioned that the dialogue should resist focusing on a single instrument; in addition to carbon border adjustments, rules targeting imports linked to deforestation, product standards, certification schemes and due-diligence requirements all deserve equal scrutiny. The dialogue should identify the measures actually in play and weigh their impacts on developing countries' capacity to act on climate and on the affordability and availability of the technologies the transition relies on. It said the dialogue needs an institutional space in the UNFCCC to promote the implementation of

Article 3.5. It also said that each session should leave a clear, even-handed account of where Parties converge and differ, and the accounts should build on one another and feed into what the SBs will present to the high-level event in 2028, so that the work compounds rather than restarting each time.

The **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** said that for SIDS, “trade can play an important role in supporting the achievement of the objectives of the Convention and the PA” as it can facilitate access to technologies needed for mitigation, adaptation and resilience-building, support sustainable development and economic diversification, and strengthen SIDS’ ability to respond to climate change. It highlighted the importance of trade-related climate measures being developed and implemented in a manner that is consistent with the principles and objectives of the Convention and PA, including equity, CBDR-RC and the right of developing countries to pursue sustainable development. For SIDS as island economies, AOSIS said that the heavy dependencies on maritime transport and international supply chains for access to essential goods, technologies and services mean that corresponding support needs to be considered for meeting requirements through finance, technology transfer, capacity-building and relevant associated technical assistance.

AOSIS welcomed the dialogue as “a space to exchange views, share experiences and deepen understanding of both the opportunities and challenges arising at the intersection of trade and climate policy”. It cautioned that the process should not “duplicate discussions taking place in other forums, nor address trade disputes”. Instead, its value lies in examining how trade and climate interactions affect implementation of the Convention and PA – such as the implementation of nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans and long-term resilience strategies, and provision of corresponding support needs – thus providing an opportunity to analyze how trade-related climate measures interact internationally, and to identify ways to promote interoperability that can reduce barriers and costs for developing countries.

Chile, speaking for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, stated that the dialogue was an opportunity to “deepen our collective understanding of the role of measures at intersections of environment and

trade”, particularly “how they could be designed and implemented to advance our shared goals and principles in a transparent, non-discriminatory, proportionate and comparative manner, while avoiding burdens on developing countries”.

AILAC said that the design of measures in the intersection of climate and trade must account for differentiated impacts across the most vulnerable segments of our economies and societies, and also said that the global industrial transition must not reproduce existing inequalities, whether through the concentration of subsidies, preferential access to technology, or the consolidation of value chains in countries with greater fiscal space. For AILAC, the dialogue must promote cooperation to better understand the intersections and interoperability of standards, pursue gradual and sequenced approaches to implementation, strengthen financial and technical support for developing countries, and ensure that natural circumstances and capacities are recognized in the design and assessment of any measures, all in a manner consistent with the principle of CBDR-RC.

On the scope, it welcomed impact assessment of different types of measures and said that such assessments must be “evidence-based” and “directly and exclusively anchored in their relationship with the Convention and PA, and nothing beyond that”. Cautioning that these issues are global in nature, AILAC said this is not the space to single out a specific region over others. It also underscored that while trade-related topics already have dedicated governance bodies with competence, this does not preclude collaboration between the UNFCCC and these bodies, but “any such collaboration must remain within their respective mandates and competencies”.

Bhutan, for the **Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs)**, said trade must “act as an enabler of sustainable development and climate action” through facilitation of technologies, goods and services, and that the principle of CBDR-RC “must actively reduce rather than exacerbate” the high transit and trade costs faced. It pointed out that not all LLDCs are members of the WTO, and as such, measures undertaken by the WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment in major markets leave LLDCs with no recourse to the impact of these measures on exports from non-members. It said that measures must be designed and implemented in a manner that supports rather

than restricts international trade and economic development, energy security and the sovereign interest of developing countries. It said that “under the UNFCCC, we are emphasizing building climate resilience, but real resilience is built through prosperity generated through free and fair trade”, and must ensure that such measures should not have unintended consequences of disrupting trade and prosperity by increasing compliance costs to trade.

China observed a concerning shift from trade as “a bridge for cooperation” to “a tool of competition”, where unilateral measures are undermining global mitigation potential and causing a net flow of climate finance from the South to the North. Calling Article 3.5 of the Convention “the North Star guiding our pursuit”, it called for clarification of the destination stipulated in Article 3.5 and the dimensions and indicators of an “open and supportive international economic system”; the identification of measures and assessment of impacts on development of the Global South; dissemination of climate solutions and global potential to address climate change; an evaluation of measures in compliance with the Convention and the PA, including CBDR, and the nationally determined nature of NDCs; operationalization of Article 3.5 including a dedicated work programme with a clear agenda; and for Parties to deliver tangible outcomes, with the three dialogues building on each other, with the Chairs’ summaries and reports for consideration by the COP and CMA.

Calling carbon leakage a “pure violation” of the Convention and its PA, in particular the principles of equity and CBDR-RC, China explained that unilateral climate measures pursue solutions from symptoms rather than problems, and called for Parties to correct course, as these pose barriers for developing countries to accelerate ambition and transition absent means of implementation. China said “it is actually like raising the price of a ferry ticket to urge people to cross the river faster; however, without providing any boat, it will not deliver”.

India said that the focus of the dialogue must be on “how unilateral trade measures disguised as climate policy have severe distributional consequences for developing countries”, such as placing disproportionate compliance burdens on developing country exporters, affecting market access and production directly, and employment

and livelihoods, poverty eradication and adaptive capacity indirectly. It reminded that the existing international trade regime already burdens developing countries with stringent market access requirements in the form of phytosanitary requirements in an attempt to harmonize standards. It also said that developed countries have disproportionately exhausted the global carbon budget and continue to deplete even the little remaining carbon budget by continuing to emit far more than their fair share. In that sense, unilateral climate-related trade measures, by imposing mitigation on developing countries, is a further additional appropriation of developing countries’ fair share of the carbon budget.

South Africa said that neither the UNFCCC nor the WTO provides a mandate for trade measures designed to shield domestic industries from competition under the guise of climate action. It said that the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures and its Katowice Committee of Experts were established to facilitate consideration of implications of trade-related climate measures for equity, sustainable development and the principle of CBDR-RC, and should remain central platforms for this work. It also said that an optimal use of this dialogue and the most useful way forward for the COP would be to prohibit the use of unilateral trade measures by some developed countries to pursue climate-change objectives in ways that undermine equity and development. It supported establishing a durable institutional basis for this work, including a dedicated agenda item, stating that it remained open to alternative arrangements that provide equivalent continuity and standing.

Brazil clarified that the dialogue, a major outcome of COP 30, was meant to build “a shared diagnosis of where trade and climate intersect, a common understanding of the questions that intersection raises and a sense of where the comparative advantage of this regime lies”. As such, the trade-climate question “needs an institutional home within the UNFCCC”, rather than being addressed only reactively or settled elsewhere on terms in which developing countries do not always have a presence. It attached importance to the proper sequencing of these dialogues, where the first dialogue should help map the landscape on opportunities, challenges, barriers and principles; the second could move towards tools, methodologies and cooperative approaches;

and the third could identify options for institutional follow-up. It said that the report to be delivered to the high-level event should be an aggregation of annual synthesis reports produced on the basis of each dialogue; and that the high-level event in 2028 should also have a relation to the second global stocktake, and should help consolidate climate and trade as a structured area of work under the UNFCCC.

Egypt expressed deep concern over the proliferation of unilateral climate-related trade measures and standards with significant implications for market access and competitiveness, such as the imposition of substantial costs and compliance burdens on developing country exporters through requirements related to carbon accounting, reporting, verification, traceability and certification. It said that the value of dialogues was to be able to share with and “alert” other developed countries who are on the verge of articulating new mechanisms, to realize that such mechanisms bring about significant impacts to developing countries which suffer from them.

It also pointed out that such unilateral measures are applied universally and hence are inconsistent with the requisite differentiation which underlies the climate regime, and that such mechanisms are “coercive” in that they effectively subvert the bottom-up, NDC-based nature of the PA regime by demanding that, irrespective of what a given country’s NDC says, it must decarbonize immediately and at a pace and scale imposed externally by those with vastly larger resources and capacities. It called for the dialogue to include an assessment of the real world financial, economic and social impacts of such climate-related trade measures and mechanisms on development in developing countries. It also wanted the dialogue to consider how to operationalize Article 3.5 of the Convention as well as undergo a mapping exercise on existing and projected climate-related trade measures with a view to ensuring that the legally binding provisions of the climate regime are upheld and that concerns of trading partners in the Global South are central to the implementation of current and future mechanisms.

Botswana said that paragraphs 56 and 57 of the Global Mutirão decision establish two distinct but inseparable imperatives that must be addressed: paragraph 56 reflects a “shared prosperity imperative” and paragraph 57 reflects a “historical responsibility imperative”. It also stated that the

UNFCCC has an important “orchestration” role to play in the provision of normative guidance to the broader international cooperation ecosystem, as “declaratory statements and political signals from this body carry weight, and they can shape the behaviour of actors across the finance, trade, and technology landscape”. It highlighted the priorities of African countries, namely industrialization and economic development through local-content requirements and integration into technology value chains, and called for the Technology Mechanism of the UNFCCC to be activated to deliver on Article 4.5 of the Convention and Article 10 of the PA, to enable technology development, transfer and endogenous capacity.

The **European Union** emphasized that there is a need for policies to “send the right market signals necessary for trade-related decarbonization strategies”, adding that it strives for trade that is open, fair, clean and can support sustainable development goals. It warned that if Parties disregard sustainability considerations, negative environmental externalities can emerge and lead to dependencies which undermine efforts to protect the environment and climate. The EU said that the dialogue should focus on exchanging views on how to increase synergies between climate action, sustainable development and trade. In particular, it said that the dialogue should allow Parties to explore ways in which trade policies support implementation of NDCs and the PA.

For the EU, the dialogue should focus on discussing the design and implementation of those trade and climate policies, for example, labelling and standards, fighting carbon leakage, and ways to boost trade in a manner that is beneficial for climate action and the clean transition. It urged Parties to build on similar discussions that take place at multilateral level in the WTO, where the dialogues (at the UNFCCC) can serve as a platform to debrief non-WTO members on these discussions.

It also said that these dialogues can collectively explore how trade policies can and do support the implementation of the PA, for example, by enhancing the global deployment of clean technologies, adding that it was open to discussing the positive contribution that free trade agreements can have in fighting climate change. It said it was also looking forward to discussing different solutions to common challenges such as risks related to carbon

leakage, achieving the interoperability of carbon accounting methodology, measures to reinforce sustainable supply chains, policy design tools, good regulatory practices, transparency provisions and impact assessments.

The EU concluded by reiterating that these dialogues should be “based on facts” and “not aimed at undermining one Party's regulatory autonomy, or questioning how they choose to comply with their climate commitments”.

The **United Kingdom** said that trade is a critical enabler of climate action but also recognized challenges such as carbon leakage. On modalities, it said that “this is a non-negotiating, non-rule-setting space” and that the dialogue’s strength lies in facilitating open exchange and shared learning. It said it is essential that Parties preserve this character and do not undermine the mandate on the report that will be produced in 2028. On the content of the dialogues, it said that they should help build a shared understanding of how trade intersects with PA objectives, including on mitigation and adaptation. It would like to focus on practical areas, such as trade in environmental goods and services, where facilitation and liberalization support the uptake of clean technology, including within developing countries. It suggested that Parties share their experiences in addressing fossil fuel subsidy reform and progress made in the WTO which could be explored. It also suggested that Parties share experiences on how trade policy is supporting climate at the national levels, and explore the impacts of climate change on trade.

The UK also said that the framing of this discussion must be non-prejudicial, including the language which Parties use to describe such measures, as this process is not intended to scrutinize or single out individual domestic measures. It said that its approach to trade-related climate measures is “grounded in the need to deliver our ambitious NDCs, and is entirely consistent with international legal frameworks, including WTO rules and national determination under the PA”. It added that the consideration of their wider context of use in the UK includes efforts to support international industrial decarbonization and the uptake of carbon pricing schemes globally. It also said that there is value in strengthening coherence across international discussions and to draw insights from other areas such as ongoing work at the WTO.

Japan stated that it views trade as a tool to address the risk of carbon leakage, provided that the measures are consistent with the WTO rules and take into account the various decarbonization policies introduced by each country, such as carbon pricing, carbon markets and other relevant regulations. It said that in order to make substantive progress, it is necessary to make sure that these discussions are held inclusively, involving the people with appropriate mandates. It understands that discussions on climate and trade have already been progressing in the appropriate forum and said that Parties should take into account the risk of overlap in such frameworks, which could disperse limited resources and may adversely affect the discussions. Therefore, Japan concluded, “it is necessary to carefully consider whether it needs to exist in the first place, and if so, what should be discussed, with discussions ongoing on existing forums, within and outside of the UNFCCC, fully respecting the mandates of the other organizations”.

Norway said that it wanted to use existing spaces in the WTO for information-sharing on trade-related climate measures. It supported enhancing access to environmentally sound technologies, such as renewables and electric mobility, that requires lowering tariffs and more open markets. It said that “we must make full use of the tools available within the UNFCCC, including through Article 6, to reduce costs and enable ambitions”. It emphasized the need to ensure that trade and climate agreements support rather than undermine each other.

Switzerland said that trade and environment are mutually supportive: they can accelerate the diffusion of technologies and sustainable goods, and can also support the climate goals by creating incentives for low-carbon production and investments. It said that Parties must be “disciplined” about what the dialogue should cover, as discussions on trade and environment, including climate, already take place at a technical and legal level in other international organizations. Therefore, there is a need to avoid reiterating the same discussions, it said, adding that this forum should be about “working together to explore how trade can be harnessed as a possible tool towards our common goals”. It stated that the UNFCCC’s “comparative advantage” lies in convening Parties under the PA, and “it is not important to discuss trade law nor discuss its compatibility”.

It called for a more interactive format for the next session and to increase Parties' exchanges with organizations that already tackle these issues and focus on areas where trade and climate intersect, and where the UNFCCC can genuinely add value. First, on fossil fuel subsidies, which are "both a climate problem and a trade distortion", Switzerland suggested exploring how inefficient fossil fuel subsidies inhibit the deployment of clean energy technologies. Another area would be minerals, as achieving global climate objectives requires substantial increases in production, processing, recycling and cross-border movement of minerals; in this case, the dialogue could focus on how international trade in minerals can support the implementation of NDCs and the achievement of PA goals while ensuring that environmental impacts are not displaced.

Canada said that trade-related climate measures should be designed and implemented in a transparent, predictable and non-discriminatory manner. Such measures should support climate objectives while minimizing unnecessary disruptions to trade in global supply chains. They should also avoid becoming arbitrary, unjustifiable restrictions on international trade, consistent with longstanding principles reflected in both the climate and trade systems. It said further that greater cooperation can help reduce fragmentation, lower compliance costs, and improve predictability for business and trading partners. It stated further that there can be added value in convening cross-cutting dialogues to improve understanding across climate and trade communities, supporting equitable and inclusive transitions, and encouraging practical cooperation that supports the objective of the Convention and the PA. At the same time, Canada said, the discussion should remain complementary to work underway in other international organizations.

On the next dialogue topics, Canada said that it would see particular value in practical discussion around interoperability, equivalence, transparency and compatibility approaches, including with respect to standards, measurement, reporting and verification systems, and carbon-related reporting approaches. It also wanted more time for question-and-answer between Parties and panellists to

improve technical exchanges and learning in this space. It also wanted only one report for this dialogue.

New Zealand said that coalescing around a set of principles is helpful, where key principles include "non-discrimination, WTO compliance, and consistency with obligations under the PA, transparency, having a basis in robust science, being environmentally effective, least trade-restrictive, and informed by consultations with international and domestic partners".

The **Russian Federation** called the dialogue "long overdue" and a "needed space" to discuss both the opportunities and the unintended negative consequences of trade on climate action. Stating that the growing number of climate-related requirements create the perception that the transition is a "zero-sum game", it said that it is hard to build domestic support for ambitious climate policies where other development priorities remain pressing, and reminded Parties that there is no single pathway to climate action. It also said that it did not believe that these discussions belong exclusively in the WTO, as the implications of many climate measures merit discussion in the UNFCCC, consistent with the Convention and the PA. It stated its hope that the dialogue will become a permanent workstream within the UNFCCC process, to ensure that trade supports, rather than complicates, effective and inclusive climate action.

In response to some interventions, **Saudi Arabia** pointed out that plurilateral initiatives were "symptoms of further fragmentation". It also clarified that the SB Chairs do not need a mandate to produce a report, and that it struggled to find where in the decision there is language to prevent production of the report.

Referring to calls by some Parties for the discussions to not look into the punitive dimension, it drew attention to the penalization experienced by other Parties through measures such as the CBAM. As for Parties stating that "we all have an obligation" on climate change, Saudi Arabia emphasized that this was a "fundamental misunderstanding", given that Parties must respect the principle of CBDR-RC and national circumstances.

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Gridlock in Bonn sets stage for Antalya showdown

Kuala Lumpur, 22 June (Jinghann Hong) – The conclusion of the Bonn climate talks on 18 June at the 64th session of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Bodies (SB 64) revealed critical faultlines among Parties, paving the way for a big showdown in Antalya, Turkiye, at COP 31 to be held in November this year.

Ending just slightly before midnight when the World Conference Centre premises were about to be shut down, the closing plenary was presided over by Julia Gardiner (Australia), the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), and Carol Franco (Dominican Republic), the Vice-Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). The plenary was held in two parts, with closing statements from Parties delivered first, prior to the gaveling of the conclusions, to allow for more time to break the gridlock over three agenda items at the level of heads of delegation (HODs).

The most fractious items were: the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), the Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP), and the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures (RM).

According to sources, at the HODs meeting, SBI Chair Gardiner emphasized on the strict time limits and sequenced the consideration of the draft conclusions; the RM draft conclusions as is; and thereafter, consideration of the GGA. However, the **Arab Group** proposed to address the GGA matter first as a priority, on the grounds that Parties had already engaged on the substance of the draft text and that it was important to continue that. The **European Union** wanted to move on with the

MWP and RM items, but the **United Kingdom** was in agreement about starting with the GGA.

SBSTA Vice-Chair Franco then asked if Parties could accept the GGA draft text as is since there was no further time available to discuss and open it. However, the **African Group** underlined that some elements it had been raising were missing from the text and proposed wordings to be added (as regards the work of the technical task force on the Belém Adaptation Indicators). The SBI Chair Gardiner made clear that there was no time to open the text, to which the African Group responded that it could not take the draft text as is. The Group's stance was supported by the **Arab Group**, **South Africa**, the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** and **Egypt**, while the **EU**, **Canada**, **Norway**, the **UK** and the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)** were opposed to the changes proposed. Franco then announced that because there were objections, there was "no way forward" on the GGA text, thus inviting the application of Rule 16 of the UNFCCC's Rules of Procedure. (Rule 16 provides that "Any item of the agenda of an ordinary session, consideration of which has not been completed at the session, shall be included automatically in the agenda of the next ordinary session.")

Sources also said that on the MWP and RM, following intense exchanges, Parties agreed to only procedural conclusions of continuing consideration of these matters at SB 65, with the big fights on substance to continue in Antalya. (More details on these matters will follow in forthcoming articles.)

On the whole, the key flashpoints at the Bonn talks, as evidenced by the statements delivered during the plenary, centred, among others, on what

is the “best available science”; the meanings of the decisions adopted in Belém last year, especially in relation to the MWP and its mandate; as well as strong opposition from developed countries to acknowledging their commitments in relation to the provision of finance in the various draft texts proposed over many issues across the board.

Highlights of statements from the closing plenary

Uruguay, for the **G77 and China**, expressed its deep concern over the progress made on the GGA. Emphasizing that the GGA is a key priority for developing countries, it highlighted the need for progress particularly on adaptation finance, stressing that the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in light of different national circumstances, are central and should be upheld as the basis for the work.

On finance, it stressed the need to reflect the item on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, viz., the Climate Finance Work Programme (CFWP), on the provisional agenda of CMA 8 (8th meeting of the Parties to the PA), and thanked the Brazilian COP 30 Presidency for requesting the secretariat for its inclusion in the CMA 8 provisional agenda.

On the Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security (SJWA), the Group regretted that Parties could not make further advancements, saying that this should move beyond dialogues and reports and translate into effective implementation of climate action. It added that this agenda item must remain focused on agriculture and food security as agreed at COP 27, and not on a transformative agriculture approach, which was not appropriate for this work.

The G77/China welcomed the selection of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as the host of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and looked forward to the Financial Mechanism strengthening its linkages with the Technology Mechanism to support the implementation of the Belém Technology Implementation Programme.

On research and systematic observation (RSO), the Group emphasized the importance of science in the deliberations. While it commended the scientific

community’s efforts in advancing research and addressing knowledge needs and gaps, it noted that structural research and systematic observation gaps persist in developing countries and urged the provision of means of implementation (MOI) to developing countries to urgently address these deficits. It also underlined the importance of the integrity of information on climate change.

On trade and climate, it emphasized that the dialogue should not be a talkshop, and that it looked forward to a concrete process that builds from one dialogue to the next.

On mitigation, it reaffirmed its continued commitment to contribute to the ultimate objective of the Convention and the goals of the PA including the temperature goal. It also welcomed the progress made during this session under the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), as well as the successful conclusion of the negotiations of the 5th comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building.

It expressed disappointment and concerns regarding the outcomes of the transparency agenda (where developed countries were opposed to acknowledging the lack of funds to support developing countries in this regard).

China, for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, said that the Party-driven, inclusive, transparent and consensus-building process under the Convention is of great value to progress, and that applies to the design of events, workshops and dialogues as well. It called for sticking to mandates as Parties move from negotiations to implementation, the latter of which includes mitigation, adaptation, and MOI and international enablers for cooperation, in particular a supportive and open international economic system. As such, it said, a balanced and comprehensive interpretation and implementation of the agreements and outcomes is key for implementation and ambition, and initiatives and controversial issues outside the process should be kept separate from the negotiations, to minimize the risks on the road to Antalya.

Reflecting on the Bonn negotiations, it observed that MOI are “being most contested ... in nearly all the negotiating agendas here”, expressing the hope that this will change. Above all, it highlighted that narrowing the North-South development

gaps in the just transition is key to closing the implementation and ambition gap.

Agreeing with Parties on upholding the science and defending it, the group said that it was important to bear in mind that science and equity are indispensable to each other, adding that climate solutions should be implemented taking into account the social and economic conditions and the disproportionate impacts of climate change, together with disproportionate mitigation burdens faced by developing countries. As such, it emphasized, bringing equity in the underlying assumptions which are currently missing (in the climate scenarios) is highly necessary. It reaffirmed its commitment to ensuring the inclusivity of perspectives on the science of climate change and the integrity of this science.

Ghana, for the **African Group**, said it was particularly concerned that some Parties appear to be waiting and positioning themselves for a “big moment” at the second global stocktake (GST-2 in 2028), and reminded Parties that Antalya must set a “solid foundation” for GST-2.

On finance, the Group said that it looked forward to a corresponding item on the Article 9.1 work programme on the CMA 8 agenda. On adaptation finance, it stated that Parties cannot delay the ability of the Adaptation Fund (AF) to monetize the proceeds from the Article 6.4 mechanism, and illustrated this lack of urgency manifesting itself in GGA discussions where tripling adaptation finance, which was also agreed at COP 30, was resisted by developed countries.

It welcomed the finalization of the terms of reference for the review of the JTWP at CMA 8, though it expressed concerns over the limited progress in operationalizing the just transition mechanism (JTM).

Saudi Arabia, for the **Arab Group**, regretted that some countries did not honour their historical and legal obligations, in particular for funding the contributions to the AF. On adaptation finance, it expressed disappointment that some countries were reopening certain issues where agreements had already been reached. It also regretted the lack of progress on RSO. It noted that Parties should approach science with objectivity, but that the RSO negotiations were instead characterized by certain levels of selectivity and politicization, which

ultimately undermined the importance given to the needs of developing countries.

Palau, speaking for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, regretted the lack of engagement on finance, relating to the issues of adaptation finance and transparency. It also expressed disappointment with the progress of the MWP and said that it had not effectively delivered on its mandate, and that any continuation of the MWP must therefore be accompanied by “a significant strengthening of the modalities”.

It also stated its deep concern that the policy relevance of the 1.5°C limit may be undermined. It said that these approaches are out of step with the urgency faced to limit the scale and duration of any overshoot. It reaffirmed that all negotiation streams must be based on the latest and best available science. Stating that “science is not negotiable”, it regretted that the RSO negotiations resulted in “near-procedural conclusions”. It also rejected the notion that AOSIS was blocking Parties’ engagement on substance, stating that AOSIS itself expected substantive outcomes on RSO.

On adaptation, AOSIS said that it was extremely disappointed with how the GGA negotiations were conducted at SB 64, where negotiators were consistently “given texts with little to no time to engage before informal sessions were meant to begin”. Calling the progress on the AF “sluggish” in light of clean text that is ready to be transmitted on technical mandates, AOSIS urged the SBI Chair and the COP 31 Presidency to proactively engage on political issues that are continuing to prevent full progress on the AF and hindering its ability to monetize the proceeds when they become available.

Panama, for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, said that undermining the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s integrity and independence is an “obstruction”, and that the IPCC’s 7th Assessment Report (AR7) must arrive in time to inform GST-2. On finance, it expressed alarm at the decline in contributions from developed countries across all multilateral climate funds and also stated its expectation for the CFWP as an item under the CMA 8 agenda. On the AF, it cautioned that procedural disagreements over access to the share of proceeds must not hold the Fund’s future hostage.

AILAC regretted that the MWP did not live up to its purpose as the only space mandated to urgently scale up ambition, but called for not “giv[ing] up” on the MWP as it is not a “lost cause”. It considered Antalya as the opportunity for the MWP to deliver substantive outcomes, with regional dialogues as an integral component.

On adaptation, it expressed deep disappointment that no progress has been made because adaptation finance has not advanced, and said that the success of the GGA cannot be measured solely through methodological and technical progress, but through conclusions that enable concrete adaptation action.

South Africa, on behalf of the **BASIC** countries (**Brazil, South Africa, India, China**), said that on finance, it insisted on the inclusion of the CFWP on the CMA 8 agenda, to “give the rightful place to this agreed and essential platform to advance implementation and address persistent finance challenges”. To close the adaptation finance gap, BASIC also called on Parties to conclude the transition of the AF at SB 65, including enabling access to Article 6.4 proceeds.

On mitigation, BASIC said that it saw the need to weave together different mitigation elements into a “coherent mitigation package”, balanced “in itself” and “across the outcomes of the COP”. It stressed the need for ambition – in the form of increasing support to implement mitigation – where developed countries took the lead in mobilizing MOI for developing countries. On adaptation, it underscored the need to at least triple adaptation finance, saying that the GGA is not a “peripheral agenda item”. Calling on Parties to honour what was agreed in Belém, BASIC warned that it could not accept a situation where the most important adaptation agenda is repeatedly advanced through processes that “do not allow for full and meaningful Party engagement”.

On just transitions, it underscored that the JTM must enable access to opportunity and MOI, facilitate practical partnerships, as well as recognize and address international and structural factors – finance, trade, standards, technology access – that shape transition outcomes, to narrow the North-South development gaps.

On trade and climate change, BASIC noted the SB Chairs' decision to produce an informal

note arising from the dialogues. It said that each dialogue across the cycle (2026–28) should be reported in turn, building an evolving body of work that feeds the 2028 high-level event, rather than relying solely on a single report for that event. It reiterated its strong belief that the dialogue needed “a dedicated, continuing institutional space within the UNFCCC”.

On transparency, it was very troubled by the lack of progress made at SB 64, considering the provision of support for reporting, under the Convention and PA respectively. It said, “The tone of the deliberations at this session took us back years; we will have to ask some hard questions during the review of the rulebook if these mandates to provide support are not fully implemented, including questions about the sufficiency of current flexibilities.”

Timor-Leste, for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, said that the lack of progress on the GGA and MWP and the weak outcome on RSO were incredibly worrying. It also regretted that SB 64 did not deliver on agriculture, which is the “backbone of LDCs’ economies”. The LDCs also shared their frustration at the lack of progress on transparency items, pointing out that LDCs cannot strengthen their capacities and submit their biennial transparency reports without the provision of adequate financial and technical support. They also rejected the “blatant undermining of science”, where “science is neither contentious nor negotiable”.

On finance, the group said that SB 64 showed that “trust depends on delivery” and so COP 31 must “unlock” issues on the AF, including its smooth transition to exclusively serve the PA. It also stressed that the CFWP must be placed on the provisional agenda of CMA 8, grounded in Article 9.1 and climate finance delivery. On mitigation, it said that its expectation was to have strengthened outcomes on the continuity of the MWP to scale up mitigation ambition and implementation, complementing the outcome of GST-1.

It welcomed the progress on just transition that would be forwarded to Antalya, and said that work must commence immediately to strengthen the JTWP and operationalize an LDC-responsive JTM at COP 31. On technology, it welcomed UNEP as the host of the CTCN and called for progress on the Belém Technology Implementation Programme.

Bhutan, for the **Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs)**, welcomed the agreement on the terms of reference for the review of the JTWP and the advancement of discussions on the operationalization of the JTM, emphasizing that just transition pathways must respond to LLDCs' structural realities. As such, international support arrangements and implementation frameworks must adequately reflect the special circumstances and development challenges of LLDCs.

Kyrgyzstan, for the **Mountain Group**, welcomed the dialogue on mountains and climate change and the progress achieved under the Nairobi Work Programme, especially regarding adaptation challenges in mountain regions and the commitments to closing knowledge gaps. It recalled its request at the tenth meeting of the Paris Committee of Capacity Building to integrate a specific capacity gap on mountainous regions – including glacial monitoring, disaster risk reduction, water security, access to climate finance and technology transfer – and called for the explicit recognition of the unique vulnerabilities faced by pastoralists and farming communities in high-altitude areas dealing with water degradation and severe water stress.

Argentina, for **Group SUR (Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay)**, said that it is necessary to increase openness and flexibility in negotiations to overcome the points of divergence that still remain, and stressed the requirement for adequate implementation measures that guarantee real access to funding, transfer of technologies and capacity building. Particularly in agriculture, Group SUR said it is in favour of broadened funding based on grants and concessional finance, stressing that it is important for this agenda to focus on food security.

Cyprus, for the **European Union**, said that Parties' focus now should be on effective implementation to keep the 1.5°C ceiling within reach and limit overshoot to the minimum. It said the credibility of negotiations rests on the best available science provided by the IPCC, and affirmed its commitment to ensure the timely delivery of AR7 as set out by the IPCC co-chairs' timeline. The EU said, "Scientific integrity must remain non-negotiable. While we are here to negotiate positions, we cannot allow science to be politicized, delayed or obstructed. In the context of the climate emergency, defending the integrity of information is fundamental to the very foundation of multilateralism."

As for implementation of GST-1 outcomes, the EU said that ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are essential to closing the vision, ambition and implementation gaps, and to keeping 1.5°C within reach. In paving the way for GST-2, the EU said, "the cost of inaction is much higher than the cost of ambitious action".

On finance, the EU reiterated its commitment to the implementation of the new collective quantified goal (NCQG), adding that this "clearly includes the commitment under Article 9.1 [of the PA]". Recognizing the urgent need to scale up finance from all sources, the EU said it was "proud to have delivered over and above the \$100 billion goal in 2025". It therefore looked forward to engaging in the Veredas Dialogue and through continuous regulatory reform, to ensure that finance flows contribute to limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C and strengthening resilience.

It also recalled that effective climate action should be implemented in a manner that respects, protects and promotes human rights while advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in all their diversity.

Switzerland, for the **Environmental Integrity Group**, emphasized that science has been the foundation on which the UNFCCC process was built, and it remains the compass by which Parties must navigate it. It was concerned about what it said were efforts to question, delay or weaken the role of science in informing the work. It urged all Parties to support the proposed timeline of the IPCC co-chairs so that the delivery of the next IPCC reports can inform GST-2, and was confident that the reports produced on the schedule will meet high standards, adhere to the IPCC rules and procedures, and provide the best available scientific knowledge to the world.

The **UK**, for the **Umbrella Group (UG)**, reminded Parties of the need to "accelerate collective climate action to keep 1.5 in reach", given the beginnings of El Niño against the backdrop of increasing global warming. In that, the UG said that "climate action must always be guided by the best available science", expressing disappointment with the RSO outcomes. It said that it was concerned that "some Parties find it difficult to acknowledge the findings from the world's leading climate scientists [from the IPCC]", where the IPCC was the "global authority" on climate science and the "most robust

source” of scientific information to inform global climate action.

Articulating the need to strengthen the “mitigation architecture”, the UG regretted that the GST NDC dialogues have now concluded and said that it looked forward to either reviving this space or finding a new avenue to discuss NDC preparation and implementation.

On finance, the UG emphasized its commitment to the delivery of the NCQG and its role in taking the lead in the delivery of the goal of at least \$300 billion by 2035. It also said that it would “continue to play our part in efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035, in the context of the NCQG”. On the CFWP, it welcomed the “work underway” and encouraged the SB Chairs to continue engaging with Parties on the way forward, “consistent with the legal interpretation of the mandate from COP

30”. It also said that it looked forward to the first meeting of the Xingu finance talks [under the Veredas Dialogue on Article 2.1(c)] where all relevant stakeholders are to be brought into this process.

India agreed that climate science is essential to inform and guide climate action, but said it cannot dictate a “top-down message” and instead must “draw inclusively from the lived experiences of Parties’ regions and communities”. It stressed that “when science turns to the implementation of climate action, this is particularly important – as science must be informed by equity and CBDR-RC in an integrated action”. It added that “equity cannot be an afterthought”. It also said further that SB 64 highlighted that implementation cannot be achieved through ambition alone, and that MOI must move from “promise to practice”. Otherwise, it cautioned, the gap between outcome and collective action will continue to widen.

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Parties clash over future of the Mitigation Work Programme

New Delhi, 23 June (Radhika Chatterjee) – Only a procedural conclusion was adopted on the Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (Mitigation Work Programme or MWP) at SB 64 in Bonn, as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) “could not conclude considerations of this matter at this session”.

Throughout the SB sessions, Parties engaged in very tough negotiations over 10 informal consultations, presided over by co-facilitators Ursula Fuentes (Germany) and Maesela John Kekana (South Africa), mainly over how the MWP should continue.

In order to advance work, the co-facilitators produced draft conclusions towards the end of the negotiations and also produced an informal note to capture discussions and a “non-exhaustive reflection of the exchange of views” under their own responsibility. They said that both the informal note and the reflection had “no formal status”. However, the informal note and the non-paper were rejected by Parties. The reflection was a document that was supposed to reflect the views exchanged by Parties in response to three guiding questions that had been shared to facilitate discussions during SB 64:

1. “How can a range of topics under the scope of the MWP be addressed most effectively over the course of its duration with a view to achieving its objective?”
2. “How to improve modalities of the MWP to better facilitate implementation of concrete actions, including through more effective engagement of experts, practitioners, financiers and project developers?”
3. “How do you see operationalization of linkages with other processes and workstreams under the UNFCCC with a view to strengthening effectiveness of the MWP, including, inter alia, the Financial Mechanism, the Technology Mechanism, capacity-building, the Non-Market Approaches Platform, Global Stocktake, Global Climate Action Agenda?”

A final version of the draft conclusions was proposed by the SB Chairs on the last day of SB 64, but this was also not agreed to by Parties.

The main flashpoint among Parties was over how discussions related to the continuation of the MWP would be framed, i.e., whether there would be “safeguards” such that the outcomes will be “non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances, take into account the nationally determined nature of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and not impose new targets or goals”. These “safeguards” are contained in paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7 from Belém.

Developing countries like the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, the **African Group** and the **Arab Group** wanted paragraph 16 to frame the MWP’s continuation, while others like the **European Union**, the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, and the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** did not want that approach.

In fact, **AILAC** and **AOSIS** wanted the discussions to be framed by paragraph 1 of decision 4/CMA.4 on the objective of scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation. More specifically, they did not want any kind of “safeguards” contained in

paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7 to apply in discussions related to the future work of the MWP at SB 65 to be held in Antalya at COP 31. AILAC stressed the need for “further safeguards” to the “safeguards”. (See below for more details on Parties’ interventions.)

(The relevant part of paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7 reads: “... the work programme’s objective is to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade, that its continuation shall be operationalized through focused exchanges of views, information and ideas, and that the outcomes of the work programme will be non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances, take into account the nationally determined nature of nationally determined contributions and not impose new targets or goals”.

(The relevant part of paragraph 1 of decision 4/CMA.4 reads: “Confirms that the objective of the work programme for urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation referred ... shall be to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade in a manner that complements the global stocktake”).

Other key areas of divergence included issues related to the scope and modalities of the MWP, in light of improvements to the programme and its continuation.

The contention over the scope of the MWP centred around the issue of whether or not there should be a linkage of the MWP to the outcome of the first global stocktake (GST-1), particularly its mitigation section which has goals related to energy transition and halting deforestation. At the heart of the matter is the question of whether the MWP should act as a vehicle for monitoring and implementing GST-1 outcomes, and if it should impose any mitigation targets in a top-down manner.

On the modalities, divergences hinged around questions of whether there should be a technical expert group/committee constituted under the MWP; what the timeframe of the MWP should be, if Parties agreed to continue it; the manner in which topics for future global dialogues are selected; and the kind of improvements needed in the investment-focused events and pitch hub events to facilitate implementation of mitigation projects in developing countries. (See Update 4 for details.)

Parties were unable to find consensus at the final informal consultation held on the concluding day of SB 64. Following this, the SBI Chair Julia Gardiner (Australia) and SBSTA Vice Chair Carol Franco (Dominican Republic) convened consultations at the level of heads of delegation (HODs) behind closed doors.

According to sources, Parties were invited to these consultations to consider draft texts related to the Global Goal on Adaptation, response measures and the MWP on a “take it or leave it” basis. Parties were asked whether the draft conclusions on the MWP as produced by the co-facilitators were acceptable to them. It is learnt that while the LMDC expressed its willingness to go ahead with the draft conclusions, the EU asked for opening of the text in relation to the “safeguards” as discussed in the morning. (The EU was referring to AILAC’s proposal of including “further safeguards” on the “safeguards” to ensure that paragraph 16 does not guide discussions on the continuation of the MWP.)

The Arab Group, for its part, expressed concerns about the linkage of the MWP to the GST in the informal note produced by the co-facilitators. Finally, the SB Chairs proposed a procedural conclusion on the MWP agenda, due to lack of agreement amongst Parties on the draft conclusions text.

Brief highlights of interventions

Egypt, for the LMDC, emphasized the need to include a reference to paragraph 16 of the Belém decision in the draft conclusions text. It expressed its disagreement with the non-exhaustive reflection note, finding it to be biased. It said the note “includes issues which are outside of the mandate of the MWP, which should not be discussed under the MWP. If we go into this route, we can bring in issues we consider relevant to the mandate (for example, definition of mitigation pathways based on common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) and historical responsibility, the need for support under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement and unilateral trade measures and the list continues).”

It also expressed frustration over the views of three major developing country groups not being fully reflected in the note. It pointed out that these groups – the LMDC (24 countries with a total population of 4.5 billion), the African Group (54 countries with a total population of 1.58 billion) and the

Arab Group (22 countries with a total population of 500 million) – had repeatedly said the MWP should not be implementing GST-1 outcomes as that was outside the MWP’s mandate, and yet this was not included in the note.

It also said that there was a fundamental difference amongst Parties regarding the issue of what lies inside and what lies outside the mandate, and proposed that Parties should first come to an agreement on this point before continuing further discussions.

At the closing plenary, **China**, for the **LMDC**, said many groups had demonstrated “their maximum flexibility on many issues” despite having serious concerns. It said if Parties could accumulate this positive element, it could pave the way for Antalya. It said there was common ground at SB 64 about the fact that no one wants to reopen decisions that were adopted in Belém. It pointed out that “no one is against mitigation implementation and ambition. We would like to increase ambition, accelerate the implementation” with the required support and enablers. It highlighted various ideas like the digital platform, improvement of investment-focused events and conducting the global dialogues in a more efficient manner.

The **Arab Group** expressed concern at “a growing tendency to frame the MWP primarily as an ambition-raising exercise rather than an implementation-focused platform. The ambition discussion is not new. Parties have already communicated their NDCs. Parties have already set out their national commitments, priorities and pathways. The question before us is therefore not whether more political signals or targets are needed. The question is how to support the implementation of commitments that Parties have already made.” It said further that for many developing countries, including in its region, “the challenge is not the absence of ambition. The challenge is translating commitments into action while addressing realities such as water scarcity, desertification, food security concerns, energy access, economic diversification, growing populations and broader sustainable development priorities. This is precisely why Parties agreed to establish the MWP as a facilitative platform focused on implementation. Its purpose was not to renegotiate ambition, prescribe pathways, or generate political messages. Rather, it was established to facilitate focused exchanges of views, information and ideas, and to improve

understanding of opportunities, challenges and barriers to implementation, with a view to supporting Parties in delivering their NDCs in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication.”

It added: “If we are serious about implementation, we should be asking why the longstanding gaps in finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building continue to persist. We should be asking why barriers to implementation remain unresolved. We should be asking why developing countries are repeatedly being asked to do more while many of the commitments that would enable implementation have yet to be fully delivered.” It said the success of the MWP should “be measured by whether it helps Parties implement existing commitments, not by whether it generates new political messages, targets and goals or scaling up ambition”.

It shared concerns about the focus on “targeting particular energy sources rather than addressing emissions. Such approaches risk oversimplifying a highly complex challenge and overlook the different national circumstances, development priorities and starting points of Parties. For many developing countries, climate action must be pursued alongside energy security, poverty eradication, economic development, industrialization and access to affordable energy. Ignoring these realities does not strengthen implementation; it makes implementation more difficult. The Paris Agreement recognizes that Parties will pursue nationally determined pathways reflecting their own circumstances. Attempts to promote a single pathway, a single technology, or a singular focus on specific energy sources fail to reflect this diversity of circumstances and risk undermining the balanced approach to sustainable development embedded in the Convention and the Paris Agreement.”

The **African Group** asked for the inclusion of a reference to paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7 in the draft conclusions. It also asked for inclusion of a caveat that the draft conclusions did not prejudge the draft decision that would be considered and adopted at SB 65. It also expressed a preference for not having any intersessional workshops ahead of COP 31. It did not agree to including a reference to the non-exhaustive reflection note in the draft conclusions and informal note as some of the Group’s views had not been included in the reflection note.

India, referring to the safeguards contained in paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7, said, “These safeguards are important to ensure that we engage in discussion under the work programme in a manner that is acceptable to all of us ... any agreement on the continuation of the work programme for us is conditional on the safeguards under decision 4/CMA.4, reaffirmed once again in 13/CMA.7.”

It said issues related to availability and access to finance, technology transfer, capacity building, institutional and administrative barriers like those related to intellectual property rights and climate-related unilateral trade measures need to be addressed to significantly advance Parties’ understanding of what the barriers to mitigation implementation are. Active consideration of equity and CBDR-RC would allow Parties to understand the dilution of the gap in developed countries’ emission reduction, it added. India expressed strong support for enhancing linkage of financial and technology mechanisms with the MWP. Regarding the linkage of the MWP with the GST, it said, “Our task is to implement the Paris Agreement and not just some elements of it. We cannot accept linkage to specific processes that have their own mandates” here in the MWP.

Stressing the importance of arriving at a common understanding of the MWP’s mandate, it said there is a “need to find common ground on how we understand the mandate of the work programme. What we consider non-prescriptive is not how we think our partners understand the concept of non-prescriptive. We are all aware of how narratives are created around certain kinds of targets and pathways and inevitably imposed on countries. Just as the disproportionate use of the carbon budget, there is also a disproportionate occupation of the narrative space, with those who have higher resources being able to convert what we think is fairly benign into top-down targets, before we even realize what has happened.”

Egypt, in its national capacity, stressed that the topics of the global dialogues should not arise from the GST as that was not part of the MWP’s mandate. It pointed out that this was clarified in Belém through paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7. It said asking for a linkage between the MWP and the GST to facilitate implementation at domestic level amounts to providing domestic prescription, cautioning against such measures. It pointed out that Parties have already shared their experiences of how the GST informs their NDC preparation

through the annual GST dialogue and there was no need to replicate that. It stressed it “will not allow any infringement on our national sovereignty; we will not allow any prescription on how Parties should implement NDCs”. Responding to calls for linking the MWP to the Global Climate Action Agenda, it pointed out that the agenda was formed by a “coalition of the willing” and did not have full participation, and asking the CMA to follow up on any outcomes or messages from that agenda would be unacceptable. It said the timeframe of the MWP should not go beyond 2030. Regarding the proposal on separation of global mitigation ambition and following up on past CMA decisions, it said this would amount to a “monitoring mechanism under the MWP” and this was not part of its mandate. It said pitch hub events should not be regarded as capacity-building sessions, as had been called for by some Parties, adding that this was not a constructive proposal and would “kill the facilitative nature of the MWP”. It said pitch hub events should allow facilitation of implementation. It said the MWP needs tools to help implement NDCs and long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies (LT-LEDS).

Colombia, for AILAC, said the timeframe of the MWP as captured in its scope refers to the critical decade in light of the need for near-term mitigation action. It said this cannot be used as a justification for not extending the work programme beyond 2030. It said it is “entirely feasible for the MWP outcome to serve as guidance for Parties to implement in a nationally determined manner”. It pointed out that Article 16.4 of the Paris Agreement provides for regular review of the implementation of the agreement. It said the dialogues under the MWP cannot create new obligations and that it did not see any contradiction in giving guidance to Parties. Referring to the safeguards mentioned in paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7, it said “we need our own safeguards” and that it viewed guidance as a crucial element in the scope of the MWP. It added that collective action signals were provided in the GST-1 outcome and stressed the need for addressing cross-cutting topics like tripling renewable energy and transitioning away from fossil fuels (TAFF). In this context, it also mentioned the need for enabling conditions for TAFF.

It said further that the future of the UNFCCC and its mitigation regime is inherently connected to the way forward of the MWP, and emphasized the need for substantive discussions on how the MWP

can be linked to the GST. It stressed the need to safeguard the technical integrity of the process and address the issue of how Parties will advance the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.

AOSIS said that the MWP is the only space where Parties have the mandate to discuss scaling up of mitigation ambition in this critical decade in a manner that complements the GST. It called the three documents produced by the co-facilitators useful but added that “further refinement is necessary”. It showed a preference for organizing the intersessional workshop under the guidance of the SB Chairs and for including reference to institutional arrangements, governance, objectives and principles in the reflection note, calling them elements of “critical importance”. It said the addition of a reference to paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7 in the informal note was unacceptable as it did not form the basis for Parties’ discussion at SB 65; rather, it was paragraph 1 of decision 4/CMA.4 which formed the basis of the MWP’s mandate.

Sierra Leone, for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), welcomed all three documents produced by the co-facilitators and emphasized the need to capture linkage of the MWP with the GST. It said it wanted to see the establishment of a technical committee and asked for that to be captured under the section on “institutional arrangements”. It also asked for including the MWP as a permanent agenda item to maintain the momentum of discussions related to mitigation. It expressed support for the proposal for the intersessional workshop to advance discussions.

The **EU** said it was possible to understand a broad range of issues and said this should be reflected in the chapeau to the potential improvements and adjustments section of the informal note. It called for adding an acknowledgement of the “divergent views on the MWP, including the scope”.

The **United Kingdom** supported the compilation of views (the reflection note prepared by the co-facilitators). It said it wanted to see a linkage of the

GST with the MWP, and expressed a preference for intersessional work ahead of COP 31 to help advance discussions.

Switzerland expressed disappointment with the documents and said they were missing references to the MWP’s role in informing mitigation action in the domestic context. It said the scope section of the reflection note should mention reference to GST outcomes and related calls for the work programme and other constituted bodies to take up this work. It said the investment-focused events could benefit more from support in the project preparation phase and emphasized the need to ensure projects are ready to be financed. It said the idea of a technical experts committee belonged to the institutional arrangements section of the reflection note.

Japan said outcomes of the global dialogues should be utilized to inform domestic implementation of NDCs. It said the format of the dialogues should be so designed as to permit the participation of a wide range of stakeholders. Highlighting the need for enhancing the effectiveness of the MWP, it stressed the need for efficient linkage of the MWP with other workstreams, including the Belém Mission 1.5 and the Global Climate Action Agenda.

New Zealand said that the MWP must continue if the need for mitigation is relevant. It asked for a focus on enhancing the MWP and mentioned the need for having regional dialogues as practical improvements for the MWP. It stressed the need for grounding topics of the global dialogues in IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) informed sectors and GST signals. This, it said, was within the mandate of the MWP complementing the GST. It asked for more targeted exchanges around energy transition. It called the investment-focused events a “critical modality for scaling up mitigation implementation”. It said sharing of experiences ahead of NDC submission is in line with the MWP’s objective of complementing the GST. This, it said, is not about prescribing or altering national determination, but simply to exchange information. It emphasized the need for strengthening the MWP’s complementarity with the GST.

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Just transitions: Progress in Bonn but real test lies at COP 31

Kuala Lumpur, 24 June (Hilary Kung) – The Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) was among the first agenda items concluded during the recently ended 64th sessions of the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Bodies (SB 64) in Bonn. The swift resolution was driven by the persistent efforts of developing countries, the consensus-building leadership of the Co-Chairs, Joseph Teo (Singapore) and Federica Fricano (Italy), and unwavering pressure from civil society organizations highlighting that the stakes were too high to delay a conclusion.

The SB 64 session concluded with Parties agreeing to the terms of reference (TOR) for the 2026 JTWP review (contained in the annex to the conclusions), and also transmitted an informal note prepared by the Co-Chairs under their own responsibility, with a disclaimer that “the content is ... preliminary, has not been agreed, is not exhaustive ... and does not prejudice further work or prevent Parties from expressing their views at any time”.

[For context, the Dubai decision 3/CMA.5 mandated the review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the JTWP and consideration of its continuation in November 2026 at COP 31 in Antalya, Türkiye, while the Belém decision 2/CMA.7 last year requested SB 64 to develop the TOR for the review. While this year’s primary focus is on operationalizing the just transition mechanism (JTM), it also marks the scheduled review of the JTWP.]

At the start of the Bonn talks in the first week, developed countries sought approaches to delay and restrict the JTM’s operationalization by insisting that a mapping exercise be considered first, to inform the structure of the mechanism or even to see if a JTM is needed at all (see Update 5).

During the final contact group meeting on 17 June (a day before the conclusion of the Bonn talks), negotiations broke down over two key issues: the final outstanding issue in the TOR which concerned proposals from developed countries to include areas of complementarity and coherence between the JTWP and other UN instruments, initiatives and processes; and the African Group’s proposal for additional intersessional space to advance discussions on operationalizing the JTM. To find convergence, Parties entered a 45-minute huddle before reconvening later in the afternoon. In a final attempt to break the deadlock, the Co-Chairs introduced a bridging proposal and appealed to Parties to “save the TOR”. This plea was echoed by most of the Parties and observer constituencies. Ultimately, **Saudi Arabia**’s last-minute intervention agreeing to the proposal to “save the TOR” drew applause from the room, while the **European Union** requested additional time to coordinate internally. When the contact group reconvened at around 5.40 pm with this remaining the sole outstanding issue, the EU said it would accept the latest iteration of the text on the TOR in the spirit of compromise. This saw huge relief in the room at the progress on the JTWP.

The Co-Chairs’ bridging proposal for paragraph 6(d) of the TOR, which was adopted by the SBs, reads as follows: “The review [of the JTWP] will be informed by: ... (d) The mapping of relevant instruments, initiatives and processes under the Convention and the Paris Agreement and relevant entities in the United Nations system and the synthesis report to be prepared ..., including areas of complementarity and coherence if any”.

As for the intersessional work, the adopted SB conclusions provide (in paragraph 10) that

“The SBSTA and the SBI invited the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies to consider informal intersessional work on the issues under these items, prior to SB 65, in appropriate formats subject to the availability of financial resources.” (The adopted SB conclusions feature compromise language that expands the scope of intersessional work, moving away from the exclusive focus on the JTM originally requested by the African Group, which was supported by many developing countries.)

The adopted SB conclusions also include an invitation for “Parties and non-Party stakeholders to submit via the submission portal by 1 September 2026 views on the review of the work programme on the basis of the terms of reference contained in the annex”. The secretariat is tasked “to prepare a report on the views [from the submissions] including proposals for improving the modalities of the JTWP”.

Another contentious issue on the scope of the TOR emerged when developed countries suggested that the JTWP review should examine how the JTWP complements the JTM. Developing countries preferred to address the relationship between the two only when Parties deliberate on the operationalization of the JTM, warning that doing so earlier could prejudice and derail discussions on both mandates. This issue was resolved with Parties agreeing to the bridging proposal by the Co-Chairs, which reads [in paragraph 5(h)]: “How the review of the work programme could inform or be informed by the process for the operationalization of the just transition mechanism, without prejudice to the mandate set out in paragraph 25 of decision 2/CMA.7”.

As for the informal note, paragraph 9 of the adopted SB conclusions reads: “The SBSTA and the SBI agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SB 65, taking note of the informal note prepared by the Co-Chairs for these agenda items at these sessions as input, recognizing that the informal note has been prepared by the Co-Chairs under their own responsibility and that it does not reflect all views shared and proposals made by Parties, does not represent a basis for further negotiations, is non-exhaustive, includes divergent views, does not prejudice further work or prevent Parties from expressing additional views at any time, as well as the views submitted via the submission portal no later than four weeks prior to SB 65, with a view to recommending a draft decision thereon for consideration at CMA 8.”

The informal note was released by the Co-Chairs capturing views from Parties on the three buckets of issues on the second last day of the contact group: (1) implementation of the JTWP, with a placeholder for messages from the sixth dialogue; (2) placeholder for the outcome of the review of the JTWP; (3) process for the operationalization of the JTM, with a proposed clustering of indicative and non-exhaustive elements of the JTM. There are six clusters of issues in the informal note in this regard: context, purpose, functions, modalities/governance, timelines and link to the JTWP.

With not much time left before the closing plenary, the Co-Chairs requested Parties to provide views on whether the overall structure of the informal note was a useful basis for further work without going into the specific details at this stage. These issues remain highly contentious and the real test lies in how they are resolved on the road to and at Antalya.

More details of Parties’ interventions are captured below, including heated exchanges on unilateral measures and climate science.

Contentious issues in the TOR

Saudi Arabia, for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), said that paragraph 24 of decision 2/CMA.7 mandates the synthesis report on the mapping exercise as an input to the JTWP review, and only as an input. It does not mandate the review to assess the relationship between the JTWP and other instruments, initiatives, processes or UN entities, nor to evaluate their complementarity and coherence.

Saudi Arabia also said that the JTM “stands on its own as an issue under our mandate”; therefore, the discussion of the relationship between the JTWP and the JTM should be considered when deliberating on the JTM development in the upcoming sessions. It is important not to fragment discussions and risk prejudging the outcome of either process, it said. It also called for the deletion of paragraphs 5(h) and 5(i) of the first draft of the TOR.

[Paragraph 5(h) in the first draft read, “The relationship between the JTWP and relevant instruments, initiatives and processes under the Convention and the PA and relevant entities in the United Nations system, including areas of complementary and coherence, drawing on

the synthesis report on the mapping...”; while paragraph 5(i) read, “Considerations of how the improved modalities of the work programme could inform or be informed by the process for the operationalization of the JTM”.]

India agreed with the LMDC, adding that “Since both processes [the JTWP review and the operationalization of the JTM] are to be conducted together, there is a possibility of inviting Parties to make submissions on how they see the interlinks [between the two] but having it in the TOR can derail the discussion of both mandates and prejudices the discussion.” On the mapping exercise, it said “there is a divergence in the room and we do not consider it as an input to the JTM and so we do not want to see it in the scope [of the TOR]”.

The **European Union** proposed that the scope of the TOR for the JTWP review include the functioning of the modalities, quality of outputs, inclusivity of stakeholder engagement, coherence with other relevant instruments, initiatives and processes within the UN system and outside the UN system, and also suggested mapping of the comprehensive work beyond the UN, including the multilateral development banks. It also said that the review should consider how the JTWP complements the JTM and that the “mapping [exercise] is also relevant for the future mechanism” and that the purpose of the review is to assess the JTWP and facilitate just transition pathways towards the 1.5°C goal.

The **United Kingdom** also suggested that the outcome of the review and the operationalization of the JTM are inherently linked and so the TOR should recognize this and avoid duplication. It also called for the TOR to reference paragraph 8 of decision 2/CMA.7 which is a “specific mandate” for this JTWP “to integrate the outcomes of the first global stocktake (GST-1) relevant to just transition in line with the invitation in paragraph 186 of decision 1/CMA.5”.

New Zealand said that the review should include whether resources are used efficiently under the JTWP and consider the extent to which the JTWP ensures coherence with relevant processes, both internal and external to the UNFCCC. **Norway** suggested that one of the questions that the TOR should address is how the JTWP is included and used by the work by others under the PA; while **Japan** said that the effectiveness and efficiency of

the JTWP should be reviewed from the budgetary perspective.

Ethiopia, for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, noted that it is important to discuss the linkage between the JTWP and the JTM.

(During the last contact group held in the morning of 17 June, the Co-Chairs proposed a full package, including the draft SB conclusions, the revised TOR in the annex with bridging proposals on the outstanding issues, as well as the revised informal note with purely editorial edits. In the revised TOR, the contentious text regarding the relationship between the JTWP and other UN instruments was deleted from the “scope” [paragraph 5(h)] and relocated to the “sources of input” [paragraph 6(d)]. The new paragraph 6(d) read, “The mapping of relevant instruments, initiatives and processes under the Convention and the PA and relevant entities in the UN system and the synthesis report to be prepared as requested in paragraph 24 of decision 2/CMA.7, including any areas of complementarity and coherence to be drawn from it”.)

Saudi Arabia, for the **LMDC**, reiterated its concerns over the specific reference of the TOR in paragraph 6(d) to include “any areas of complementarity and coherence to be drawn from [the mapping exercise]”, and stressed that “this is not part of the mandate”. As a show of compromise, it asked for a “small amendment” changing “including any areas” to “which may include possible areas” and deleting “to be drawn from it”. Saudi Arabia’s proposal was supported by the **Arab Group**, **Iran** and **Kuwait**.

Fiji, for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, said it supported the way forward as proposed by the Co-Chairs and called for no further changes to the package.

The **UK** rejected Saudi Arabia’s proposal, saying that it was not the time to reopen the text and that “there is strong desire to move forward” with the current package as proposed by the Co-Chairs.

The **EU** supported the Co-Chairs’ proposed way forward but also noted that the relationship between the JTWP and the JTM was being removed from the scope of the TOR. However, it said, in the spirit of compromise, it could move forward and also accepted the proposal made by the Co-Chairs on the JTWP and JTM to inform each other, and that

one should not prejudge the other. It also said that it could agree with the proposed conclusion with the TOR as the basis for the review of the JTWP.

Views on the overall structure of the informal note

South Africa, for the **African Group**, said it welcomed the text “in a constructive spirit” but highlighted concerns around the framing and overall architecture of the informal note. It said that the current framing of the text inevitably frontloaded the domestic dimension while the international dimension that spoke to the levers around global just transitions was inherently treated as secondary, when the JTM’s role as a mechanism was to enhance international cooperation in supporting nationally determined just transition pathways. “The context, purpose and functions outlined in the text should be reordered to reflect these mandates,” said South Africa, to which the Co-Chairs clarified that the order in which the elements were presented was not intended to suggest a prioritization of issues.

South Africa also emphasized that the JTM should go beyond helping countries navigate challenges; it must also address existing gaps and enable countries to have equitable access to the economic opportunities emerging from green industrialization and value chains, etc. It also reiterated that the Group wanted to see “a constituted body under the CMA” which would “report through the SBs” with a “two-tier structure” where there is a “policy tier to provide normative guidance and an implementation tier that provides technical support in a practical way”. On the relationship between the JTM and the JTWP, South Africa said that “the JTM will not sit under the JTWP” and looked forward to further discussing this.

Chile, for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, said it accepted the current non-paper. Commenting on the “modalities/governance”, it highlighted that it should not prejudge the review of the JTWP, especially over the JTM being operationalized under the JTWP. It said that there is a need to avoid any duplication of the JTWP and JTM. It also suggested merging the “integration of just transition considerations into the work of the UNFCCC’s constituted bodies and work programmes” and enhancing “coordination and coherence” in the functions, given some repetition in both. It expressed support for integrating the

relevant outcomes of GST-1 in the context and functions of the JTM.

Ethiopia, for the **LDCs**, said the informal note provided a strong basis for further work and called on Parties to show flexibility in adopting the draft TOR. **Fiji**, for **AOSIS**, said the current non-paper was a “good basis for COP 31”.

Saudi Arabia, for the **LMDC**, said “the current version of the informal note, particularly with respect to the substantive elements it contains, is not reflective” of all Parties’ views. It also said that a number of issues were “unacceptable”, such as the “mitigation-centric approaches” in bucket 1, “the integration of the relevant outcomes of the first GST, as this is prescriptive and top-down”, “the interlinkages with processes outside our UNFCCC process, which is inappropriate”, and “the lack of mention on the support and means of implementation required from developed to developing countries” in bucket 3.

Qatar, for the **Arab Group**, commented that the critical elements of poverty eradication and sustainable development were not captured well in the note and the principles of equity and CBDR-RC were also not reflected throughout the text. It said that the text could be forwarded but was not a basis for negotiation.

Brazil said the non-paper was a good way forward but expressed concern about the “modalities/governance” headings. It supported AILAC’s suggestion to merge the integration of just transition considerations into the work of UNFCCC constituted bodies and work programmes and enhance coordination and coherence in the functions.

Colombia welcomed the integration of just transition into national climate change planning and also into the work of UNFCCC constituted bodies and work programmes under the functions of the JTM. It then suggested adding “provide technical assistance and capacity building to support Parties in integrating just transition to transition away from fossil fuels in the energy system in a just, orderly and equitable manner”. On the relationship between the JTM and the JTWP, it suggested preserving the JTWP as the political and Party-driven platform while the JTM would serve as the operational arm that helps translate into implementation.

China sought clarification on the rationale for clustering the issues under the functions of the JTM and questioned why the informal note did not draw on the Belém decision, which already contained agreed language setting out the key functions: “enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge sharing and enable equitable, inclusive just transitions”. It also asked why there was no section on “principles” given that this was important for the JTM. The Co-Chair in response said that “technical assistance” and “capacity building” were cross-cutting issues and included in several functions in the informal note.

Kenya said it was a useful input but also pointed out that agriculture and food systems must account for different national contexts and varying starting points and should not undermine food security, land rights and accessibility to markets. On the “development and implementation of nationally determined just transition pathways” under the JTM bucket, it said it was “good to be clear that we are not developing a new document”.

India said the way that agriculture and food systems were reflected in the informal note was a “red line for us”. It highlighted that for a sector primarily driven by smallholders, the country's immediate priorities lay in adaptation and resilience rather than emissions reduction. It also highlighted that the international and national dimensions in the JTM bucket in the informal note were “not balanced enough”. It said that the informal note “shouldn’t be used as a basis [but] we do not want to lose the progress as it is a compilation of views”.

Norway said the note was “a good way to start” but also that it “disagreed with a lot of comments”.

Japan said the discussions in Antalya “should be based on this note” but suggested that once the mapping was done, Parties should first discuss the “functions” (of the JTM) to avoid “duplication with existing mechanisms” while ensuring “effectiveness of efficiency” of the work. It also said it was “extremely important to reflect mitigation and greenhouse gas emissions” in the key messages from the fifth dialogue and proposed adding “enhancing international cooperation for North-South plurilateral partnership” and including the words “South-South” based on the initial output of the mapping exercise.

The **UK** said the informal note provided “a good basis” and stressed the need for “reference to agriculture emissions” as it related to the “core of the goal of the mandate”. It also mentioned “transitioning away from fossil fuels in the agricultural fuel system”, adding the need to “take forward the mandate of integrating the GST” in the implementation of the JTWP. It had concerns regarding MOI, saying that “we do feel it needs to be pragmatic and specific on what JT can do”.

Canada said the informal note was a helpful tool to visualize all the options but highlighted that the current framing on international cooperation was rather “narrow” and “does not necessarily reflect the wide spectrum” of international cooperation.

The **EU** said that the key messages from the fifth dialogue were not balanced, given the “lack of reference to mitigation, energy transition ... transition away from fossil fuel in a just, orderly and equitable manner ... and in reducing emissions from the food system”. Responding to China’s question on “principles”, the EU argued that a separate section on principles was unnecessary, since a common understanding of a just transition was already provided by the dialogues’ key messages. On the “governance and modalities”, it said the JTM should be fit for purpose and connected to the functions.

Switzerland, for the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, said it was willing to engage on the informal note but it also had concerns.

Many other Parties provided substantial inputs on the specific elements in the informal note, to which the Co-Chairs invited Parties to use the intersessional work to mobilize support for their proposals and for further discussion among Parties.

Heated exchanges on unilateral measures and climate science

Egypt, for the **G77 and China**, said that one of the high-level messages from the fifth dialogue was the “negative impacts of unilateral trade measures on food production and food security; climate-related unilateral trade measures (UTMs), including carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAM) which risk imposing additional burdens on developing countries, undermining their

food security, livelihoods, and ability to pursue nationally determined just transitions. These measures can restrict market access, increase compliance costs, raise fertilizer and food prices and exacerbate structural inequities.”

Responding to the call by other developing countries to include key messages on unilateral measures, the **EU** defended its CBAM policy by saying that a “vast majority are domestic policies and nationally determined by nature” and were intended to address “carbon leakage from the emission-intensive sectors”. The EU also said that its legally binding targets were 55% reduction in 2030 and no net emissions by 2050 by preventing carbon leakage in carbon-intensive industries. It also drew attention to paragraph 57 of the Global Mutirão decision that the climate and trade dialogue is the “main political forum for the discussion on climate and trade”.

Further, the EU also said that the UNFCCC and PA “are not designed to assess nationally determined policy” and have no mandate to do so, asserting that international validation of Parties’ response measures is outside of the scope and that “it is unacceptable [to discuss] EU policies or any other Parties’ policies”. It then said that cross-border impacts have been discussed under the Katowice Committee on Response Measures for decades and that remains the relevant space. It also warned against treating these policies “prejudicially” as unilateral measures or trade-restrictive measures, and insisted that they are “climate measures, not trade measures”.

China responded by saying that the CBAM “is not a domestic measure as it does not just target domestic players but also international players”. It said further that it did not understand the logic of not allowing the international community to discuss a country’s measure which is already in implementation and already has an impact on other countries. It said that it supports global free trade to facilitate renewable energy deployment around the world and that while these unilateral measures (UMs) claim to tackle carbon leakage, they are essentially a form of trade protectionism which would disrupt global supply chains and go against the principle of CBDR. It said that countries have different economic structures and when UMs apply a one-size-fits-all approach, it will fail. Lastly, it stressed that trade barriers will make it harder

for food security and that just transitions can be achieved only through multilateral collaboration; hence there is a need to assess and address the adverse impact of UMs to ensure a fair global environment for trade.

The **UK** said the scope of discussion should not be expanded with regard to trade as Parties have agreed that trade will be discussed in the climate and trade dialogue. Further, it said that “with regard to science, we underline that science is non-negotiable. The IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] findings, though not comfortable for certain Parties, ... need to guide climate action ... Misinformation is not a side-issue. It undermines trust in science and delays action.”

(The UK’s intervention on climate science, which was echoed by others including **Japan**, **Colombia** and **New Zealand**, was in response to India’s intervention on the global carbon budget and fair shares and the equity assessment of the scenarios assessed in the IPCC’s 6th Assessment Report. For further information on India’s intervention, please see Update 5.)

India responded by saying, “We are in an era where there is much misinformation about science, and regions where climate change denial is substantial. In India we are fortunate to not be affected by this phenomenon of climate change denial. This is because we understand that science is an everyday aspect of our work and interactions. It must in fact constantly be discussed and debated. Debate and skepticism are hallmarks of scientific inquiry. Taking some statements and reports as a given without engaging with the substance of what they say, would be a poor reflection indeed, and not in keeping with the very reason why we have had such great scientific advance over the years.

“That being said, we would also underline that cherry-picking elements of some reports is not in keeping with the scientific method. It is, in fact, the very IPCC reports that are being cited that signal clearly that even a 50% probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C implies limiting cumulative emissions to about 3,000 billion tonnes. 2,500 billion tonnes have already been emitted by 2020 itself, largely by developed countries, leaving a carbon budget of 500 billion tonnes from 2020 onwards for the entire world till emissions reach net zero. We must also mention 500 billion

tonnes is almost exactly equal to what the Annex I countries have emitted just from 1990 onwards till 2020 – even after agreeing to take the lead under the Convention.

“We are very happy that we are having these scientific discussions here. But as we said yesterday, a serious engagement with science requires debate, discussion, and balance. Science cannot simply be a slogan to be used as convenient.”

Saudi Arabia, for the **LMDC**, said, “‘Science’ is not science if underlying assumptions are not discussed and debated vigorously as is scientific practice; it becomes either speculation or political justification, especially when most outputs are produced by experts from developed countries and therefore cannot reflect a truly global and objective situation, including that of developing countries.” Saudi Arabia highlighted the need to ensure that “barriers to development are addressed, as this is not just a matter of trade but also a matter that hinders progress of developing countries in their development pathways, which is closely linked to just transitions; this includes opposing climate-related unilateral trade measures ... which have a global restrictive impact particularly on developing countries”. It added that “distortive domestic subsidy packages in developed country Parties create unfair global trade conditions that disadvantage food producers in developing country Parties and should be phased out”.

It said that unilateral trade measures “have a significant impact on the value chain of fertilizers, as a key example, which would in turn cascade onto agricultural production rates as well as affordability and overall food security. CBAM has a great negative impact on food security and raises global prices. Fertilizers are critical because they directly affect how much food can be produced from existing farmland ... and disruptions or constraints in their supply or affordability can quickly translate into lower yields, higher food prices, and increased food insecurity – contributing to the absolute opposite of sustainable development and eradication of poverty – the very mandate of just transitions.”

“Article 3, paragraph 5, of the Convention, which predates the Paris Agreement and is not subject to any no-mandate argument, establishes that Parties ‘should cooperate to promote a supportive and open

international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.’”

Saudi Arabia added, “What we are witnessing is a form of reverse MOI. Instead of enabling developing countries through finance, technology, and capacity building, resources are effectively being extracted from them, reinforcing existing inequalities. Some developed countries doubled down and expanded unilateral trade-restrictive climate-related measures. In an interesting turn of events, finance is now flowing from developing countries to developed countries.” It said further, “The reframing of unilateral trade measures as being positive is not acceptable and we disagree with the notion that these approaches are to address ‘carbon leakage’.”

Intersessional work between Bonn and Antalya

During the final contact group meeting on 17 June, **Ghana**, for the **African Group**, proposed to “include additional space during the sixth dialogue to discuss the process for the operationalization of the JTM”, in the hope of advancing the discussion before Antalya. This proposal was supported by **Botswana** for the **Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs)**, **Nigeria** and **South Africa**.

Brazil noted that a space was secured during the fifth dialogue and so did not see why it could not be secured during the sixth dialogue, adding that there would be no budgetary implication if it was part of the dialogue. Brazil’s points were echoed by **China** and **AILAC**. **Egypt** also noted that this could be part of the sixth dialogue and would not incur additional budgetary implications.

The **EU** said “we do have a topic defined for the sixth dialogue and we will need a time to discuss this. [It is a] technical dialogue and so that’s not the right space [to discuss the JTM]. We potentially see a space for submissions on this, or virtual meetings as done before, but this is not an option for us.” It also said that the dialogues were meant for technical issues on how to accelerate the implementation of

just transitions and they were more for the experts from national levels, and hence they may not be the same people coming to the dialogue.

Norway said the African Group's proposal for additional space would require some sort of arrangement or support, adding that "if we mandate a workshop, then we need to invite all Parties and there will be budgetary implications and a surge in cost ... clearly there is no UNFCCC budget for additional activities".

The **UK** came back with another proposal to add a para *6bis* that "The SBSTA and SBI considered the possible interlinkage between the implementation of JTWP and JTM", to better reflect the discussion Parties had in Bonn. This was rebutted by Saudi Arabia, which said it was not sure if Parties did consider the interlinkages between the JTWP and the JTM in Bonn.

Japan said any intersessional workshop should "take into account the budgetary implications".

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Controversy over science and equity at Bonn climate talks

Delhi, 26 June (Radhika Chatterjee) – Following highly contentious negotiations, Parties adopted draft conclusions on matters related to science at the recently concluded climate talks of the 64th session of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Bodies (SB 64) in Bonn.

The agenda item on “research and systematic observation” (RSO) was dealt with by the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), which adopted an outcome that is weak in terms of substantive issues. In particular, it failed to include any reference to the need for incorporating equity in research related to climate modelling and development of scenarios as part of the messages that should be communicated to the wider scientific community for further research related to climate change.

Under this item at SB 64, Parties considered the way research findings and gaps that were presented and discussed at the 18th meeting of the Research Dialogue held on 9 June would be communicated to the wider scientific community. Another document that informed these discussions was a mapping of how research gaps identified by the SBSTA were being addressed by the scientific community. The Research Dialogue focused on three themes:

- advances in climate modelling and scenario development
- pathways for sectoral transformation
- understanding climate risks, impacts and tipping points.

(The SBSTA Research Dialogue provides a setting to discuss needs for climate change research and research-related capacity-building, particularly in developing countries, and to convey research

findings and lessons learnt from activities undertaken by regional and international research programmes and organizations in support of the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement.)

Negotiations on the RSO agenda item occurred over eight informal consultations conducted over the two weeks of SB 64, and were presided over by Patricia Nying'uro (Kenya) and Frank McGovern (Ireland). Differences amongst Parties became marked as the negotiations progressed.

The main flashpoint was the issue of how language on scenarios related to limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C (since pre-industrial levels) and “overshoot scenarios” would be reflected in the conclusions, particularly in light of concerns related to implications for food security and livelihoods, as such scenarios would require reliance on large-scale land-based carbon dioxide removal (CDR), as well as the manner in which research gaps and advances would be reflected, especially in the context of the need to incorporate the issue of equity in such scenarios. Also under contestation was the question of whether misinformation and disinformation should be referenced in the text.

Implications on food security due to reliance on CDR in overshoot scenarios

India, the Arab Group and Kenya stressed the importance of highlighting the implications of reliance on large-scale land-based CDR on food security in developing countries while referring to overshoot scenarios. India also pointed out that pathways related to overshooting 1.5°C and pathways which involve overshooting and returning to the limit are very different and should

not be spoken of in the same manner as that would be unscientific. It was supported by the Arab Group and Kenya on this.

On the other hand, the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** and the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, supported by the **European Union** and the **United Kingdom**, emphasized the need for “developing scenarios that limit the magnitude and duration of overshoot of 1.5°C as much as possible, that achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions [GHGs] as soon as possible in the second half of this century, and that bring warming below 1.5°C as far as possible by 2100, while taking feasibility and sustainability constraints of large-scale CDR into account”.

Chile and **Guatemala** said CDR “encompasses a diverse range of technologies and solutions, including ecosystem-based ones, which would need to be feasible and their negative impacts minimized”.

The final text related to these issues is captured in paragraph 7 of the conclusions adopted at SB 64, which reads: “The SBSTA noted with appreciation the discussions at the 18th meeting of the Research Dialogue on climate scenarios and modelling, pathways for sectoral transformation, and understanding climate risks, impacts and tipping points. It noted the scientific information and advancements, as well as knowledge and research gaps and research needs presented at the dialogue and encouraged the scientific community to continue advancing research to address these knowledge and research gaps and needs.”

Advances and gaps in research, and the issue of equity in climate scenarios

India acknowledged that while advances had been made in research, gaps still existed when it came to incorporating equity in climate scenarios. It pointed out that the presentation in the 18th Research Dialogue on this theme referred to the work of only one group from the developed region. It said “the lack of any representation of the initiatives being undertaken in developing countries in building their own models and scenarios, is a serious limitation”. It stressed the need for capturing this important distinction in the text so that these discussions could be expanded in the wider scientific community. It was supported by **Kenya** and the **Arab Group** on this.

AOSIS said the text should be able to make a distinction between advances and gaps in research and pointed out there were differences between what is achieved and what the gaps are and the two needed to be separated. It said it saw that significant advancement was presented in the Research Dialogue but the lack of differentiation or nuances in this context “would send a misleading message to the scientific community and policymakers”. This, it said, would “undermine the science”.

The **EU**, on the other hand, said that while it was important to maintain distinction between advances and gaps, there was a need to highlight the progress made in research on equity in climate scenarios. It also said that it could not accept reference to equity in the context of advances and gaps in research. The **UK** too emphasized the need for highlighting progress made in research on equity in scenarios.

The final text related to this issue is captured in paragraph 7 of the conclusions adopted (see above).

Climate change information integrity, misinformation and disinformation

The **EU** proposed highlighting in the conclusions climate change information integrity and countering misinformation and disinformation. It was supported by the **UK**, **Japan**, **AOSIS** and the **LDCs** in this.

India, **Kenya** and the **Arab Group**, on the other hand, acknowledged the importance of referencing climate change information integrity but shared concerns related to the misuse of the terms “misinformation” and “disinformation” against anyone who questions the status quo while engaging with science. India pointed out it had seen evidence of this at SB 64 when talking about carbon budgets (in relation to the temperature goals) was labelled as “misinformation” in another negotiating room (see Update 11 for details). It highlighted that the carbon budget was part of the scientific evidence that was presented in the 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Kenya also proposed alternative language to address climate denialism, especially from particular regions.

The final text related to this issue is captured in paragraph 3: “The SBSTA noted the need to enhance efforts to promote and support the integrity of information on climate change.”

Highlights of interventions

India said research needs and gaps “cannot be addressed simply by ensuring that the topics are spoken about here. They require deeper engagement with structural barriers and recognizing that significant efforts will be needed to close the gaps. Efforts that include the provision of support to developing countries to build their capacities to ensure that they do so, do not simply remain data points for observation by institutions in developed countries, but can undertake observation, data processing, and analysis themselves.” It noted that while equity in scenarios was flagged as a major gap, the presentations in the 18th Research Dialogue referred only to “the work of one group based in a developed region. While these efforts are not unwelcome, the lack of any representation of the initiatives being undertaken in developing countries in building their own models and scenarios, is a serious limitation. To really address some of these fundamental issues, it is important that conversations do not remain limited to small groups and initiatives in some regions only, but in fact expand significantly to cover wider research communities in developing regions as well.”

Underlining the constant importance of science and engagement of the political process with it on a regular basis, it stressed “the responsibility of Parties in communicating scientific messages accurately, with their attendant nuances, uncertainties and limitations”. It also emphasized the need for ensuring that Parties “preserve balance and clarity of communication so that scientific results and outputs do not get misrepresented or misused”.

On the messages that should be captured from the Research Dialogue, it said, “There is much confusion on the use of the term overshoot pathways. There are also serious concerns about what would be required to reduce temperatures after a temporary period of overshoot – particularly given the pressure this would create for land-based mitigation and therefore on food security. This is already indicated to be a serious concern in the scientific literature. Any discussion of overshoot scenarios must therefore balance the trade-offs between stabilization scenarios at a certain level above 1.5°C vs. overshoot scenarios that return temperatures back to this level.”

It said further that “another serious issue is the often incorrect use of the term tipping points. We also witnessed this in the Research Dialogue ..., regions being referred to as tipping points. The term is overused and there is also significant disagreement and contestation within the scientific literature itself on its use. Unless it is used in references to specific systems in the scientifically correct context and manner with all the attendant uncertainties clearly stated, we will not be in a position to accept blanket statements on tipping points.” It added that “it is our responsibility to ensure that we do not miscommunicate science or, perhaps even worse, communicate incorrect science in our desire to produce some messages that we think are important”, urging caution while including such messages.

It pointed out that in one of the presentations at the 18th Research Dialogue, “the entire Hindukush Himalayan Range was referred to as a ‘global tipping point’” and that this was an inaccurate use of the term. There were also multiple references to projected “irreversibility” as tipping points. In fact, irreversibility and tipping points are not synonymous. A change is irreversible if it cannot be undone, but a tipping point is a critical threshold beyond which a small perturbation can cause a qualitatively different system state through self-reinforcing feedbacks. “This is why we think that we need to in fact have a clear call on ensuring that we are correct in communicating science.”

Regarding language on scenarios related to exceeding 1.5°C, it cautioned against using the phrase “every increment above 1.5°C”, especially in the context of scientific integrity, and said “it is very difficult to establish that every tenth of warming above 1.5°C is going to cause impacts. There is no scientific evidence on this yet.”

It said using the word “accurate” in the context of scenarios is inappropriate because scenarios are about different possibilities for the future, and it is not known yet as to which of the many scenarios is accurate.

Responding to the EU’s proposal of using “tipping elements” while talking about ongoing research, it said that would make it more obscure without an explanation of what tipping elements are and how they are different from tipping points.

It said there has been a major advancement in the RSO room and pointed out that a few years ago even mentioning equity was a very contentious thing, “but now it is easily acknowledged as an intrinsic aspect of science”. It emphasized that science is not separate from the social world. It said this is also why it has constantly been reiterating in the RSO consultations that while it is not opposed to including a reference to overshoot pathways, any such discussions “must be clear in underlining the serious implications for food security, biodiversity and rural livelihoods” due to reliance on large-scale land-based CDR. It emphasized that “just saying there are feasibility and sustainability concerns” of using large-scale land-based CDR in overshoot pathways for a huge drawdown of carbon dioxide is very weak and therefore unacceptable to it. It highlighted the IPCC’s 6th Assessment Report, produced by its third working group, which has also pointed out the food security implications of very stringent mitigation pathways, even those that have limited overshoot.

It did not support specific calls to develop overshoot scenarios because that would be completely unbalanced given that “there are all kinds of scenarios that need to be developed” and “singling out one specific kind of scenario” was unacceptable to it.

It pointed out that saying “achieving global net zero by or around mid-century with a view to keeping 1.5°C within reach” is “not scientific”. It said, “We have heard in the Research Dialogue we are going to overshoot. We do not think pathways to come back to 1.5°C should be spoken of in the same way as overshoot scenarios ... the two have very different pathways.” Expressing confusion in this context, it asked: when we say keeping 1.5°C within reach, does that also apply to overshooting 1.5°C and returning to it by the end of the century? If so, then that would be “a narrative” and not science. It pointed out that scientifically it is important to note that exceeding 1.5°C could mean reaching 1.7°C in the light of overshooting and stabilizing. It pointed out that it is not known yet which of the two would be better: exceeding 1.5°C and returning or exceeding and stabilizing. This, it said, is not settled in the literature and not known with certainty.

On the issue of how advancements and gaps related to research are reflected in the conclusions draft text, it said while there is no problem in acknowledging

that scientific research has advanced, there is a need to be “careful about claiming that we know all that is there to know. This can be misused and we must acknowledge where more research is required. This is not just a matter about clarity of communication” and is also related to scientific research. (It was referring to the gaps in research related to tipping points.) It also stressed that in the context of equity in scenarios, while some advancements have been made, they can no means be described as “significant”. On the contrary, it pointed out that gaps are significant in this and that “researchers have said themselves that not enough work has been done on equity”.

It supported the importance of climate change information integrity but expressed worry while talking about misinformation and disinformation. Words like “misinformation” and “disinformation” can be used in any way to counter science that people do not like, evidence of which was seen in SB 64 when India was told it was spreading misinformation while speaking about carbon budgets (in another negotiation room), which are considered scientific evidence in the IPCC’s AR5 report. It said if these words are included in the text, then they must be accompanied by necessary explanations. It highlighted the fact that it gave rationales for every argument that it made in the RSO room and called that the essence of the scientific process. “Our arguments have not been engaged with in a manner it requires in this room, this undermines the multilateral process. We have narratives being created about information and science outside this room – yet there is no engagement with science in this room.” (India was referring to a press conference held by the “Friends of Science”, in which speakers from the EU, Switzerland, Nepal, Fiji, Vanuatu and Panama claimed that science was being undermined in the negotiations at SB 64.)

At the closing plenary, after the adoption of the RSO decision, India expressed its disappointment with the final outcome and said, “While we had the basis to achieve robust substantive outcomes, we had to settle for a very weak outcome that prevented us from discussing critical issues, such as the integration of equity and justice into climate models and scenarios. India has always engaged actively and constructively in this agenda item, as we are firm in our commitment to scientific and evidence-based policymaking on climate change. Given that we discuss science in these

rooms, India has always ensured that we explain our positions and provide substantive arguments for what we say.” It stressed that “science is not removed from people and from society. So, discussions of equity are central to discussions of science. This includes the consideration of both the disproportionate distribution of climate impacts and the disproportionate use and distribution of the global carbon budget. It is unfortunate indeed that there is a growing narrative that suggests that asking questions, examining assumptions, and ensuring the inclusion of diverse perspectives is equivalent to questioning the science. We submit that this is, in fact, fundamental to the scientific method.”

Saudi Arabia, for the **Arab Group**, said, in the context of research gaps and capacity, that “further work should improve regional balance, developing-country research capacity, and nationally relevant evidence, particularly for developing countries and data-sparse areas. This should include regional research networks, sustained institutional capacity, equitable access to tools, computing resources, funding and participation opportunities, and data governance arrangements that respect national ownership, access conditions, and countries’ capacities to generate, manage, and use their own data.”

On climate modelling and scenario use, it noted that “significant uncertainties remain in downscaling, data availability, model assumptions, aerosols, cloud processes, carbon-cycle feedbacks, natural variability, high-end outcomes, and regional representation. Scenario work should not be limited to pathways associated with 1.5°C, but should also provide a broader range of policy-relevant pathways that reflect different temperature levels, national circumstances, sustainable development priorities, and response options.” It highlighted “the need for further research to address equity and justice issues in scenario development”.

On technology systems, sectoral transformation and food systems, it said “discussions should be grounded in national circumstances, sustainable development priorities, energy security, infrastructure readiness, feasibility, costs, benefits, trade-offs, and equity implications. Greater attention is needed to access to affordable finance, reducing the cost of capital in developing countries,

and strengthening technology transfer, while supporting a broad range of nationally determined technologies without assuming uniform energy pathways. Research on food systems should protect food security, livelihoods, water needs, and rural development.”

It expressed concern about the broad manner in which the term “tipping points” is used and pointed out that the term “is receiving disproportionate attention relative to the level of scientific certainty surrounding it. The concept of tipping points remains complex, and there continues to be considerable discussion and differing views within the scientific literature regarding its application and interpretation. Unless the term is used in reference to specific systems, in a scientifically accurate manner, and accompanied by a clear reflection of the associated uncertainties, we would not be in a position to support broad or generalized statements on tipping points.”

It added, “It is our collective responsibility to ensure that scientific findings are communicated accurately and responsibly. In our efforts to highlight important messages, we must avoid oversimplifying or overstating scientific concepts. We therefore urge caution regarding both the use of the term and the prominence being given to it in the outcomes of these discussions.”

It said any reference to overshoot scenarios and returning to 1.5°C must be consistent with the IPCC’s special report on 1.5°C, and highlighted concerns related to land and water security in this context. It pointed out that its region suffers from water scarcity and frequent sandstorms and that all scenarios do not include that. It underlined the need to be careful of that when information related to climate change is downscaled.

Expressing support for integrity of scientific information, it said the statement on misinformation and disinformation is vague and could be potentially weaponized, due to which it could not accept references to that.

Kenya supported language of equity in reference to scenarios. For overshoot pathways, it strongly supported singling out the impacts of land-based CDR as that was critical for developing countries, particularly in Africa. It asked for including a

reference to implications for land use, food security, biodiversity and rural livelihoods in the context of overshoot scenarios in the text. Sharing a similar position as India on language related to overshoot scenarios, especially exceeding 1.5°C and coming back to it, it said this should be in line with human and social impacts of these scenarios and asked for including language that considers these human impacts. It also pointed out that there will be many dynamics when the world will overshoot 1.5°C which are not known yet.

While acknowledging the importance of countering misinformation, it said mentioning that in the text can be problematic because it can open the door for anyone who asks questions of science or challenges the status quo to be labelled as spreading misinformation. It added, “Being climate scientists, we shouldn’t give room to climate skepticism. We should support inclusivity and transparency.” Responding to the EU’s proposal of using the UNESCO definition of misinformation and disinformation, it said the definition is very generic and open to interpretation, and asked if language around climate denialism, particularly from some regions of the world, would be agreeable instead.

Chile, for itself and **Guatemala**, highlighted remaining gaps in capacity-building requirements of developing countries, which have “a stark impact in our process as the lack of representation in the mainstream literature can lead to an underestimation of the overall climate-related impact for some developing country sub-regions and prevent having robust findings on some topics for said regions”. It added, “We should be able to quantify and qualify these gaps and request that knowledge in this gap is included as a gap to be addressed by the scientific community and reiterate that the Convention already contains provisions regarding strengthening systematic observation and national scientific and technical research capacities and capabilities, particularly in developing countries, and also to take into account the particular concerns and needs of developing countries and cooperate in improving their endogenous capacities and capabilities to participate in research and systematic observation efforts.”

On equity and justice, it said, “We would further like details on how this is done, not just that it needs to be done, so as to take the step from discourse to

action without leaving anyone behind or creating more injustices.”

It said there are issues related to the reliance on CDR in overshoot scenarios and keeping 1.5°C within reach in the way they have been referenced in the text. It said CDR may be required in various sectors but added that CDR “encompasses a diverse range of technologies and solutions, including ecosystem-based ones, which would need to be feasible and their negative impacts minimized”. This, it said, should be reflected in the text, and not just “engineered CDR”.

In the context of sectoral transformations, it noted “gaps in knowledge regarding resilient energy systems and the lack of attention to the increasing need of critical energy transition minerals for energy transformations and the impacts to ecosystems and to Indigenous Peoples as well as local communities”.

Antigua and Barbuda, for **AOSIS**, said tipping points have increased at every additional degree of global warming and shared concerns about accelerated sea level rise, ice melting, glacier loss and the serious implications for water security. It welcomed progress in climate modelling and scenario development and said scenarios are important to explore potential mitigation measures, among other things. It welcomed climate scenarios that facilitate vulnerability assessment and also welcomed downscaling of climate information and said the use of machine learning should be reflected in this. It welcomed incorporation of equity and regional issues in scenarios and said alignment with 1.5°C goes hand in hand with distribution of equity. It said there is a need to reflect language in the text related to limiting the overshoot of 1.5°C to the smallest degree possible, achieve net zero in the second half of this century, and come as close as possible to 1.5°C by the end of this century.

It said such overshoot scenarios are needed to minimize tipping points and climate impacts and proposed the following language to be included in the text: “The SBSTA welcomed the scientific information and significant advancements in research related to climate scenarios and modelling, including in providing downscaled climate information, and the consideration of equity and justice. It also encouraged the scientific community to continue to strengthen regional

climate information and downscaling initiatives, particularly for SIDS and LDCs, and to further develop scenarios that limit the magnitude and duration of overshoot of 1.5°C as much as possible, that achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible in the second half of this century, and that bring warming below 1.5°C as far as possible by 2100, while taking feasibility and sustainability constraints of large-scale CDR into account.” In the later consultations, Antigua and Barbuda emphasized the need to reflect “to see global net zero by or around mid-century with a view to keeping 1.5°C within reach” in the text. (This text was a joint proposal from AOSIS and the LDCs.)

It said the text should be able to make a distinction between advances and gaps in research and pointed out there were differences between what is achieved and what the gaps are and the two need to be separated. It said it saw that significant advancement was presented in the Research Dialogue but the lack of differentiation or nuances in this context “would send a misleading message to the scientific community and policymakers”. This, it said, would “undermine the science”.

It supported the EU’s suggestion of reflecting statement on information integrity, combating misinformation and disinformation, and strengthening science policy interface.

Grenada, Palau, Fiji and Vanuatu aligned with AOSIS.

Fiji also stated that for the **Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS)**, reference to the 1.5°C limit is crucial, adding that “that is from the Paris Agreement, which has one goal of 1.5°C”. This, it said, was an absolute red line for the PSIDS. [The temperature goal of the Paris Agreement in Article 2.1(a) states: “Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.”]

Sierra Leone, for the **LDCs**, endorsed the proposal to include this language in the text: “to further develop scenarios that limit the magnitude and duration of overshoot of 1.5°C as much as possible, that achieve net zero GHGs as soon as

possible in the second half of this century, and that bring warming below 1.5°C as far as possible by 2100, while taking feasibility and sustainability constraints of large-scale CDR into account.” It also aligned with AOSIS on having more distinction between advances and gaps in research in the text. It also supported inclusion of references to misinformation and disinformation in the text.

The **EU** supported the joint proposal made by AOSIS and the LDCs on the need to develop scenarios that limit the magnitude and duration of 1.5°C overshoot, achieve net zero GHGs by 2050 and bring back warming to below 1.5°C by the end of this century. It said it would like to work closely with Parties to keep temperature rise to as close as possible to 1.5°C. It said just referring to the development of scenarios for warming pathways is vague; instead, there is a need to talk about pathways that exceed 1.5°C and also decline back to 1.5°C after exceeding it.

On the risks of large-scale CDR to food security, it said the reference was too broad and general and expressed a preference for the proposal made by Chile. It said “we need a balanced narrative on these issues”. (The relevant part of the text it was referring to was from the iteration dated 15 June, which read: “It noted that ‘overshoot scenarios’ may rely on large-scale carbon dioxide removal, and that certain land-based carbon dioxide removal methods have implications for land use, food and water security, biodiversity and rural livelihoods.”)

It asked for a clear differentiation between advancements and gaps in research and said that considerable advances have been made by the international community, mentioning equity, justice, trade and development of scenarios in this context. It stressed the importance of highlighting this progress. In later consultations, it said it could not accept a reference to equity in the context of mentioning advancements and gaps in research. It also expressed a preference for using the term “tipping elements” instead of “tipping points” and said that the former is “scientifically more accurate”.

It stressed the importance of integrity of climate information and said it should be highlighted. It said the topic of information integrity is a prerequisite for policy guidance. It also proposed that the need to counter misinformation and disinformation

should be highlighted and suggested that the UNESCO definition of these terms could be used.

The **UK** said it would like the conclusions to recognize ongoing work on equity in scenarios and said while speaking of gaps in research that efforts are already underway in the consideration of equity. In the context of overshoot scenarios, it said

it is important to retain focus on 1.5°C pathways in line with the Paris Agreement temperature goals. Regarding the reliance on CDR, it supported Chile's proposal on mentioning diverse types of CDR. It said there is a need for further research on risks and implications of large-scale land-based CDR on food security and land use changes.

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Shifting goalposts through new roadmaps and widening inequality

Kuala Lumpur, 29 June (Hilary Kung) – Experts and developing country negotiators spoke of how the goalposts of the climate regime are shifted with new roadmaps, while mitigation scenarios by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) lock in and widen inequities between developed and developing countries.

Panellists spoke at a side-event co-organized by the Republic of Cuba and the Third World Network (TWN) on 8 June, entitled “An Assessment of the Belém Outcomes and the Challenges on the Road to Antalya”, held in conjunction with the climate talks in Bonn.

The side-event was moderated by **Meenakshi Raman**, Deputy Director of TWN, and was joined by **Ambassador Pedro Pedroso** from the Republic of Cuba, **Khaled Hashem** from Egypt, who is also the G77 coordinator for the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), **Vicente Paolo Yu**, an expert on climate and trade, and **Dr Tejal Kanitkar**, from the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) in India, an expert on climate modelling from an equity perspective.

In her presentation “Who is afraid of roadmaps”, Kanitkar explained why certain developing countries are reluctant to accept the IPCC findings as the “best available science”. (The COP 30 Presidency, on its own initiative, organized Presidency-led events on the “roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels” on 12 June, and on the “roadmap on addressing deforestation” on 8 June, on the sidelines of the Bonn talks.)

Pedroso, in his opening speech, underscored the critical need for respecting the institutional architecture of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and cautioned against the recent trend of shifting goalposts in the climate architecture, explaining why this presents a tremendous challenge to developing countries like Cuba in the current geopolitical environment.

Hashem recounted the journey of the JTWP and provided reflections on the operationalization of the just transition mechanism (JTM), while Yu spoke about the past, present and future of the climate and trade dialogue.

Further details on each of the speakers’ presentations are captured below.

Who’s afraid of roadmaps?

Speaking about how a “roadmap” becomes the headline in climate news “as if it is a very new thing”, **Dr Tejal Kanitkar** said, “There have been roadmaps before ... we’ve all spoken about pathways, scenarios, ways in which to achieve the goals of the PA [or the] objectives of the UNFCCC, which is far more overarching in terms of an objective, and when we talk about a way to achieve an ultimate target, it is in fact a ‘roadmap’ ... [not] because you call something a roadmap, suddenly it becomes something new.”

Kanitkar clarified that the “roadmaps” are not part of official UNFCCC decisions but are independent Brazilian COP 30 Presidency initiatives.

Kanitkar then highlighted two critical questions that needed to be answered. The first is: “What have we done with the roadmaps that we’ve had so far? Were these roadmaps or a particular roadmap itself adequate? You had the Kyoto Protocol targets, you [now have] the nationally determined contributions (NDCs), the net zero pledges ... to implement climate actions. Some of them are part of official submissions of Parties including the long-term low emissions development strategies (LT-LEDS), some are independent pledges and so on and so forth.”

The second question is: “Was even the ‘inadequate’ roadmap implemented? Having a roadmap is one thing, but the other thing is to actually implement the roadmap.” Referring to the “shifting of goalposts”, Kanitkar said, “It is important to remember why it is that we keep arriving at this new jargon, new coinage, new things that we keep putting on the table in this process. Is it because old things actually do not work, or is it because there are certain sections of the world that do not want old things to work anymore? So, why is it that we need new things?” She said Parties should implement the PA and “see how it works out instead of constantly trying to create new things”.

Kanitkar then presented two charts showing what actually happened to the roadmaps that have been in place since 1990, and explained the large gaps between what is a fair-share target, what is pledged by Annex I countries and what are the actual GHG emissions starting from 1990.

[Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC include the industrialized countries that were members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992, plus countries with “economies in transition” (EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States. Non-Annex I Parties are all the developing countries.]

Kanitkar said that a fair-share target of emissions reductions for Annex I countries should be net zero by 2020, based on the fair-share calculation of the global carbon budget from 1990 onwards. However, the target that Annex I Parties have pledged is to achieve net zero by 2050. So, there’s already a big gap between what the pledge is, what the actual emissions are, and what a fair and equitable roadmap would actually be.

On the actual emissions, Kanitkar said more than 80% of the GHG emissions (1990–2021) came from the richest Annex I countries. Due to the long period of recession in the EIT countries, there was some reduction in emissions. However, if the focus is on the actual emissions of the richest Annex I countries, which are the United States, Canada, Australia, Western Europe, Japan and a few other countries, there was no substantial reduction in emissions from the year of the UNFCCC onwards.

“During the period between the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (KP), the actual emissions of the richest Annex I countries had actually increased. The economic crisis led to a little bit of a dip in the emissions during the first commitment period of the KP, which is around between 2008 and 2012; but otherwise, the emissions weren’t decreasing that fast. There was a 7% increase in emissions by 2008 in the emissions of the richest Annex I Parties,” said Kanitkar.

Between 1990 and 2015, the year the PA was adopted, there was only a 1% decline in the emissions of the richest Annex I countries. When COVID-19 hit, there was a dip again in the emissions, but after that, the emissions stabilized and increased again.

“So, there was basically a total of 23% reduction in Annex I emissions; but only 13% reductions in the richest Annex I countries till 2021. In total, the Annex I countries emitted 500 gigatons of carbon dioxide between 1990 and 2021. Over 80% of this was from the richest Annex I countries,” explained Kanitkar.

“How much is 500 gigatons? It is approximately the carbon budget you have [left] for a 50% chance of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius based on the IPCC 6th Assessment Report. So that’s the amount of the carbon budget that you have left for the entire world from 2020 onwards till we all reach collectively to net zero. This amount was [the same amount] emitted by the richest Annex I Parties between 1990 and 2021. And now they are telling the rest of the world, which is 82% of the world population, that that’s all [we all] have if you want to keep the 1.5°C temperature goal within reach,” said Kanitkar.

Commenting further, she said, “This is the situation of the roadmaps that we have had, [but

now they are asking for] new roadmaps; without equity and CBDR-RC [common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities], there's no climate justice in any of these roadmaps. The best available science, unfortunately, is not yet the science that developing countries need. Equity is not just ignored but actively perpetuated in the IPCC's AR6 [6th Assessment Report] scenarios."

She said the IPCC report itself has some qualifiers but the global stocktake (GST) decision (in 2023) did not have these qualifiers because developed countries and some developing countries said that these were unscientific and asked to drop the qualifiers, even though they were in the IPCC report.

Kanitkar then presented a chart showing how the IPCC's AR6 scenarios violate the principles of equity and justice by perpetuating global inequality across all variables covering income, energy and emissions.

"Projected energy consumption continues to be highly unequal, not just total energy consumption, but even fossil fuel consumption continues to be highly unequal in these scenarios, and of course, the impact, in terms of emissions burdens or emissions roadmaps, is that Africa bears the highest mitigation burden in the near term. Now, if this isn't a violation of equity and CBDR-RC, I really don't know what is," said Kanitkar.

In terms of the near-term (2020–30) emission reductions, she said that the highest near-term mitigation burden is on Africa, followed by Latin America, China, Pacific OECD, South Asia, and then North America and Europe. Thus, developing regions in fact have to take on a higher mitigation burden compared with North America. This, Kanitkar said, is precisely why certain developing countries are reluctant to accept the IPCC as the "best available science".

"But that doesn't mean we do not accept the IPCC or the science. The fact is that the IPCC is an extremely important body which provides a lot of information to the political process, to the governments in general, and to places where scientific development has to also catch up. But science happens within society, and the inequalities of society are also reflected in the way in which science is produced and the way in which science is

assessed, and we must understand that," explained Kanitkar.

"When developed countries do not act [on mitigation], that burden gets shifted to other countries because [of the limited] carbon budget. If developed countries are slow, others are forced to be fast, and this happens in the face of extreme inequalities," Kanitkar said, with regard to the implications for developing countries due to delayed action from developed countries.

She then explained that "transitions mean very different things to different countries". To illustrate this, she presented three separate charts comparing eight countries – the US, Australia, Germany, China, Brazil, India, Ghana and Chad – across three metrics: per capita fossil fuel use [gigajoule (GJ)/person]; primary energy consumption (GJ/person); and electricity consumption (kWh/person). Some examples she provided to show the inequities were as follows: In the IPCC's C1 scenarios [limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot], the GDP per capita for Sub-Saharan Africa was \$3,000 in 2020 and \$9,000 in 2050; while for North America, it was \$54,000 and \$72,000 respectively. In terms of per capita energy consumption in 2050, it is about 20 GJ/person in Sub-Saharan Africa and 160 GJ/person in North America. (For further details, please refer to the TWN Update "IPCC scenarios project highly unequal future between North and South".)

Kanitkar said further that "poverty eradication and sustainable development ... are not simply buzzwords. These are realities that we will contend with on an everyday basis. The provision of clean water supply, the provision of sanitation, building hospitals, schools, providing these services, all of these are realities that developing countries have to contend with. And what does a fossil fuel roadmap or a deforestation roadmap matter, that ignores history, that ignores justice, that ignores equity? What would it have to offer countries that have to contend with these realities?"

[For further details, see:

- Kanitkar, T., Jayaraman, T. & Lavanyaa, V.P. (2026). Projected global and national energy and climate futures using an alternative integrated assessment framework. *npj Climate Action* 5, 41, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s44168-026-00368-0>

- Kanitkar, T., Mythri, A. & Jayaraman, T. (2024). Equity assessment of global mitigation pathways in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report. *Climate Policy* 24(8), 1129–1148, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2024.2319029>

Constant shifting of goalposts

Ambassador Pedro Pedroso of Cuba highlighted the importance of “unity and cohesiveness to push for the outcome we want”, and the need to “respect the institutional architecture that we have collectively built in the UNFCCC and the PA because we cannot rely on a system that is systematically changing goalposts, and we have seen attempts in the recent past in our process to continuously move and change the goalpost that is multilaterally agreed”.

Pedroso said in general, COP 30 in Belém last year “demonstrated the importance of real dialogue, real multilateralism that respects the institutional architecture”, especially against an unfavourable geopolitical backdrop. Reflecting on the geopolitical context last year, Pedroso recounted that “we have had a major emitter withdraw from the PA and UNFCCC and having questioned the fundamentals of multilateral consensus or multilateralism”, and the failure of multilateralism to produce consensual agreements like in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the plastics treaty. Amid this backdrop, COP 30 delivered a good outcome in favour of developing countries owing to their unity and cohesion.

The Cuban ambassador also highlighted his expectations for the Climate Finance Work Programme (CFWP) to focus on Article 9.1 of the PA, which refers to the obligation of developed countries to provide financial resources to developing countries, and for the climate and trade dialogue to focus on the impacts of unilateral measures. He then spoke on why the “shifting goalposts” present a tremendous challenge to developing countries like Cuba in the current geopolitical environment.

“There is a very significant setback in the international finance flows,” he said, referring to official development assistance (ODA) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). “These are the issues that we, as developing countries, have to look at”, in a context where the shifting goalposts

in the architecture continue to place more demands on us, said Pedroso.

He said ODA recorded a second consecutive year of decline, noting that major donors like the US and the EU have made significant cuts, not only in development assistance but also in their climate budgets, with funding increasingly being redirected to defence spending.

He also pointed to the latest replenishment to the GEF, which saw a 27% cut from the previous cycle. “And we have seen it in the Green Climate Fund [too]. We have seen that developed countries have not channelled what they promised to do in relation to the Loss and Damage Fund. So, all this is the challenge that we as developing countries are facing right now in order to ... carry on a more ambitious climate action. That is why we say ambition has to go in parallel with the support that we need and not as a gift; it's support based on historical responsibility and obligation; it's a legally binding obligation of developed countries.”

Pedroso said it is particularly a major challenge for his country, “because Cuba has been suffering for almost 70 years of the most stringent economic, financial and trade blockade or embargo as they call it ... a unilateral measure which has been intensified to an unprecedented level since January, which means that Cuba is almost paralyzed, as an attempt to produce a change in the political and economic order”.

“Since January till June, we have received just one single shipment of oil into the country ... [The] energy blockade on the country is having very serious and significant humanitarian impact. That is what allows hospitals to run and we have queues of patients waiting in line for surgery. We have children who suffer from cancer in waiting lists for surgery. And on top of that, on the 1st of May, they came with another executive order by which they will be imposing what they call complementary sanctions, or secondary sanctions, on the major investors, foreign investors in Cuba ... Just to cut off Cuba from the international economic system in the 21st century ... this is genocide.”

“So, this is the geopolitical context in which we are moving right now,” Pedroso said, adding that there is increasingly aggressive rhetoric threatening Cuba with military action. “They could do of course; they are the first superpower in the world ... but

what they could not do is to break our resilience, is to break our will, is to break our resolution ... we will not give up on our independence and sovereignty,” he said, drawing a round of applause from the audience showing solidarity with Cuba.

Unity of developing countries crucial for fully operational just transition mechanism

Khaled Hashem noted that what Pedroso said “laid the ground and put in front of us many questions with regard to ‘justice’ at large, not just climate justice but also in the context of international relations and geopolitical challenges that our multilateralism is facing, [which is] also evident and reflected in so many occasions of our negotiations”.

Focusing on the JTWP, Hashem said the JTM was seen as a good achievement for developing countries last year. He recognized the efforts from developing countries and also thanked many NGOs which “provided insights on how to link the question of climate justice, sustainable development and poverty eradication to the obligation under the PA and the UNFCCC, which we call climate action”.

“Just transitions are not an optional add-on to climate action; rather, they are a foundational requirement for achieving the goals of the PA in a manner that is equitable, development-oriented and fully aligned with national circumstances ... For developing countries, just transition must support poverty eradication, economic diversification, industrialization, social protection and the right to development while recognizing the pathways will differ across countries,” commented Hashem.

On the JTM, he said, “We hope that by COP 31, we have a full operational mechanism that would enable developing countries to access the means of implementation ... so that it would assist them and support them in implementing their climate action.”

Recounting the journey of the JTWP, Hashem said it has enabled and enriched the understanding of just transitions, beyond the direct association between just transition and the workforce, and extending to other perspectives from developing countries including energy poverty, energy access and the provision of clean cooking as integral to the right to development.

“From our side, we would like to focus more on how [the JTM] will be able to translate the opportunities with the transition and to mitigate any challenges that could also be associated with the transition, especially on the developing countries. We also want to elevate the mechanism to provide us with a dedicated space to operationalize support for developing countries as they navigate the complex socioeconomic [issues] and address the structural vulnerabilities during the transition, and pursue development pathways that are both climate-compatible and people-centred – these are our overarching objectives towards the JTM,” Hashem said, adding that G77 and China unity would be important in advancing just transitions.

The climate and trade dialogue

Vicente Yu said climate and trade has been percolating within the system for quite some time and the first time this came up was during the negotiation of the UNFCCC in the early 1990s, which led to Article 3.5 of the Convention. Article 3.5 states: “The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”

Yu said that Article 3.5 is always referenced whenever developed countries put in place climate-based barriers to goods and products from developing countries. When the EU started implementing the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and other G7 countries sought to follow suit, the BASIC grouping of countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) suggested including an agenda item on trade at COP 28 in Dubai in 2023. This led to paragraph 154 of the Global Stocktake 1 (GST-1) outcome, which was seen as an “initial step in revitalizing the use of Article 3.5 of the Convention”. In 2024, BASIC also asked for an agenda item on trade, and then going into Belém in 2025, there was an agenda fight, with the Like-Minded Developing Countries asking for an agenda item.

“Many of the developing countries were pushing it,” said Yu, “because what needed to be done was

to move the conversation on trade and climate from the decision text into a concrete process, similar to what we did with the JTWP, and with loss and damage.”

“Do we talk about it as a way of undertaking a true multilateral action or is it more about competition and competitiveness? Is it more about some parts of the world imposing their standards onto other parts of the world? And so that kind of conversation is what the climate and trade dialogue intends to trigger ... For example, is there a better way that the EU could have done their CBAM? Should they have consulted developing countries first? Should the revenue they expect to get from the CBAM be rechannelled back as climate finance? It’s a conversation that finally has a home here. [This kind of] conversation tends not to happen in the World Trade Organization, [as] the talk [there] is about trade regulations, not [about] broader principles [and the] political conversation that we are trying to have.”

“The mandate [from Belém] is to have three dialogues [on climate and trade] in 2026, 2027 and 2028. It is important for developing countries to grasp this opportunity and make sure that this does not end up with a talkshop, but rather that the conversation is recorded so that we build up a record of issues that we are raising this year, add on to it next year with some other thinking about trade and climate that might come in after having had a year and a half of implementation of the CBAM, and then end up in 2028 with the final dialogue where we could have maybe a set of ideas or messages or principles that could go into the second GST as inputs into what we could then come up with. Maybe that way we actually shift the conversation away from talking about competitiveness and competition into a conversation about trade and climate as a mutually integrated system where we are trying to cooperate and help each other rather than trying to compete with each other,” concluded Yu.

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Fight over Adaptation Fund matters to continue at COP 31

Kathmandu, 30 June (Chhegu Palmuu) – At the closing plenary of the 64th session of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB 64) on 18 June in Bonn, developing countries represented by the **G77 and China** led by **Uruguay** noted the “progress made on negotiations on two of the three separate mandates of the Adaptation Fund” (AF), adding that “the progress we made in this session is [that] we all acknowledged as Parties that we have achieved consensus on the matter of the arrangements of the AF to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and on the initiation of the fifth review of the AF, and we look forward on forwarding the texts for adoption in Antalya for COP 31”.

The three matters relating to the AF are: (i) arrangements of the Fund to exclusively serve the PA; (ii) membership of the AF Board; and (iii) the 5th review of the AF. These are viewed by developing countries as three “separate” mandates requiring three “separate decisions” once consensus is achieved respectively, without any linkage among them.

On the other hand, developed countries see the three matters as involving a single “package” decision, especially linking the matter of the arrangements to the controversial AF Board membership (which is highly political and currently clearly lacks consensus). Developing countries are firmly against any change in the composition of the AF Board (which provides them larger representation compared with other multilateral climate funds). The dominant issue is over a change in terminology in relation to the membership of the Board, pushed by developed countries to be in line with the PA, viz., from the current “Annex I Parties/non-Annex I Parties” (as defined under the

Convention) to “developed/developing countries” (as under the PA). Developing countries view this matter as a political issue delinked altogether from the institutional arrangements of the AF.

[The question of the number of decisions, whether three or single, has been lingering since SB 62 in Bonn last year, when negotiations started (see [TWN Update](#)), with continued stalemate at SB 63 at COP 30 in Belém despite a “clean” or agreed text denoting “consensus” on the arrangements matter (see [TWN Update](#)). Thus, developing countries see their topmost priority – the matter of the arrangements – as being held hostage by developed countries to the matter of the AF Board membership.]

[By decisions 1/CMP.14 (meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) and 13/CMA.1 (meeting of Parties to the PA) taken in 2018 in Katowice, Poland, the AF shall exclusively serve the PA once the share of proceeds from the PA’s Article 6.4 carbon market mechanism becomes available. Currently, the AF governed under the CMP is primarily financed by the share of proceeds from the certified emission reductions (CERs) generated by the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), besides voluntary contributions from developed countries. The institutional arrangements of the AF to exclusively serve the PA constitute a new trustee agreement (with the World Bank) and memorandum of understanding regarding secretariat services (with the Global Environment Facility). The new trustee agreement is key to ensuring prompt monetization of the Article 6.4 share of proceeds to trigger the AF transition to the PA.]

Point of order raised by the Arab Group

At SB 64, right from the outset, the **G77 and China** stood firm in maintaining that the arrangements issue was a priority matter to be first solved, given the presence of the “clean” draft text from Belém (which was taken as the basis for negotiations) denoting “consensus” in the room and hence warranting a standalone separate decision. It underlined “three separate decisions in three separate documents, one for each decision”, at the first informal consultations on 9 June. This also aligned with the guidance by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) Chair Julia Gardiner (Australia), who announced at the opening plenary that the AF matters constituted “three separate mandates”. Developing countries also made clear that they saw no linkage to the separate terminology issue of the AF Board membership (which lacked consensus as reflected in the four options in the draft text), but **Switzerland** and the **European Union** stressed a linkage and the need for “one” decision on all AF matters, essentially blocking a separate decision on the arrangements issue.

At the second informal consultations on 11 June, the **G77 and China** restated its position to transmit the “clean” text on arrangements for a standalone decision, which was echoed by all of its subgroups, namely, **Saudi Arabia** for the **Arab Group**, **Kenya** for the **African Group**, **Honduras** for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, **Maldives** for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, **Nepal** for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, **China** for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** and **Bhutan** for the **Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs)**, along with the **Philippines**, **Bangladesh**, **Uganda**, **Malawi** and **Cuba**. Further, **Saudi Arabia** for the **Arab Group** said it did not want the matter to be “held hostage”, and **Kenya** for the **African Group** requested to be put on record that “we are being pushed to no transition”.

Switzerland, the **EU** and the **United Kingdom** reiterated their entrenched position on a “package” decision and hence denied “consensus” on the arrangements issue until the membership matter was also resolved, with **Canada** toeing the line, despite it being an “observer” (as it is not a Party to the Kyoto Protocol). Switzerland said that “all are collectively holding hostage” by not engaging on the membership issue.

Saudi Arabia, for the **Arab Group**, responded with clarification that the terminology issue would be discussed as a “separate” matter given a separate mandate. It then invoked “Rule 34” (citing the UNFCCC’s Rules of Procedure on point of order), questioning the treatment of the “three separate matters”. It requested a point of clarification from co-facilitator Koosje Beumer–van der Loo (Netherlands), asking whether, in her assessment, the arrangements matter enjoyed “consensus”, to which she replied “yes”, further stating that “Parties are not proposing further amendments”, but that there were “different” views on the membership matter and whether this was or was not linked to the arrangements matter.

Saudi Arabia voiced disapproval of the co-facilitator’s approach, stating that there were three separate matters, with clear instructions from the SBI Chair on the separate mandates. It questioned why a “text” (on arrangements) enjoying “consensus” (as per the co-facilitator’s assessment as well) was not being transmitted for recommendation for adoption. It asked which rule was being applied that said other separate mandates needed to be cleared in order to forward a clean text enjoying consensus on a separate matter. The point of order was also supported by **Kenya** for the **African Group** and **Honduras** for **AILAC**.

The **UK** and **Norway** reiterated that they saw “no consensus” unless there was adoption of a single decision on all three matters. **Switzerland**, elaborating its position on the membership issue, stated that it was simply asking for a change in terminology to “two developed and two developing country Parties” instead of “two Annex I Parties and two non-Annex I Parties” as outlined in the current AF Board membership, and that it was “up to Parties to decide whether it should be developed or developing” (in relation to the status of countries). It assured there would be no change in the number and composition of the Board, with geographical balance also remaining intact.

With the matter eventually taken to the SBI Chair Gardiner for further guidance, **Saudi Arabia** made clear to co-facilitator Beumer–van der Loo to relay its questions to the SBI Chair. It is learnt that the SBI Chair engaged in bilateral consultations with groups the rest of the week, following which she eventually addressed Parties at the informal consultations on 16 June where she stated there

was “no agreement on decisions to take forward” and that the issue of number of decisions and issue of membership were not resolved at the technical level and would require engagement at higher levels.

The **G77 and China** requested to escalate the matter to the level of heads of delegation (HODs) to find a way forward for a successful outcome on the AF. Further, **Saudi Arabia** for the **Arab Group**, **South Africa** for the **African Group** and **China** for the **LMDC** made clear that consensus had already been reached on two mandates (alluding to the arrangements matter as well as on the 5th review of the AF, which, as had been agreed by all at the second informal consultations on 11 June, would be undertaken following the transition of the AF to exclusively serve the PA).

The HODs meeting was convened by SBI Chair Gardiner on 17 June in a “closed” (only Parties and not webcast) setting, where sources said that the Chair asked for views on the membership matter, including on bridging proposals, as well as whether decisions could be taken independently on the other two mandates.

It is learnt that the **G77 and China** reiterated its stance on the three “distinct” mandates, as also announced by the SBI Chair herself in her guidance, and that there were two “clean” texts on the arrangements matter and the 5th review which were ready for transmission to the CMP and CMA. The Group said it found itself “blocked” from making progress on the critical issue of the arrangements due to a “political” issue on the AF Board membership regarding terminology and that it did not wish to see any changes in the Board.

Sources further said that **Switzerland**, for the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, confirmed that there was “consensus on two issues” but reiterated the need for a “package” decision aligned with the PA language on the membership matter, pointing to option 4 in the draft text (which was a proposal by the EU).

The **EU** said that there could not be a Fund defined by “rigid annexes of the Convention” and that contributors were actually having difficulties getting a seat on the AF Board. The **UK** underlined the need for “robust governance”, calling for terminology in line with the PA. **New Zealand**

also touched on governance issues and called for forwarding “one” document containing progress on all three issues to resolve at COP 31 in Antalya.

Canada and Norway expressed similar sentiments and suggested that the incoming COP 31 Presidency reach out intersessionally to resolve the matter before arriving at COP 31.

Russia made clear that any change in terminology was a “red line” that excluded countries from participation in the Board, and that any change from “annexes” would be renegotiating the Convention and the PA itself.

It is learnt that, after hearing no bridging proposals and no flexibility on positions, the SBI Chair closed the session stating that she would inform the incoming COP 31 Presidency on the matter with a view to concluding it in Antalya.

In the next informal consultations on the same day, co-facilitator Beumer–van der Loo proposed and read out procedural conclusions. This was opposed by **Saudi Arabia** for the **Arab Group**, which said it could not agree on anything before it was circulated or projected on screen, given that it needed to consult with its legal team, and requested to pause the session.

The draft procedural conclusions which were next circulated read as follows:

- “1. The SBI continued consideration of:
- (a) the matter relating to the membership of the Adaptation Fund Board;
 - (b) the matter of the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement; and
 - (c) the initiation of the 5th review of the Adaptation Fund.

“2. The SBI noted that progress has been made on the matter of the arrangements for the AF to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and the initiation of the 5th review of the Adaptation Fund, and that Parties have a common understanding that these drafts are clean.

“3. The SBI agreed to continue consideration of the matter relating to the membership of the Adaptation Fund Board at SBI 65 (November 2026) on the basis of the draft text prepared by the co-facilitators for this agenda item at this session, available on the UNFCCC website.”

Following tough negotiations, developing countries succeeded in reshaping the adopted draft conclusions as follows:

“1. The SBI continued consideration of three separate mandates:

- (a) The matter of the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement;
- (b) The initiation of the fifth review of the Adaptation Fund;
- (c) The matter relating to the membership of the Adaptation Fund Board.

“2. The SBI noted that progress has been made on the matters relating to the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and the initiation of the fifth review.

“3. The SBI agreed to continue consideration of the matters referred to in paragraph 1(a–c) above at SBI 65 (November 2026) on the basis of the work and progress achieved at this session and the draft texts available on the UNFCCC website. [Footnote 1: See document at <https://docs.unfccc.int/documents/10000181>.]

“4. The SBI noted that these conclusions do not prejudice the final outcomes at SBI 65.”

The conclusions in paragraph 1 refer to the critical element of “three separate mandates”. Paragraph 2 refers to “progress has been made”, denoting “consensus” achieved on the two mandates and ready for adoption. Paragraph 3 captures “on the basis of the work and progress achieved at this session and the draft texts available”, with the draft texts (with the plural “s”) denoting three separate texts on the three matters. In paragraph 4, text pushed by developed countries, viz., “does not prejudice the number of draft decisions on these matters”, was replaced with the more balanced “do not prejudice the final outcomes at SBI 65”.

It is to be noted that when agreeing to the draft conclusions, the **UK**, the **EU** and **Switzerland** expressed their “understanding” that it did not “preclude one or several decisions” and this would need “legal interpretation” when in Antalya (COP 31) – the draft texts reflect “brackets” (not agreed) around a separate decision each or a single package decision on the three separate mandates under the AF.

Another showdown is expected in Antalya over these matters.

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COP 30 President asks for Climate Finance Work Programme on agenda

Kathmandu, 1 July (Chhegu Palmuu) – At the 64th session of the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Bodies (SB 64) which took place in Bonn, Ambassador Andre Correa do Lago (Brazil), President of COP 30, sent a letter on 12 June to the UNFCCC Executive Secretary requesting the secretariat to include the two-year Climate Finance Work Programme (CFWP), established in Belém last year, as a sub-item under “matters relating to finance” on the provisional agenda of the Conference of Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA). This was done on the request of the **Group of 77 and China** for inclusion of the matter on the forthcoming CMA provisional agenda.

In his letter, the COP 30 President stated: “As the work programme falls under the authority of the CMA, I request that the secretariat include the following sub-item under the item ‘Matters relating to finance’ on the provisional agenda of CMA 8 [coming up at COP 31 in Antalya, Turkey, in November] and CMA 9 [in 2027] to allow Parties to consider their work under the programme as they deem appropriate: ‘Work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement in the context of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement as a whole’.” (Footnote 1 to this sentence reads: “Established in Decision 1/CMA.7, paragraph 54”)

By paragraph 54 of the Global Mutirão decision 1/CMA.7, Parties had decided to “establish a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement in the context of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement as a whole”. (Footnote 5 to this paragraph reads: “Without prejudging the process

for the implementation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance.”) The two-year CFWP is a watered-down compromise from the original agenda item proposed by the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** on the “Implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement” (on the mandatory provision of climate finance by developed to developing countries) and which was also supported by the **Group of 77 and China** (see TWN Update).

At SB 64, the CFWP took centre stage when developing countries represented by the **G77 and China** led by **Uruguay** refused to accept the workplan for 2026–27 by the CFWP Co-Chairs Yolando Velasco (the Philippines) and Apollonia Miola (European Union), which largely provided for only “engagement workshops” during the SBs and the CMA without formal consideration of work under the programme, particularly in the form of an expected CMA agenda item.

Additionally, in the document (FCCC/SBI/2026/4) prepared by the secretariat for the consideration of Parties at SB 64 on the arrangements for intergovernmental meetings (AIM), which included elements for provisional agendas among other things, Annex IV on possible elements for the CMA 8 agenda did not contain the CFWP agenda item.

It is learnt that before the opening of SB 64, on 7 June, **Uruguay**, on behalf of the **G77 and China**, wrote a letter to the SB Chairs, as well as to the CFWP Co-Chairs, stating that in accordance with the Global Mutirão decision 1/CMA.7, the CFWP “should be part of the provisional agenda for CMA

8". The letter stated that "therefore, the group requests the SBI Chair to issue a revised version of FCCC/SBI/2026/4 [AIM document] correcting the CMA provisional agenda by including the CFWP".

The letter also said that the G77 and China was not in the position to "accept and work" with the workplan. It recalled that under the Global Mutirão decision, the CMA decided to transition to a focus on the implementation of the PA and as part of this effort, the CMA decided to establish the CFWP. "The Group strongly views that the workplan and mode of work, consisting largely of engagement workshops, as presented, do not reflect a Party-driven process and is not in line with the implementation-oriented mandate of the CMA 7 decision," stressed the G77 and China.

The letter further reminded that the mandate from CMA 7 in Belém "was the result of a delicate compromise to address requests for an agenda item in previous sessions, dedicated to discuss the implementation of Article 9.1 of the PA, under which developed country Parties took on an obligation to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention. The CFWP must provide the space in this process for Parties to discuss Article 9.1 obligations, which remains critical for our group to enable implementation of our NDCs [nationally determined contributions] and NAPs [national adaptation plans] to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. This is particularly significant in the context of diminishing contributions to the operating entities of the financial mechanism, even at times reneging of commitments already made, and increasing share of loans provided as climate finance."

"In this regard, the group affirms that the CFWP must be a Party-driven process and aimed towards concrete outcomes. We therefore request that, in conjunction with SB 64, the work programme be provided with an informal space for Parties to express their views and expectations on the scope and modalities of the work programme with the view to adopt a decision that will decisively put us on a path towards the implementation of Article 9.1. In this regard, the Co-Chairs' proposed workplan is not a basis for engagement," said the G77 and China.

Sources said that in response to the G77 and China letter, SBI Chair Julia Gardiner (Australia) clarified that Annex IV of the AIM document was "prepared by the secretariat in consultation with the COP Presidency and the Bureau [of the UNFCCC]. Beyond participating in the consultation as a member of the Bureau, the SBI Chair does not have a role in this process, nor the authority to make changes to possible elements of the draft provisional agenda for CMA.8 contained in the Annex." She also informed that the CFWP Co-Chairs were "addressing the other concerns you have raised and will provide an opportunity for inclusive, transparent, and Party-driven exchanges on key issues related to the work programme".

[It is learnt that the G77 and China letter was instrumental in changing the programme and nature of the CFWP "engagement" workshop, scheduled on 8 June, into a discussion space on the "scope and modalities" of the CFWP and the way forward. And, it was no surprise that the workshop saw strong divergences between developing and developed countries over the CFWP's scope and modalities (see Update 3).]

In order to ensure the inclusion of the CFWP on the CMA provisional agenda, the **G77 and China** also engaged under the AIM matter. At the first informal consultations on AIM on 9 June, the Group stated that it noticed the "omission" of the CFWP as an element for the CMA provisional agenda in Annex IV of the AIM document. It underlined that the work programme was a "process mandated by CMA 7" in accordance with the Global Mutirão decision, and as such, it was the "expectation" of the G77 and China that the CFWP be reflected in the provisional agenda for CMA 8 as a "sub-item under matters relating to finance". The **European Union** did not agree on the need to have an agenda item on the CFWP.

In the adopted draft conclusions on the AIM matter, the SBI requested the secretariat to take note of the views expressed by Parties regarding possible elements for the provisional agendas for COP 31, CMP 21 and CMA 8 and the organization of work for those sessions.

In its closing plenary statement at SB 64 on 18 June, **Uruguay**, for the **G77 and China**, reiterated the need to reflect the CFWP agenda item on the

provisional agenda of CMA 8. The Group also thanked the Brazilian COP 30 Presidency for requesting the CFWP's inclusion in the provisional agenda, and stated that it looked forward to "seeing it in CMA 8, as an agenda item".

Whether or not the CFWP is included in the CMA 8 provisional agenda will be keenly watched when the provisional agendas of the governing bodies COP/CMP/CMA are released in August.

Veredas Dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the PA

The first meeting of the Veredas Dialogue on the implementation of Article 2.1(c) of the PA and its complementarity with Article 9 of the PA, took place on 9–10 June in conjunction with SB 64, led by Co-Chairs Debra-Lee Swanepoel (South Africa) and Ralien Bekkers (the Netherlands).

[Decision 11/CMA.7 taken in Belém last year recognized that there is no common interpretation of Article 2.1(c) of the PA or the manner of its implementation and that deliberations under the Veredas Dialogue will take into account the concerns and safeguards outlined in paragraph 3 of the decision. Article 2.1(c) provides for "making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development".]

As outlined in the 2026 workplan of the Co-Chairs on the Veredas Dialogue process going forward, the two main themes of the first meeting centred on: (i) the nationally determined implementation of Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9; and (ii) international dimensions of implementing Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9.

On the theme of nationally determined implementation, in relation to policies and instruments, case studies were presented by: Egypt on the challenges and lessons learnt from the implementation of its Nexus of Water, Food & Energy Platform; Norway on its carbon pricing as an instrument to align financial flows with climate objectives; and the International Development Finance Club on lessons learnt by IDFC members on public finance mechanisms for scaling up private capital towards national pathways, including by leveraging grants and concessional finance.

In relation to financial systems and climate resilience, case studies were presented by: Rwanda on aligning public finance with climate resilience; Greece on climate change and sustainability at the Bank of Greece; the Centre for Impact Investing and Practices on financial sector approaches to climate risk management and investing in resilience – enhancing the business case for adaptation and mobilizing private capital for resilience; Switzerland on its Swiss Climate Alignment test; Turkiye on aligning financial flows with climate and environmental objectives; and Uganda on best practices in monitoring and evaluating finance flows to inform national policies and strategies to implement Article 2.1(c).

On the theme of international dimensions, in relation to global financial policies and scaling investment, case studies were presented by: Queen Mary University on making global finance work for climate-resilient development; and Barbados on international dimensions of implementing Article 2.1(c).

The plenary presentations were followed by expert-facilitated breakout groups with guiding questions.

The following is the closing plenary statement presented by the G77 and China in relation to the Dialogue:

"On behalf of the G77 we would like to congratulate the Co-Chairs on the organization of this first meeting of the Veredas Dialogue, appreciate the active engagement from Parties, and inputs from experts and stakeholders.

"Across the various segments of the dialogue, we have heard about the efforts developing countries are undertaking to consider Article 2.1 in a nationally determined manner, consistent with the safeguards agreed to in Belém. We have also heard about the various challenges and constraints our countries face, including limited access to finance, fiscal constraints, the high cost of capital, as well as unintended impacts of policy measures. We would also highlight the decreasing commitments from developed countries on climate finance, as well as the impacts of unilateral measures.

"Reflecting upon these experiences, one thing remains very clear to us. That is, Article 2.1(c)

implementation cannot be implemented in isolation from delivery under Article 9. This is in particular, the delivery of developed countries on their obligations under Article 9.1 to enable developing countries to implement action in line with nationally determined pathways, reflecting our unique national circumstances and timeframes, firmly grounded in the foundational principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

“It is important to ensure a balance between observers from the global North and South and also ensure that developing country Parties and groups, especially those with smaller delegations, are able to be represented and share views during the Dialogue. Therefore, we would suggest rethinking the format to ensure meaningful participation and inclusivity is strengthened. There is also a need to ensure that questions guiding these sessions remain exploratory rather than leading in nature, enabling a balanced and open exchange of views. In doing so, they should also adequately capture the complementarity with Article 9, particularly its role in the provision and mobilization of climate finance from developed countries in support of developing countries.

“We look forward to our engagement in further meetings of the Dialogue in the future, including the Xingu Finance Talks.

“We further look forward to enhanced clarity and the delivery of concrete actions and outcomes on Article 9.1 under the Climate Finance Work Programme, to enable developing countries to step up our efforts to consider consistency of finance flows with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate resilient development in accordance with Article 2.1(c).”

The COP 30 Presidency provided a presentation on the Xingu Finance Talks, which were mandated by paragraph 13 of decision 11/CMA.7 as “an annual high-level roundtable with a view to facilitating a cooperative exchange of views among all interested Parties and non-Party stakeholders, in particular academia, international financial institutions and the private sector, on practical solutions that address the challenges and opportunities in the implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement”.

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Global Goal on Adaptation: Fractious talks end in no results

Kuala Lumpur, 1 July (Eqram Mustaqeem) – The adaptation agenda closed on a fractious note as Parties failed to conclude deliberations on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) at the recently concluded Bonn climate talks that ended 18 June. Parties were unable to reach agreement during this 64th session of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Bodies (SB 64) on the GGA, resulting in the item being forwarded to the next session under Rule 16 of the draft Rules of Procedure.

(Rule 16 provides that “Any item of the agenda of an ordinary session, consideration of which has not been completed at the session, shall be included automatically in the agenda of the next ordinary session, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties.”)

The failure to reach an outcome on the GGA agenda came after a series of frustrating impasses that consumed countless hours in the last days of informal consultations, as Parties were deadlocked in terms of how to proceed with a draft text that had reflected strong language on adaptation finance and the principles and provisions of the Convention and its Paris Agreement, including the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) in light of different national circumstances.

After multiple attempts by developing countries, including through the convening of a heads-of-delegation (HODs) meeting on the final day of the talks by the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs), to arrive at a positive conclusion on the matter, no agreement was ultimately achieved.

In the final two days, the SB Chairs tabled two iterations of draft text in an effort to bridge

differences. The first version of the draft text included a bridging proposal from the SB Chairs reflected as options on the adaptation finance language, and references to equity and CBDR-RC, which developed countries proclaimed were “extremely uncomfortable” for them.

While developing countries expressed willingness to use this draft text as a basis for negotiations despite the inclusion of weaker language on adaptation finance and the watering down of the principles of equity and CBDR-RC, it was rejected forthright by the developed countries.

A second version of text was introduced less than an hour before the final informal consultations on the final day, presented effectively as a “take it or leave it” text as time was running out.

Botswana, for the **African Group**, and **Uruguay**, for **Group SUR**, requested additional time to consider the proposal. However, this request was not accommodated, as the SB Chairs were due to attend an HOD meeting to deal with other outstanding issues (on the Mitigation Work Programme and response measures).

The final version of the GGA draft text leaned more heavily towards the demands of the developed countries by removing the language on equity and CBDR-RC, watering down the language on adaptation finance and removing the involvement of Parties in the work of the technical task force on the Belém Adaptation Indicators (BAI) related to the GGA.

As there was no consensus on the final draft text and with time running out, the **African Group**, supported by **Group SUR**, suggested that the

matter be forwarded to the HOD meeting instead for resolution.

At the HOD meeting, according to sources, the Vice-Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) Carol Franco (Dominican Republic) asked if Parties could accept the GGA draft text as is, since there was no further time to discuss and open it. However, the **African Group** underlined that some elements it had been raising were missing in the text and proposed wordings to be added (as regards the work of the technical task force on the BAI).

The SBI Chair Julia Gardiner made clear that there was no time to open the text, to which the **African Group** responded that it could not take the draft text as is. The African Group's stance was supported by the **Arab Group**, **South Africa**, the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** and **Egypt**, while the **European Union**, **Canada**, **Norway**, the **United Kingdom** and the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)** were opposed to the changes proposed. The SBSTA Vice-Chair then announced that because there were objections, there was "no way forward" on the GGA text, thus inviting the application of Rule 16 of the UNFCCC's Rules of Procedure.

This update will highlight the substantial points of contention between Parties under the GGA agenda item, including disagreements over adaptation finance, equity and CBDR-RC, the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR), and the composition of the technical task force, as well as how these divergences evolved and ultimately prevented consensus at SB 64.

Mandates under the GGA

Parties had arrived at SB 64 with clear expectations of the tasks ahead. At the first informal consultation on 10 June, the co-facilitators, Ricardo Marshall (Barbados) and Peter Gerard Wittoeck (Belgium), outlined the mandates as established under decision 12/CMA.7. Parties were invited to consider the following set of matters under the GGA agenda item:

- The Belém-Addis Vision on adaptation (BAV), which comprises a two-year policy alignment process by Parties aimed at developing guidance for operationalizing the BAI under the vision.

- Undertake technical work on improving metadata and methodologies for the BAI, to be considered at CMA 9 (in 2027), including by establishing a technical task force to contribute to that work.
- The first phase of the BAR, covering 2026–28, shall focus on initial implementation of activities under the Roadmap, consisting of the organization of two workshops per year convened by the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies with the support of the secretariat, and the preparation of a technical paper by the secretariat, aimed at enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening cooperation and facilitating adaptation planning and implementation in line with different national circumstances and in the context of Article 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement (which relates to the temperature goal).
- The Subsidiary Bodies will develop and agree in 2026–27 the terms of reference (TOR) for the review of the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience, which will include the review of the BAI.

Clear divergences emerged between developed and developing countries across each element of work. These divergences were further triggered by the inclusion of language on adaptation finance in iterations of the draft text, introduced following persistent calls from developing countries from the very start of informal consultations. While this language was seen by many developing countries as essential to meaningful adaptation implementation, it proved contentious for developed countries.

Ultimately, disagreements over adaptation finance, equity and CBDR-RC and the reluctance of developed countries to engage with such language became a central factor in the breakdown of the GGA negotiations.

Developed countries oppose references to adaptation finance, equity and CBDR-RC

Throughout the discussions, developing countries consistently emphasized the need to include explicit language on the tripling of adaptation finance and on the delivery of adequate, predictable and accessible support for finance, technology transfer and capacity-building from developed to

developing countries, in line with Articles 9.1, 10 and 11 of the PA.

Sri Lanka, speaking on behalf of the **G77 and China**, raised these points early on, with strong and continued support from **Botswana** for the **African Group**, the **Dominican Republic** for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, **Sudan** for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, **Chile** for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, **China** for the **LMDC**, and **Saudi Arabia** for the **Arab Group**.

The absence of such language in the first and second iterations of the draft text was viewed by developing country groups as a significant omission requiring correction. In an attempt to rectify the omission, when language on equity, CBDR-RC and adaptation was finally added, it was reflected only as bracketed paragraphs which read as follows:

“1. [The SBSTA and the SBI agreed that all work undertaken under the global goal on adaptation shall be implemented in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.]”

“5. [The SBSTA and the SBI further recalled Article 9, paragraph 1, Article 10 and Article 11 of the Paris Agreement, welcomed the call for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 and emphasized the importance of means of implementation for developing country Parties for achieving the global goal on adaptation, including under the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience.]”

“6. [The SBSTA and the SBI urge the full and urgent delivery of this call to increase the trajectory, as referred to in paragraph 34 of decision 12/CMA.7, dedicated support for achieving the global goal on adaptation and implementing the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience, including the targets thereunder; and efforts to strengthen transparency and accountability in tracking adaptation finance commitments; regularly assess support provided, including under the work programme on climate finance referred to in paragraph 54 of decision 1/

CMA.7; and increase the provision of predictable, grant-based, accessible and country-driven finance for developing countries.]”

In the informal consultations on 15 June, in response to the new text, **Sri Lanka**, for the **G77 and China**, stated that the provision of means of implementation (MOI) to developing countries from developed countries was based on the Convention and thus should not be negotiable. The Group wanted to put across firmly and clearly that any attempts to renegotiate the Convention provisions especially with respect to MOI were creating distrust within the process. It requested that the brackets in paragraphs 1 and 6 in particular be removed. Other developing country subgroups reflected similar views.

The **EU** expressed serious concerns and disappointment with the text and requested that there be no-text options for the adaptation finance language reflected in paragraphs 5 and 6, which was supported by **Canada**, **Switzerland** and the **UK**. **Japan** went a step further by suggesting that there should be no-text options also for paragraph 1 (where the principle of equity and CBDR-RC was reflected).

It was due to this insistence by developed countries on no-text options that progress on the GGA came to a halt. They did not want discussions to proceed until their no-text options were reflected. Developed countries continued with this position until the very last informal consultations, which saw a “take it or leave it” text with watered-down language on those paragraphs in particular.

India’s intervention best captured the vibe of the room, describing the developed countries’ stance as “coercion” and “creating conditions where issues become more difficult”.

In an attempt to salvage the discussions and make progress, the co-facilitators proposed that the brackets in paragraphs 1 and 6 be removed, with agreement that the entire text from start till end be bracketed. They said that if Parties objected to this, then they would have to refer the matter to the SB Chairs for further guidance.

The **EU** disagreed with the way forward proposed by the co-facilitators and requested that the matter be brought directly to the SB Chairs. Consequently,

two informal consultations were held on 17 June (just one day before the closing of the SBs), with direct facilitation by the SB Chairs.

In the informal consultations on 17 June, SBI Chair Gardiner opened the meeting saying that there was a solid text here encompassing the BAR, BAV and TOR of the review of the UAE Framework. She said further that to have an outcome out of this session, it was critical to refer to the tripling of adaptation finance decision from Belém and that it had to appear in some shape or form. She added that the current issue was that the form of the language was not acceptable to all Parties. Gardiner then indicated that both the SB Chairs would conduct bilateral meetings with Parties to understand the issues surrounding the contested paragraphs to find a way forward that was acceptable to all.

Sri Lanka, for the **G77 and China**, stated that in order to engage with the text, there was a procedural matter that needed to be addressed, which was the removal of the brackets in paragraphs 1 and 6 in particular. The **EU**, on the other hand, shifted its position between calling for the inclusion of no-text options for the contested paragraphs and narrowing the focus solely to the text on the task force for the BAI while sidelining discussion on other elements of the text. This flip-flop approach, supported by the **UK**, **Canada** and **Japan**, consumed much of the time of the informal consultations, effectively hindering substantive progress.

During the second informal consultations held on the same day, the SB Chairs introduced a new draft text in an effort to break the deadlock. This version included options in paragraphs 1, 5, 6, 22 and 23 as bridging proposals, many of which reflected previously agreed language. The Chairs proposed that the text could serve as the basis for discussions in an “informal-informal” setting to allow work to progress. They also cautioned that if no agreement was reached by the following day, the process would likely result in either procedural conclusions or recourse to Rule 16.

Developing countries, in unison, acknowledged that the text represented a significant compromise on their part. It introduced options around key elements they had consistently advocated for since the first informal consultation, particularly language on adaptation finance, equity and CBDR-

RC. Despite these concessions, they expressed willingness to use the text as a basis for further discussions in the informal-informal setting.

Saudi Arabia, for the **Arab Group**, stressed that Rule 16 was not an option for it and that it was willing to work constructively and stay until midnight if necessary. **China**, for the **LMDC**, indicated its willingness to engage and use the text as the basis. The group however stressed that the discussions should cover all parts of the text instead of singling out parts of the text on the BAI task force. **Botswana**, for the **African Group**, emphasized that in the spirit of constructive engagement, it would go ahead with the suggestion and that Rule 16 was not an option. The same spirit was reflected by all other G77 subgroups with the salient point that the discussions must look at the whole text and not just focus specifically on paragraphs pertaining to the task force.

Developed countries, instead of building on the proposal by the SB Chairs or reciprocating the flexibility and compromise shown by developing countries, doubled down on their positions, not showing much concern over the possibility of inviting Rule 16 or the lack of progress made at SB 64.

Norway suggested that Parties only focus on paragraphs relating to the task force and drop all the other paragraphs or insert no-text options in them, including paragraphs 1, 5, 6 and 21–34 (the latter encompassing texts related to the BAR and the TOR). The suggestion to either drop all other parts of the text or include no-text options was supported by the **EU** and the **UK**.

China, for the **LMDC**, responded that singling out paragraphs on the task force as the easiest start for progress did not make sense, as the other earlier paragraphs of contention were all by themselves agreed language with options themselves, which also reflected agreed language which made it even easier for Parties to reach agreement.

This led to another round of informal consultations but no progress was made as developed countries did not budge on their position. This impasse and blocking of progress by developed countries prevented Parties from actually deliberating on matters, which consequently led to the invocation of Rule 16.

Divergences on the operationalization of the Belém-Addis Vision on adaptation

Operationalization of the BAV, particularly on determining the composition of the task force undertaking the work, was by itself the biggest issue between developed and developing countries under the GGA. The only major point of agreement between Parties was on the mandate of the task force itself, which was to continue technical work on the indicators by improving metadata and methodologies, and the timeline of work of the task force.

However, on the composition of the task force, there were markedly different views from the outset. A common thread across proposals from developing countries was the inclusion of varying degrees of involvement and/or oversight by Parties in the task force work. This stood in sharp contrast to the position of developed countries, which advocated for a model that excluded Parties entirely from the task force, limiting their role to reviewing outputs during the SB and CMA sessions.

The proposal to exclude Parties drew significant criticism from developing countries, which viewed it as a continuation of the expert-driven approach adopted under the UAE-Belém Work Programme (UBWP) for the development of the indicators. That process had produced a set of indicators that many Parties found unsatisfactory, reinforcing concerns about limited or zero Party involvement and oversight.

Notably, there were smaller, more minor differences between Parties that were bridgeable, such as over the role of constituted bodies, expert pool from the UBWP, independent experts and UN agencies.

In the first round of interventions pertaining to the task force on 11 June, **Sri Lanka**, for the **G77 and China**, stated that on the composition of the taskforce, it saw value in a manageable and workable arrangement that also ensures Party oversight and brings in the necessary expertise with the participation of relevant constituted bodies.

China, for the **LMDC**, emphasized the fundamental importance of full Party participation and strong Party oversight in the work of the task force. It stressed that the process must remain non-prescriptive, Party-driven and tailored to national circumstances, guided by the principle of CBDR-

RC and centred on the needs of Parties, with official Party submissions serving as the primary and most authoritative inputs.

Saudi Arabia, for the **Arab Group**, stated that the Adaptation Committee (AC), in collaboration with the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) and the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), should undertake the technical work on methodologies, guided by the provisions of the Convention and the PA, as well as the safeguards outlined in decision 12/CMA.7, including its non-prescriptive nature.

It said further that the resulting technical report from the AC should take into account national circumstances, data availability and capacity constraints, including metadata associated with the indicators. It should also address methodologies for indicator application, as well as information on data availability and means of implementation needs. It should include a Party-led policy alignment process, composed of representatives nominated by regional groups with equitable geographical representation, who would then review and refine these technical outputs before their incorporation into a final knowledge product for consideration at SB 66. The Group made clear that it did not support outsourcing the work to international organizations or experts from the UBWP, emphasizing instead that the work should be undertaken by constituted bodies.

Botswana, for the **African Group**, said that the BAV should comprise both a technical and a political track. The technical track would focus on advancing work on metadata and methodologies through a Party-driven process, while the political track would centre on policy alignment, including assessing whether the indicators are fit for purpose.

On the technical track, the group expressed support for establishing a task force to carry out work on metadata, with clear outputs, timelines and modalities. Regarding its composition, the group stressed that the task force should be Party-led while maintaining technical rigour. It proposed a structure comprising both Party representatives and experts, chaired by Parties, with nominations based on UN regional groupings. It further underscored that a smaller, Party-led body would be more effective, while remaining responsive to Party guidance. It should include participation from relevant constituted bodies and processes,

while engagement from other stakeholders would be invited on a needs basis.

Uruguay, for **Group SUR**, said the task force needed balanced representation between developed and developing countries in line with UNFCCC constituencies, alongside participation from observer constituencies. Representatives from constituted bodies were highlighted as important contributors to the technical work. The proposal also underscored the role of experts convened by the SB Chairs, drawing from the experts pool established under the UBWP, while ensuring balanced representation across thematic areas, regions and gender. It further stressed the importance of involving international governmental organizations that serve as custodians of specific indicators, maintaining openness to observer participation.

Chile, for **AILAC**, underlined the need for a balanced composition of the task force, drawing from the UBWP experts while ensuring equitable representation between developed and developing countries. It also highlighted the importance of contributions from constituted bodies, as well as participation from intergovernmental organizations and representatives of UNFCCC observer constituencies. It further stressed the need for modalities that ensure continuous interaction between the technical and political processes. In this regard, it underscored that the task force should not operate in isolation, but rather inform negotiations under the GGA agenda item, while remaining responsive to political guidance that shapes its priorities.

The **Dominican Republic**, for **AOSIS**, said the BAV should comprise two interlinked workstreams, a policy alignment track and a technical track focused on improving the metadata and methodologies of the indicators. These workstreams were not intended to operate in isolation and must inform one another throughout the process. Policy alignment was described as a means of strengthening coherence across the broader adaptation architecture, ensuring that the indicators, UAE Framework targets and NAPs work together to support effective implementation by Parties. On the task force, flexibility in its design was important and the involvement of constituted bodies was underscored, as well as the importance of drawing on the expertise of the UBWP experts. The group stated that while the task force's work

was inherently technical, it should remain anchored in a Party-driven process. Continuous feedback from the policy alignment track was essential, with voluntary Party inputs, testing and national experiences feeding into the task force to ensure both policy relevance and technical soundness.

Sudan, for the **LDCs**, also outlined that the BAV should operate through a technical track and a policy alignment track. Under the technical track, it supported the establishment of a task force comprising representatives from the constituted bodies, while drawing, as needed, on external expertise, including relevant international organizations. The group further proposed that the task force publish periodic updates, with all outputs made accessible through an indicator repository maintained by the secretariat.

The **UK** emphasized that the task force should be composed of self-nominated and impartial experts, underscoring the need to maintain the process as technical in nature. It highlighted the importance of drawing from the UBWP experts to preserve institutional memory. The task force should maintain cohesive and sufficient representation across thematic areas, while also being inclusive of cross-cutting considerations such as gender, human rights, Indigenous Peoples and local perspectives.

The **EU** proposed that the task force be convened by the SB Chairs, with support from the UNFCCC secretariat and the UN Statistics Division, and elect two co-chairs drawn from relevant UN agencies. In terms of composition, the task force would consist of 16 members from UN agencies, with due consideration for gender balance. To ensure transparency, the SB Chairs could organize two virtual exchanges with the co-chairs of constituted bodies. Progress would be reported at SB 65 and SB 66. Under this proposal, the task force would not include Party representatives or members of constituted bodies, and would instead be composed exclusively of experts from international agencies.

Canada said that the nature of the mandate called for a technically driven task force composed of experts serving in their individual capacities. It suggested a structure of no more than 20 self-nominated technical experts, with due consideration for regional and gender balance. It supported engagement with relevant UN agencies and constituted bodies, while also underscoring the importance of reflecting Indigenous Peoples'

perspectives in the work. However, it did not support direct Party representation in the task force, noting that Parties were already represented in a balanced manner within constituted bodies.

The interventions by Parties on the composition of the task force were compiled and reflected as different options in the draft text. Parties deliberated on these options during the informal consultations held on 15 June, which ultimately proved to be the first and only opportunity for substantive discussion, as progress was subsequently stalled. It became evident that Parties required more time, given the wide divergence in views across groups on the appropriate composition of the task force, and the need for further engagement to bridge these differences.

A Baku Adaptation Roadmap with or without outputs?

At the outset in the informal consultation on 11 June, developed countries made it clear that they wanted the BAR together with its workshops to only be talkshops with no outputs, whilst also trying their best to not have the BAR be guided as per the mandate agreed in paragraph 28 of decision 12/CMA.7.

[Paragraph 28 reads:

“Recalls paragraph 29 of decision 3/CMA.6 and decides that the work under the Baku Adaptation Road Map shall be guided by the following:

- (a) Aligning adaptation action with adequate adaptation responses in the context of the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, ensuring that national and global adaptation strategies and actions reflect the risks and needs arising from different warming increments within the temperature goal;
- (b) Strengthening implementation of the targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5;
- (c) Enhancing knowledge-sharing;
- (d) Ensuring access to means of implementation for adaptation, for adequate, predictable and accessible financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support, including from developed country Parties to developing

country Parties, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 1, and Articles 10–11, of the Paris Agreement”.]

The interventions made by Parties in the 11 June informal consultation captured below reflect their views on the BAR and illustrate the clear divergences between developed and developing country Parties.

Saudi Arabia, for the **Arab Group**, stated that all work on the BAR should be anchored under the four pillars of paragraph 28 and all associated outputs must integrate such pillars. It suggested that Parties can submit views on each workshop, with the secretariat to provide synthesis and issue the concept note six weeks in advance and provide a summary report after each workshop including the first workshop and they should be considered by Parties under the following SB and CMA sessions. The first phase of the BAR (2026–28) should conclude with a synthesis report integrating the outcomes of all workshops, technical papers and related activities. For the Group, the BAR should deliver the outcome on temperature-responsive adaptation action, and its value lies in determining whether adaptation responses are keeping pace with evolving risk, impacts and needs of increasing temperatures.

China, for the **LMDC**, said that all work under the BAR should be structured strictly under paragraph 28. Therefore, any discussions on MOI must be in line with paragraph 28(d) and provision of support is the prerequisite for adaptation implementation and identifying gaps and barriers for adaptation action in developing countries. On the BAR modalities, there needs to be a clear process with outcomes to be considered by Parties. The group requested that summary reports be published after each workshop to ensure views of all Parties are preserved and be up for consideration by Parties in following SB and CMA sessions. The output of the first phase of the BAR should be in a consolidated synthesis report taking into account the workshop summary report, concept note of workshop and submissions of views of Parties on the workshop topic which at the end will be up for consideration by Parties.

Chile, for **AILAC**, said the BAR should support developing countries in assessing MOI and identify practical tools for adaptation implementation while respecting the country-driven nature of adaptation.

MOI, in particular finance, should be the essential standing element of the BAR, ensuring regular consideration that will result in tangible adaptation outcomes on the ground. The group requested that concrete outputs be produced from the workshops that should inform Parties' work under the BAR.

Botswana, for the **African Group**, said that paragraph 28(d) and the reading of MOI within the context of this pillar must anchor the work under the BAR and across the GGA. It must centre MOI at its core and retain its ambition. For the BAR workshops in particular, the Group maintained that the preparation of summary reports and an annual progress report is important, with a final consolidated synthesis report consolidating key outcomes and activities at the end of the first phase (2026–28). Prior to each of the workshops, Parties should be given the opportunity to provide submissions on their views, which should then be compiled and be up for consideration at each session.

The **Dominican Republic**, for **AOSIS**, said the BAR should be a space to track implementation of the UAE Framework, discuss MOI and function as a science-to-policy bridge.

Sudan, for the **LDCs**, emphasized the importance of having reports from the workshops.

The developed countries, however, did not see such ambition for the BAR, dismissing any need for MOI discussions and suggesting that there be no outputs. When the iterations of draft text were published, developed countries expressed strong preference that there be no text altogether for the BAR.

The **UK** said that the BAR can hold workshops but they should not be parallel negotiations and the BAR should not be a finance tracking mechanism or duplicate work of the SCF. **Canada** stated that the mandate on the BAR comes from paragraphs 26 to 29 of decision 12/CMA.7 read together with paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5; thus there is no scope to review or extend the mandate at this stage, and consequently no mandate to produce workshop reports. **Japan** said the BAR is a non-negotiating process and thus shall not provide inputs into negotiated items. On MOI, the BAR should not focus on finance as the core area of work as discussions on finance should be in an already existing and dedicated track and processes that should not be duplicated.

In the next few iterations of text until the last, the BAR work was reflected in two options: one that captured the views that had been expressed by Parties, particularly developing countries; and the other was the no-text option. Developing countries leaned towards the former while developed countries preferred the latter, stating that there was already an agreed, existing mandate which should not be extended further.

In its response, **Saudi Arabia**, for the **Arab Group**, stated that the exclusion of text on the BAR was entirely unacceptable. Any outcome that fell short of delivering clear and meaningful outcomes for the BAR was not an option, it said, asking for the no-text option to be omitted. It affirmed that it did not accept misinterpretation of the BAR mandate and that all work under the BAR must be anchored in and guided by paragraphs 28 and 29 of decision 12/CMA.7.

Clearly, Antalya will see similar wrangles between developed and developing countries.