

## Belém Climate News Updates

(November 2025)

**TWN**  
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## **NOTE**

This is a compilation of 22 News Updates prepared by the Third World Network for and during the United Nations Climate Change Conference – encompassing the 30th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 30), the 20th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 20), the 7th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 7), as well as the 63rd sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 63) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 63) – held in Belém, Brazil, on 10–22 November 2025.

# TWN

## ***Belém Climate News Update*** 1

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### **Saving multilateralism is not enough for saving the planet and the poor**

**The Paris Agreement's promise of a unified climate solution faces a  
harsh reality of injustices and inadequate action**

Belém, 29 October (Meena Raman) – When the Paris Agreement was announced 10 years ago in 2015, the world was euphoric, as it was the culmination of many years of protracted negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Following the collapse of the Copenhagen climate talks in 2009, the multilateral climate regime was viewed as having endured and ultimately prevailed. It took five intense years of negotiations to deliver the Paris Agreement at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21), which was no mean feat.

In the run-up to the accord, the North-South divide remained pronounced across numerous issues, particularly regarding the recognition of equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). Tensions centred on how to reflect differentiated obligations between developed and developing countries. In the end, the Paris Agreement's provisions reflected a fragile and delicate outcome, which set out clearly the obligations of developed and developing countries, with differentiation clear in many provisions but somewhat blurred in some aspects, for instance, in the reporting arrangements under the enhanced transparency framework.

While many viewed the Paris Agreement as falling short of what was needed to save the planet and protect the poor, others argued that, given the prevailing political constraints, particularly a hostile United States Congress during Barack Obama's presidency, it represented the best possible outcome at the time and laid a foundation for greater ambition in the future.

The global stocktake (GST) under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement was viewed by many, especially the European Union, as the ambition ratchet mechanism, where after a collective assessment of progress towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and its long-term goals, the outcome of the GST “shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support ... as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action”.

The first GST took place in 2023 in Dubai at COP 28, and Parties were required to submit their new nationally determined contributions (NDCs) by COP 30 in 2025 in Belém, Brazil. These NDCs will cover the time frame of 2031 to 2035, since the first NDCs covered the time frame of 2021–2030. According to the Paris Agreement architecture, the GST will be conducted every five years, and the next is due in 2028.

One controversial subject in Paris had been the scope of the NDCs, with developed countries pushing the narrative that it should only comprise climate change mitigation targets, while the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) advanced the position that NDCs are not only about mitigation. The LMDC's view eventually prevailed, with Article 3 of the Paris Agreement reflecting that NDCs are “a global response to climate change” and Parties are to undertake and communicate “ambitious efforts”, which can include mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation that are needed or to be provided.

A synthesis report of the latest NDCs is expected ahead of COP 30 to be held in Belém, and it will likely confirm what many already fear:

governments remain far off-track in limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C – or even 2°C – above pre-industrial levels.

The report is expected to trigger renewed calls for greater ambition to close the emissions gap. This urgency is underscored by alarming findings from the World Meteorological Organization, which reports that the past decade has been the warmest on record, and that there is a 70% probability that the five-year average temperature rise between 2025 and 2029 will exceed 1.5°C. These projections are not abstract – they signal a rapidly narrowing window to prevent irreversible climate damage and demand bold, immediate action.

### **Fair share of justice**

The elephant in the room remains: who will bridge the global emissions gap?

Is it just to expect developing countries to shoulder greater responsibility when developed nations – historically the largest emitters – have yet to deliver their fair share of reductions? Despite the developed countries' disproportionate use of the planet's atmospheric space and longstanding promises to lead on climate action, many have fallen short. The burden of closing the gap cannot be shifted onto those who contributed least to the crisis and who now face the steepest challenges in adapting to the consequences.

These concerns were noted in the GST decision from Dubai in 2023, which remarked that “the carbon budget consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal is now small and being rapidly depleted and acknowledges that historical cumulative net carbon dioxide emissions already account for about four fifths of the total carbon budget for a 50% probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C”.

The amount of carbon budget remaining for limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C (with a 50% probability) is 500 gigatonnes (Gt). According to a fair-share assessment by the India-based Climate Equity Monitor, for limiting the temperature rise to 1.5°C, the fair share of the remaining carbon budget for developed countries is 87 Gt carbon dioxide equivalent (CO<sub>2</sub>-eq), if past emissions are not considered. If the total carbon budget is considered, then developed countries have to undertake negative emissions immediately. However, the analysis of current NDCs shows that cumulatively, by 2030, existing developed countries will emit 140 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>-eq, exceeding their

fair share of even the remaining carbon budget by 53 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>-eq. The Climate Equity Monitor's analysis also reveals that the developed countries' current climate mitigation efforts are insufficient for limiting the temperature rise to 1.5°C and overconsume the remaining carbon budget. This is made worse by factoring in the exit in 2025 of the United States from the Paris Agreement.

In the run-up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, there were proposals from some developing countries (viz., India, Bolivia and Ethiopia) on the need for equitable access to atmospheric space in determining how the remaining carbon budget within a certain temperature rise threshold is to be shared on a per capita basis, taking into account historical responsibility. Such equity-based proposals did not see the light of day due to tremendous resistance from developed countries, especially from the United States, on the grounds that no international agreement can dictate a top-down approach to emissions cuts.

In Paris in 2015, the only consensus possible was through the acceptance of a bottom-up approach, which paved the way for NDCs, under which each country would pledge what it can do voluntarily without any methodology to assess if such reductions are consistent with equity or fairness. In fact, analysis by serious academics and progressive civil society groups has pointed out that rich countries are not doing enough at all and are very far away from what is needed to limit temperature rise.

Instead of focusing on what emission reductions ought to be from a fair-share perspective in order to keep within the remaining carbon budget in an equitable way, at COP 26 in 2021, the United Kingdom presidency pushed the “net zero” mantra for all countries, which allows developed countries to get away with targets that amount to doing too little too late and passes on the responsibility to developing countries to do the heavy lifting, without commensurate finance and technology transfer. The Paris Agreement provides for a global aspiration of balancing emissions and sinks by mid-century, and not a country-by-country net-zero target.

Such net-zero announcements have drawn much flak from some developing countries and climate justice groups for being unambitious, not going far and even dubious in the case of some. These groups have called for “real zero” and not “net zero”, starting first with developed countries, which must also be responsible for the provision of

financial support for developing countries to head in that direction.

Many of the net-zero pledges are not grounded in deep decarbonization and rely heavily on “nature-based solutions” as sinks to sequester carbon emissions. Many rely on carbon markets to deliver carbon offsets, mainly in developing countries. What offsetting means is not a reduction of emissions domestically but paying developing countries to reduce emissions in their countries, as it is seen as being more “cost-effective”, and buying the carbon credits to offset the emissions generated in the developed world.

With or without carbon offsetting, such pledges create a huge demand for sinks mainly located in forests, wetlands and grasslands in developing countries. What seems clear is that the quantity of the sinks needed would exceed the sequestration capacity of the planet several-fold. This will have negative implications for developing countries, including for conflicts over land use, and for local communities and Indigenous peoples whose lands and forests are being sought to solve the emissions problem of rich nations. Climate justice groups have referred to this as “carbon colonialism”.

### **Beyond rhetoric to real action**

In light of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the Trump administration’s overt denial of climate change – coupled with the US’ aggressive promotion of fossil fuels, including pressuring both developed and developing countries through trade deals to increase fossil-based energy consumption – the global trajectory has veered dangerously towards climate catastrophe.

Like a schoolyard bully whose actions threaten the collective well-being, such behaviour demands a unified and forceful response from the international community. Yet, at the Bonn climate talks in June this year, the broader developed world failed to demonstrate meaningful commitment to renewed cooperation with developing countries.

Instead, they continued to dilute their responsibilities and evade their obligations, particularly in the critical area of climate finance – undermining trust and jeopardizing the prospects for equitable global climate action.

The assertion that wealthy nations lack adequate financial resources is untenable – particularly when substantial funds are readily mobilized to support arms sales to Israel amid its devastating genocide in Gaza and to expand military defences and security infrastructure globally. This stark contrast exposes a troubling prioritization of geopolitical interests over planetary survival.

Meanwhile, climate impacts continue to escalate, with extreme events such as heatwaves, droughts, wildfires and floods disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations. In this context, developing countries must urgently focus on adaptation and on addressing loss and damage.

This is precisely why COP 30 must centre the priorities of the Global South. The spotlight must fall squarely on the provision of climate finance from developed to developing countries – a binding obligation under the Paris Agreement. It must also advance meaningful support for just transitions, scale up adaptation efforts and deliver concrete funds to address loss and damage. Anything less would be a betrayal of climate justice.

It is no longer sufficient to merely invoke the need to save multilateralism. What is at stake is far greater – we must deliver on saving the planet and protecting the world’s most vulnerable. This demands genuine, transformative solutions rooted in international cooperation, not the tired cycle of blame-shifting and rhetorical sleight of hand.

The time for smokescreens and symbolic gestures has passed; what is needed now is bold, accountable action that prioritizes justice, equity and survival.

*This article first appeared in Focus 23: Global South’s Climate Agenda, published by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.*

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## ***Belém Climate News Update*** 2

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### **Multilateralism in the balance: Expectations from COP 30**

Belém, 9 November (Meena Raman and Radhika Chatterjee\*) –The 30th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 30) will take place on 10–21 November in Belém, Brazil. Parties are also expected to advance the work of the 20th session of the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 20), 7th session of the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 7), and the 63rd sessions of the Scientific Body for Implementation (SBI 63) and Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 63).

While the formal negotiating sessions commence on 10 November, a Leaders Summit of close to 60 world leaders was convened by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva on 6–7 November in Belém. Lula called on world leaders “to do more for the planet and to reaffirm their commitment to climate multilateralism” and to “restore mutual trust and the spirit of collective mobilization”.

Issuing the “Call of Belém for the Climate”, Lula said, “The goals we set in the Climate Convention and its instruments will only be achieved if the world embarks on an accelerated path of transformation. Ten years after the Paris Agreement, we are beginning a new decade focused on implementation. We must urgently address the shortcomings: in our climate commitments (the ambition gap); in what we are actually doing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (the implementation gap); and in the necessary financial, technological, and capacity-building support for developing countries to carry out their transition (the means-of-implementation gap).” He added that “rich countries have developed unsustainably over the past few centuries, at the cost of greenhouse gas emissions, as recognized in the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and

respective capabilities. Therefore, they have a material and historical obligation to help other countries develop sustainably and in a way that is less harmful to the planet. We cannot repeat the mistakes of the past.”

Lula’s call comes at a time when multilateralism hangs in a very fragile balance. In light of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the Trump administration’s overt denial of climate change – coupled with the US’ aggressive promotion of fossil fuels, including pressuring both developed and developing countries through trade deals to increase fossil-based energy consumption – the global trajectory has veered dangerously towards climate catastrophe.

The US president’s stance, like that of a schoolyard bully whose actions threaten the collective well-being, demands a unified and forceful response from the rest of the international community. Yet, at the Bonn climate talks in June this year, the rest of the developed world failed to demonstrate meaningful commitment to renewed cooperation with developing countries. This was especially clear in relation to matters on finance and the means of implementation, where meaningful progress was not possible. (See further details below.)

Meanwhile, just ahead of the COP, developing countries from Jamaica, Cuba and Haiti to Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam have witnessed turbo-charged super-typhoons with devastating destruction, including the loss of many lives. In this context, calls for COP 30 to accelerate action on adaptation and loss and damage can be expected to be even louder.

It has never been clearer that it is no longer sufficient to merely invoke the need to save multilateralism. What is at stake is far greater – we must deliver on saving the planet and protecting the

world's most vulnerable. This demands genuine, transformative solutions rooted in international cooperation, not the tired cycle of blame-shifting and rhetorical sleight of hand.

The time for smokescreens and symbolic gestures has passed; what is needed now is bold, accountable action that prioritizes justice, equity and survival. Whether this will prevail remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, a recently released synthesis report by the UNFCCC's secretariat of Parties' nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement only covers the NDCs submitted till the end of September this year. It also includes the NDC of the US, although the country has exited the Agreement. It states, "Since this report considers 64 new NDCs, covering 30 per cent of global GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions in 2019, it is not possible to provide a clear picture of the aggregated effect of all NDCs towards achieving the objective of the Convention ... and towards [the temperature goal mentioned in] ... the Paris Agreement."

Many more countries have submitted their NDCs since September, including the European Union and China. It is expected that the synthesis report will be updated to reflect the current status of the aggregate effect of the NDCs and their implications. The main message is however not likely to change, which is that governments remain far off-track in limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C – or even 2°C – above pre-industrial levels. It can be widely expected that this will trigger many calls from many Parties to respond to the synthesis report.

However, the elephant in the room remains: who will bridge the global emissions gap? Clearly, it is not just to expect developing countries to shoulder greater responsibility when developed nations – historically the largest emitters – have yet to deliver their fair share of reductions. Despite their disproportionate use of the planet's atmospheric space and longstanding promises to lead on climate action, many developed nations have fallen short. The burden of closing the gap cannot be shifted onto those who contributed least to the crisis and who now face the steepest challenges in adapting to the consequences. (See TWN Belém Update 1 for more.)

Several critical issues to watch out for in Belém are highlighted below.

## Adoption of provisional agendas

In the provisional agendas of the CMA and COP dated 5 September, two new matters have been included at the request of the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, viz.: (i) "Implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement" (on the mandatory obligation of developed countries to provide climate finance to developing countries), and (ii) "Promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate-change-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures" [which include carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) adopted by the EU and similar proposals by the United Kingdom and Canada]. Also included on the provisional agenda of the CMA is a request by the **African Group** to include the matter of the "Special needs and special circumstances of Africa".

Following the issue of the provisional agenda for the CMA, several new items for inclusion have been proposed by various Parties, which appear in a supplementary provisional agenda for consideration.

One item is entitled "Implementation of Decision 1/CMA.5 on the outcome of the first global stocktake", which has been requested for inclusion by **Honduras, Papua New Guinea and Suriname**. Another is a proposal from the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** for the inclusion of an item on "Responding to the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions and addressing the 1.5°C ambition and implementation gap". The latest proposal for inclusion, submitted on 6 November by the **EU**, is on "Synthesis of biennial transparency reports". [Parties are required to submit biennial transparency reports (BTRs) every two years under the enhanced transparency framework of the Paris Agreement to indicate what progress Parties have been making under their NDCs. The first submission of BTRs was due by December 2024.]

Given the variety of proposals for additional agenda items and a lack of consensus on their inclusion, the incoming Brazilian Presidency of the conference has been consulting Parties these past weeks on how to proceed. The Presidency's hope is for a smooth adoption of the agendas, with no delays in commencing negotiations. Going by previous experiences, it is not going to be an easy



and smooth start for the Belém talks, with likely disputes over the agenda, unless some resolution is found ahead of the COP opening on 10 November.

## **Adaptation**

Belém will be significant for important adaptation-related outcomes under the CMA with regard to: (i) the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and (ii) National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).

### ***GGA: UAE-Belém work programme on indicators***

At CMA 7, the development of indicators under the UAE-Belém work programme under the GGA is expected to be a key outcome. (The GGA thematic targets cover water, food and agriculture, health, ecosystems and biodiversity, infrastructure and human settlements, poverty eradication and livelihoods and protection of cultural heritage. The dimensional targets are impact, vulnerability and risk assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring, evaluation and learning.)

In June this year, at the 62nd meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB 62), Parties discussed what further guidance they would provide experts for finalizing the list of indicators and reducing their number to no more than 100. This final list of indicators will be up for political consideration by Parties. Negotiations over this matter continued till the final hours of SB 62 and there was a deadlock over the issue of means of implementation (MOI) indicators to measure achievements on implementation of adaptation actions (see [TWN update](#)). Developed countries were against incorporating any MOI language that would stress their obligations, while developing countries wanted a clear emphasis on those obligations. Parties finally agreed to include MOI indicators to “measure access, quality and adaptation finance” as part of their guidance to experts.

Following the guidance from Parties, the expert group meeting on the development of indicators took place in August, the summary report of which can be found [here](#). The experts’ [final technical report](#) and the [final list of indicators](#) were published in September. A [workshop](#) on the UAE-Belém indicators was held in October to consider the final list of indicators. Parties will continue the consideration of this matter under the SBs in Belém.

### ***National Adaptation Plans***

At SB 62, Parties adopted a procedural decision to continue consideration of NAPs on

the basis of a [draft negotiating text](#) with a view to recommending a “draft decision” for consideration and adoption at CMA 7. This draft negotiating text is the same as the conference room paper that the developing-country Group of 77 (G77) and China put forward at SB 62 by compromising their positions to achieve an agreement with developed countries to advance the work (see [TWN update](#)).

Negotiations in Belém are expected to be difficult, given the dogged stance of developed countries to exclude addressing MOI for the formulation and implementation of the NAPs of developing countries. Whether this stance will change remains to be seen.

According to a UNFCCC secretariat [report](#) titled “Progress in the process to formulate and implement NAPs”, “As at 30 September 2025, 144 countries had initiated and launched the NAP process, and 67 developing countries, including 23 LDCs [least developed countries] and 14 SIDS [small island developing states], had submitted their NAPs to the UNFCCC.” This is a far cry from what Parties agreed to as part of the first global stocktake decision in 2023 for Parties that had not yet submitted their NAPs to have done so by 2025.

The secretariat’s report also states that “countries are implementing the adaptation actions identified in their NAPs to address climate risks that align with the key thematic areas of the global goal on adaptation, although these actions are largely fragmented, are constrained by resources and capacity, and remain insufficient relative to escalating climate risks”.

## **Just Transition Work Programme**

Parties decided to establish the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) at COP 27 in 2022 for “discussion of just transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement”. In the following year at COP 28, Parties agreed on the elements of the JTWP and decided that the SBs shall guide the implementation of the work programme. Parties also decided that the JTWP’s work would be reviewed in 2026.

Last year at COP 29, Parties adopted only a procedural decision due to wide divergences on how to advance the work of the JTWP. Earlier this year at SB 62, Parties continued that discussion and transmitted an [informal note](#) prepared by the Co-Chairs. In Belém, Parties will continue consideration of these matters with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the CMA. With the entire informal

note in brackets (denoting lack of agreement), tough negotiations are expected.

There are three main issues that need to be addressed: (i) how the JTWP's work should be advanced – whether through the creation of new institutional arrangements or not; (ii) the manner in which high-level messages from the dialogues under the JTWP should be reflected in the decision; and (iii) the need for highlighting the importance of the means of implementation for implementing just transitions.

Developing countries are keen to advance the JTWP's work through the creation of new institutional arrangements and the provision of means of implementation for supporting just transitions. Developed countries, on the other hand, want to defer the decision on this issue till 2026 when the JTWP's work will be reviewed.

Further, developed countries want to focus the discussion on key high-level messages emerging from the dialogues, highlighting fossil fuel phase-out while downplaying the international dimensions of opportunities, barriers and challenges. Developing countries have been stressing the need for a balanced reflection of high-level messages, emphasizing the importance of international cooperation and of recognizing the right to development of developing countries (see [TWN update](#)).

Another key point of contention concerns the inclusion of unilateral measures such as CBAMs in the JTWP, which developing countries argue undermines the pursuit of their just transitions, while developed countries are opposed to having this addressed.

### **Mitigation Work Programme**

Discussions at SB 62 on the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) focused on three main things: what would be required to make the MWP a “safe space”; a proposal for a digital platform that was put forward by **Brazil** on behalf of **Group SUR** at COP 29; and the structure of the draft decision that Parties would consider and adopt at CMA 7. Parties took note of an [informal note](#) prepared by the co-facilitators and adopted a procedural decision. Though the informal note lays out the structure of the draft decision, Parties have to decide on the details, which they are expected to do in Belém.

The key areas of divergence in these discussions are expected to be the issue of including high-level messages from the global dialogues

held as part of the MWP's mandate; linking the MWP with Parties' NDCs, especially the NDCs synthesis report; whether to continue discussions on the digital platform; and whether to take up the discussion on reviewing the work of the MWP.

Developed countries and some developing countries have been unhappy that the MWP has not been made a vehicle for the implementation of global mitigation efforts laid out in the first global stocktake (GST 1) outcome, and are keen to include high-level messages that are focused on raising mitigation ambition. At SB 62, developing countries pointed out they have already been doing more than their fair share in respect of mitigation ambition and emphasized the importance of the provision of means of implementation (see [TWN update](#)). They also stressed the need for developed countries to raise their mitigation ambition urgently.

A high-level ministerial roundtable on pre-2030 ambition, as a mandated event, is also expected to discuss issues related to mitigation ambition during COP 30.

### **Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage**

Decision [2/CMA.2](#) (paragraph 46) recommended that the review of the WIM be held in 2024 and every five years thereafter. At SB 60, Parties finalized the terms of the WIM review in 2024. However, they could not conclude the review at SB 61 in Baku last year. At CMA 6, Parties requested SB 62 to continue consideration of the WIM's review. At SB 62, Parties agreed to continue consideration of the matter at SB 63 on the basis of the [informal note](#) prepared at SB 62, with a view to recommending a draft decision for adoption by the CMA.

Key issues that are expected to be discussed are the need for scaling up loss-and-damage-related finance and other support; ensuring the complementarity and coordination of the various loss-and-damage constituted bodies (i.e., the WIM Executive Committee, the Santiago Network, and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage); and enhancing knowledge products, including the development of a regular global “State of Loss and Damage” report. These are some of the main demands made by developing countries which developed countries have been contesting, due to the latter's concerns over new financing obligations they may have in this regard (see [TWN update](#)).

## Global stocktake

The decision on GST 1 was adopted in 2023 at COP 28. Discussions on GST-related matters have been continuing since then under three agenda items: (i) the UAE dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes, referred to in paragraph 97 of the decision; (ii) the annual GST dialogue and its report, referred to in paragraph 187 of the decision; and (iii) the refinement of the GST process, referred to in paragraph 192 of the decision.

Last year, there was no consensus on any of these items. Rule 16 of the UNFCCC's draft rules of procedure was applied to the issues of the UAE dialogue and the annual GST dialogue. (Rule 16 provides that any agenda item whose consideration is not completed "shall be included automatically" in the agenda for the next session, unless decided by the COP.)

At SB 62, there was again no consensus amongst Parties on GST-related matters. They agreed to continue consideration of the UAE dialogue at SB 63 on the basis of the informal note that was prepared at SB 62. Similarly, on the refinement of the GST process, Parties agreed to continue consideration at SB 63 on the basis of the draft text produced by the co-facilitators at SB 62. Further details are set out below.

### *UAE dialogue*

The mandate to "establish the UAE dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes" was provided in paragraph 97 of the GST decision. This paragraph came under the "Finance" heading of the "Means of implementation and support" section. Paragraph 98 of the decision decided that the UAE dialogue would be operationalized starting from CMA 6 (2024) and conclude in 2028, and requested SBI 60 to "develop modalities for the dialogue" for consideration by CMA 6.

Discussions on the UAE dialogue, particularly its scope, have been highly contentious from SBI 60 onwards. The key issue has been on whether the focus should be on the implementation of finance-related elements of the GST outcomes or on all elements of the outcomes. At COP 29, the draft decision text proposed by the Azerbaijan Presidency for final consideration was rejected by some Parties led by developed countries such as Switzerland and the EU due to the absence of any reference to the preparation of an "annual report" in the decision text, which proponents saw as a means of "tracking" the implementation of all the GST outcomes, including the implementation of

paragraph 28 of the GST decision on "transitioning away from fossil fuels".

Deep divergences persisted amongst Parties in the discussions on the UAE dialogue at SB 62. These stemmed from different understanding of the Paris Agreement architecture, the purpose of the GST and the purpose of the UAE dialogue itself.

Developed countries and some developing-country groups repeated calls for producing annual reports from the dialogue, including consideration of the "collective" assessment of Parties' progress based on their national efforts, and for adoption of CMA decisions thereon accordingly. Many other developing countries pointed out that such reports would amount to a mini-GST occurring annually, which is contrary to the architecture of the Paris Agreement, according to which the collective assessment of progress has to be done every five years, as provided for under Article 14. They stressed that the GST outcomes inform the preparations of Parties in the submission of their NDCs and NAPs, which are "nationally determined", and that the next collective assessment process is the GST itself, which is conducted every five years and is not an annual process.

Parties will continue these discussions in Belém, on the basis of an informal note produced by the co-facilitators, which is fully bracketed and contains both the draft text that was produced at SB 62 and the draft text that was proposed by the COP 29 Presidency. Divergences are expected to continue in this regard.

### *Annual GST dialogue*

The mandate for the annual dialogue stems from paragraph 187 of the GST decision, which is under the "Guidance and way forward" section. Paragraph 187 requests the SB Chairs to "organize an annual GST dialogue ... to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practices on how the outcomes of the GST are informing the preparation of Parties' next NDCs in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement". It also requests the secretariat to "prepare a report for consideration at its subsequent session".

At COP 29 in Baku, Rule 16 was applied to the report of the 2024 first annual GST dialogue held during SB 60, with the draft text reflecting contestations over whether there should be key messages and substantive elements drawn from the summary report prepared by the secretariat, the timing of subsequent dialogues, and whether there should be a continuation or termination of the dialogue itself.

The second annual GST dialogue was held in June during SB 62. The title of the dialogue was GST “NDC” dialogue. At CMA 7, Parties will be invited to consider the summary reports for the 2024 and 2025 annual dialogues and to also take any action deemed appropriate. The main issue is over the purpose and continuation of the dialogue itself, when many Parties have already submitted their NDCs.

### ***Refinement of the overall GST process***

The second GST (GST 2) will need to conclude in 2028, with the process for inputs commencing in 2026 and the technical assessment phase taking place from 2027 to 2028. Paragraph 192 of the GST 1 decision decided that “consideration of refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process on the basis of experience gained from the first global stocktake” shall commence at SB 60 and conclude at CMA 6. However, at CMA 6, Parties adopted a procedural decision for continuing consideration of the matter at SB 62.

At SB 62, discussions on this matter took place with Parties diverging on three key issues: (i) providing a prescriptive timeline to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for completing the seventh Assessment Report to align it with GST 2; (ii) timeline of the technical and political phases of GST 2; and (iii) the role of the high-level committee in the political phase of the GST. Parties agreed to continue consideration of this matter on the basis of the draft text prepared by the co-facilitators. Given that the entire text is bracketed, discussions on this matter are expected to remain highly contentious.

### **Matters related to finance**

There are several matters on finance which will be the focus of attention in Belém.

### ***Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement***

CMA 4 in 2022 decided to launch the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue between Parties to exchange views on and enhance understanding of the scope of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Agreement. [Article 2.1(c) relates to making “finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development”. Article 9 in general refers to the obligations of developed countries for the provision and

mobilization of finance for developing countries.] CMA 5 decided to continue and strengthen the dialogue, including with regard to the operationalization and implementation of Article 2.1(c) in 2024–2025.

In Belém, Parties have to consider the report prepared by the Co-Chairs of the dialogue, summarizing the proceedings of two workshops held in 2025, including a synthesis of all work undertaken under the dialogue in 2023–2025, with a view to deciding on a way forward with regard to deliberations on the matter. The report contains recommendations by the Co-Chairs for continued engagement on efforts, challenges and opportunities on Article 2.1(c) implementation, in the “format of a dialogue” building on the experience of and lessons learnt over the past three years.

Thus far, there has been no common understanding among Parties on the scope of Article 2.1(c). It can be expected that developed countries would want to continue the dialogue and upgrade it into a work programme or even call for a new agenda item altogether on Article 2.1(c), while some developing countries would call for an end to the dialogue, given a lack of common understanding on the matter.

### ***Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T***

Paragraph 27 of last year’s decision 1/CMA.6 on the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on finance launched the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T” under the joint Presidencies of Azerbaijan and Brazil, and requested “the Presidencies to produce a report summarizing the work as they conclude the work” by CMA 7 in Belém. The Roadmap relates to scaling up of financing to developing countries, with an aspirational target of reaching “at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035”, as contained in paragraph 7 of the NCQG decision.

The expected key outputs of the work include: (i) the Presidencies’ report summarizing the work undertaken on the Roadmap; (b) the production of the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T report; and (c) web-based content and material including a repository of information and inputs received.

The Roadmap was made available just a few days ago in early November and is about 100 pages. It highlights that while sufficient global capital exists, the critical barriers are political will, fiscal constraints, high cost of capital, fragmented systems and weak access for vulnerable

countries. The Roadmap proposes five action fronts (replenishing, rebalancing, rechannelling, revamping and reshaping) to strengthen supply of concessional-grant finance, create fiscal space, steer private finance, improve institutional capacity and reform systems for equitable flows. The Presidencies have also outlined some follow-up steps to the Roadmap. How Parties will react to the Roadmap, including whether there will be any further follow-up in this regard, remains to be seen.

### ***Matters related to the Adaptation Fund***

In Baku last year, Parties requested SBI 62 to consider the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and to make recommendations on this matter for consideration at CMP 20 and CMA 7 respectively in Belém. In decisions taken in 2018, Parties had agreed that the Adaptation Fund shall exclusively serve the Paris Agreement once the share of proceeds under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement becomes available. Currently, the Adaptation Fund is financed by a share of proceeds from the certified emissions reductions (CERs) generated by the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (see [TWN update](#)).

Given that the governance of the Adaptation Fund is currently only under the CMP, there is the urgent need for the CMA to mandate the Adaptation Fund Board to conclude a new trustee agreement with the World Bank for the monetization of the Article 6.4 share of proceeds, in order for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement.

At SB 62, Parties agreed on the need for a smooth transition of the Fund from the CMP to the Paris Agreement and acknowledged the importance of making this transition without losing any proceeds from the CDM (a matter on which Parties did not find any consensus at SB 62 per this [draft decision](#)).

Another matter for consideration relates to the membership of the Adaptation Fund. The main contention is over change from the terminology of groups of Parties referenced under the Kyoto Protocol ["Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties)" and "Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I Parties)"], to "developed country Parties" and "developing country Parties" respectively, as used in the Paris Agreement. (See [TWN update](#).) Parties agreed to continue consideration of these matters in Belém on the basis of the work conducted at SBI

62 which was captured in this [informal note and conference room paper](#) (submitted by the G77 and China).

### **Technology Implementation Programme**

The Technology Implementation Programme (TIP) was established at COP 28 in 2023 through the GST 1 decision. This had been a key demand made by developing countries. According to paragraph 110 of the decision, the TIP is to be "supported by, inter alia, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, to strengthen the support for the implementation of technology priorities identified by developing countries, and to address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism".

The TIP as a standalone CMA agenda item provides a valuable opportunity to advance the critical issue of "implementation" of technology development and transfer for developing countries, including for the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing countries as referred to in Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC. Whether any advances will be made on this matter in Belém will be closely watched.

At SB 62, discussions on the TIP reached a deadlock over the question of which text should be forwarded for further work in Belém. Different versions of the text contained diverging views on modalities of the TIP, with developing countries wanting a stronger mandate for the TIP such that it would prioritize technology needs of developing countries, while developed countries wanted the TIP to prioritize implementation of GST outcomes (see [TWN update](#)). No agreement was reached and Rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure was applied.

The main faultlines of discussion are expected to be over which bodies should be responsible for the TIP's implementation; whether the TIP should prioritize implementing technology needs identified by developing countries or the GST 1 outcome; and topics to be addressed in the global dialogues under the TIP.

### **Article 6 of the Paris Agreement on carbon markets and non-market approaches**

#### ***Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 carbon markets***

With regard to Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, which is on cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs), Parties are expected to consider the compilation and synthesis of the

results of the Article 6 technical expert review, and also an annual report prepared by the UNFCCC secretariat on the activities relating to recording and tracking cooperative approaches. This is under the agenda item of the CMA on “Implementation of the guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement”.

Under a CMA 3 decision adopted in 2021, the secretariat was requested “to prepare annually a compilation and synthesis of the results of the Article 6 technical expert review, including identification of recurring themes and lessons learned”, for consideration by Parties, including in the context of its review of the guidance; and also provide an annual report to the Parties on the activities relating to recording and tracking cooperative approaches, including information on recorded ITMOs, corresponding adjustments and emission balances.

As regards Article 6.4, Parties will be invited to consider the annual report and the recommendations of the Supervisory Body with

a view to adopting the recommendations and to provide guidance to the Supervisory Body, as appropriate, under the CMA agenda item “Report of the Supervisory Body and guidance for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement”. Parties will also be invited to elect members and alternate members of the Supervisory Body.

#### ***Article 6.8 on non-market approaches***

At SB 62, there was no consensus on a decision on Article 6.8 on non-market approaches. In Belém, Parties will be invited to consider the progress and outcomes report of the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches (GCNMA), provide inputs to the review of the work programme that will take place next year at SBSTA 64 and 65, and take any action deemed appropriate on the basis of the recommendations of the SBSTA.

*\* With inputs from Hilary Kung*

# TWN

## ***Belém Climate News Update 3***

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### **“We are moving in the right direction but at a wrong speed” – President Lula**

Belém, 11 November (Radhika Chatterjee and Hilary Kung) – The COP 30 opening plenary on 10 November began with an inspiring address by Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, where he said that under the Paris Agreement, “we are moving in the right direction but at a wrong speed”. The opening also saw enchanting performances by the country’s indigenous peoples.

Following Lula’s address, work of the governing bodies was launched, after a smooth and swift adoption of their respective agendas. Ambassador André Aranha Corrêa do Lago, the Vice Minister for Climate, Energy and Environment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, was elected the COP 30 President at the opening plenary session.

The quick adoption of the agendas of UNFCCC’s COP 30, the Paris Agreement’s CMA 7 and the Kyoto Protocol’s CMP 20 was enabled by intensive informal consultations held by the COP 30 Presidency with Parties especially on 9 November, when meetings went on very late into the night to find a way forward on eight contentious proposals for new agenda items from various Parties (see further details below).

#### **Highlights of President Lula’s address**

President Lula began by stressing the importance of choosing Belém as the site for COP 30. He said “it would have been much easier” to have the COP in a city that was already well built as that “would have no problem ... but we decided to have the COP in the Amazon region state to prove that when you have political will” and “commitment to truth you can prove that nothing is impossible”. This, he said, was a “lesson of

civility” and “human greatness”. Lamenting the huge amount of resources going towards military spending, he said “it would be much cheaper to put money into climate finance than for war”.

Recalling the Rio Summit on Environment and Development held in 1992, he said that was a time when multilateralism was at its apex. It was during that time that countries “came up with the context of sustainable development and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities”. He said “today the Climate Convention is back to its home country” and stressed the need for reclaiming the enthusiasm that drove the birth of the Convention in 1992.

Highlighting the urgent need for action, he said “climate change is not a threat of the future. It is a tragedy of the present time” in which extreme weather events cause devastation for the most vulnerable populations.

Calling COP 30 the “COP of truth”, and in an apparent reference to the Trump administration in the United States, he added that “in an era of fake news and misinformation the obscurantists reject not only the evidence by science but also the progress in multilateralism. They control algorithms, sell hatred and spread fear. They attack institutions, they attack science and universities.”

Lula stressed that “now is the moment to defeat the denialists”, adding that “without the Paris Agreement the world would suffer from catastrophic warming” and that “we are moving in the right direction but at a wrong speed”.

He sounded a call to action that was “split in three parts”. In the first part, Lula appealed to countries to abide by their commitments, including by formulating and implementing ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDCs). He

asked for the assurance of finance, technology transfer and capacity building for developing countries, and for due attention to adaptation in developing countries.

In the second part of his call for action, he focused on accelerating climate action. He said “there is a need for overcoming reliance on fossil fuels and stopping deforestation” and stressed the need for advancing “a more robust governance to ensure that words can be translated into deeds”. Finally, he called on the international community “to place people at the core of the climate agenda”.

He said that “global warming has pushed millions of people into poverty” and it has a disproportionate impact on people who are least responsible for causing climate change. This “should be taken into account in adaptation action”. He said there should be a “fair transition” and pointed to the need for reducing “asymmetries between the Global North and Global South”, adding that the “climate emergency is increasing inequality” and emphasizing that this was “unacceptable”.

### At the COP 30 plenary

At the COP 30 plenary, Ambassador Corrêa do Lago announced that the agendas of the governing bodies would be adopted without the new agenda proposals, on the understanding reached among Parties that four out of the eight proposals would involve further informal consultations convened by the Presidency and which would be open to observers.

The four agenda items under consideration are: implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement (which relates to the mandatory provision of finance from developed to developing countries) [proposed by the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**]; unilateral trade measures (UTMs) (proposed by the **LMDC**); “responding to the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions and addressing the 1.5°C ambition and implementation gap” [proposed by the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**]; and “reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement” (which relates to the biennial transparency reports) [proposed by the **European Union (EU)**].

(All these agenda items were proposed for the consideration of the CMA, while the UTMs proposal was also for the consideration of the COP. The Article 9.1 finance agenda item has drawn the support of the **G77 and China**.)

Following the launch of work of the respective governing bodies, the Presidency convened consultations on these four agenda items that began late afternoon on 10 November and went on for around four hours, with no consensus in sight. The next consultation will take place on 11 November to find solutions, and the Presidency announced that it will convene a stocktaking plenary to update Parties on these consultations on 12 November.

### Way forward on the other agenda item proposals

The COP 30 Presidency informed that the agenda item related to “implementation of the outcomes of the first global stocktake” had been withdrawn by its proponents. Ambassador Corrêa do Lago also informed that the Presidency will conduct consultations on the item on the “special needs and special circumstances of Africa” (proposed by the **African Group**) and on the item on “annual expert dialogue on mountains and climate change” (proposed by **Kyrgyzstan**). The Presidency also said that the outcomes of these consultations will be reflected in the report of the session. Parties were also informed that the item related to “climate change and health” (proposed by **Zimbabwe**) would be dealt with under matters relating to adaptation.

Following the adoption of the agendas of the respective bodies, work was launched for the talks to proceed beginning 11 November.

### Work begins under the Subsidiary Bodies

The 63rd sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs), viz. Scientific Body for Implementation (SBI 63) and Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 63), commenced at around 5.45 pm on 10 November, following a delayed start.

The provisional agendas of the bodies were adopted smoothly, with the inclusion of a footnote regarding the understandings reached by Parties on the LMDC proposals on Article 9.1 and UTMs.

The SBI Chair Julia Gardiner (Australia) and SBSTA Chair Adonia Ayebare (Uganda) orally amended the provisional agendas to include the footnote, which was similar to the footnote and understanding agreed to during the SB 62 session in June.

The footnote read out was as follows: “The SBI and SBSTA Chairs will hold substantive consultations on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement



to consider substantive elements regarding the implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. The SBI and SBSTA Chairs will take stock of progress on these consultations at SB 63 and report back on the outcomes of these consultations at the conclusion of SB 63, for Parties' consideration with a view to determining a way forward, including potentially a standalone agenda item on this matter. The issue of unilateral trade measures will be dealt with in the relevant agenda items, including under the Just Transition Work Programme, response measures, and other appropriate agenda items, consistent with the understanding on the way forward on this issue."

Following the launch of work under the various agenda items of the respective bodies, towards the end of the session, the SB Chairs provided a report back on the outcome of their consultations with Parties on the matter of Article 9.1, which revealed that no consensus had been reached among Parties on the proposal. The SB Chairs said that with the consultations and report back, their mandate had concluded.

**China** and **Saudi Arabia** took the floor and requested the SB Chairs to provide a report back on the matter at another time and to communicate this in advance, as their finance negotiators were engaged in consultations convened by the COP Presidency (on the agenda items as reported above, including on Article 9.1).

The Chairs then agreed that this matter remained open and that they would provide a

subsequent report back with prior notification to ensure the relevant negotiators are present.

On another agenda item, "Methodological issues: emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport" under the SBSTA agenda, the Chair had proposed that the consideration of this matter be deferred to June next year.

**China** took the floor and stressed that the matter was important for consideration at this session, as over the past year, the two international organizations responsible for the aviation and maritime sectors had undertaken extensive discussions on these issues and therefore, it was necessary within the framework of the UNFCCC to also consider these issues. The SBSTA Chair then proposed that informal consultations on this matter will proceed at this session.

Another intervention from the floor during the plenary concerned the item on the report of the Adaptation Committee. Speaking on behalf of **Group SUR, Uruguay**, supported by **Colombia, Argentina** and the **EU**, requested that the Chairs invite Parties to welcome the report rather than merely taking note of it.

In her opening remarks, SBI Chair Gardiner paid tribute to the crucial role of indigenous peoples as stewards of the land and acknowledged their traditional knowledge and contributions to climate action, noting that the SB session is being held in the Amazon, which is home to many indigenous communities.

# TWN

## ***Belém Climate News Update 4***

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### **Strong and united call from developing countries for a just transition mechanism**

Belém, 12 November (Hilary Kung) – At the inaugural contact group meeting of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) in Belém held on 12 November, developing countries, led by the **G77 and China**, presented a unified front in advocating for the creation of a just transition mechanism. Their call emphasized the need to strengthen international cooperation and ensure that just transitions are equitable, inclusive and responsive to the diverse needs of all nations.

**Egypt**, for the **G77 and China**, presented the group's proposal, which outlined the objectives, key functions and features of the mechanism. The proposal was strongly supported by all developing countries including the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, the **African Group**, the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** and the **Arab Group**.

However, developed countries including **Japan**, **Norway**, the **United Kingdom (UK)**, the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, **Australia**, **Canada** and the **European Union (EU)** did not support the G77/China proposal.

The contact group, co-chaired by Federica Fricano (Italy) and Joseph Teo (Singapore), convened on 12 November. The Co-Chairs proposed to start with the informal note transmitted from the 62nd sessions of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Bodies (SB 62) held in June 2025, focusing first on the three areas that are least defined. (These are the three main areas, each with a range of options, in the informal note.)

The three areas are: (i) the question of how the JTWP should advance work, whether through improving existing modalities, new institutional

arrangements or defer to 2026; (ii) the manner in which high-level messages from the dialogues held should be reflected in the JTWP decision; and (iii) a placeholder on promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate change related to trade-restrictive unilateral measures.

When the Co-Chairs proposed to start discussions on the high-level messages from the dialogues, the **G77 and China** requested that discussions begin with a focus on institutional arrangements, as Parties needed more time to review the fourth dialogue report and the annual summary report of JTWP dialogues, which had just been released a few days before the start of COP 30. Most Parties supported this request, except **Japan**, which raised concerns about the informal note and proposed projecting the text on the screen for a line-by-line negotiation, and to also focus on the "controversial issues".

Parties agreed to begin deliberations on how the JTWP should advance work.

**Egypt**, for the **G77/China**, presented the Group's proposal to establish a just transition mechanism to systematically integrate the principles of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement (PA) into the JTWP.

The G77 and China said that the new mechanism would aim to ensure the operationalization of the principles of fairness, equity, and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) in climate action across all levels of implementation in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication; enhance understanding and execution of all elements of the JTWP consistent with paragraph 2 of decision 3/CMA.5 (the 2023 Dubai decision);

provide a structure for effective information exchange, facilitation and cooperation at international and national levels; and offer coherent, action-oriented and inclusive support for implementing national just transition pathways, with international cooperation and multilateralism at its core, among others.

Egypt explained further that some of the key functions of the proposed mechanism include providing technical assistance and facilitating knowledge exchange between Parties; promoting international cooperation and mobilizing resources for just transition pathways across all sectors and thematic areas; and assessing support gaps and recommending actionable solutions.

The Group also emphasized that the mechanism should be Party-led and bottom-up, and have a multi-stakeholder approach; be non-prescriptive, complementary and non-duplicative; and be focused on practical implementation and delivering tangible benefits and respectful of national sovereignty.

**Chile**, for **AILAC**, highlighted that discussions on institutional arrangements respond to the real challenges faced by countries. It underscored that establishing the just transition mechanism is essential to strengthen the agenda nationally and internationally, enhance efficiency and effectiveness, and ensure the JTWP's continued relevance ahead of its 2026 review.

**Tanzania**, for the **African Group**, said the mechanism must contribute to sustainable development, promote clean cooking and access to energy, and enhance climate resilience, all supported by international cooperation.

**Ethiopia**, for the **LDCs**, said it expects to see the relevant paragraphs in the informal note updated to reflect the G77/China's proposal. It emphasized that the JTWP needs to advance work by coordinating to support the implementation of just transitions through finance, technology transfer and capacity building, recognizing the systemic inequalities and the different starting points among countries and the special circumstances of LDCs. It also called for universal access to clean, affordable renewable energy, eradication of poverty, sustainable development and facilitating the right to development. It highlighted the need to discuss how to improve the existing modalities of the JTWP, adding that this is not mutually exclusive to the proposal for establishing a new institutional arrangement.

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **LMDC**, also expressed strong support for the just transition mechanism,

saying it would "provide coherent, action-oriented and inclusive support for implementing nationally defined just transition pathways, with the right to development, international cooperation and multilateralism at its core".

**Fiji**, for **AOSIS**, said just transition needs a transitioning away from fossil fuels and that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recognized just and fast transition in line with best available science. Elaborating further, it said global energy transition means massive challenges and this is one of the reasons for this work programme to ensure that the transition is just.

**Norway** said that it will be much more efficient to use existing mechanisms that Parties have already established under the PA, especially on the means of implementation, since there are already in place institutions such as the Technology Mechanism. It warned against duplicating the work of institutions, adding that establishing a new mechanism would easily take five years.

It also warned that there are serious problems with funding as currently less than 50% of activities are funded under the core budget and that new institutional arrangements would require more funds. It then suggested that Parties focus on giving guidance to existing institutions on how to implement just transitions in their respective institutions.

**India** commented that the establishment of the just transition mechanism can allow Parties to move beyond discussions and provide space for exploring concrete ways in which just transitions can be implemented.

"We are discussing this issue here, because we know that transitions can very easily be unjust, denying those who have contributed the least to the problem of climate change, the right to develop and burdening them with unfair mitigation burdens and costs. The impact of this on developing countries is not abstract, but it has real consequences for communities, the formal and informal sector workers in our countries," said India further.

In response to Norway's concern about duplication, India said, "We have heard some of our colleagues speak about duplication, especially with the Technology Mechanism. However, we think the establishment of the [just transition] mechanism can allow us to explore the relationship between technology and society. We are confident that we can collectively find ways in which we avoid duplication..."

The **EU** emphasized the need to "capitalize on the substantive work" that Parties have

done for the past two years, noting that the key messages from the third and fourth dialogues are particularly important. It reiterated that Parties should be given sufficient time for discussion, as otherwise, it would be “hard to discuss institutional arrangements without the substance”. The EU then sought clarification on the G77/China proposal, specifically on what substance the mechanism would be focusing on. It also highlighted that there are many initiatives that Parties should seek to build upon, strengthen complementarity and enhance synergies. At this stage however, the EU noted, it is “unclear how the suggested mechanism would avoid the duplication”. It also added that the EU intends to engage constructively to see how to enhance just transitions domestically.

**Switzerland**, for the **EIG**, said the Group supported improving existing modalities instead of new institutional arrangements.

The **UK** said that it does not support the proposal for a new institutional arrangement and had set out extensive concerns in this regard. It then highlighted two key questions that it said remain unanswered: what is the function and added value of the G77/China proposal that is distinct from existing initiatives; and why is something new needed since there are already existing institutions/initiatives. It echoed Norway that a new arrangement may take years to be operationalized and it will not achieve the intended results.

It also said that just transitions have two aspects: one is ambition, which is the destination; and the other is how we get there, which is the journey. “The JTWP must represent both aspects while leaving no one behind,” said the UK.

The UK also commented that in previous discussions, “just transition” was used to reduce ambition, and highlighted that the temperature goal under the PA is inextricable and must be recognized. It supported AOSIS’s statement regarding the transitioning away from fossil fuels.

**Japan** said it is necessary to map all existing initiatives and avoid duplication. It said it is important to examine the interlinkages between

just transition and mitigation and the 1.5°C temperature goal. It requested that the secretariat assess the budget implications of having a new institutional arrangement.

**Australia** echoed the UK’s concerns and said it expects to see a strong link between just transitions and ambition, grounded in social protection, decent work and human rights. It also commented that a new mechanism may duplicate work and strain resources. Australia also said that there are at least 50 bodies and institutions working on just transitions and so mapping who is doing what and developing ways to collaborate is key.

**Canada** said it has many more questions than answers at this stage and also advocated for the mapping exercise as it is “procedurally important” to inform the future arrangements of the JTWP.

**Trade Union NGOs (TUNGO)**, speaking for cross-constituencies (**Environmental NGOs, Women and Gender, Children and Youth**), said the “cross-constituencies have been asking for a step change in the way in which the UNFCCC is delivering on just transitions”. They reiterated their demand for the establishment of a “Belém Action Mechanism for Just Transition (BAM) to accelerate, consolidate and achieve a holistic just transition across the whole economy within and between countries”. The cross-constituencies also advocated for the coordination entity of the mechanism to have meaningful inclusion and participation from both developed and developing countries, other relevant UN agencies and observer constituencies (each of which should have a representative seat during the meetings), as well as other stakeholders.

The contact group will convene daily until 14 November.

Earlier in the day before the contact group convened, the COP 30 Presidency organized a two-hour open dialogue with Parties and NGO constituencies on “Just transition: status of negotiations and opportunities for an ambitious outcome”, signalling the high importance of this agenda for the COP.

# TWN

## ***Belém Climate News Update 5***

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### **Divergences continue over global stocktake negotiations**

Belém, 13 November (Radhika Chatterjee) – Negotiations on matters related to the global stocktake (GST) have revealed the continuation of key divergences amongst Parties at the ongoing climate talks in Belém.

With the swift adoption of the agenda on the first day of the 7th session of the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 7), work on all matters relating to the GST began in full swing from 11 November onwards, under the work of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Bodies (SBs).

Discussions have been particularly contentious on matters relating to the scope, purpose and objective of the UAE dialogue (under paragraph 97 of the GST decision from Dubai). These are a continuation of the divergences that came to the fore at the June session of the SBs (SB 62) during consideration of this matter.

Meanwhile, discussions on the refinement of the overall GST process (in preparation for the next GST) revealed key divergences around the issue of aligning the 7th Assessment Report (AR7) cycle of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to the second GST (GST 2) process.

In the discussions on the annual GST dialogue (under paragraph 187 of the GST decision from Dubai), the main point of divergence amongst Parties hinged on what kind of outcome should be adopted from the dialogue, i.e., whether the outcome should be a substantive one with key messages or only a procedural one, and the duration of the dialogue.

#### **UAE dialogue**

Over the two informal consultations that have been held on this item so far, Parties shared their views on three issues – scope, structure and follow-up of the dialogue – as requested by the

co-facilitators Ricardo Marshall (Barbados) and Patrick Spicer (Canada). Parties also addressed the important procedural question of the text that should be used for discussions on this item.

It was clear from the discussions over two days that wide divergences among Parties persisted on the question of scope, purpose and objective of the UAE dialogue. (Positions remained similar to what had been shared earlier at SB 62; see [TWN update](#) for details.) At the end of the second informal consultation, the co-facilitators announced that they will present a new text based on the informal note that Parties had agreed to transmit from SB 62 to CMA 7.

(The [informal note](#) from SB 62 was fully bracketed and contained two versions, with the first one reflecting the text that Parties had discussed during SB 62 and previously in Baku at CMA 6, while the second version contained some additional elements that had been introduced into the text at the last moment by the European Union on the concluding day of SB 62.)

The mandate to “establish the UAE dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes” was provided in paragraph 97 of the GST decision. This paragraph was under the “Finance” heading of the “Means of implementation and support” section. Paragraph 98 of the decision decided that the UAE dialogue would be operationalized starting from CMA 6 (2024) and conclude in 2028, and requested SBI 60 to “develop modalities for the dialogue” for consideration by CMA 6.

Developing countries like the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, the **Arab Group**, **India**, **China** and the **Philippines** expressed the need to respect the mandate of the UAE dialogue which stemmed from the finance section of the outcome of the first GST (GST 1). They stressed the need for focusing on utilizing

the dialogue as a space for exchange of views and information on issues related to finance required for addressing developing countries' needs for climate action. They also highlighted that the UAE dialogue should conclude in 2026, to ensure no overlap in its work with the GST 2 process. They expressed a preference for relying on the first version contained in the informal note from SB 62 for further discussions here at Belém.

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **LMDC**, did not accept using the UAE dialogue as a bridge between the GST 1 and GST 2 processes, as suggested by the **EU** and the **United Kingdom**, as it said that would "make the UAE dialogue a mini-GST". It described this suggestion as "using different language to come up with the same idea".

Responding to references made by **Switzerland** for the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)** and by **Australia** about addressing goals on energy transition in the GST 1 outcome, the LMDC said that was "completely prescriptive" and a top-down imposition of GST outcomes on Parties. It added that this kind of cherry picking introduces new approaches to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and goes beyond the informal note that Parties had agreed upon at SB 62.

**India** pointed out that the UAE dialogue cannot "get past the architecture of the PA" and described any attempts to make the dialogue a link between the first and second GST processes as a way of introducing top-down elements in the PA, which was against its architecture.

**China** said the mandate of the UAE dialogue was to conduct a dialogue and not a review. Responding to the interventions made by developed countries about the idea of using the dialogue as a follow-up mechanism for implementing the GST outcomes, it said that if the UAE dialogue did that, it would become a mini-GST. What developed countries were asking for, it said, was to make the UAE dialogue's modalities such that it would involve three phases: collecting inputs, producing reports, and considering those reports to produce a decision. It said inputs for the dialogue would be Parties' nationally determined contributions (NDCs), National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and National Communications (NCs), which was "essentially the same as the GST". This similarity showed that the UAE dialogue would become a "replica of the GST".

With the GST process starting next year, it said that if both the GST and the UAE dialogue would be soliciting inputs next year, the only

difference between them would then be that the dialogue would be conducted annually while the GST process is held every five years. It asked which would be a more meaningful process – one that is conducted over a year or one that is spread over five years. It said replicating a mini-GST through the UAE dialogue would amount to rewriting of the PA, and stressed that the UAE dialogue should be a "non-negotiated forum for discussing the implementation of real world problems ... to identify opportunities and share ways for overcoming barriers for that".

Developed countries like the **EU**, the **EIG**, the **UK**, **Australia**, **New Zealand** and **Japan** said the UAE dialogue should focus on implementing all GST outcomes. They stressed that synthesis reports of the information discussed in the dialogue and messages from the dialogues should be considered for a decision to be adopted by the CMA.

The **EU** and the **UK** said the dialogue should be used as a bridge to link the first and second GST processes to ensure the full implementation of GST outcomes. The **EIG** said the dialogue should be a space to discuss all homeless elements of the GST 1 outcome and track progress of global goals contained in that outcome, especially those relating to fossil fuel transition and deforestation. **Australia** said if the dialogue conducts any discussion on trade, it must address issues relating to paragraphs 28 (on fossil fuel transition) and 33 (deforestation) of the GST 1 outcome. It also said that the annual decisions from the UAE dialogue should feed into the GST 2 process. **Japan** said the dialogue's focus should not be restricted to just the finance elements of the GST outcome but should be on all elements of the outcome.

Developing-country groups like the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)** and the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** said the UAE dialogue should focus on the implementation of all GST outcomes with a particular focus on means of implementation, especially finance, technology and capacity building. They stressed the need for a follow-up of the UAE dialogue in the form of a decision.

The next informal consultation on this item is scheduled for 13 November.

### **Refinement of the overall GST process**

Presided over by co-facilitators Eduardo Silva Besa (Chile) and Kelsey Gray (Australia),

discussions on the “procedural and logistical elements of the GST process” are being conducted on the basis of the draft text that Parties had prepared at SB 62. The two informal consultations held on this matter have revealed that the main area of divergence amongst Parties hinges on the question of aligning the cycle of the IPCC products for AR 7 with that of GST 2, to ensure that IPCC reports are made available in time for them to be considered at GST 2.

(GST 2 concludes in 2028, with the process for inputs commencing in 2026 and the technical assessment phase taking place from 2027 to 2028. Paragraph 192 of the GST 1 decision decided that “consideration of refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process on the basis of experience gained from the first global stocktake” shall commence at SB 60 and conclude at CMA 6. However, at CMA 6 Parties adopted a procedural decision for continuing consideration of the matter at SB 62. For the background relating to these discussions at SB 62, see TWN update.)

Developing countries like the **LMDC**, the **Arab Group**, **India** and **China** have stressed the need to ensure the integrity and independence of the IPCC, which requires that Parties do not direct any changes to its timeline to align the IPCC’s work with GST 2.

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **LMDC**, said “a typical IPCC timeline is seven years, or even up to nine years. Restricting that to five years [to align with the GST cycle] can compromise the work of the IPCC.” It pointed out that developing countries do not have the resources to mobilize research within such a short period of time. It added that “it is not our place to decide on whether there should be any alignment between the two cycles” and asked whether Parties are discussing “refinement of the GST process or refinement of the IPCC process”.

**China** said that the integrity of the GST relies on the independent nature of scientific work and that the independence of the GST and IPCC should be maintained. It pointed out that the two have to be complementary processes. It said the GST is a Party-driven process while the IPCC is a science-driven body, and added that scientific inputs from the IPCC to the GST should occur without directing the IPCC’s timeline. It said “accelerating the scientific process would affect and compromise the quality and public trust in scientific findings, especially in the current context where climate science faces questions in some places”. It pointed out that meaningful participation in scientific research “requires sufficient time and resources”.

**India** said it was puzzled by the continued discussion of the IPCC’s relevance for GST 2, a matter that had been made clear in decision 19/CMA.1. Responding to interventions made by developed countries and some developing-country groups about the IPCC being “the best available science”, it said the “IPCC reports are an assessment. They are a secondary source of scientific information, and not a primary source of scientific information.”

Developed countries like the **EU**, the **EIG** and the **UK** expressed a preference for aligning the cycle of the IPCC’s AR7 to GST 2. Calling the IPCC “the best available science”, they said such alignment would ensure that GST 2 fulfils its mandate.

Developing-country groupings like **AOSIS**, **AILAC** and the **LDCs** too emphasized aligning the IPCC’s work on its AR7 with the GST 2 process, and stressed that the IPCC is the main and only source of best available science.

(The issue of aligning the IPCC’s AR7 cycle with GST 2 had also been a key area of divergence at the 63rd meeting of the IPCC held in Lima, Peru, ahead of COP 30. See TWN update for details.)

The next informal consultation on this item is scheduled for 14 November.

# TWN

## **Belém Climate News Update 6**

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### **Loss-and-damage negotiations advance work on long-overdue WIM review**

Belém, 13 November (Jinghann Hong\*) – Loss and damage (L&D) negotiations over the third review of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts, saw advances in Belém at the ongoing climate talks. The WIM review had been long overdue.

This agenda item under the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) was delayed from Baku, Azerbaijan, during COP 29, which resulted in a procedural conclusion, with Rule 16 of the UNFCCC draft rules of procedure applied, enabling negotiations to resume at the June session of the SBs in Bonn. During continued consideration in Bonn, Parties captured deliberations in an informal note on the first day of the L&D negotiations.

At the informal consultations which began on 11 November in Belém, developing-country negotiators were united in their call for the three L&D bodies [the WIM Executive Committee (ExCom), the Santiago Network, and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD)] to be coordinated, coherent and complementary in their activities so as to avoid duplication of work and maximize the use of resources. They also stressed the need to enhance the use and accessibility of these bodies' various knowledge products; to enhance the role of national contact points for L&D so as to streamline the process and support their coordinated work with Santiago Network and FRLD liaisons; and for a global "State of L&D" report advancing L&D support needs.

The informal consultations were co-facilitated by Cornelia Jaeger (Austria) and Pepetua Latasi (Tuvalu). The co-facilitators outlined the work that lay ahead, mainly the need to conclude the third review of the WIM by presenting a draft decision

thereon for adoption at the SBs' closing plenary on 15 November, and thereafter to be forwarded to the COP and CMA for adoption.

Given the limited time provided for this agenda item, the co-facilitators suggested that Parties use the informal note as a basis for negotiations, and focus on the text to find solutions that reflected general consensus. Parties then began deliberations on the third review of the WIM, first on the mode of work and then broadly highlighting issues important to them.

Taking the floor first, the **Philippines**, for the **G77 and China**, said that to make efficient use of the time, it proposed using the informal note as the basis of the negotiations, specifically directly working on the text to find convergence and eventually consensus. However, it also pointed out that the entire informal note itself was not agreed text amongst Parties, and so it would also be useful to do a first sweep of the informal note from top to bottom, to understand which areas might need more detailed work than others, before proceeding with direct textual negotiations.

The **European Union** agreed that it would be useful to look at the text as Parties did spend quite a lot of time in Bonn discussing the issues where Parties were most far apart from each other because of the need to understand the different positions. The EU said that its focus was on those who were particularly vulnerable and on the frontlines of climate change, elaborating: "The adverse effects of climate change affect people and ecosystems, communities and countries in different ways due to intersecting vulnerabilities and diverse adaptive capacity." It stated that it would propose a stronger focus on gender and data collection. It also wanted to highlight that reaching the mitigation goal was



the most effective way to avert and minimize L&D. It added that the review was an opportunity to focus on the coherence and complementarity of work to avoid duplication and maximize the use of resources. It also said that WIM activities need to be more inclusive and responsive – for instance, the necessity to make knowledge products useful and accessible – and that different WIM processes should be updated to ensure reinforcement of experts’ engagement. As for the mode of work, the EU supported the approach highlighted by the G77/China.

The **Dominican Republic**, for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, called for a strong outcome on the WIM review, stating that it “is a priority, and it is crucial that we start sending a message that multilateralism is committed to having a response on L&D”. It highlighted its priorities in addressing some of the important gaps that remained, including the opportunity to increase coordination and coherence between the L&D bodies under the UNFCCC and to simplify access for developing countries which direly need support.

It also wanted to give specific guidance to the Santiago Network to acknowledge that despite significant progress in existing strategies at the moment, only one technical assistance request has been published and matched, and a second one published only. “This progress is too slow,” it said. “We need to make sure that we are giving sufficient guidance to the Santiago Network to enhance and really quickly put to place the operationalization that has been made so that countries can begin accessing the technical assistance that is there for them.”

It added that there are important considerations that can be made to increase the state of knowledge under the WIM, and reiterated the proposal for a regular “State of L&D” report of which it had spoken in past sessions and which it would continue to advocate as a key priority for AOSIS.

**Bangladesh**, for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, highlighted that there are many good elements which add to the priorities of the LDCs, particularly the knowledge product on non-economic L&D assessment, the knowledge product on quantifying the needs and costs for L&D, the L&D landscape report, the voluntary guidelines for including L&D in nationally determined contributions (NDCs), and elements to scale up financing needed to address L&D at a community level. It supported AOSIS on the need

for coherence, coordination and complementarity among the different constituted bodies, particularly the Santiago Network and the WIM ExCom, calling for easy access modalities. It also wanted a clear financial mechanism so that the Santiago Network and WIM ExCom can deliver on their functions effectively and efficiently to protect vulnerable communities.

The **African Group** stated its expectations for the review, noting that it should send a strong signal on enhancing coordination and complementarity among the Santiago Network, the WIM ExCom and the FRLD. It said that the review should also deliver a strong political message on the means of implementation, particularly to scale up finance for addressing loss and damage for both the FRLD and to increase the resources available for the Santiago Network, calling for strong language in the outcome to ensure that resources will be available for technical assistance needed by developing countries. It also wanted to enhance the role of national liaison and contact points, suggesting that Parties agree on a set of streamlined entry points to one entry point for the WIM ExCom, the Santiago Network and the FRLD.

It also called for a strong signal and expectation that the WIM ExCom should provide guidance on how L&D can be voluntarily included in NDCs and biennial transparency reports (BTRs), in addition to strong modalities of how the Santiago Network can cooperate and work with the FRLD to further qualify its technical assistance and provide support to developing countries. It also expected knowledge products to have regional and context-specific knowledge, e.g., products on slow-onset events and thematic information needed for countries to further understand categories of L&D.

**Switzerland**, for the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, desired to reflect the positive progress made by the WIM ExCom and the Santiago Network. It wanted to strengthen language on gender responsiveness and recognize language on locally led approaches to ensure that technical assistance and support is context-specific, responsive to local needs, and does no harm. It maintained that coherence is important, not only between different entities in the L&D architecture but in a broader sense of the humanitarian landscape and system.

**Australia** acknowledged the importance of getting an outcome in Belém and said that it was another milestone year for L&D, with the Santiago Network starting to deliver technical assistance, the FRLD launching its call for funding

proposals and this launch of the WIM review. It said that the informal note was a good basis and it would support the G77/China proposal to work in an informal-informal consultation setting later (Informal-informals are meetings among Parties behind closed doors.) It also noted that Parties did not have the opportunity to reflect on the full overall text, although not desiring to reopen the text substantially. Australia then highlighted its priorities, namely enhancing gender approaches; engaging meaningfully with communities affected by L&D; and encouraging work by the WIM ExCom to enable and enhance efforts that attract and maintain engagement of the expert group.

**New Zealand** supported the mode of working on the informal note within an informal-informal consultation setting, and said it was keen to capitalize on that approach to ensure that Parties get to a strong outcome. It was keen on a text that delivers on enhancing effectiveness, coherence and complementarity within the broader L&D architecture to deliver for those on the frontlines of climate change, including small island developing states, AOSIS and its region in the Pacific.

**Japan** stated that many of its priorities had been covered by colleagues and agreed to base the discussion on the informal note as well.

The **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)** supported the G77/China on how to proceed with the text and expressed sincere congratulations to Switzerland for its effort to fund the Santiago Network (which is based in Geneva). It affirmed that the WIM review was its highest priority; though deeply regretting the progress in Bonn, it recognized the meaningful developments since then, including the adoption of the Barbados Implementation Modalities for the FRLD's call for proposals and the activation of the Santiago Network.

AILAC referenced the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion issued on 23 July 2025 on the legal obligations of states regarding climate change, stating: "This evolving landscape is also shaped by the written advisory of ICJ which underscores climate action is not just a political commitment but also a legal obligation, particularly in the topic of L&D. Therefore, we must act with highest ambition and best available science to prevent harm, protect human rights, and ensure intergenerational equities. Inaction or delay may amount to a breach of international law, as we [Parties] assume that climate-related obligations, including entities. The ICJ's opinions provide an informed legal foundation for advancing L&D

work, including the need for comprehensive assessment and health protection from vulnerable groups and integral forms of reparation."

Stating that developing countries have called for the establishment of a comprehensive state of play on L&D, AILAC considered a global "State of L&D" report to be a vital component of the review which will provide much-needed clarity to help identify gaps and guide collective efforts going forward. It highlighted that the Action and Support Expert Group that supports the WIM ExCom needs to update modalities in light of an evolving L&D agenda, particularly to revise the terms of reference to extend membership and update plans of action. It called for the Santiago Network to advance methodological work on assessment, economic and non-economic losses, and to compile and analyze assistive methodologies for L&D assessment. It also supported the LDCs' call for the development of new guidelines to support the integration of L&D into NDCs to improve the assessment of economic and non-economic losses.

**Group SUR** said its priority was on enhancing coherence and complementarity, strengthening finance, knowledge sharing and capacity building within the WIM.

**The Gambia** stated that Parties must move beyond procedure to progress and deliver real support performance on the frontlines. It recognized the delivery of work by the WIM ExCom, the Santiago Network and the FRLD, but said that the scale of implementation is not up to the reality faced. As such, this review needs to result in an action-oriented WIM. It highlighted four priorities for the review: predictable new and additional funding, with reference to encouraging the WIM outcome to connect with the FRLD; that the three bodies must be able to work in a coordinated and complementary manner to avoid duplication of effort; the establishment of a national L&D contact point at a country level, stating that "this will ensure streamlined process to access the FRLD and the Santiago Network"; and a global L&D report and voluntary guidelines to integrate L&D into NDCs.

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **Arab Group**, in response to AILAC's suggestion to include the ICJ advisory opinion, stated that the Convention and Paris Agreement are the legal basis of the work in the negotiations and as such, it does not support including the ICJ view. It said that the opinion was developed through a process in which Saudi Arabia also participated, but this is a non-binding advisory opinion and does not represent Parties' views. It stated that more than 190 countries agreed to the

Convention and the Paris Agreement and so “this is what governs us”. It said that negotiations are a Party-driven process based on consensus and not litigation. It also did not support guidance for the inclusion of L&D into NDCs, stating that it was “not on this agenda”.

**Vanuatu** said that it celebrated the work done so far and supported the AILAC proposal to acknowledge the ICJ advisory opinion, stating that it could see it as welcoming it in the text at the beginning, and that it looked forward to finding the right language.

**Rwanda** said that the review was going to be an opportunity for guideline classification of economic and non-economic loss to quantify, qualify and classify both the economic and non-economic impacts stemming from adverse impacts of climate change; to enable a report on the L&D gap; to ensure that L&D funding arrangements are responsive to real needs on the ground; and to enhance coherence, complementarity and coordination. It also voiced the need for the Santiago Network to be country-driven in its provision of technical request and assistance; for three national contact points to work together to show the integration of L&D into the national strategy; and for boosting the terms of reference, plans of action and membership of the expert group.

The **United Kingdom** supported the coherence and complementarity of the Santiago Network and the FRLD. Speaking as a board member of the FRLD, it welcomed the progress on the FRLD this week. It also noted the appetite for a global L&D report, stating the need to focus on implementation, as seen with the FRLD and WIM ExCom. It wanted to inject a slight note of caution on reporting L&D in the NDCs, as it said the focus of NDCs would be mitigation and there are other avenues in future discussions, such as the biennial transparency reports. While it expressed agreement on the FRLD working together with the WIM, it warned against trying to direct funds in this space.

Responding to the various interventions, the **Philippines**, for the **G77 and China**, took the floor last and said that there was good convergence across many issues among all the groups. It wanted

an outcome that would strengthen coordination, coherence and complementarity between the three bodies; an outcome to reaffirm the WIM’s key role under the Convention and Paris Agreement with respect to L&D; a call to scale up the provision and mobilization of finance with respect to L&D, particularly for the FRLD, WIM ExCom expert groups and the Santiago Network, so that these bodies are able to function as intended; language that would enhance provision of technical assistance in the Santiago Network; language that would allow Parties to see improvements in the use and integration of knowledge products of the WIM ExCom and Santiago Network; and language that would strengthen the ability of national L&D focal points relating to the WIM ExCom, the Santiago Network and the FRLD so that they can better enable countries to work together with respect to L&D. It called for Parties to provide a mandate to update the terms of reference, plans of action and the membership of the expert group; and to enhance the WIM’s knowledge base through regional case studies, methodologies for assessing needs relating to non-economic losses and slow-onset losses, and a regular report for the global landscape relating to L&D, including references to means of implementation provided by developed countries and received by developing countries.

While some progress has been made, negotiations will further continue in the form of informal-informal consultations on 12 and 13 November where Parties will move to propose detailed textual changes.

Meanwhile, on the joint annual report of the WIM ExCom and the Advisory Board of the Santiago Network, this was swiftly dealt with by a mandate given to the co-facilitators to produce a draft decision text in a similar way to how the draft decision text was produced for the 2024 joint annual review. Upon circulation to Parties at a later date/time during the week, Parties will negotiate outstanding matters in informal-informal consultations before adopting the text on 15 November.

*\* Jinghann Hong is a volunteer with the Third World Network.*

# TWN

## **Belém Climate News Update 7**

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### **Work on the Global Goal on Adaptation advances with negotiations on draft text**

Belém, 14 November (Eqram Mustaqeem) – Parties at the Belém climate talks on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) agenda item under the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) delivered a strong start on the first day of informal consultations held on 11 November, which culminated in a mandate given to the co-facilitators to produce a draft text. Since then, Parties have been engaging in providing inputs to the draft.

[There are three mandates that Parties have to deliver on under the GGA. The first is the two-year UAE-Belém work programme (UBWP) on indicators, as per decision [2/CMA.5](#); the second is to develop the modalities for the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) as per decision [3/CMA.6](#); and the third is to continue consideration on “transformational adaptation” as per decision [2/CMA.5](#).]

The focus of the informal consultations is largely on the work on indicators in the UBWP as the two-year work programme will end here in Belém and Parties have to come to a decision on the adoption of the indicators, which is critical to understanding what progress Parties are making on the adaptation front.

At the very start of the consultations, the message from the Presidency and SB Chairs was conveyed by the co-facilitators Tina Kobilšek (Slovenia) and Gao Xiang (China), who made clear that the GGA agenda item is a priority for the CMA (Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement). They said a decision has to be reached with an early preparation of a draft text being important. Parties in their responses all provided the mandate to the co-facilitators to come to a solid list of indicators.

During the consultations, there were strong points of both convergence and divergence. On the

former, it was agreed that the indicators should be voluntary and not constitute a basis of comparison among countries and should serve the purpose of assessing progress towards the GGA targets and to the global stocktake (GST) process to assess the collective progress on adaptation. While it was agreed that the list of indicators was not perfect and required further work, at issue was what to do with the final list of indicators and the modalities of further work. Political differences also arose on how certain indicators are framed, particularly on the means of implementation (MOI) indicators and methodological differences on the mode of further work.

(The [list of indicators](#) had been published on 11 September and a two-day [workshop on indicators](#) between technical experts and Parties was held on 3–4 October, where Parties had their first opportunity to engage and share reflections on the final list of indicators with the technical experts who developed them.)

(The GGA thematic targets cover water, food and agriculture, health, ecosystems and biodiversity, infrastructure and human settlements, poverty eradication and livelihoods and protection of cultural heritage. The dimensional targets are impact, vulnerability and risk assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring, evaluation and learning.)

Apart from the GGA, informal consultations also began on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).

#### **Global Goal on Adaptation**

**Sri Lanka**, speaking for the **G77 and China**, set the tone for the discussions, stating the need to address hard realities of access, quality and

provision of adaptation finance in light of evolving needs of developing countries and calling for developed countries to deliver on such finance. The Group expressed concern that the current list of indicators is not fully aligned with the guidance provided by Parties at SB 62, particularly regarding the MOI indicators.

The Group reiterated that MOI indicators are a core component of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience and are non-negotiable and must be aligned with Articles 9.1, 10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement, with a need to track international support flows from developed to developing countries. It also stressed that indicators should remain focused on the core objectives of Article 7.1 of the PA and on measuring clear adaptation progress and implementation without merging with loss and damage or other metrics, while avoiding duplication with other processes under the Convention and its PA.

**Uruguay**, for **Group SUR**, made clear that the adoption of the indicators would be their priority here at COP 30. The Group called for focus on indicators of finance, technology and capacity building, with a particular emphasis on the finance indicators as they are not aligned with guidance given on MOI indicators. It also called for the deletion of indicators that are not aligned with the Convention and its PA and emphasized that MOI indicators should apply to all targets. It believed that the biennial transparency reports (BTRs) should be the main vehicle to report on indicators, with reporting to begin in 2026.

The group proposed a Belém Climate Pact that urges developed countries to triple the provision of adaptation finance to developing countries from the 2025 level by 2030, reaching at least \$120 billion by 2030.

**Botswana**, for the **African Group**, stated that indicators must be outcome-oriented and contextually disaggregated to allow for the collective assessment of progress. It said that some indicators are inconsistent with guidance provided since SB 60 and by the Convention and the PA. It said that some indicators effectively amount to rewriting the legal treaties by shifting obligations to those least responsible for the climate crisis, such as the indicators on the “proportion of government budget allocated to climate adaptation and resilience” and on “annual adaptation finance expenditure”.

The African Group emphasized that these types of indicators risk normalizing expectations that developing countries which are already

managing debt and fiscal stress are to finance adaptation from their own resources. It said further that some indicators intrude upon sovereign decision making and policy space, such as the indicator for considering climate risk in public procurement.

It also said that technical experts have completed their work and now this work must be complemented by consideration by Parties to align it with obligations and provisions of the Convention and PA.

It outlined several elements moving forward: affirming the distinction and elaboration of the use of thematic targets and dimensional targets; and thematic indicators should be a menu of options from which countries select based on national priorities, whereas dimensional targets represent a set of minimum information reported by all countries to enable collective assessment. It also proposed the launch of a two-year policy process to consider the indicators and align them with the obligations and provisions of the Convention and PA and ensure policy relevance. This process would allow for further consideration of the indicators with the aim of recommending a decision and adoption at CMA 9 in 2027.

**Sudan**, for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, raised similar concerns that the indicators are not aligned with the Convention and the PA. In relation to the technical experts, it said that given the huge institutional memory and familiarity with the process, it requested the secretariat to create a roster of experts which should be made available on the UNFCCC website and be a resource that Parties can draw on to further understand the indicators in the list. In terms of the next stage of work, the group believed that it should focus on deepening the technical foundation of the indicators to ensure usability and consistency between Parties.

It requested the Adaptation Committee (AC) in collaboration with the UNFCCC’s Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) to lead the next stage of technical refinement, including through the establishment of technical task forces for each GGA target. These task forces should be mandated to develop a workplan over an agreed timeline to deliver strengthened methodology, improve metadata and enhance overall robustness of the indicators by CMA 9.

It also suggested that the AC draw upon the aforementioned roster of experts and call on international organizations and UN agencies to support the refinement process. It also requested the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG)

to provide additional guidance on integrating the indicators into NAPs.

On adaptation finance, the group supported the proposal for the tripling of climate finance for adaptation from 2025 levels by 2030.

**China**, for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, stated that the MOI indicators should encompass all targets under the GGA, with particular language on provision from developed to developing countries. It opposed how certain MOI indicators are currently framed in the list, such as those touching on national budgets and national expenditures, as these are nationally determined and are not under the purview of the Convention and the PA, and said these indicators should be removed. Instead, it called for all MOI indicators to align with Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the PA, with “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC) as the crucial guiding principle for GGA implementation. (Articles 9, 10 and 11 refer to finance obligations, technology transfer and capacity building respectively.)

On the metadata availability and readiness, China said that Parties, particularly developing countries, may not be able to provide all the data needed for reporting on the indicators. Hence, the indicators need to be revised to ensure that they accommodate the challenges, needs and gaps in the implementation of the GGA by developing countries.

On the BAR, the LMDC believed that it is a crucial mechanism for the way forward for the implementation of the GGA in general as there has only been a short two-year span for the development of the indicators. The BAR can focus on the further testing of the indicators through the practitioners and relevant stakeholders and be a platform for further reflection by Parties for further refinement of the indicators.

**Chile**, for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, said that the lack of metadata should not be a reason to exclude indicators, and it is important to retain indicators that have never been measured before as this would enable Parties to generate relevant data in the future to better assess adaptation needs. It wanted a decision at CMA 7 that would both enable the adoption of the list of indicators and incorporate additional elements that allow for further work to refine and address current gaps.

On the implementation of the GGA framework, it said that MOI indicators are fundamental and that the current set of MOI indicators contradicts the

CBDR-RC principle, dilutes the responsibility of developed countries to provide adaptation finance and places disproportionate emphasis on domestic and local efforts. For developing countries, the ability to implement indicators depends directly on the support they receive, and without measurable and robust MOI, the GGA cannot fulfil its purpose.

Further, it said that reporting on indicators requires technical and financial support, which must be provided to developing countries in order to properly implement the indicators. It added that the credibility of this process depends on the ability to deliver meaningful progress on adaptation.

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **Arab Group**, said that the indicators shall be subject to Parties’ interpretation, refinement and adjustment to align with their national contexts and should be considered as knowledge products from experts. It believed that due to the “work in progress” nature of the indicators, they must undergo a full review after the second GST, including the option to refine, replace or remove them.

The Group said that the BAR should be the engine that drives implementation of the GGA aligned with Article 7.1 of the PA. It proposed the establishment of a work programme with four workshops annually, designed to support countries in their adaptation implementation aligned with their national circumstances to ensure adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal of Article 2.1 of the PA in two phases: Phase I (2025–2028) on implementation; and Phase II (2028–2029) on review and recalibration of the BAR. It added that the BAR can engage the AC, LEG, CGE, the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP) and the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) to deliver targeted support and knowledge products that help countries plan for the temperatures the world is heading towards in the context of the temperature goal, and should focus on adaptation implementation as a whole and not be limited to the work on indicators.

On adaptation approaches, the Group believed that no single adaptation approach shall be presented as superior or universally applicable, and that all approaches remain valid and should be respected, reflecting national realities and priorities. It also emphasized that without a transformational increase in adaptation finance, there will be no adequate adaptation response.

The **European Union** stated that CMA 7 is important in delivering on enhanced policy coherence to link the GGA and the UAE Framework to national- and subnational-level action via NAPs

and other strategies. It provided proposals for the GGA decision in CMA 7 and the adoption of the indicator list captured as an annex in the decision text. It also elaborated on the use of the indicators and outlined a two-phase post-Belém agenda: a shorter-term phase with limited further technical work on indicators, and a longer-term vision to strengthen adaptation efforts and implementation.

On the list of indicators, the EU said it does not support a two-tier list that creates hierarchy amongst indicators, instead preferring to adopt a single list that sees no bifurcation between indicators. It wanted MOI to come from all sources. Further, it does not support the two-year policy process, but on the delivery and adoption of indicators here in Belém. On the use of indicators, it believed that it should be reported by Parties in their BTRs whilst sending strong and clear invitations to national and subnational entities to utilize the indicators.

The EU proposed a shorter-term post-Belém phase to still allow for further tweaks on indicators, but further technical work on indicators can be parallel to the adoption of indicators. It added that the process would be overseen by the SB Chairs and conclude in SB 65; there will be limited technical work that will focus on identifying responsible agencies or custodians for each indicator; developing methodologies and standardization including disaggregation; compiling data and metadata including disaggregation; and addressing other concerns on individual indicators. This, it said, will not be an extension of work but a new phase post-adoption of indicators.

On the longer-term post-Belém agenda, the EU said it wants to enable implementation at the national level including via NAPs and strategies and a longer-term vision to guide implementation of the GGA until 2030. It added that the BAR's purpose is to conclude work derived from paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5.

(Paragraph 38 of the UAE Framework outlines five key areas of focus: exchanging knowledge and experience on implementing the Framework; identifying potential inputs for future global stocktakes related to achieving the GGA; enhancing understanding of risks and impacts from

different temperature increases across different regions; collaborating with scientific bodies to support the implementation of the Framework; and developing terms and a timeline for reviewing the Framework.)

**Japan** said it is against opening the indicator list and does not support any proposal to establish new policy processes, and instead proposed that Parties address technical issues under the UAE Framework review after the second GST. It wanted to adopt the indicator list here in Belém, and on MOI indicators, it said it cannot accept bifurcation and called for all overall adaptation finance flows to be captured, which means public finance, domestic budgets and private finance. On follow-up work post-adoption of indicators, it proposed the following timeline: (i) 2026–2027 – decide terms of reference for UAE Framework review, including how the review will refine the indicator list; (ii) 2028 – second GST is conducted; (iii) 2029 – review of UAE Framework to take place based on agreed terms of reference and could include review of technical issues; (iv) 2030 – BAR work on supporting the implementation of the UAE Framework is concluded; (v) 2031 – take stock of progress, review and identify possible next steps beyond 2030.

It believed that the BAR can be a roadmap for efforts to support the implementation of paragraph 38 of 2/CMA.5, and added that “transformational adaptation” should be discussed continuously under the GGA agenda item.

In response to calls by Parties to provide a draft text for consideration, the first iteration of the draft was provided by the co-facilitators on 12 November and deliberated on by Parties. However, due to lack of time, the deliberations on the draft text continued the following day.

## **National Adaptation Plans**

The NAP informal consultations, co-facilitated by Antwi-Boasiako Amoah (Ghana) and Cassandra Moll (New Zealand), revolved around the preferred mode of work for Parties. Despite initial slow progress, consensus was reached to begin work on financial and technical support, building directly on the draft text from SB 62.

# TWN

## ***Belém Climate News Update 8***

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### **Unilateral trade measures hinder climate ambition – say developing countries**

Belém, 14 November (Hilary Kung) – Developing countries at the ongoing climate talks in Belém said that unilateral trade measures (UTMs) would “hinder [climate] ambition, violate the right to development, and exacerbate poverty, clearly attacking the very concept of just transitions”.

This remark was made by **Saudi Arabia** for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** during the negotiations on the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) on 13 November, which are taking place under the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Bodies (SBs). Similar concerns were shared by many other developing countries (see details below).

The contact group, co-chaired by Federica Fricano (Italy) and Joseph Teo (Singapore), convened on 13 November to discuss the issue of UTMs and how it will be framed and reflected in the decision text. (Following a call by the LMDC, a footnote had been added during the adoption of the SB agendas on 10 November to the effect that the issue will be dealt with in the relevant agenda items, including under the JTWP, to reflect the understanding reached among Parties.)

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **LMDC**, also said that such measures disproportionately harm the people in developing countries and reverse the financial flow from developing to developed countries. The LMDC then proposed creating a dedicated space within the JTWP to discuss UTMs, including measures such as the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), through a working group, to address concerns and promote international cooperation.

The LMDC said “what we need is not a CBAM” but “a BAM [referring to the Belém Action Mechanism which was proposed by civil society organizations for the continuation of the

JTWP]; a BAM that respects equity; a BAM that advocates the right to development and a BAM that reflects national sovereignty”.

Several developed countries, including the **EU**, the **United Kingdom**, **Australia** and **Japan**, disagreed with the framing of unilateral measures. The **EU** argued that addressing carbon leakage in emission-intensive sectors is not a unilateral measure and that the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement have no mandate to assess other Parties’ policies, while highlighting its efforts to provide capacity building and tools to facilitate compliance. The **UK** stressed that “green trade” offers huge opportunities for the global economy and argued that measures such as the CBAM are needed to address the risk of carbon leakage. **Japan** cautioned against duplicating discussions in the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Developing countries stressed that unilateral trade-restrictive climate measures are not about climate ambition but serve to protect industries in the Global North at the expense of equity and sustainable development in the Global South.

Discussions on the matter are continuing on the basis of the informal note produced from SB 62 in Bonn.

#### **Key highlights of the interventions**

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **LMDC**, proposed that there should be a dedicated space within the JTWP to discuss UTMs and why they should be rejected, by establishing a working group to address the concerns and dis-enablers to international cooperation.

Referring to the CBAM, Saudi Arabia explained that the mechanism “is projected to increase the income of Annex II Parties [developed



countries] by \$2.5 billion, while reducing the income of developing country Parties by \$5.9 billion, all for an estimated global CO<sub>2</sub> [carbon dioxide] reduction of just 0.1% ... This is not climate ambition; it is an economic transfer from the poor to the rich, disguised as climate action.”

The group warned that when some nations attempt to impose their own models of carbon pricing on the rest of the world, they are not promoting ambition but are actively and deliberately limiting it. It stressed that unilateral measures such as the CBAM, when imposed on other countries, undermine the ability of developing nations to pursue the highest level of ambition. The group noted that such measures lock countries into pathways that disregard their national circumstances, exacerbate poverty, and extract from the Global South rather than empower them.

Saudi Arabia questioned “what is ‘just’ in all this, when your measures deepen our poverty and limit our ambition, [and] you are taking the ‘just’ out of just transitions”.

The EU, in response, said that “the framing of unilateral measures does not make sense” and that addressing carbon leakage in emission-intensive sectors should not be qualified as unilateral measures. The EU also argued that the UNFCCC and the PA were not designed to assess Parties’ nationally determined policies and response measures to climate change and there is no mandate to do so. It also said that “any assessment of response measures is outside the scope of this discussion”.

Elaborating further, the EU noted it has demonstrated that it is becoming more conscious of partner countries’ concerns, affirmed its commitment to complying with WTO rules, and emphasized that the EU Green Deal has been carefully designed with these considerations in mind. It then briefly explained the measure, noting that the EU has tools in place and will provide capacity-building support to facilitate compliance, while reassuring its trading partners that it will maintain dialogue and work closely with them.

**Qatar**, for the **Arab Group**, outlined five key points which it wanted reflected in the decision text:

- (1) Recall Article 3.5 of the Convention;
- (2) The CBAM does not recognize different starting points and does not account for the concept of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective

capabilities (CBDR-RC) in light of national circumstances. Developing countries face higher costs of borrowing and limited access to technology and have weaker infrastructure, all of which create an uneven playing field;

- (3) Unilateral measures are an attempt to export policies to developing countries, which is against the PA architecture;
- (4) The CBAM has forced Parties to focus their decarbonization on certain sectors, which is against national sovereignty and disregards national circumstances; and
- (5) For developing countries, instead of being supported to implement their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), the CBAM will lead to a reverse financial flow from developing countries to developed countries.

(Article 3.5 of the Convention states: “The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”)

**Tanzania**, for the **African Group**, echoed the concern and said that “unilateral measures including CBAM must not have spillover or negative cross-border impacts on developing countries”. Commenting further, it said imposing such measures would restrict economic development, constrain the ability to achieve sustainable development and hinder just transitions in Africa.

The **UK** said that it has significant concerns on the framing of this issue, noting that there is no agreed definition, and emphasized that any discussion must be “balanced”. The UK called on Parties to focus the discussion on ambitious outcomes that deliver the goal of the PA, stressing that “green trade” offers huge opportunities for the global economy. It also highlighted global emissions from industries and argued that a low-carbon economy cannot be achieved if emission-intensive industries are able to avoid carbon taxes by relocating from countries with stringent climate policies to those with weaker decarbonization requirements. In this context, it argued that measures such as the CBAM are needed to address

the risk of carbon leakage. It also highlighted that it is taking the lead with an ambitious 1.5°C-aligned NDC, and that “UK policy is not arbitrary, not unjustifiable, not a disguised restriction on trade”.

**Australia** emphasized the need to be practical and get “transition” on the ground while ensuring that workers, women, youth, indigenous people and local communities have a seat at the table.

**India** said it supported the call to establish a working group on unilateral measures. It highlighted that UTMs – across multiple papers in international law, trade and even environment – are defined as follows: “Unilateral trade measures involve actions taken by a single country or a group of countries to restrict or alter trade practices based on standards, such as environmental standards for example, aiming to incentivize foreign nations to modify their practices or penalize those that do not.”

Explaining further, India said, “UTMs such as the CBAM serve to protect industries in countries that already benefit from historical and ongoing advantages – robust fiscal environments, strong state support for innovation, and infrastructure built over decades through extensive use of the global carbon budget, which has contributed to the temperature rise we are witnessing today. These industries will now be further protected [via the CBAM] at the cost of industries in developing countries.”

India also emphasized that unilateral measures like the CBAM are “in effect outsourcing the mitigation burden to the developing world” by “imposing compliance costs on developing countries without providing enabling finance or technology, acting as true dis-enablers for climate action”. This violates both Article 2.2 of the PA which states that the Agreement shall be implemented to reflect equity and CBDR-RC and Article 4.5 which clearly places the onus on developed countries to provide financial and technological support to enable enhanced action by developing nations. It also risks diverting scarce resources away from essential priorities such as poverty eradication, energy access, rural electrification and adaptation.

“Empirical studies show that CBAM-type measures could reduce the export competitiveness of small and medium industries in developing countries by 10–25%, slowing structural transformation and delaying the transition to clean technologies,” said India.

Responding to Australia’s intervention on the impact on communities, India highlighted that “all

of these communities are particularly vulnerable in the Global South. That is why we have heard so many developing-country voices speak about this issue, raising concerns.”

“Non-discriminatory trade practices in an open global economic system can help developing countries pursue industrialization and modernization, paving the way for improved well-being of their populations. Even issues such as gender justice, and just and equitable development for all peoples and communities (which many of our colleagues have referred to) cannot be addressed if those with historical advantages continue to prioritize the profits of some sections of their own populations through protectionist, unilateral policies,” stressed India.

Explaining further, it said the CBAM has both direct and indirect impacts on people in developing countries. Policies affecting industries in the Global South also affect workers, hinder poverty eradication and slow sustainable development, disproportionately impacting women, children and local communities. India then questioned the reluctance of developed countries to engage in discussions on unilateral measures, noting the irony that these are the same countries that frequently raise concerns about impacts on communities.

India concluded by saying, “Unilateral trade-restrictive climate measures are not about climate ambition. They are about competitive advantages for industries in the Global North at the cost of development in the Global South. This is what is meant by carbon leakage.”

**Japan** said the definition of unilateral measures is “ambiguous” and there is already discussion in the WTO on trade and environment. It did not support discussing it in the JTWP and noted that this topic is undergoing Presidency consultations and so “any duplication should be avoided”. Japan highlighted that the “cross-border impact” is also being discussed in the “response measures” agenda track.

**China** said that unilateral measures are a new form of injustice and asked why developing countries are being asked to pay additional costs to countries for their unilateral measures. It also commented that it is “unilateral” because the rules are not being discussed in a multilateral platform. It also emphasized that the definition of unilateral measures should be determined not by the Parties introducing them, but by those affected by them.

**Egypt** explained that it is very concerning to see the trend of developed countries implementing CBAMs. Commenting on how such measures

would cause a reversed financial flow from developing to developed countries, Egypt remarked that developing countries are now being expected to finance the transition plans of developed nations, which runs counter to the PA's principles of just transition.

Further, it said that the CBAM is based on highly sophisticated carbon markets that the Global North took decades to develop, yet developing countries are being asked to implement them without support. This approach undermines the nationally determined nature of climate action and the principle of CBDR-RC. It then said that in the fourth dialogue under the JTWP, participants provided scientific and economic evidence on the CBAM's impacts on specific developing countries and emphasized the need for space under the work programme to discuss not only these impacts but also practical solutions to address them.

The **Russian Federation** and **South Africa** also raised concerns on unilateral measures and supported the call for a dedicated space to discuss this issue further.

Echoing others, **Cuba** also highlighted a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights.

**Iran** asserted that the issue of unilateral coercive measures must be addressed in the JTWP. It called for cooperation, solidarity and adherence to international law, not through coercion, and urged immediate cessation of all unilateral measures.

**Chile**, on behalf of the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, said it supported the inclusion of this topic in the decision text.

# TWN

## **Belém Climate News Update 9**

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### **COP 30 President outlines mode of work for final week of pivotal Belém talks**

Belém, 17 November (Hilary Kung and Meena Raman) – The COP 30 President, Ambassador André Aranha Corrêa do Lago, convened a plenary meeting of the governing bodies of the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement in the evening of 15 November to outline the mode of work for the final week of the climate talks, saying that this is “towards a strong and successful work in Belém”. The climate talks began on 10 November and are expected to conclude on 21 November.

Prior to the convening of the plenary of the COP, CMP and CMA, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) held their closing sessions, where recommendations and draft decisions from the work of these bodies were transmitted to the respective governing bodies for their consideration or adoption.

At the plenary meeting of the COP, the President outlined three tracks of work for the coming week: (i) conduct of ministerial-led consultations focusing on outstanding political issues; (ii) continuation of the technical work on a limited set of issues where emerging political guidance will be incorporated; and (iii) Presidency consultations.

On the outstanding work relating to the governing bodies and the specific issues from the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs), the COP 30 President strongly encouraged Parties to progress and conclude work on both the political and technical aspects by 18 November.

Corrêa do Lago said he will convene a stocktaking plenary next week to provide an overview of progress across all workstreams, and he will also be conducting consultations of *mutirão* (“collective efforts”) early next week at ministerial and head-of-delegation level across all items.

For the ministerial consultations, the COP 30 President said that he has invited pairs of ministers to lead on the following issues, which “will benefit from political guidance”:

- on the global stocktake: Andres Bjelland (Norway) and another minister to be announced;
- on adaptation: Rohey John Manjang (The Gambia) and Jochen Flasbarth (Germany);
- on finance: Ed Miliband (United Kingdom) and Deborah Mlongo Barasa (Kenya);
- on mitigation: Sara Aagesen (Spain) and Wael Aboulmagd (Egypt);
- on just transition: Alicia Bárcena (Mexico) and Krzysztof Bolesła (Poland);
- on technology: Chris Bowen (Australia) and Bhupender Yadav (India); and
- on gender and climate change: Maisa Rojas (Chile) and Helena Dyrssen (Sweden).

Corrêa do Lago also said that the ministerial consultations would report back on progress on 18 November.

He also announced that a summary note would be produced on the Presidency consultations on the four agenda items which had been ongoing since last week, viz.: (i) “Implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement” (which relates to the mandatory provision of finance from developed to developing countries); (ii) “Promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate-change-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures”; (iii) “Responding to the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions and addressing the 1.5°C ambition and implementation gap”; and (iv) “Reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement” (which relates to the biennial transparency reports) to further structure the conversation going forward.

The summary note from the Presidency was published on 16 November at around 8 pm. The note states: “This document seeks to summarize key points received and heard from Parties in written submissions and during Presidency consultations. As per the compromise reached among Parties on 9 November, this note covers only issues related to the four agenda item proposals. The Presidency identified a high degree of convergence and alignment emerging both from written and oral inputs. The Presidency sees an opportunity for this summary to serve as a preliminary glimpse of where an overall package of outputs from the consultations could emerge from Parties. Where we saw potential divergence of views, we tried to reflect them in options that could be taken by Parties as either mutually supportive or mutually excluding, as they see fit. In Presidency consultations on Monday, Nov 17, we will invite Parties to reflect on balance and potential misrepresentation of topics within or outside of options, to ensure our process continues guided by what Parties feel is the right direction and pace.”

The note states further that the “Presidency’s framing on direction, as guided by Parties”, is as follows:

- “Strong message around multilateralism, people, accelerating implementation”
- “COP of Truth”
- “Transition from negotiations to implementation”
- “Significantly enhance international cooperation for accelerating implementation”
- “Fully faithful to Convention, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement – its purpose, long-term goals, principles and provisions as well as its architecture and policy cycle”
- “No new obligations/commitments beyond the instruments and agreed decisions”
- “Sustainable development, poverty eradication and tackling inequalities”
- “Climate action and impacts linked to sustainable development”
- “People – Important role and active engagement of non-Party stakeholders”.

The COP President also said that the technical work will continue, especially on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA); the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP); the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP); review of the functions of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN); Technology Implementation Programme (TIP);

National Adaptation Plans (NAPs); Adaptation Fund (with regard to the Adaptation Fund Board); the global stocktake (GST) issues of “procedural refinement” and UAE dialogue; gender and climate change; response measures; and the review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts.

[All of these agenda items had been taken up during the first week under the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs), and discussions concluded with agreement that additional technical work is required to achieve consensus on the draft text/informal notes produced.]

During the plenary session, there were interventions by some Parties.

**Chile** took the floor to comment on the agenda item on “Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism”, which could not be concluded due to lack of consensus among Parties during the first week of talks under the SBs, attracting the application of Rule 16 of the UNFCCC’s draft rules of procedure. It wanted this matter to be discussed again based on the work Parties had undertaken this year, by including the draft text prepared by the co-facilitators, and said that it will propose this during the closing plenary of the Belém talks.

(Rule 16 states that where an agenda item has not been completed at a session, it shall be included automatically on the agenda of the next session. Normally, Parties begin consideration of the item from scratch, without reference to any documents worked on from the previous session.)

**Honduras, for the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN)**, highlighted the need for a roadmap to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, in accordance with Article 5 of the Paris Agreement, adding that this is an “implementation COP”. It also said that it is currently working with Parties on a draft decision text.

(Article 5 of the Paris Agreement states: “Parties should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases ... including forests. ... Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including through results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in related guidance and decisions already agreed under the Convention ... and alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of

incentivizing, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches.”)

### **At the SBI closing plenary**

During the negotiations under the SBI held in the first week in Belém, Parties could not arrive at a conclusion on matters related to the Adaptation Fund (AF), and the issue was forwarded to the second week for further consideration. (For the background, please see [TWN update](#).)

The main contention in the discussions in this regard is over the issue of change in terminology of groups of Parties – from “Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties)” and “Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I Parties)” as referenced under the Kyoto Protocol, to “developed country Parties” and “developing country Parties” respectively, in line with the terminology used in the Paris Agreement (see [TWN update](#)).

At the closing of the SBI, **China**, for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, expressed disappointment that developed countries continued to link the AF’s institutional arrangements for its transition to serving the Paris Agreement, to the membership of the AF Board. It said that “we don’t see it as a package deal” and

that “there is no relationship between the two”, and requested the developed countries to adopt a decision in Belém without holding hostage the smooth transition of the AF, which is of critical importance to all developing countries.

**Turkiye** said it did not accept any new classification and linkages between the Convention’s annexes and classification between developed and developing countries in the PA, citing that this is its red line. **Turkiye’s** intervention was supported by the **Russian Federation**.

The **European Union** said it concurred with many Parties that “the transition of the AF has to be achieved here at this COP and as part of the transition, we also have to make sure that the Fund has a fully functional Board. The changes in terminology that we propose are in line with the PA. In Bonn, we worked on language that provided comfort for Parties that have concerns with this.” It then said that it is willing to work with the COP Presidency and Parties on the language.

The EU’s intervention was echoed by the **United Kingdom**, which said it is important to conclude this matter to ensure that the “institutional arrangements are functional for what the AF Board will need to do in the coming period”.

The final week of the talks is expected to be intense, and how compromises are arrived at will be closely watched.

# TWN

## ***Belém Climate News Update 10***

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### **No to imposing national mitigation targets**

Belém, 17 November (Radhika Chatterjee) – Discussions on the “Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme” [commonly referred to as the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP)] at the ongoing climate talks in Belém saw many developing countries saying that work under the programme occurs within its mandate and should not be used to impose national mitigation targets. They also said that it should not undermine the nationally determined nature of each country’s contributions to climate action, and highlighted the importance of means of implementation in raising their ambition.

The **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** pointed out that the UNFCCC’s synthesis report of the biennial communications from Parties [i.e., the biennial transparency reports (BTRs)] showed that none of the Annex I Parties (developed countries) are on track to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets of 2030, emphasizing that developed countries are not taking the lead in mitigation efforts.

The **Arab Group**, in response to interventions by some Parties on keeping the 1.5°C goal within reach, referred to the decision made under the agenda item on “research and systematic observation” at the last session of the Subsidiary Bodies in June (SB 62), which noted that “the multi-decadal estimates of current global warming are between 1.34 and 1.41°C” and that “given the uncertainty ranges, the possibility that we have already exceeded 1.5°C cannot be ruled out”. It wanted this to be reflected in the MWP decision in Belém. (See further details below on the interventions of Parties.)

The first week of the talks showed strong divergences in the following areas: the manner in which the MWP decision will take into account the findings of the global dialogues as contained

in the annual report of the MWP; whether there should be any linkage between the MWP and the global stocktake (GST) decision adopted in Dubai at COP 28; whether the MWP should be a vehicle for implementation of the mitigation section of the GST outcome; the relationship between the MWP and nationally determined contributions (NDCs); whether to have any further follow-up discussions and actions on the digital platform for the MWP; and how to address the issue of continuation of the work programme. The importance of means of implementation as a crucial element of raising mitigation ambition and implementation was also highlighted.

(The MWP decision adopted in 2022 prior to the GST outcome states that “the work programme shall be operationalized through focused exchanges of views, information and ideas, noting that the outcomes of the work programme will be non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances, take into account the nationally determined nature of NDCs and will not impose new targets or goals”. The MWP is supposed to continue its work till 2026, before the adoption of a decision on further extension of the work.)

The informal consultations on the MWP under the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) were co-facilitated by Ursula Fuentes (Germany) and Maesela John Kekana (South Africa), with Parties being requested to share their views on three questions: what concrete improvements to the MWP they would like to see and how the digital platform should be considered; what the key outcomes of the fifth and sixth global dialogues would be, taking into account the annual report, and how they should be framed; and the continuation of the work programme. After five days of informal consultations, Parties agreed to

forward the informal note to the CMA for further consideration of the matter.

Several developing countries including the **LMDC**, the **African Group**, the **Arab Group**, **Egypt**, **Algeria** and **South Africa** stressed that the MWP should not be used to impose any targets on countries while taking into consideration the findings of the fifth and sixth global dialogues, as the objective of the programme is to facilitate dialogues and exchange views, to provide an opportunity for Parties to share experiences and learn from each other. They further argued that any kind of imposition of new mitigation targets on developing countries through the inclusion of key messages would result in going beyond the mandate of the MWP and add a burden on developing countries. They emphasized the importance of means of implementation in scaling up mitigation ambition.

They also said that the focus of the MWP should rather be on further improving the global dialogues which are mitigation-related and the investment-focused events (IFE) held under the programme, to ensure that Parties are able to make the most out of the dialogues conducted. They emphasized the need for building on the discussions that Parties had on the digital platform as a “hub” at the sessions held in Bonn in June 2025 (see TWN update for details), and supported the idea of launching a mitigation platform using the mitigation component of the non-market approaches (NMA) platform under Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement. Stressing the importance of means of implementation in scaling up mitigation ambition, they said there is a need for mapping existing international financial institutions that provide climate finance, including multilateral development banks, regional development banks and bilateral financing agencies, with a view to hosting those institutions later on the platform. They also highlighted the need for increased cooperation between the MWP and the UNFCCC’s Financial Mechanism and Technology Mechanism to ensure greater provision of financing for projects and assessment of technology needs identified through the MWP.

(The fifth and sixth global dialogues this year under the MWP focused on the topics “enabling mitigation solutions in the forest sector, drawing on national and regional experience” and “enabling mitigation solutions in the waste sector, including through circular economy approaches” respectively. The secretariat prepared an annual

report on the global dialogues and investment-focused events held in 2025.)

Developed countries and some developing countries especially the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** and the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, on the other hand, insisted on having strong outcomes from the MWP by scaling up mitigation ambition keeping in mind the “urgency” of the situation. This, they said, was to be done through the insertion of key messages under the MWP in the CMA decision. Some of the key elements they emphasized for these messages were: having mitigation action aligned with the 1.5°C goal, creating a strong linkage between the MWP and the GST referring to paragraph 186 of the Dubai GST decision; scaling up mitigation action in line with paragraphs 28 (on energy and fossil fuels) and 33 (addressing deforestation and forest degradation) of the GST decision; and using the MWP to align NDCs with the outcomes of the first GST.

(Paragraph 186 of the GST decision from Dubai states: “Invites the relevant work programmes and constituted bodies under or serving the Paris Agreement to integrate relevant outcomes of the first global stocktake in planning their future work, in line with their mandates.”)

**China**, for the **LMDC**, said the MWP decision should be achieved in a “facilitative, participative, non-prescriptive” manner and stressed the need for highlighting the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in light of different national circumstances. It said “technology support should be provided to increase ambition and implementation” in mitigation and the UNFCCC’s Financial Mechanism should be invited to ensure greater coherence between the work of the MWP and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and Green Climate Fund (GCF). It suggested further optimization of the proposed digital platform with a clearer definition, to address concerns raised by others about duplication of work.

Stressing the fact that solutions identified under the MWP cannot be imposed in a one-size-fits-all approach, China proposed to take note of the annual report of the global dialogues in a “concise paragraph” that notes the key findings, opportunities and barriers identified in the dialogues, “instead of reflecting detailed messages”. It pointed out that messages would vary depending on the region and context and cannot be singled out and imposed in a top-down manner. It added



that the MWP's mandate does not mean forcing Parties to enhance mitigation targets and imposing mitigation targets on developing countries. On the issue of considering the continuation of the work programme in this year's decision, it said addressing that before 2026 would amount to going beyond the MWP's mandate. Referring to the BTR synthesis report, it added that "Annex I Parties are not taking the lead on mitigation action" and said "we don't understand their eagerness in discussing the continuation of this programme".

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **Arab Group**, said "the MWP must remain faithful to its mandate focused on information exchange and ideas in a non-prescriptive, facilitative, non-punitive manner ... taking into account the nationally determined nature" of mitigation actions. It rejected any linkages between the GST and the MWP, and said that the "GST has its own dedicated agenda", adding that "revisiting the GST within the MWP is outside the MWP's mandate". It said prescriptive messages violate the MWP's mandate and the bottom-up nature of the PA. On the issue of aligning NDCs with the GST outcome, it said NDCs are not mitigation-specific and have elements related to adaptation as well. Responding to the interventions made by some Parties for keeping the 1.5°C goal within reach, it suggested inclusion of language in the MWP text from the decision made under the "research and systematic observation" agenda item at SB 62, according to which "the multi-decadal estimates of current global warming are between 1.34 and 1.41°C" and "given the uncertainty ranges, the possibility that we have already exceeded 1.5°C cannot be ruled out".

On the digital platform, it said it could be linked to the NMA platform under Article 6.8 of the PA, adding that improvements to the MWP must remain within the scope of its mandate. Emphasizing the importance of means of implementation, it said financiers and investors should be invited to the IFEs to "ensure meaningful progress". It said IFEs "should be held in conjunction with global investment forums rather than limiting them to the global dialogues" so that "organized structured matchmaking between projects and financiers" could occur.

On the outcomes of the fifth and sixth global dialogues, it said the Group "can take note of the report, but cannot cherry-pick solutions" that are not applicable to every national or regional context. It said next year's dialogue should focus on industry and address barriers faced in the sector. It also asked for addressing impacts of mitigation

action on developing countries and emphasized the need for minimizing negative impacts, keeping in mind equity considerations. Stressing the need to highlight the principles of equity and CBDR, it said developed countries must continue to take the lead in mitigation and provide the means of implementation for developing countries, and pointed out the different starting points of developing and developed countries.

**Zimbabwe**, for the **African Group**, said the "presentations and views shared by Parties during the global dialogues were not exhaustive" and the "annual report is not fully reflective of Parties' views". It said the IFEs and pitch hubs "have not borne the fruit they were intended for" and found it "regrettable that they remain advisory in nature" and are not bringing any new financing in the form of grants and concessional loans despite proposals from the Group. On the digital platform, it said "we still need to agree on its purpose and objective", and expressed a preference for the mitigation platform to be hosted under the NMA platform under Article 6.8 of the PA. On the issue of how messages from the annual report are considered in the decision, it said messages "should not be prescriptive". It said "forestry is not just a mitigation issue. For the African Group, forests are an issue of sustainable development [and] livelihoods". It added that "nature-based solutions for the forestry sector should not be discussed on the basis of mitigation" only. Citing paragraph 2 of decision 4/CMA.4, it said it "did not envisage any discussions" about the continuation of the work programme at COP 30.

**India** said "the MWP is non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, and respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances". It said the MWP's work should now focus on "implementation support and bridging gaps in access to those enablers, disabling the dis-enablers", adding that the Technology Mechanism can facilitate the implementation of the MWP and the Financial Mechanism should be used to support the work of the MWP. It said the digital platform can be coalesced with the digital platform of Article 6.8 of the PA and the platform can be "a facilitative tool". On the outcomes of the fifth and sixth global dialogues, it said, "These dialogues have demonstrated that there is no single pathway to mitigation. Parties value exchanges that help identify enablers such as finance, technology, and capacity, rather than prescriptive models. Parties are capable of drawing from the reports and experiences to design domestic approaches that reflect their national circumstances, development priorities

and capacities. The MWP must remain facilitative, non-prescriptive, and grounded in equity and national ownership.” It called the proposal made by Australia for drawing linkages between forests and the food sector “highly problematic”, adding that “higher reliance on forests as emissions sinks, especially as carbon markets, will have negative impacts on food security”.

It said the GST and the MWP had different mandates and it could not accept any linkages between the two. Given the nationally determined nature of NDCs, it said it was up to the Parties to see how they would like to use the GST decision to inform their NDCs, instead of imposing in a top-down manner any kind of alignment between the GST outcome and NDCs.

On continuation of the MWP, it said, “The current mandate runs until 2026, and any discussion on further continuation at this point may be premature. Any proposal for continuation or expansion beyond the agreed timeline would require a clear rationale, Party consensus, and a formal decision by the CMA. Our priority now should be to strengthen the quality, inclusivity, and Party ownership of the ongoing process – not to reopen its scope or timeline.” Responding to the comparison made by some developed countries between the MWP and the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) in the context of continuation of the MWP’s work, it said discussions in the JTWP are focused on an actionable outcome and “not a review of the JTWP” and pointed out that in those discussions developing countries were “being told that we cannot have a discussion even on an actionable outcome” nor on a review of the work programme.

**Egypt** said “the ultimate objective of the MWP is to help Parties achieve reductions in GHG emissions according to their national circumstances and respecting their national sovereignty. It is not meant to infringe on national sovereignty or tell Parties what to do.” It said “the MWP needs to cooperate with the Financial Mechanism of the PA. Any identified project from the work under the MWP specifically from the pitch hub should find its way for easy access to the Financial Mechanism.” It added that “the MWP needs to cooperate with the Technology Mechanism. The MWP should ask the Technology Mechanism to study and evaluate opportunities identified under the MWP and inform Parties on the outcomes of such evaluation. Such evaluation and information would be useful for parties when designing their NDCs based on their

own national circumstances and in a manner that respects their national sovereignty.”

Calling the digital platform a facilitative tool for matchmaking, and taking into account concerns raised by other Parties about the possible duplication of work in the digital platform, it said the best alternative is to utilize the mitigation component under the Article 6.8 platform. This is a platform which is already available and agreed upon by all Parties, and will not consume time and resources to establish, it said. On the manner in which messages from the annual report of the MWP should be taken into account in the decision, it offered two alternatives: either “having policy-neutral messages that are not prescriptive”, with caveats added to stress the importance of the no-one-size-fits-all approach, or “only taking note of the report”.

**South Africa** shared similar views and said that “one common denominator is the lack of finance for ambitious implementation”. It said it would like the MWP to “lead to implementation of finance for projects at national and regional level”, and emphasized the need for IFEs and pitch hubs to “lead to the provision of finance”.

**Bangladesh, for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, said there is a need to promote integrated approaches to address biodiversity, livelihoods and sustainable development. Recognizing the complementarity and co-benefit between adaptation and mitigation, it asked for the inclusion of messages on sustainable management of forests to ensure finance reaches the sector. It said messages on the waste sector from the annual report should promote the reduction of methane and circular economy approaches, among other things. On the digital platform, it said “we support targeted approaches aligned with national priorities” and that it was “trying to get convinced about creation of digital platform”. It also pointed out that the nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) registry was not successful in this context and added that “it should not take several years for the creation of new online tools”. It asked for accelerating the implementation of NDCs and to “overcome structural barriers, limited capacity, high transaction costs, and risk premiums”. It said derisking and technical assistance through the MWP would “ensure country ownership and direct access”. It said submissions should be invited from Parties to address questions like where to have the review for continuation of the MWP after 2026 and when is the appropriate time for this review.

**Samoa**, for **AOSIS**, said there is a need for strengthening collective ambition and implementation of mitigation efforts. It asked to reaffirm “urgency to scale up mitigation ambition to keep 1.5°C within reach” and mention Article 2.1 of the PA in the preambular section of the decision. It emphasized the “vital role of forests” in mitigation and asked for halting and reversing deforestation by 2030. It asked to link paragraphs 28 and 33 of the GST outcome with the MWP for keeping 1.5°C within reach. For improving the work programme, it said there is a need for “actionable solutions” and “greater integration with the GST, not to duplicate, but for complementarity”. It did not see how the digital platform would be different from other platforms such as the NAMA. It said “any decisions on the digital platform should take place outside the MWP”. It said “the current MWP will not deliver its objective” and emphasized the “need to improve it”. It supported the call for inviting submissions from Parties for considering their views on the continuation of the work programme.

**Colombia**, for **AILAC**, said there is a need for “enhancing mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade”. It said “after years of operation, the MWP has failed to deliver outcomes” and called for accelerating “solutions for emissions reduction”. It added that the MWP “must evolve into a dedicated action-oriented space to achieve GHG reductions by 2030 consistent with the PA temperature goal”. It also said the MWP “must be aligned with outcomes of the GST”. It mentioned paragraph 28 of the GST outcome and pointed to the need for “scaling up ambition and implementation across sectors”. It said the global dialogues of the MWP “should lead to clear messages that Parties can integrate in their NDCs”, and asked for aligning GST and NDC cycles. It asked for scaling up climate finance and direct access to means of implementation. It said the discussions on the digital platform “divert attention away from the mandate of this work programme” and said it “will fit better under the action agenda”. It said the discussion of continuation of the MWP needs to be informed by “a review of its effectiveness”.

**Switzerland**, for the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, said Parties should make an “important contribution to the first COP in the Amazon” by reflecting messages on deforestation in the MWP. It asked for a “substantive outcome on scaling up mitigation ambition and

implementation”, and said outcomes of the fifth and sixth global dialogues should be reflected in the MWP decision. It said forests are crucial in mitigation and adaptation and mentioned the role of nature-based solutions in adaptation. In this context, it also mentioned REDD+ and payments for ecosystem-based services for directing finance towards the forest sector. It emphasized the need for enhanced effort to achieve halting and reversing deforestation. It did not see the digital platform as the main part of the MWP. It said the platform under Article 6.8 of the PA “is not a matchmaking platform” but an “information-sharing platform”. It said there is a need for “broader reflection on how the process [of continuation of the MWP] works” and to “strengthen critical learning” and work on a “sectoral basis”.

**Australia** said this year’s annual report of the MWP has “strong substantive messages on forests”. It said key messages in the MWP decision should have “a solutions-oriented approach”. It highlighted the role of forest ecosystems in global emission reduction efforts as carbon sinks, and underlined the need to address underlying drivers of deforestation in a fair and equitable manner. It mentioned the need for synergies between the Rio Conventions. It also stressed the importance of robust measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) systems and database building, and the need for international support for this. It mentioned “climate finance, carbon markets, public-private partnerships and other important tools for derisking investments” as important sources of finance for mitigation actions in the forest sector. Highlighting the importance of international cooperation and means of implementation, it said specific suggestions like carbon markets, REDD+ and simplified access to finance for Indigenous Peoples could be included in the decision. It said it would like to make the key messages in the MWP decision “actionable” and that links may be specified between agriculture and forestry, among other things. It also mentioned “sustainable management of forests” and “agroecology products” in this context.

It called the digital platform an “interesting idea” and said it was “not clear on how the [Article 6.8 platform] would work” and pointed out that “active discussions were happening in that room”. It said it would be good to discuss this idea further along with the review of the MWP next year. It supported calls inviting views on continuation of the MWP in 2026, a synthesis of which would be considered at SB 64.

The **European Union** said there is a need for “a more effective MWP” and to stress “urgency” of action in the preamble. It said it wanted to include a reference to the GST outcome, particularly its paragraphs 33 and 186, in the MWP decision. It said key messages in the MWP decision should have a “social dimension” in the circular economy. On continuation of the work programme, it said, “We don’t want to force a decision here. We just want to create the time to reflect on how we can make the MWP more effective in the next five years.” It said it noticed “similarities and differences between the MWP and the JTWP” and mentioned that some Parties “are very strict on the mandate in the MWP, but are creative with the JTWP’s mandate”. It added that “we need actionable outcomes in the

MWP”. On the digital platform, it said that “after all the additional information we got on the digital platform, we don’t see any added value” and that no “more discussion is required on that”.

The **United Kingdom** said it was looking for “specific improvements to the global dialogues and IFEs”. It expressed the need for including detailed messages from the MWP’s annual report in the decision, framing them within national and regional contexts. It said that “domestic action can be taken”. It said it needed guidance from colleagues who work on Article 6.8 issues to consider what a mitigation platform under the Article 6.8 platform would look like. On the continuation of the work programme, it said “we would like to see some language here”.

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## ***Belém Climate News Update 11***

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### **Belém countdown: Climate talks race to the finish**

Belém, 19 November (T. Ajit\*) – The climate talks in Belém have entered a frenzied final stretch, with negotiators racing to conclude by the expected deadline of Friday, 21 November. Having commenced on 10 November, the discussions are now deep into their second week, unfolding across three parallel tracks: technical negotiations, ministerial consultations and Presidency-led discussions.

On 18 November morning, the COP 30 Presidency released a draft text titled “Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change” (further details on the text below).

The Mutirão deals with four agenda items which have been ongoing since last week, viz.: (i) “Implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement” (which relates to the mandatory provision of finance from developed to developing countries); (ii) “Promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate-change-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures”; (iii) “Responding to the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions and addressing the 1.5°C ambition and implementation gap”; and (iv) “Reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement” [which relates to the biennial transparency reports (BTRs)].

Technical negotiations also continued on the global stocktake (GST), Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), finance issues, adaptation, and review of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage, among others.

Ministerial consultations convened on the GST, JTWP, MWP, Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), finance issues as well as gender. In the ministerial consultations, ministerial pairs are trying to tackle the most contentious/political

issues related to the agenda item, by seeking bridging proposals from negotiating groups and Parties as well as trying to understand their red lines.

On 18 November, following the release of the Mutirão text, the Presidency consulted with negotiating groups in a bilateral setting throughout the day, to seek their feedback and understand their red lines.

Following the bilateral meetings, the Presidency convened a meeting with Parties. In its remarks to Parties, the Presidency said it had heard from Parties their overall vision around the Mutirão text as well as their red lines. The Presidency representative said that it was time to streamline the text but for work to advance, they would need to collaborate around the three tracks of negotiations, viz., they would meet with the ministerial pairs to hear their feedback on the consultations and also with the co-facilitators of the technical work to conclude by 7 pm.

The Presidency also encouraged Parties to speak to each other and present potential landing zones and compromise by 7 pm, and to stay on in the venue until midnight. It also said that if Parties are able to finish the work by 19 November, this would be a “historical message that we will be sending to the world and our societies. A message that multilateralism, people and the Paris Agreement need the most – we are able to work together to advance work on an unprecedented pace...”.

In a late evening communication to Parties on 18 November, the Presidency outlined plans for adopting the “Belém political package on 19 November”.

The Belém political package comprises the following issues: Presidency Mutirão consultations on Article 9.1, unilateral trade measures, responding to the NDC synthesis report

and responding to the BTR synthesis report; GGA; JTWP; MWP; GST; compilation and synthesis of, and summary report on the in-session workshop on, biennial communications of information related to Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement; the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on the scope of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement; report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures; matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance; report of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to the COP and guidance to the GCF; report of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to the COP and guidance to the GEF; report of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) and guidance to the Fund; matters relating to the Adaptation Fund; matters relating to technology development and transfer: Technology Implementation Programme; and reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement: provision of financial and technical support to developing country Parties for reporting and capacity-building.

The communication said that streamlined texts would be issued early morning on 19 November, and following that, the Presidency plans to engage ministers to progress towards reaching agreement. On items not included in the Belém political package, work would continue on 18 November until midnight, with a view to preparing texts for adoption on 21 November.

### **Mutirão text**

The Mutirão text contains preambular language, followed by paragraphs under three headers: “United in celebration of the 10-year anniversary of the Paris Agreement”; “From negotiation to implementation: Paris Agreement policy cycle fully in motion”; and “Responding to urgency: Accelerating implementation, solidarity and international cooperation”. The nine-page text contains contentious issues under different options. The options presented were in the following areas:

i. Paragraph 25 on welcoming the \$100-billion-per-year goal of developed countries or noting with great concern that the goal was not achieved, as well as a no-text option.

ii. Paragraph 35 on convening a workshop or to invite Parties to “share domestic opportunities and success stories on the just, orderly and equitable transition towards low-carbon solutions, taking into account countries’ different national circumstances, pathways and approaches,

and the principles and provisions of the Paris Agreement” or to encourage Parties “to cooperate for and contribute to the global efforts referred to in paragraphs 28 [mitigation efforts including transitioning away from fossil fuels] and 33 [halting and reversing deforestation] of the GST decision ... in a nationally determined manner, taking into account the Paris Agreement”, and “convene a high-level ministerial round table on different national circumstances, pathways and approaches with a view to supporting countries to develop just, orderly and equitable transition roadmaps, including to progressively overcome their dependency on fossil fuels and towards halting and reversing deforestation”. There was also a no-text option presented for this paragraph.

iii. Paragraph 44 had options ranging from establishing “an annual consideration of the NDCs synthesis report and the BTR synthesis report” to launching a “Global Implementation Accelerator, as a cooperative, facilitative and voluntary initiative ... to accelerate implementation, enhance international cooperation, and support countries in implementing their nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans”; and a third option “to launch ... the Belém Roadmap to 1.5 [temperature goal], aiming at addressing the ambition and implementation gap of nationally determined contributions, to identify opportunities and actions to accelerate the implementation of, and international cooperation and investments in NDCs”.

iv. Paragraph 56 on adaptation finance, where the options comprised establishing “a goal of tripling of adaptation finance [from public sources] by [2030] or [2035], compared to 2025”; a second option of acknowledging “the need to dramatically scale up adaptation finance, with a view to achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation...”; and a third option urging developed countries “to at least triple their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2025 levels by 2030”, and launching “an annual Belém Dialogue on Tripling Adaptation Finance”.

v. Paragraph 57 on implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement had five options. Option 1 was to “establish a three-year Belém work programme and legally-binding action plan on the implementation of Article 9.1”.

Option 2 was to launch a work programme to address four distinct roadmaps, which included “workstream on pathways to support provided focussed on needs of developing countries as

envisaged in Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement and not finding full expression in the NCQG [new collective quantified goal on finance] decision”; “workstream on pathways to mobilised finance building from the \$300 bn [per year] in the NCQG and also aligning it with Article 9.3 [on the mobilization of finance] of the Paris Agreement, and trust building transparency arrangements around that”; “workstream on 1.3T as expressed in the NCQG decision and further work on taking forward the recommendations of the Baku to Belém Roadmap report, noting the importance of support of our capital markets in domestic resource mobilisation efforts”; and “workstream on quality of finance issues raised in the NCQG such as cost of capital, debt-free instruments”.

Option 3 was to convene “an annual high-level ministerial round table to reflect upon the implementation of the NCQG” and establish “a two year work programme under the CMA, taking into account the process on the NCQG implementation commencing in 2028, to deliberate on the implementation on the NCQG, including on the provision and mobilisation of support...”.

Option 4 was to “establish the Belém Global De-Risking and Project Preparation and Development Facility (‘Belém Facility for Implementation’) to catalyze climate finance and implementation in developing country Parties by translating nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans into project pipelines and/or country platforms and providing solutions to de-risk investments in developing country Parties and urges developed country Parties to capitalize the Belém Facility for Implementation in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement”.

Option 5 was a no-text option.

vi. Paragraph 58, on unilateral trade measures, had four options.

Option 1 was to invite the Presidencies of COP 30 and COP 31 “to organize technical workshops on trade-climate linkages, with the participation of Parties and relevant international organizations...”.

Option 2 was to convene a dialogue at the “sixty-fourth, sixty-sixth and sixty-eighth sessions of the subsidiary bodies, with the participation of Parties and relevant stakeholders ... and will allow the consideration of opportunities, challenges, and barriers to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade as an enabler for achieving the Convention and the Paris Agreement”.

Option 3 involved a decision “to establish a Platform on Unilateral Trade-Restrictive Measures Related to Climate Change”.

Option 4 “invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level summit on the importance of an open and supportive international economic system” and “launch an annual dialogue to facilitate discussions among Party and non-Party stakeholders on the importance of an open and supportive international economic system in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication”.

### **Press conference by COP 30 President**

Meanwhile, on 18 November evening, the COP Presidency in a press briefing said it had received positive feedback regarding the draft Mutirão text “as a basis to continue work” during its consultations. The COP President André Corrêa do Lago said they had collected assessments from delegations of preferred options and interlinkage of issues. He also said that the contentious issue was finance and adaptation and added that “we want this to be an adaptation COP, [and] the GGA is central. The push for adaptation resources is significant.”

Corrêa do Lago also said that the paragraph on targets for transitioning away from fossil fuels had received mixed reviews: very favourable and very negative (see options in paragraph 35 above in relation to the Mutirão text).

Another COP Presidency representative, Ana Toni, said during the press briefing that most groups had said it was a red line for them and that they do not want such language on fossil fuels and obligations.

On the *mutirão* process, another Presidency representative said in the press briefing, “Normally a draft [text] like this appears in the very end of the conference. We decided to accelerate the mode of work and invite Parties to work in a task mode, in a *mutirão* mode.... We asked them to approve as a package the *mutirão* decision and all seven or ten other decisions, including adaptation indicators, technology etc., that have issues related to finance, NDCs and finance for adaptation. That was the criteria for the package we want to get approved tomorrow. If we get it approved, we will get the whole package approved later. If it is not possible, we have more time.”

(It was only the second day of the final week of the COP, but several observers said it felt like

the final day of negotiations. With many issues witnessing huge divergences among Parties, whether the Brazilian Presidency will actually be able to get Parties to agree to a consensus so soon in midweek remains to be seen. The COP 30 Presidency had announced earlier that it aimed to adopt the Mutirão package on 19 November, which would actually be quite historic, given that COPs usually go overtime and decisions get adopted way past the scheduled official closing of meetings.)

Corrêa do Lago also said at the press briefing that Brazilian President Lula would meet ministers of negotiating groups on 19 November (probably to push for compromises to be reached).

The race is on to see what will eventually be delivered out of COP 30.

*\* With inputs from Rajnia Rodrigues*



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## ***Belém Climate News Update 12***

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### **China calls for “implementation roadmap” for delivery of new finance goal**

Belém, 20 November (Radhika Chatterjee) – At the 3rd high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance held on 15 November, during the ongoing climate talks in Belém, **Li Gao**, the Chinese Vice Minister of Ecology and Environment, called on developed countries to “present an implementation roadmap for the delivery of the \$300 billion [per year] ... including short-term and medium-term actions for providing the necessary guarantee”. He also called for the establishment of “a new quantified target and implementation plan for adaptation finance”.

Li Gao said further that “the delivery of the \$300 billion in the new collective quantified goal on finance [NCQG] should serve as an opportunity to rebuild trust” between developed and developing countries, and called for the development of a “practical roadmap for implementation” to “avoid blame shifting and prevent further erosion of trust between developed and developing countries”. The Vice Minister pointed out that while delivering on their previous \$100 billion commitment, developed countries included export credits and official development assistance (ODA) in their accounting and included excessive market-rate loans, which cannot be regarded as “new and additional” by developing countries. As a result, “many developing countries do not recognize that the \$100 billion target has been truly met”. (See further details below.)

Moderated by **Katie White**, UK Parliamentary Undersecretary of State (Minister of Climate), and **Deborah Mlongo Barasa**, Kenya’s Minister of Environment, Climate Change and Forestry, the dialogue saw several high-level speakers sharing their views on the NCQG. The keynote address was delivered by **Analena Baerbock**, the President of the 80th session of the

UN General Assembly, and Professor **Jim Skea**, Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Expert keynote presentations were delivered by **Avinash Persaud**, Special Advisor to the President of the Inter-American Development Bank, and **Artur Cardoso de Lacerda**, from the Green Climate Fund. These were followed by a discussion session with ministers from Egypt, China, Germany and Norway. This discussion and the subsequent interventions addressed the following guiding questions:

- What short-term and medium-term (2–5 years) actionable solutions will Parties undertake towards implementing Articles 9.1 and 9.3 of the Paris Agreement and achieving the quantitative and qualitative elements of the NCQG?
- What short-term and medium-term (2–5 years) actionable solutions will Parties undertake towards increasing adaptation finance specifically?

This event draws its mandate from paragraph 10 of decision 12/CMA.1 which provides for the convening of biennial high-level ministerial dialogues on climate finance in the “context of identification of indicative quantitative and qualitative information related” to Articles 9.1 (on provision of finance by developed countries) and 9.3 (mobilization of finance with developed countries taking the lead) of the PA, “including as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided by Parties” as per Article 9.5.

**Analena Baerbock** said the “North Star of the PA has guided us from projection of 4°C of warming in 2100 to between 2.3 and 2.8°C today”. She said that without the PA, we would still be facing a 4°C world. “Yet we all know we are still

far from 1.5°C as set in Paris.” She pointed out that renewable energy has now become the “single fastest-growing source of new energy. Yet, even as renewable energies are on the rise globally, we are far from realizing their full potential, and aligning financing with our goals remains our greatest challenge.”

She said the annual financing gap for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals totals \$4 trillion, adding that “on climate finance specifically, Article 9 and the NCQG agreed at COP 29 called on developed countries to provide \$300 billion annually in climate finance”. Sharing a note of optimism, she said “the technologies are here and they are affordable, different than 10 years ago. In our world of abundance, it’s not money as such that is the problem. The question is rather how and where money is invested.” She said despite the progress made, potential remains “untapped because capital still isn’t flowing where it’s needed most, especially in Africa ... Today over 600 million Africans still live without electricity, even though the continent’s renewable potential is 50 times greater than the world’s projected electricity demand for 2040. Yet, in 2024, Africa added only 4.2 gigawatts of renewable capacity compared to 421 gigawatts in Asia” and “this is happening on a continent with the youngest and fastest-growing population on earth, where 60% of people are under the age of 25. So the question is not whether the money or the potential exists, but how to channel it to where it’s needed most.”

Highlighting the importance of private finance, she said it is clear that “public financing alone cannot close the gap. Building on the commitments of developed countries, all actors, public and private, must now mobilize \$1.3 trillion needed each year for climate action. Unlocking this potential requires dismantling barriers that hold their capital flows. We know investors want to invest and governments want to collaborate.”

Baerbock elaborated that “What’s missing is an enabling environment in all the regions built on trust and cooperation. That means modern financial frameworks as discussed in Seville [at the 4th Financing for Development Conference in July 2025]. It means scaled up international funds and the removal of restrictions that stifle innovation as we outlined in the Seville Commitment on Financing for Sustainable Development.”

She said there is a need for the world to “come out of the silos and connect these different commitments”. She stressed that developing countries should “strengthen domestic capacity,

maintaining stability, improving infrastructure and creating regulatory frameworks that de-risk and attract investment”, and that “developed countries in turn have to deliver on the promises”. She said “investing in climate resilience is not an act of charity. It is an investment in global prosperity, stability, universal human rights, but also future economic development.”

**Jochen Flasbarth**, State Secretary at the German Federal Ministry for Environment, Climate Action, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, said “public finance is the core of the NCQG” and developed countries are taking the lead in its delivery. He said “nobody here in the room doesn’t want to deliver”, adding that “we will continue to provide our fair share” maintaining a balance between mitigation and adaptation. He said there is a need for more finance from private sources, reducing the cost of capital, and creating enabling environments to ensure financial flows. In this context, he mentioned the dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the PA and its complementarity with Article 9 and expressed a desire for “an ambitious outcome” on it. He said there is a need to be free of the triple crisis of escalating debt burdens, climate change, and biodiversity and nature loss, adding that in the context of evolving needs the impact and effectiveness of climate finance needs to be maximized.

**Li Gao**, the Chinese Vice Minister, in addition to his remarks above, said that effective implementation of Articles 9.1 and 9.3 of the PA and the NCQG decision “is crucial for scaling up financial resources, strengthening support to developing countries in implementing their climate actions and their nationally determined contributions [NDCs], and in advancing the achievement of goals of the PA”. He added that “this could be done by upholding the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC) and clearly defining “the responsibilities and boundaries of financial support”. Elaborating further, he said Article 4.3 of the Convention “explicitly stipulates that developed countries shall provide new, additional, predictable, and adequate financial resources to developing countries. This legal obligation is continued and reinforced under Article 9.1 of the PA. Article 9.3 further specifies that developed countries should take the lead [on the mobilization of finance], noting the significant role of public funds.”

He said the significant gap “between the provision and mobilization of climate finance and

the actual needs of developing countries ... hinders global climate action and undermines trust between the North and the South. Developed countries should strictly fulfil their funding obligations and honour their financial commitments, while fully considering the needs of developing countries. They should provide and expand public finance, primarily in the form of grants and highly concessional loans.”

Li Gao also said that China will, on a voluntary basis, continue to “provide support within our capacity to other developing countries through South-South cooperation on climate change”.

### **Highlights of interventions from country groupings**

**Iraq, for the G77 and China**, said that for the Group, “scaling up climate finance in accordance with the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC and PA forms the core of the priorities”, and called for its full and timely delivery by developed countries. It emphasized that the “\$300 billion remains significantly insufficient to meet the needs of developing countries in their just efforts to combat climate change” and asked developed countries to “significantly scale up the provision of climate finance and means of implementation to enable ambitious and urgent climate action at the scale and speed required”. It also highlighted the need for “addressing the systemic dis-enablers of climate finance”. It said COP 30 must ensure a successful outcome on items related to climate finance, including the Adaptation Fund. It underscored “the need to improve biennial communications submitted by developed countries to demonstrate additionality and deliver the predictability needed”. It emphasized the importance of operationalizing the NCQG decision “to urge the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and other funds to at least triple their annual outflows by 2030, with a significant increase of public resources provided through the funds”.

It said the agreed goal under the NCQG “can only be met through fully executed contribution inputs from developed countries to the trust funds of the operating entities in a predictable, timely, and ambitious manner”. It requested all climate funds to have “transparent financing procedures that apply equally to all non-Annex I Convention Parties”. It asked developed countries to “address non-enablers and structural barriers, such as transaction costs, risk assessments, bottlenecks of the international financial institutions and illicit

financial flows that are creating reverse flows from South to North and diverging climate-resilient development in developing countries”. Finally, it stressed that “measures to address climate change, including unilateral actions, must not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade” and urged the “international community to act in unity in addressing climate change, consistent with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”.

**India, for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, said accessing climate finance at scale is the “critical enabler of climate action”. It said “several measures, such as strengthening the operational entities of the Financial Mechanism through increased replenishments and pledges, enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of these institutions, without discrimination and conditionalities, can play a significant role in enhancing the flow of resources to developing countries in the short to medium term”.

It added, “Grants and concessional resources under Article 9.1 can lower the cost of capital, facilitating a robust pipeline of investments in developing countries and making these investments more sustainable by lowering the cost of capital. Innovative financial instruments such as blended finance could also play a major role in mobilizing resources under Article 9.3.”

Emphasizing the importance of transparency, predictability and reliability of financial flows, India said “the absence of a multilaterally agreed-upon definition of climate finance and deficiencies in reporting under Article 9.5 have been a concern to developing countries”. It pointed out that the recent synthesis report on the biennial communications under Article 9.5 shows that certain developed countries have “reported a decrease in financial support compared to previous years, with reductions ranging from 51–75% and 76–100%, respectively. There is a lack of consistency among developed countries in defining what constitutes new and additional climate finance, as well as a failure to distinguish between development finance and climate finance in their reports. We require multi-year, quantified projections with methodologies under Article 9.5 for predictability of financial flows.”

Finally, it said the NCQG is “a suboptimal decision with no clear commitment from the developed countries making it impossible to meet the NDCs set down by the developing countries. It specifically refers to Article 9.3

with the legal mandate under Article 9.1 going completely unaddressed. The decision we all know is inadequate, incomplete with no discussion on Article 9.1 and no plan to address qualitative elements other than a call to all to do so. At best, it is a deflection of the responsibility of the developed countries.”

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **Arab Group**, said the “quality aspect” of finance is as important for developing countries as the “quantity aspect”. It said “quality” refers to “whether climate finance is flowing towards developing country Parties in accordance with the needs and priorities outlined in NDCs and NAPs [National Adaptation Plans]”.

It added, “Quantitatively, climate finance must be provided and mobilized at the necessary scale to address conditional targets set out in national plans.” It called means of implementation “the medium that translates” developing countries’ “objectives into realities” and stressed that without sufficient means of implementation, developing countries “would not be able to translate” their climate action plans into reality. It highlighted “the importance of ensuring the affordable, transparent, adequate and predictable provision and mobilization of climate finance in line with Article 9.1 and 9.3 respectively”. It said “the provision of climate finance under Article 9.1 is a prerequisite to mobilization under Article 9.3” and that “provision should aim to contribute and build towards the necessary enabling environments needed to ensure that finance could be mobilized to developing countries”.

It pointed out that a majority of climate finance “is still concentrated in the Global North while the Global South remains significantly underserved”, and said that a significant shift is needed to ensure that climate finance flows to developing countries to help them achieve goals of sustainable development and poverty eradication. Highlighting the importance of public finance, it said “public support provided by developed country Parties is also a catalyst to creating enabling environments for the private sector to engage in developing countries”.

It lamented that “the private sector is incentivized to move to the Global North rather than the Global South” and emphasized that “the private sector will not be able to cover nor replace public resources provided by developed country Parties through grant-based and highly concessional forms”. Regarding the issue of scaling up adaptation finance, it said at least 75% of the \$300 billion goal set under the

NCQG should be “dedicated for adaptation to close the finance gap between adaptation and mitigation”. It said “dedicating reporting standards for adaptation” under Article 9.5 of the PA “would ensure predictability for planning and coordinating adaptation plans between developing countries. This should also include consideration of geographic balance, aligned with the diverse range of needs expressed by developing countries, guaranteeing dedicated and inclusive support for Parties”.

**Bangladesh**, for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, said climate finance is not a matter of negotiation but rather “a matter of survival, justice and dignity”. It highlighted “the importance of having a periodic report and assessment of the delivery of finance goals to developing countries” and pointed out that “different accounting approaches” and the “lack of definition of climate finance have made it difficult to objectively assess progress against targets”. It said to further improve predictability and transparency, “developed countries could consider working together on a ‘climate finance delivery plan’ and communicate their intended contributions and pathways towards achieving the at-least-\$300-billion goal by 2035”. It called for targeted support for LDCs and small island developing states (SIDS), and encouraged developed countries to triple their pledges to the LDCs in the upcoming replenishment cycles of the Global Environment Facility. It underlined that finance for climate action should not increase the debt burden, and emphasized that “support for adaptation and loss and damage require support in the form of grants”.

**Belize**, for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, said there is a need to deliver more finance that is “predictable, transparent and at scale” to respond to the needs of those most vulnerable. It said developed countries must provide standardized, forward-looking information on climate finance for SIDS, including immediate next-year estimates disaggregated for adaptation and loss and damage. This, it said, would allow SIDS to plan their climate actions. It pointed to the need for the UNFCCC’s climate funds to urgently simplify procedures for direct access entities from SIDS and expand readiness support, and fast-track small grant windows for building resilience. It said a robust replenishment of the UNFCCC’s funds must lead to tripling of outflows, which is an obligation under the PA. Stressing the need for “action-oriented solutions”, it said developed countries must triple their collective provision of

adaptation finance to developing countries by 2030 from 2025 levels, reaching at least \$120 billion per year. This, it said, would help close the adaptation finance gap and ensure parity with mitigation finance. It said there is a need for leveraging regional institutions to channel scale of finance efficiently and urgently. It also asked for support for regional insurance schemes and provision of direct access pathways, particularly for countries that lack regional support entities.

**Costa Rica**, for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, said it cannot afford uncertainty and non-detailed information when it comes to climate finance flows needed to meet the goals of the PA. It said there is a need for a monitoring system that “tells us clearly whether we are on track to deliver \$300 billion annually”. It said countries are not able to plan and demonstrate their climate actions in the absence of sufficient provision of climate finance. It called Article 9.5 of the PA a “pillar of mutual trust and transparency” which helps developing countries to plan their NDCs and NAPs. It called for a common framework and methodology for ex ante information and for regional communication of financial support to enhance predictability and traceability of resources. It said Article 9.5 should serve as the foundation of the NCQG

and feed directly into its design, monitoring and accountability aspects.

**Denmark**, for the **European Union**, said clear and consistent climate finance is required for higher climate action. This, it said, would help in building trust and demonstrate that developed countries are delivering on their commitments. It welcomed the NCQG decision as a “framework for scaling up climate finance from all sources”, including public and private, to deliver climate-resilient pathways. It said “we are ready to take the lead with the expectation of others to follow”.

It said the EU is committed to a balance between mitigation and adaptation and scaling up finance for adaptation, particularly for the most vulnerable such as LDCs and SIDS. It said there is a need to do more to address key areas and ensure better access. It expressed support for “ongoing work of the climate action funds” and said funds should reach communities to “enhance impact and efficiency”. It said the EU is actively moving on debt-for-climate swap projects. It also said that action is required at the domestic level and mentioned the need for country-level investment strategies. It stressed that all Parties and partners have to come together to implement the NCQG as a whole to accelerate the achievement of collective goals of the PA.

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### **COP 30 ends with delicate Belém Political Package amid last-minute drama**

Belém, 24 November (Radhika Chatterjee and Meena Raman) – The COP 30 climate talks in Belém concluded in dramatic fashion after running a day overtime, finally wrapping up late on Saturday, 22 November. Following marathon negotiations, delegates adopted several key decisions, marking a tense and hard-fought finish to the talks.

While there were mixed reactions to the outcomes in Belém, the **G77 and China** celebrated “the establishment of the just transition mechanism as a historic milestone” [a decision under the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP)], saying that “for developing countries, this achievement is more than an institutional step. It is a symbol of hope, solidarity and a promise that the international community will stand together to ensure that no nation and no community is left behind. We urge that this mechanism be swiftly operationalized at the next COP so that its vision can be translated into tangible support for those most in need.” The Group also highlighted the importance of “tripling adaptation finance and its inclusion in the COP 30 outcomes”.

The adoption of the decisions at the closing plenary had been expected to be smooth, given that heads of delegation (HODs) had worked all night long with the COP 30 Presidency with little sleep since Friday, 21 November, to iron out last-minute compromises on what was a very delicate set of decisions under the “Belém Political Package”.

However, when the closing plenaries of the governing bodies (UNFCCC COP, the Paris Agreement’s CMA and the Kyoto Protocol’s CMP) were convened at around 1 pm on Saturday by the COP 30 President, Ambassador André Aranha Corrêa do Lago of Brazil, and decisions were gavelled through as a package, points of order

were raised by several countries, in what appeared to be a revolt, especially from the Latin American region.

These included **Colombia** for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, **Panama**, **Uruguay**, **Argentina**, **Paraguay** and **Sierra Leone** who raised objections to the decision adopted under the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and wanted the decision reopened to address their concerns. The **European Union**, **Switzerland** and **Canada** also raised concerns about the GGA decision. Colombia also raised objections to the decision on the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) and wanted changes to the text. (See details below.)

Several other countries from the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, the **African Group**, **BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China)** and **Russia** took the floor to support the COP 30 Presidency’s approach, clearly concerned that if the delicate political package of decisions were unravelled, then the climate talks were at risk.

This led to a suspension of the plenary for over an hour, before it resumed with Corrêa do Lago saying that he deeply regretted that he was “not made aware of the requests from the floor”. Taking into account the concerns raised by several Parties and based on a consultation with the secretariat members, he said the GGA decision “provides for further refinement of framework” and that this would be taken up by the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) in 2026, who will “work further on these two issues [the GGA and the MWP] on the basis of the work done at this session”. He also added that “the secretariat has confirmed that decisions that have been gavelled are considered adopted”

and that “today’s procedures must be avoided” and requested the secretariat to prepare guidelines and best practices on the process.

**Saudi Arabia** sought clarification on what was meant by the President regarding the work by the SBs next year on the GGA and the MWP “on the basis of the work done at this session”. Corrêa do Lago clarified and confirmed that the work will be based on the respective decisions agreed to in Belém.

Proceedings then continued, with further decisions adopted. When the time came for statements by Parties to be delivered, many provided their reflections on the decisions adopted (see below).

### **The key decisions adopted**

Several key decisions were adopted as part of the Belém Political Package. Chief among them was the “Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change”. This decision was a result of hectic informal consultations facilitated by the COP Presidency throughout the two weeks of the talks that began on 10 November. On 21 November, the day COP 30 was scheduled to conclude, difficult negotiations went on throughout the night to hammer out the sticky issues and arrive at a compromise that resulted in the final text that has now been adopted as the Mutirão decision.

Among the key outcomes of the Mutirão decision are:

- (i) a decision “to launch the Global Implementation Accelerator, as a cooperative, facilitative and voluntary initiative under the guidance of the Presidencies of the seventh and eighth sessions (November 2026) of the CMA to accelerate implementation across all actors to keep 1.5°C within reach and supporting countries in implementing their nationally determined contributions [NDCs] and national adaptation plans [NAPs]”;
- (ii) a call “for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 ... [and] urges developed country Parties to increase the trajectory of their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties”;
- (iii) the establishment of “a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement in the context of Article 9 ... as a whole” (Article 9.1 relates to the mandatory provision of

finance by developed countries to developing countries);

- (iv) “Requests the subsidiary bodies to hold a dialogue [in June 2026, June 2027 and June 2028], with the participation of Parties and other stakeholders, including the International Trade Centre, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the World Trade Organization, to consider opportunities, challenges and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade ... decides to exchange experiences and views on related matters at a high-level event in 2028 and requests the subsidiary bodies to present a report summarizing the discussions at the high-level event”. (This is in response to a call by the LMDC to address unilateral trade measures.)

Other key decisions under the Belém Political Package related to: the GGA; the JTWP; the MWP; matters related to the global stocktake (GST); matters relating to finance in the COP, CMP and CMA agendas, in particular, the Veredas Dialogue, building on the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue on the scope of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the PA; the Technology Implementation Programme (TIP); reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the PA; provision of financial and technical support to developing country Parties for reporting and capacity building; and the Belém gender action plan.

### **COP 30 Presidency roadmaps on deforestation and fossil fuels**

After adopting the decisions under the Belém Political Package, Corrêa do Lago said that as the COP 30 President, it was his “duty to recognize some important discussions that took place in Belém and that need to continue under Brazilian presidency until the next COP, even if they are not reflected in this text we just approved”.

“As [Brazil’s] President Lula said, we need roadmaps so that humanity, in a just and planned manner, can overcome its dependence on fossil fuels, halt and reverse deforestation, and mobilize resources for these purposes.” These roadmaps, said Corrêa do Lago, would be “led by science and they will be inclusive with the spirit of Mutirão”. He said his presidency will “convene high-level dialogues, gathering key international organizations, governments from both producing

and consuming countries, industries, workers, scholars, and civil society organizations, and will report back to the COP. We will also benefit from the first international conference to phase out fossil fuels [organized by Colombia] scheduled to take place in April in Colombia in 2026.”

(The proposal for a roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels, initially discussed outside the formal negotiations, had become a major flashpoint when Colombia and the EU sought to insert it into the Mutirão decision during the final stretch of talks.)

### **The drama after the gavelling of decisions**

Right after the above decisions were gavelled, several Parties took the floor to express their views on two decisions: on the GGA and the MWP. Some of these Parties had raised their flags before these decisions were gavelled, but were given the floor only after the decisions had been adopted.

**Panama** expressed its disappointment with the process because its repeated requests for the floor had been ignored by the Presidency. It said, “We cannot endorse the GGA outcome that takes us backwards.” It said the GGA indicators were released very late, and the ones that made it to the final text are not the same as those that were negotiated by Parties over the last two weeks. “This is not how we get the GGA,” it said.

**Uruguay**, speaking for **Argentina**, **Paraguay** and itself, said it cannot support the GGA outcome. It proposed that work on the indicators be continued on the basis of the decision proposed by the Presidency and concluded by September 2026.

**Sierra Leone** also expressed concerns about the GGA indicators and said the list in the final text is “not the list crafted by experts” and is “unclear, unmeasurable, and in many cases unusable”.

**Colombia**, for **AILAC**, said that “this COP was meant to be a COP of adaptation”. “The outcome before us falls far short,” it said, adding that Parties’ views were not “meaningfully reflected” in the GGA decision.

**Switzerland** said the reduction of indicators from 100 to 59 was done through limited consultations and that it “had concerns about a number of indicators”.

The **EU** said the GGA indicators package was not in line with Articles 7, 9 and 13 of the PA (relating to adaptation, finance and the transparency framework), and that it “will not be able to support these indicators at this moment”.

**Colombia** also raised its objection on the adoption of the MWP decision and expressed concerns about the “procedural issues” in the plenary due to the manner in which the decision was gavelled. It said the point of order it had raised before the adoption of this decision had been ignored by the Presidency, and that it was left “with no other choice but to object to the MWP unless mention is made to include text that for a global dialogue in 2026 ... [on] industry and pathways for implementing transition away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner”. It added that “there is no mitigation if we cannot discuss transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner”. **Panama** supported Colombia’s objection to the MWP decision.

**Nigeria** opposed Colombia’s proposal and said that “the transition pathway should strictly adhere to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) and ensure that national structures and economic reality are respected. It said it recognized the urgency of climate change and emphasized that a “successful transition cannot be imposed ... but rather it should be a deliberate process that is nationally determined”.

Since the decisions had already been gavelled, attempts to reopen them were not entertained by the Presidency.

When the plenary was opened for statements from Parties, reflections on the decisions adopted were expressed. The main highlights are provided below.

### **Highlights of interventions**

**Marina Silva, Brazil’s Minister of Environment and Climate Change**, said both roadmaps that were launched by the COP 30 Presidency – on transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner, and on reversing deforestation – will be guided by science and inclusivity. Listing out some of the key achievements of COP 30, she said, “We took an important step in recognizing the role of the indigenous peoples, traditional communities and Afro-descendant people. A just transition has gained voice and substance through the presence of these groups. We launched the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF), an innovative mechanism [an initiative of Brazil] that values those who conserve and maintain tropical forests. The text of the Global Mutirão has opened an important door for advancing adaptation with developed



countries committing to triple adaptation finance up by 2035. This effort also includes instruments to address the ambition gap of nationally determined contributions such as the Global Implementation Accelerator. It strengthens the alignment of the NDCs with development and investment policies and it recognizes the need to reshape international mitigation finance.” She called these results “fundamental gains for multilateralism”. The minister received a standing ovation after she delivered her remarks.

**Iraq**, for the **G77 and China**, highlighted the importance of “tripling adaptation finance and its inclusion in the COP 30 outcomes”. On the just transition outcome, it said “we celebrate the establishment of the just transition mechanism as a historic milestone”, adding that “for developing countries, this achievement is more than an institutional step. It is a symbol of hope, solidarity and a promise that the international community will stand together to ensure that no nation and no community is left behind. We urge that this mechanism be swiftly operationalized at the next Conference of the Parties so that its vision can be translated into tangible support for those most in need.”

On the GST, it said the group looks forward to the launch of the second GST next year, also to “constructive conversations” that will take place under the agreed scope and modalities for the UAE dialogue and the annual GST dialogue. On loss and damage, it welcomed the decision on the third WIM review, as well as the decisions on transparency in which Parties “have established the consultative group of experts (CGE) as a permanent body and established a three-year programme of activities with an initial list to be implemented in 2026”. It called on developed countries to “provide the much-needed support for the CGE to fulfil its mandate and for the secretariat to implement the three-year programme of activities starting within the initial list”. It also said that the true breakthrough on technology items at COP 30 lay in the work achieved on the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), adding that “by agreeing on new functions and hosting criteria, we have made this Centre fit for [addressing] climate change”. It also appreciated the adoption of the new gender action plan and cautioned that “secured and strengthened financing and means of implementation” must be ensured so that the plan “can be effectively delivered”.

**India**, for the **LMDC**, said “we have had some hard fights here and there have been some gains especially on the just transition mechanism which will enable the just transition for developing countries”. It said further that “although we did not get a work programme to just focus on the implementation of Article 9.1 of the PA, we believe that we have managed to secure some space to discuss the very important provision of finance from the developed countries”. The same was the case, it said, in relation to unilateral trade measures, where “we are glad there's a space at least now to discuss trade and climate linkages”. It also recognized progress on the GGA work.

It added, “We have faced immense roadblocks from our partners in this COP on issues that are of critical importance to all of us. We would have finished the COP on time but for the continued resistance on an agreement to deliver on adaptation finance.” It expressed regret about the efforts made “to dilute the provisions of the tripling of adaptation finance from year 2030 to 2035”. It said “adaptation is not a choice for developing countries and providing adaptation finance is a legal obligation of the developed countries but over the past 14 hours and huddles we have seen attempts to dilute legal obligations on adaptation finance”. It said “we have seen requests for proposals that change the architecture of the PA and infringe on national sovereignty”, adding that “at a time when we need to save multilateralism, such attempts are indeed disturbing. Demanding inclusion of non-negotiated items on the last two days of COP does not engender trust [an apparent reference to the roadmap on the fossil fuel transition].”

Said India further, “In the 20-odd hours we negotiated last night we heard calls for annual NDC enhancement without any consideration of the burden of both reporting and preparing NDCs that would be put on developing countries.” It said LMDCs “have the highest climate ambition and also implementation in this room despite our low historical responsibility and capabilities. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of those who seem to be the most vocal on advocating the transitioning away from fossil fuels.” It said further that “adaptation is our priority. Our regime is not mitigation-centric. We have all signed on to the PA, where it is sufficiently clear that the developed countries must take the lead and provide the means of implementation support to developing countries. Even with our challenges we as

developing countries are already doing more than our fair share. The facts remain that for developing countries, eradicating poverty, ensuring energy security and achieving sustainable development remains our overriding priority.”

It called on developed countries to “not shift the goalposts, to not infringe on the policy space of developing countries, and to stop diluting equity and CBDR, which are cornerstone principles”.

**Tanzania**, for the **African Group**, said the work concluded in Belém on the GGA, including its indicators, is an “important step”. It however cautioned that “indicators alone cannot protect a family from rising waters or yield harvest during a prolonged drought. Without means of implementation, finance, technology, capacity, these indicators remain elegant words on paper. This is why the absence of clear support for implementing national adaptation plans carries real consequences ... when they remain unfunded, it is not simply a gap in their agenda, it is a missing opportunity to safeguard communities who live each day on the edge of climate extreme conditions.”

It said the just transition work at Belém “touches on Africa’s longstanding commitment to pursue a just and inclusive transition. For us, transition is not about abandoning our development aspirations; it is about reimagining them. A just transition must expand energy access to the hundreds of millions of Africans still in darkness, bring clean cooking alternatives to the 900 million who rely on biomass, and unlock opportunities for industrialization and innovation. It must create jobs, advance dignity and strengthen economies, not impose new constraints. Africa therefore urges that the central role of minerals, manufacturing and value addition be fully recognized, for these sectors are foundational to a fair global transition.”

**Malawi**, for the **Least Developed Countries**, said that Parties in Belém have “taken a step forward in strengthening multilateralism”. However, it was not satisfied with the GGA outcome and called it “very weak”. It lamented the lack of means of implementation in the NAP and expressed disappointment with the GST. It called the outcomes on transparency, capacity building and technology “weak” but appreciated the progress made on matters related to loss and damage, just transition and other finance agenda items. It said it had come to the COP with the message of tripling adaptation finance by 2030 based on 2025 levels, with this finance to be grant-based. However, developing countries did not get

this. It called paragraph 53 of the Mutirão decision “weak” and said “we compromised” following the long hours of work.

**Palau**, for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, expressed concerns and disappointment with the GGA decision and the associated set of indicators. It said the “recent International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion also reaffirmed the 1.5°C temperature limit as a legal limit. We call for a space here at the COP to discuss how to get us back towards 1.5°C. This is vital not just for small islands, but for all of us.” It called the Mutirão decision important, even though it was an imperfect one. It said it was committed to working towards keeping 1.5°C within reach. It welcomed the outcomes on loss and damage, the CTCN, the TIP, carbon markets, the gender and climate action plan, just transition, capacity building, and finance, particularly for adaptation. It expressed concerns about the MWP “failing to deliver on the scaling up of ambition and implementation in this critical decade in a manner that complements the GST”.

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **Arab Group**, said that “there are different roles for developed and developing countries and we must also recognize the different pathways which will respect the different circumstances of each country. We must also respect national sovereignty and the NDCs which have been crafted.”

It said equity is most important for achieving climate action and called it the “true spirit of multilateralism”. It added that “multilateralism is not empty words, it’s based on cooperation”, and that “each state must be allowed to build its own path which will be based on their respective circumstances including their respective economies and societies”. It said further that “the main message we can take away from this COP is that the implementation pathway will define climate action and also the priorities for climate actions” and for “an enabling international environment which will allow us to cooperate”.

**Colombia**, for **AILAC**, said it had hoped for more ambitious outcomes on mitigation, adaptation and finance. It said there is a need to take “more decisive action and more quickly”. It recognized “some progress” made on tripling adaptation finance but said “regrettably it’s not at all clear how much of this finance will be forthcoming from developed countries and if it will be available before 2035”. It hoped “there will be a quick scaling up of this”. It also said that “the transition away from fossil fuels must be authentic and must not be put off. There must be effective

redistribution of resources towards communities, workers and the clean economies of the future and above all it must be supported by appropriate finance". It welcomed the adoption of the just transition mechanism but said questions remain about its governance and how its effectiveness and credibility will be ensured. It welcomed the adoption of the Belém gender plan.

**Venezuela**, for **Cuba**, itself and other members of the **Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA)**, said that the decisions adopted are not perfect, and underscored "the need for means of implementation so that we can meet our climate targets, in particular tripling adaptation finance". It said in the "COP of Truth", "it is time for developed countries to meet their financial obligations and commitments. It is time to move on to implementation with political will without double standards and respecting the sovereignty of each state party, our realities and those of our peoples." It also added that "the criminal unilateral coercive measures must be immediately lifted because they have a direct impact on the capacity [of countries] to respond to climate crisis".

**Denmark**, for the **EU**, said "the package in front of us, to some extent, is a missed opportunity". Nevertheless, it said, "the EU will not stand in the way of this package", adding that the EU is "the world's largest provider of climate finance" and "welcomes the agreement on scaling up adaptation finance. The decisions also allow us to continue work on the energy transition, including the transition away from fossil fuels. Global action must happen with continued respect for human rights, the rights of indigenous people, equity, and the rights of women and girls." It said further that the EU "looks very much forward to engaging in shaping the roadmap for transition away from fossil fuels and the roadmap for forests that can hopefully turn into a lasting legacy of Belém".

**Switzerland**, for the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, said it endorsed "the Belém mission 1.5 and the Global Implementation Accelerator to enable us to keep 1.5 within reach and to guide implementation of the GST outcome". It said Parties "have reaffirmed the new collective

quantified goal on finance and taken an important step toward supporting the most vulnerable". Referring to the GST outcome from Dubai, it said "after committing to halting deforestation and degradation and transitioning away from fossil fuels, we need to better understand how to manage its transitions in a manner that is just and informed by science". It welcomed the launching of the roadmaps on forests and fossil fuels by the COP 30 Presidency. On the just transition outcome, it welcomed the inclusion of reference to 1.5°C, the GST, human rights and gender, and said it would work together to craft "an effective new mechanism". On gender, it recognized the inclusion of "crucial aspects like care, violence against women, and reference to all women and girls in the Belém gender action plan".

**Australia**, for the **Umbrella Group**, welcomed "the establishment of the Belém mission to 1.5 and the Global Implementation Accelerator to help drive implementation, cooperation and investment in climate action". It said it is "concerned about the unwillingness to take forward the implementation of the GST. This was a landmark outcome that charts the path towards achieving the goals of Paris and keeping 1.5 degrees within reach. We cannot backslide. We are gravely concerned about attempts to undermine the science." It welcomed the "reconfirmation of the IPCC status as the best available science and its critical work in informing action and policymaking".

It added, "Adaptation and adaptation finance are important and we recognize the call to accelerate adaptation finance." It took note of the set of indicators to track progress towards the GGA but expressed disappointment with the outcomes under the MWP and underscored the need "to make progress". It said "halting and reversing deforestation is critical for our mitigation efforts and this should have been recognized". It welcomed the agreement on the TIP and "the review of the Climate Technology Centre to further promote technology development and transfer from 2026". It also welcomed the further "strengthening of the JTWP" but expressed disappointment with the minimal progress made "on taking forward the GST outcomes".

# TWN

## ***Belém Climate News Update 14***

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### **COP 30 secures breakthrough on a “just transition mechanism”**

Belém, 24 November (Hilary Kung) – COP 30 marked a landmark victory for developing countries with the consensus to develop a just transition mechanism (JTM).

According to seasoned observers, what once seemed unattainable was achieved through the united front of the G77 and China, reinforced by the decisive leadership of the Brazilian Presidency. Equally crucial were the tireless efforts of civil society organizations, whose persistent pressure compelled developed countries, long resistant to the idea, to finally accept the creation of the mechanism.

The closing plenary, which was convened on 22 November afternoon, saw the G77 and China and constituencies representing non-governmental organizations celebrate with loud applause the adopted decision that will establish the just transition mechanism. (For more information on the closing plenary, please see TWN Belém Update 13.)

Until the final hours of the climate talks, there had been uncertainty whether an agreement would be reached, owing to opposition from developed countries. Therefore, agreement to develop the mechanism was viewed as a significant step forward in advancing the work of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), particularly as the work programme is scheduled for review and its continuation will be considered in 2026. (For the background, please see TWN Belém Update 4.)

A major point of contention in Belém was how the concerns of developing countries regarding unilateral trade measures (UTMs), including carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs), should be addressed within the JTWP. There was no consensus to include this issue in the final JTWP decision. It was however addressed in

the “Global Mutirão: uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change” decision.

The final JTWP decision also saw a compromise list of 22 key messages from the four dialogues held under the programme (with a chapeau noting their non-exhaustive nature), and invited Parties and non-Party stakeholders to consider them when designing and supporting just transition pathways in line with national circumstances, priorities and capabilities, as applicable (see below for further details).

With respect to the review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the work programme and the consideration of its continuation in November 2026, Parties agreed to request “the subsidiary bodies to develop terms of reference for the review at their sixty-fourth sessions” (which will be in June 2026) and “also requests the subsidiary bodies to consider, inter alia, ways to improve existing modalities in developing the terms of reference ... without prejudice to the outcome of the consideration of the continuation of the work programme”.

#### **The just transition mechanism**

The adopted JTWP decision states that Parties agree “to develop a just transition mechanism, the purpose of which will be to enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing, and enable equitable, inclusive just transitions”. The decision also notes that the new mechanism “is to be implemented in a manner that builds on and complements relevant workstreams under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including the work programme”.

In terms of timeline, Parties requested the “subsidiary bodies at their sixty-fourth sessions (June 2026) to recommend a draft decision on the

process for [the mechanism's] operationalization for consideration by the CMA at its eighth session (November 2026)".

The decision, "in the spirit of *mutirão*", also invites Parties and non-Party stakeholders to submit their views on the process for the development and operationalization of the mechanism by 15 March 2026.

During the negotiations in Belém, the **G77 and China** had proposed the establishment of the JTM. However, due to disagreement from developed countries, sources informed TWN, the language "develop a just transition mechanism" was presented as a possible landing zone, as part of the delicate balance of the overall texts.

[The **European Union** first proposed a Just Transition Action Plan (JTAP) as an alternative to the G77 and China's JTM, during the contact group meeting on 14 November. The **United Kingdom** expressed its support for the JTAP during the third high-level ministerial roundtable dialogue held on 20 November. The other developed countries, by and large, maintained their earlier positions on either improving existing modalities, developing a policy toolbox or mapping all existing initiatives on just transition. (Further details on the third high-level ministerial roundtable dialogue are provided below.)]

In the adopted decision, Parties also agreed to request "the secretariat to map relevant instruments, initiatives and processes under the Convention and the Paris Agreement and relevant entities in the United Nations system to support the implementation of the work programme and as input to the review ... and also requests the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report...".

On means of implementation and international cooperation, the adopted decision agreed on the following:

- "Recognizes the need for enhanced support to be provided to developing country Parties for developing and implementing nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans and long-term low-emission development strategies that incorporate consideration of just transition pathways...";
- "Emphasizes that means of implementation, including capacity-building, climate finance, and technology development and transfer, as well as enhanced international cooperation, are essential to facilitating the pursuit of just transition pathways that promote sustainable development and poverty eradication in developing country Parties, while noting that

high debt burdens and limited fiscal space may hinder such efforts";

- "Recalls that scaling up new and additional grant-based, highly concessional finance and non-debt instruments remains critical to supporting developing countries, particularly as they transition in a just and equitable manner";
- "Acknowledges that developing country Parties may lack the institutional and financial capacity to achieve just transitions on their own and that global partnerships and capacity-building initiatives can provide valuable contributions in this context and recognizes that the work programme has the potential to promote and enhance the role of international cooperation and partnerships in relation to the provision of capacity-building and technical and financial assistance".

### Unilateral trade measures

Another contentious issue in Belém regarding the JTWP was on how the concerns of developing countries over UTMs, including CBAMs, would be addressed within the work programme.

The JTWP was supposed to deal with this issue but since the matter was being dealt with under the Mutirão decision, there was no need for the JTWP outcome to deal with it. In the Global Mutirão decision, paragraph 56 "Reaffirms that Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change and also reaffirms that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade".

Paragraph 57 "Requests the subsidiary bodies to hold a dialogue at their sixty-fourth [June 2026], sixty-sixth (June 2027) and sixty-eighth sessions (June 2028), with the participation of Parties and other stakeholders, including the International Trade Centre, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the World Trade Organization, to consider opportunities, challenges and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade, taking into account paragraph 56 above, decides to exchange experiences and views on related matters at a high-level event in 2028 and requests the subsidiary

bodies to present a report summarizing the discussions at the high-level event”.

### Some other main aspects of the adopted decision

Regarding the high-level messages emerging from the four JTWP dialogues, there were divergences among Parties between those prioritizing calls for increased mitigation ambition and a fossil fuel phase-out [such as the **UK**, the **EU**, the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, **New Zealand**, **Australia**, **Canada**, the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)** and the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**] and those emphasizing the aspect of international cooperation, means of implementation, and the right to development [including the **African Group**, the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, the **Arab Group** and the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**].

The final decision presented a compromise list of 22 key messages, introduced with a chapeau that “recognizes the following [key messages] on a non-exhaustive basis”, and accompanied by a paragraph inviting “Parties and non-Party stakeholders to consider the key messages ... in designing, implementing and supporting just transition pathways in line with national circumstances, priorities and capabilities, as applicable”.

Concerning the most controversial paragraph that links energy access and clean cooking fuels with transitioning away from fossil fuels, the final adopted text reads, “[Recognizes] The importance of facilitating universal access to clean, reliable, affordable and sustainable energy for all, including through the scaled-up deployment of renewable energy and access to clean cooking, and that such efforts may promote energy security, while acknowledging that pathways to energy transitions will vary by country in accordance with national circumstances.” (For background on the controversial paragraph in Bonn, please see [TWN update](#).)

Another key message is on “the importance of just transition pathways that respect, promote and fulfil all human rights and labour rights, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, the right to health, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, people of African descent, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations, and the right to development, as well as gender equality,

empowerment of women and intergenerational equity”.

The final agreed text saw a change from the earlier reference to “human rights approaches” to “promote and fulfil all human rights and labour rights”. This was a concern repeatedly raised by **Cuba**, which said that the phrase “human rights approaches” “is not recognized in the intergovernmental process as concept in the [UN] Human Rights Council” and that “there is no UN General Assembly resolution that defines this ... it is a controversial concept”.

Some other key and significant messages, as reflected in paragraph 12 of the adopted decision, include:

- “That the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities should guide just transition efforts”;
- “The importance of ensuring broad and meaningful participation involving all relevant stakeholders, including workers affected by transitions, informal workers, people in vulnerable situations, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants and internally displaced persons, people of African descent, women, children, youth, elderly people and persons with disabilities, to enable effective, inclusive and participatory just transition pathways”;
- “The importance of education systems and skills development, including through upskilling and reskilling that respond to labour market needs, of labour rights and social protection systems, and of consideration of the informal sector, the care economy, unemployed people and future workers for ensuring just transitions”;
- “The importance of the rights of Indigenous Peoples and of obtaining their free, prior and informed consent in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the importance of ensuring that all just transition pathways respect and promote the internationally recognized collective and individual rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the rights to self-determination, and acknowledge the rights and protections for Indigenous Peoples in voluntary isolation and initial contact, in accordance with relevant international human rights instruments and principles”;
- “The importance of participatory approaches and of involving affected communities in

- the development of adaptation measures, noting that affected communities must also be central to the design and implementation of adaptation and climate resilience measures in the context of just transition pathways and that one-size-fits-all solutions should be avoided”;
- “The connection between just transition pathways and ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, including through the use of ecosystem-based adaptation approaches”;
  - “That universal, affordable and reliable energy access can be central to nationally defined just transition pathways, particularly in addressing energy poverty”;
  - “The need for scaling up access to clean cooking, highlighting the many co-benefits of clean cooking in terms of, inter alia, health, gender equality, the environment and livelihoods”;
  - “That energy transitions towards low-carbon economies may include socioeconomic risks and opportunities, noting the role of nationally determined just energy transition pathways in minimizing risks and maximizing opportunities associated with these transitions”;
  - “The need to address barriers, including limited institutional capacity, implementation gaps, and financial and technical constraints faced by developing country Parties in the context of just transitions”;
  - “The importance of strengthening international cooperation on mobilizing finance, technology and capacity-building support for facilitating the implementation of nationally determined just transitions in a socially inclusive and equitable manner”;
  - “The importance of continued efforts to support just transitions through measures that avoid exacerbating debt burdens and create fiscal space for countries to advance on pathways towards low emissions and climate-resilient development”.
- Further, the decision also “underscores that relevant instruments and initiatives may provide elements for consideration in designing and implementing nationally determined just transition pathways, including the International Labour Organization guidelines for a just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all, the UN Global Accelerator on Jobs and Social Protection for Just Transitions, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and calls upon partners in relevant initiatives and organizations outside the UNFCCC process to take into account the key messages from the work programme in their implementation efforts”.
- These messages were viewed as being very significant, especially by civil society groups.

#### **High-level ministerial roundtable**

Meanwhile, the third annual high-level ministerial roundtable on just transition, co-chaired by Minister Alicia Bárcena Ibarra of Mexico and Minister Krzysztof Bolesła of Poland, took place on 20 November.

The roundtable saw strong and united calls from all developing countries and NGO constituencies for the establishment of a JTM, while the EU’s proposal for a JTAP was supported by the UK. Many Parties reiterated their previous positions on the key messages and views on the institutional arrangements.

# TWN

## *Belém Climate News Update 15*

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### **Third WIM review strengthens loss and damage pillar in the climate regime**

Penang, 27 November (Jinghann Hong and Inderera Ramjee) – The third review of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts was formally adopted after two years of technical negotiations, which concluded at COP 30 in Belém.

The final adopted draft decision includes several elements that were a matter of great priority for developing country Parties, such as the preparation of various knowledge products, including those to support the voluntary integration of loss and damage (L&D) into national response planning, and a global “State of Loss and Damage” report highlighting L&D support needs. The final decision also calls for expedited delivery of technical assistance under the Santiago Network, enhanced coordination and complementarity among the three L&D bodies [the WIM Executive Committee (ExCom), the Santiago Network, and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD)], and improved accessibility and outreach of the WIM outputs, including clear messaging on improving the user-friendliness, relevance and dissemination of its technical products. It also recognizes the need for enhanced action and support, including finance, technology and capacity building, for L&D, including for the continued and enhanced implementation of the WIM.

In doing so, the outcome of the third WIM review adopted at Belém has laid the groundwork for further strengthening and solidifying L&D as a key pillar of the multilateral climate change action regime under the Convention and its Paris Agreement. The decision provides the constituted bodies under the WIM, including the ExCom and the Santiago Network (with its Advisory Board and secretariat), with clear operational guidance and additional mandates that, when fully implemented,

would provide Parties with increased knowledge and better access to technical assistance and other support, including finance, for the implementation of their L&D actions under the Convention and its Paris Agreement.

Since the launch of the third WIM review at COP 29 in Baku (see [TWN update](#)), and continuing on at the June 2025 SBs session in Bonn (see [TWN update](#)) and at COP 30 in Belém, Parties have spent more than 70 hours of negotiating time together to agree on an outcome. While developing and developed countries were often far apart on many issues in the beginning, all Parties eventually produced a positive outcome from the WIM review that would further strengthen the L&D architecture for the benefit of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

In the course of the two weeks of talks on the WIM review at COP 30, there were a number of significant issues that were the subject of extensive negotiations and on which Parties showed flexibility and willingness to compromise, and which were eventually reflected in the adopted decision text.

For example, the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)** had proposed, in relation to paragraph 7 of the WIM review decision, that the Santiago Network should also promote and integrate into its work the conflict-sensitive approach and the “do no harm” principle, taking into account fragile and conflict-affected situations. This proposal gave rise to significant concerns from the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)** and **Group SUR**, which argued that it could open the door for the introduction of approaches or principles that were developed under the international humanitarian



law regime but had not yet been discussed in the UNFCCC context. Other groups, such as the **Arab Group** and the **African Group**, were open to the EIG proposal but wanted greater clarity on what it would mean.

After much intense discussion, the EIG, the Arab Group, AILAC and Group SUR were able to develop the following compromise language in paragraph 7 that revolved around locally led approaches that protect vulnerable communities and consider the context of displacement: “Requests the Santiago network to enhance its efforts to catalyse the provision of technical assistance by relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts to developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, while promoting, as appropriate, locally led approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage that protect vulnerable communities and consider the context of displacement.”

Another contentious issue was in relation to paragraph 10 of the WIM decision, which recalled the existing mandate coming from paragraph 27 of decision 6/CMA.5 and invited the Advisory Board of the Santiago Network “to provide guidance to the Santiago network secretariat on developing guidelines and procedures for enabling access to and assisting in preparing requests for technical assistance that recognize the significant capacity constraints of the least developed countries and small island developing States”.

To complement this, the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** proposed the inclusion of a similar new paragraph that would refer to developing countries at large. Following discussions, the Parties agreed (in paragraph 11 of the decision) to invite “the Advisory Board of the Santiago network to consider expediting the provision of support for accessing technical assistance and preparing requests for technical assistance to developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, including through possible enhancements to existing guidelines and procedures, as appropriate”.

The issue of the cost-effectiveness of the Santiago Network secretariat also proved contentious, with **Kenya** pushing for explicit language that would essentially allude to what it perceived to be the high administrative costs that may be associated with the secretariat’s location in Geneva, Switzerland, while **Switzerland** and the rest of the **EIG** opposed having such language.

Following intensive informal discussions between these Parties facilitated by the Brazilian Presidency on the WIM review agenda item in the late afternoon of 21 November, and eventually with the concurrence of all other Parties, paragraph 14(b) of the WIM review decision was agreed upon, which requested the Advisory Board of the Santiago Network to, inter alia, “Be guided by the aim of maximizing impact in its budgetary decisions, avoiding administrative burden with a view to maximizing cost-effectiveness and to ensuring the timely, efficient and effective delivery of technical assistance in developing countries, and ensure that the largest possible proportion of its resources and annual budget goes to technical assistance and capacity-building activities to support developing countries prepare their technical assistance requests.”

The Parties also agreed to request the WIM ExCom, in paragraph 17(b) of the decision, to “update, by its 25th meeting, the terms of reference, including with regard to membership, and plan of action of the expert group on action and support [ASEG] in the light of the evolving loss and damage landscape, noting the cross-cutting nature of action and support, and ensure that action and support are systematically considered in the work of its other expert groups, technical expert group and task force in order to promote synergy and consistency in their work”.

This is intended to ensure that considerations on enhancing L&D-related action and support are taken into account in the work of the ExCom and its expert groups and the task force in a systematic and cross-cutting manner. The **African Group** had stressed the need for such cross-cutting consideration in relation to the work of the ASEG, while the **EU**, the **EIG** and members of the **Umbrella Group** had sought greater clarification on what was intended by such a statement and what its systemic implications might be. Following much discussion, the Parties agreed on the adopted formulation in paragraph 17(b) quoted above.

In addition to other knowledge products mandated to be developed by the ExCom under paragraph 17 of the decision, a particularly contentious item was eventually agreed upon by the Parties. AILAC, the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** and the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** had originally proposed to have the ExCom develop voluntary guidance on how Parties could integrate, as appropriate, loss and damage considerations into their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). This was

opposed by the **Arab Group** due to concerns that having such guidance could prejudice future discussions on NDC features that are due to start in 2026, while the **African Group** stressed that such guidance should only be with respect to national loss and damage response plans.

Following intense discussions both within the **G77 and China** and with other Parties, and in a spirit of flexibility and solidarity, compromise language was eventually developed together by the **Arab Group** and **AILAC**, and agreed to by other Parties, that then became paragraph 17(i) of the decision, which requests the ExCom to “develop voluntary, discretionary and non-prescriptive knowledge products on how Parties could, as appropriate, develop and integrate consideration of loss and damage into national response plans”.

### Global “State of Loss and Damage” report

Another key outcome for developing countries is the global “State of L&D” report. While developed countries had previously not been convinced of its necessity, considering it as potentially duplicative of other reports produced by various bodies or entities outside of the UNFCCC, developing countries through the **G77 and China** and their respective subgroups firmly maintained the necessity for such a report to be produced under the UNFCCC, as it would provide an authoritative, internationally recognized source of information on L&D, including critical data on L&D support needs.

The final adopted decision states that Parties agree to “prepare a regular report ... for the purpose of synthesizing information from Parties and other stakeholders on critical issues and lessons learned and providing best practices, solutions and policy advice in relation to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, in an accessible and user-friendly manner by:

- “(a) Providing regular, concrete information on scientific, policy, financial and technical work in the global response to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage;
- (b) Providing a comprehensive source of information on loss and damage under the Convention and the Paris Agreement;
- (c) Showcasing case studies, best practices, practical and pragmatic lessons learned, innovative solutions, projections of risk, scenarios and solutions on risk analysis by capturing occurrences, typologies and costs of loss and damage at the national level in

all regions and across all types of climate-related hazards;

- (d) Showcasing national- and community-level experience and promoting understanding of ways of integrating cross-cutting vulnerability analyses, taking into consideration the eleventh preambular paragraph of the Paris Agreement,<sup>10</sup> into efforts in averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”.

Footnote 10 states: “Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, and that Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.” This is a verbatim reiteration of the eleventh preambular paragraph of the Paris Agreement.

The inclusion of footnote 10 was in response to the original proposal of **AOSIS**, **AILAC** and the **LDCs**, supported by the **EU**, the **EIG** and members of the **Umbrella Group**, to have an explicit inclusion of human rights analyses as part of the report. Following intense discussions and negotiations among the Parties over concerns raised by the **Arab Group** on such explicit reference, and consistent with how previous COP/CMA decisions relating to loss and damage have included references to the Paris Agreement’s eleventh preambular paragraph, the footnote formulation was initially proposed by the Arab Group and eventually agreed by all other Parties as the compromise solution. (Previous COP/CMA decisions relating to loss and damage that contained similar formulations include decision 10/CP.24, decision 2/CMA.2, decision 12/CMA.4 endorsed by decision 11/CP.27, decision 5/CM.5, and decision 7/CMA.5 endorsed by decision 2/CP.28.)

Inputs for this report would come from a wide array of sources, including:

- “(a) Information provided by Parties, including through voluntary submissions, related to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage in relevant national policies, plans, strategies and frameworks, particularly loss and damage response plans, including multi-

- hazard disaster risk reduction strategies, as well as in their biennial transparency reports, nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans;
- (b) Best available science, including inputs and information from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change relating to loss and damage;
  - (c) Indigenous Peoples' knowledge and the knowledge systems of local communities;
  - (d) Reports and publications from members of the Santiago network designated as organizations, bodies, networks and experts;
  - (e) Joint annual reports of the Executive Committee and the Santiago network;
  - (f) Knowledge products of the Executive Committee and the Santiago network;
  - (g) Synthesis reports prepared by the secretariat on information on loss and damage provided by Parties in their biennial transparency reports;
  - (h) Reports of the Standing Committee on Finance submitted to the Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
  - (i) Annual reports of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage;
  - (j) Relevant documents prepared at the regional level."

As for who would prepare and produce this report, Parties agreed that designated members of the Santiago Network comprising organizations, bodies, networks and experts (OBNEs) would do so, with Parties requesting "the Advisory Board of the Santiago network, in consultation with the Executive Committee, to prepare, no later than at the 7th meeting of the Advisory Board, terms of reference, covering modalities, budget, timeline and engagement and involvement of organizations, bodies, networks and experts".

In the adopted decision, Parties also agreed to request the Santiago Network Advisory Board and the OBNEs to "present a draft of the report to Parties at an appropriate event to be held at the sessions of the subsidiary bodies prior to its finalization and publication", which would allow for Parties to provide feedback before the report is finalized and published.

The decision also notes that this report is to be prepared "with a multi-year frequency to be decided at the sessions of the COP and the CMA immediately following the publication of the first report, taking into consideration Parties'

views, including on the value added of the report". Insider sources informed TWN that this language on periodicity was settled upon as a final landing zone between developing countries, who preferred a biennial report, and developed countries, who were reluctant to prejudge the report's production frequency due to the significant workload and resource implications of undertaking such a task, preferring first to produce the report and assess its usefulness before deciding on its frequency. The language in the final decision text thus reflects a delicate balance between these two views.

### Scaling up finance for loss and damage

The issue of scaled-up financing for loss and damage was another key point of contention between developed and developing country Parties during the third WIM review negotiations. The **G77 and China** and all of its subgroups, especially the **African Group**, highlighted that the WIM review should have a political statement on the need for such scaled-up financing to be channelled for loss and damage, including through the FRLD, and that such a statement should be reflected in operational language such as establishing funding targets for the Santiago Network. Developed countries largely argued that any discussions relating to loss and damage financing through the FRLD and which are outside the narrow discussion of financing for the ExCom and the Santiago Network are not within the scope of the WIM review, but rather should be discussed under the agenda item relating to the provision of COP/CMA guidance to the FRLD.

This clash of views occupied much of the negotiating time during the first week of the L&D negotiations in Belém, but was largely resolved by the beginning of the second week following intense negotiations. Compromise language was built around previously agreed language coming from the new collective quantified goal on finance (NCQG) decision in Baku (paragraph 19 of decision 1/CMA.6), which recognized the need for urgent and enhanced action and support for loss and damage. Such language was linked to the continued and enhanced implementation of the WIM and to operationalizing resource mobilization for the Santiago Network secretariat (which had already been mandated to identify fundraising targets as part of the secretariat's resource mobilization strategy adopted by the Advisory Board of the Santiago Network). The agreed paragraphs that reflected this compromise are paragraphs 37, 38 and 39 of the WIM review decision:

“37. Recalls paragraph 19 of decision 1/CMA.6, acknowledging the significant gaps that remain in responding to the increased scale and frequency of loss and damage, and the associated economic and non-economic losses, and recognizes the need for urgent and enhanced action and support for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

“38. Also recalls the paragraphs of decisions 2/CMA.2, 1/CMA.3 and 12/CMA.4, endorsed by decision 11/CP.27, relevant to the continued and enhanced implementation of the Warsaw International Mechanism in the light of the need for enhanced action and support recognized in paragraph 37 above, including for finance, technology and capacity-building, as appropriate;

“39. Requests the Advisory Board of the Santiago network to oversee the work of the Santiago network secretariat to expedite the operationalization of its resource mobilization strategy, including the timely implementation of the approaches contained in the strategy for 2026–2028”.

### **International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion**

There were two other highly contentious issues that featured prominently during the negotiations, but which are not reflected in the adopted decision text. One was on including an explicit reference in the preamble of the decision to the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the obligations of states in respect of climate change. This was proposed by AILAC and AOSIS and supported by the LDCs. However, other Parties (both developed and developing) did not agree, on the grounds that the WIM review decision was not the proper vehicle for having such a reference to the ICJ advisory opinion, that doing so would be premature considering that the UN General Assembly (as the body that requested the ICJ for the advisory opinion) had not yet acted on it, and that, as the advisory opinion was non-binding, it was up to Parties themselves to decide how and when to take it into account in their national systems.

The other issue on which no agreement could be reached was on giving the ExCom a mandate to respond to the invitation of the CMA in paragraph 186 of decision 1/CMA.5 [the outcome of the first global stocktake (GST)] to integrate or take into account the outcomes of the GST in the

development of the future work plans and plans of action of the ExCom’s expert groups and task force. This had been proposed by AOSIS and AILAC and supported by the LDCs, the EU, the EIG and the members of the **Umbrella Group**, but opposed by the **Arab Group** and the **LMDC**.

No agreement or compromise language could be reached among the Parties on these two issues, leading the Presidency to drop them from the text.

### **WIM governance**

A short, 30-minute informal consultation on the governance of the WIM concluded with Parties resuming the longstanding “dual governance” mode under both the COP and the CMA for this session, with the governance issue pushed forward to COP 31.

Conducted by Bruno Carvalho Arruda and Adriana Farias of the COP Presidency, the consultation revisited a decade-long debate over whether the WIM, established under the COP in 2013, should remain under COP authority while recognizing that the CMA also now has authority over the WIM by virtue of Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, or whether the WIM should be placed solely under the CMA.

The Presidency introduced the issue by summarizing the state of play: “Following the Paris Agreement, Parties are divided with regards to the governance of the WIM. Some Parties view CMA as the sole governing body of the WIM, while other Parties have expressed an understanding that both COP and CMA should have authority over WIM, and that the COP has not agreed to relinquish its authority over WIM. Article 8.2 of the Paris Agreement adds the CMA as the WIM’s second governing body, therefore the WIM should be guided by both COP and CMA.”

(Article 8.2 of the Paris Agreement reads: “The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement and may be enhanced and strengthened, as determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.”)

Recalling attempts at previous COPs to resolve the WIM’s governance issue, the Presidency noted, “At COP 23 and COP 24, Parties deferred the consideration of the matter of the COP’s authority over the WIM, without prejudging any outcomes of any future decisions on

the consideration of the governance of the WIM. At COP 25 and COP 26, the Chilean and UK Presidencies respectively held consultations in which Parties expressed flexibility on the shared governance of the WIM, provided that the liability provision, similar to Para 51 of Decision 1/CP.21, which enabled its inclusion of the WIM in the Paris Agreement, applies in the case of the WIM also being under the COP. However, despite a series of extensive consultations, it did not produce an outcome. At COP 27, the Egyptian Presidency held consultations to gauge the scope of resolving the matter. However, no notable convergence was observed and Parties agreed to disagree in a way that would not hinder the technical work on implementation from going forward. At COP 25, COP 26 and COP 27, both COP and CMA decisions noted that considerations related to the governance of the WIM would continue at the subsequent sessions of the two governing bodies. The COP decision at COP 25 noted the CMA decision of the WIM, and the COP 26 and COP 27 decision endorsed the CMA decision.”

The Presidency then opened the floor for Parties to voice their views on whether there was scope for resolving this matter at this COP, and if not, whether Parties would be amenable to deferring consideration of this matter to future sessions of the COP.

The **Philippines**, for the **G77 and China**, took the floor first, stating, “We continue to believe that the WIM continues to be under the Convention, and therefore under the authority of the COP; while at the same time with the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, ... it has also come under the authority of the CMA. This dual governance approach should therefore be reflected in the work that we do with respect to the WIM. At the same time, we understand that other Parties have a different view. In this context, we have evolved an existing mode of work, referring to the governing body or bodies that allow us to proceed with our work. The G77 and China is open to continuing such a mode of work, without prejudice to any future final decision on the governance of the WIM that may be taken on this issue. This would mean, as has now been previous practice under the existing mode of work, the CMA decisions relating to the WIM would be mirrored and adopted by corresponding COP decisions. Pending further consultations, the G77 and China would also be amenable to again deferring this particular agenda item on WIM governance.”

The **LDCs** group aligned itself with the G77 and China on the matter, further elaborating, “The legal understanding of the LDCs is that the WIM is subject to dual governance by both the COP and the CMA. Article 8.2 of the Paris Agreement expanded on the governance of the WIM to include CMA but did not exclude existing governance structures at all. If the exclusion was intended, it would have been clearly indicated in Article 8.2. The interpretation is consistent with the authoritative opinion that comes from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where the recent ICJ advisory opinion makes it clear that the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC are mutually supportive. The Paris Agreement gives further effect to the Convention but does not abrogate or modify previous decisions. This affirms that the WIM’s governance arrangements under the COP remain intact. We note that dual governance elements are not unusual in the UNFCCC processes; accordingly, Article 8.2 does not disperse the continuing authority and guidance of the COP when the WIM was established back in 2013. Therefore, the WIM remains under the dual governance, both of the COP and the CMA.”

The **EU** said, “The EU’s position remains the same as expressed during the previous years. We believe that the WIM is under the guidance of the CMA. As clearly indicated in Article 8.2, it may be enhanced or strengthened as determined by the CMA. We understand that there is a divergence of views. The EU position is to, above all, avoid the duplication of work and to preserve the respective provision from Para 51, Decision 1/CP.21 that ‘Article 8 of the Paris Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability of compensation’. At this session we do not have time to engage in consultations with Parties to understand whether the positions have shifted, or whether reaching a consensus on this issue is possible. We did spend most of our time in Belém negotiating the WIM review, and we believe that reaching an outcome on the WIM review remains our key priority for this session. We would be amenable to using the same approach as in our last session to defer the matter to this next session. The solution we have in the past with our discussions under CMA, endorsed by the Conference of the Parties in para 2, Decision 12/CP.27, with a footnote, is a good solution in this case, as the issue cannot be resolved in this session.”

**Group SUR** agreed with the G77 and China, strongly supporting maintaining the WIM governance under both the COP and the CMA

while acknowledging the diverging views on this matter. It stated, “For developing countries, the COP, under which the WIM was established in 2013, is essential to maintaining its provisions and principles overseeing the L&D architecture.”

**AOSIS** reaffirmed its support of the dual governance of the WIM, aligning with the G77 and China statement and further highlighting, “AOSIS is also aligned to the statement by LDCs on the particular further importance of clarifying the dual governance of the WIM in light of the ICJ’s recent advisory opinion, which emphasizes the importance of that connectivity between the different bodies.”

**AILAC** and the **African Group** then took the floor to align themselves with the statement made by the G77 and China on dual governance of the WIM.

With positions unchanged and no prospect of convergence, the Chair concluded that “the time may not yet be right for resolving this issue” and confirmed that “Parties agree to defer the consideration to future sessions of the COP, and that at this session, the COP endorses the CMA decision. This means textually, the same approach as the previous sessions of the COP will be applied.”

The final text for the joint annual report of the WIM ExCom and the Advisory Board of the Santiago Network for the COP and the CMA thus reads: “Notes that considerations related to the governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism will continue at its thirty-first session (November 2026).”

# TWN

## ***Belém Climate News Update 16***

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### **Climate talks advance Non-Market Approaches Platform for mitigation projects**

Delhi, 1 December (Radhika Chatterjee) – At the recent climate talks in Belém that ended on 22 November, the final decision adopted under the “Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme” (MWP) encourages Parties to record projects they identify on the Non-Market Approaches Platform (NMA Platform).

In Belém, after several days of negotiations under the 7th session of the CMA (CMA 7), Parties agreed to mandate the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) “to consider ways to implement additional functionalities” in the NMA Platform that would enable Parties “to record projects” that are identified through the MWP.

(According to the UNFCCC website, “The NMA Platform is designed to record and exchange information on non-market approaches under Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement. It is established in accordance with decision 8/CMA.4 and enables participating Parties and non-Party stakeholders to identify, develop and implement non-market approaches. The platform includes information on finance, technology and capacity-building support available or provided for these initiatives.”)

The idea of using the NMA Platform arose following an initial proposal by **Brazil**, representing **Group SUR** at COP 29 last year, for having a digital platform as a facilitative tool that could help support the matchmaking activities undertaken in the MWP, to ensure that means of implementation are provided to mitigation projects that are brought to the MWP’s global dialogues and investment-focused events.

In the informal consultations on the MWP in Belém, developing countries like the **Like-**

**Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, the **African Group**, the **Arab Group**, **India** and **Egypt** had expressed a preference for continuing work on the digital platform. They said that instead of creating a new platform, the digital platform could be linked to the NMA Platform under Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement.

Some developing countries like the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** and the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, along with developed countries like the **European Union**, the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, **Australia** and the **United Kingdom** said they did not see any value in the digital platform, and some expressed doubts about the idea of linking the digital platform with the NMA Platform.

Eventually, Parties agreed to mandate the SBSTA “to consider ways to implement additional functionalities in the NMA Platform that would enable Parties to record ... projects” that are identified under the MWP. The aim is for the SBSTA to recommend a draft decision on this matter which will be considered for adoption at CMA 8 in 2026. Parties have also requested the secretariat to prepare a technical paper “exploring options for the operationalization of the additional feature and functionality of the NMA Platform”. This paper will be considered by the SBSTA at its 64th session, to be held in 2026.

In the adopted decision, Parties also agreed to exchange views on the continuation of the MWP in the next session of the Subsidiary Bodies, i.e., SB 64 to be held in June 2026.

Another key aspect of the MWP decision adopted relates to the high-level political messages on forests and waste that Parties agreed to include

in the decision. The decision also invites further submissions for deciding the topics for the global dialogues to be held in 2026. (See details below.)

In the discussions on the MWP held in the first week of COP 30, key areas of divergence amongst Parties had been on the following issues: (i) how the key findings of the MWP's annual dialogue are taken into account in the decision; (ii) linkage between the MWP and the global stocktake (GST) and the idea of making the MWP a vehicle for implementing the mitigation section of the GST outcome; (iii) the relationship of the MWP with nationally determined contributions (NDCs); (iv) whether to carry out further work on the digital platform or not; and (v) how to address the continuation of the MWP. (See Update 10 for details.)

### Key messages in the decision

In the MWP decision, key findings from the annual report of the MWP, based on the fifth and sixth global dialogues held in 2025, are reflected in paragraph 13. Developing countries like the **LMDC**, the **African Group**, the **Arab Group**, **Algeria**, **Egypt**, **India** and **South Africa** had stressed that mitigation targets should not be imposed on developing countries in a top-down manner while considering key findings of the annual report. They also pointed out the importance of acknowledging the fact that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach, given the different contexts in various regions and countries. They also opposed any kind of linkage between the MWP and the mitigation section of the GST outcome and pointed out that the MWP and GST had separate mandates which should not be linked.

Some developing countries like **AOSIS**, the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** and **AILAC** and developed countries like the **EU**, the **EIG**, the **UK** and **Australia** wanted to see mitigation messages that were aligned to the 1.5°C temperature goal. They also wanted to see a strong linkage between the MWP and the mitigation section of the GST outcome. This issue of linkage was a reference in particular to paragraph 33 of the GST outcome, which has a 2030 target related to forests and which reads: "Further emphasizes the importance of conserving, protecting and restoring nature and ecosystems towards achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through enhanced efforts towards halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, and other terrestrial and marine ecosystems

acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and by conserving biodiversity, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards, in line with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework."

In the adopted MWP decision from Belém, paragraph 13 notes, among other key findings:

- "(a) The critical role of forests, including boreal, temperate and tropical forests, as well as mangroves, as carbon stocks and sinks and in enhancing climate resilience, biodiversity, water and food security, livelihoods in the context of poverty eradication, and sustainable development, as well as food security;
- (b) The vital role of Indigenous Peoples and local communities and the need to support them in the sustainable management and use of forests, as well as the importance of recognizing their land rights and traditional knowledge, including as a part of long-term mitigation policies;
- (c) The potential for synergies among mitigation, adaptation, biodiversity conservation, combatting desertification, and sustainable development..."

(There were other findings in the paragraph related to waste.)

(Language relating to halting deforestation and reversing forest degradation has also been reflected in a preambular paragraph of the Global Mutirão decision, which reads: "Mindful of being in the heart of the Amazon and emphasizing the importance of conserving, protecting and restoring nature and ecosystems towards achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through enhanced efforts towards halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030 in accordance with Article 5 of the Paris Agreement, and other terrestrial and marine ecosystems acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and conserving biodiversity, while ensuring robust social and environmental safeguards".)

Concerns of some developing countries about ensuring that the high-level messages were not imposed as mitigation targets on them were addressed in paragraph 14 of the MWP decision, which reads: "Emphasizes that addressing the key findings, leveraging the opportunities, overcoming the barriers and considering the actionable solutions referred to ... is voluntary and can be enabled by country-specific action in the light of different national circumstances, international cooperation and the mobilization of financial, technology



and capacity-building support for developing countries; that there is no single solution that fits all contexts; that not all of the opportunities, barriers and actionable solutions are applicable to every national or regional context; and that opportunities and challenges will vary in accordance with national circumstances, development stage and priorities, as well as the diverse pathways followed by different countries”.

### **Continuation of the work programme**

Parties agreed to exchange views on “opportunities, best practices, actionable solutions, challenges and barriers relevant” to the continuation of the MWP at SB 64 to be held in June 2026. Submissions are invited from all stakeholders on this issue.

During the informal consultations, the **LMDC**, the **Arab Group**, **Egypt** and **India** had expressed reluctance on having any kind of discussion on the continuation of the work programme before CMA 8 next year as they felt it would be beyond the MWP’s mandate. The **African Group** was reluctant on having any discussion on this matter at COP 30. On the other hand, **AOSIS**, **AILAC**, the **EU**, the **EIF**, the **UK** and **Australia** were keen on a discussion on the review and continuation of the work programme.

The resolution on this issue is reflected in paragraph 16 of the decision text, which reads:

“Invites Parties, observers and other stakeholders to submit via the submission portal by 15 April 2026 views on opportunities, best practices, actionable solutions, challenges and barriers relevant to the continuation, functioning and effectiveness of the work programme, with a view to an exchange of views at the sixty-fourth sessions of the subsidiary bodies (June 2026), ensuring that the work programme’s objective is to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade, that its continuation shall be operationalized through focused exchanges of views, information and ideas, and that the outcomes of the work programme will be non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances, take into account the nationally determined nature of nationally determined contributions and not impose new targets or goals”.

The MWP decision has also invited submissions from all stakeholders on topics for the global dialogues to be held in 2026 under the MWP. The deadline for sending these submissions is 1 February 2026.

(During the closing plenary at Belém on 22 November, Colombia objected to the MWP decision after it was gavelled by the Presidency and proposed insertion of new text in the decision in relation to the topics for the global dialogues to be held in 2026. The Colombian proposal was not entertained as the decision had already been gavelled. See Update 13 for details.)

# TWN

## ***Belém Climate News Update 17***

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### **Compromises shape path forward on global stocktake at Belém climate talks**

Penang, 2 December (Meena Raman) – Compromises among Parties led the way forward on a decision on matters related to the global stocktake (GST), at the conclusion of the climate talks in Belém. The decision was adopted on 22 November under the 7th session of the Conference of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 7).

The decision on the first GST was adopted in 2023 in Dubai and discussions on related matters have seen sharp divides among Parties under three agenda items: (i) the UAE dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes, referred to in paragraph 97 of the decision; (ii) the annual GST dialogue and its report, referred to in paragraph 187 of the decision; and (iii) the refinement of the GST process in preparation for the second GST in 2028, referred to in paragraph 192 of the decision. The divergences and compromises reached on these issues at Belém are highlighted below.

#### **UAE dialogue**

Discussions on the UAE dialogue, particularly its scope, have been highly contentious since 2024. The key issue has been on whether the focus of the dialogue should be on the implementation of finance-related elements of the GST decision, or on all elements of the GST outcome.

Paragraph 97 appears under the “Finance” heading of the “Means of implementation and support” section of the GST decision and reads as follows: “Decides to establish the United Arab Emirates dialogue on implementing the global stocktake outcomes.”

Developed countries wanted the dialogue to be on all outcomes of the GST, while many developing-country groupings wanted the focus to

be on finance, given the placement of the paragraph under the “Finance” heading of the decision.

Also, deep divergences persisted amongst Parties in the discussions in relation to the follow-up from the dialogue, stemming from the different understandings of the Paris Agreement architecture, the purpose of the GST and the purpose of the UAE dialogue itself.

Developed countries and some developing-country groups such as the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, **Umbrella Group**, the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)** and the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** made repeated calls for producing annual reports from the dialogue, including consideration of the “collective” assessment of Parties’ progress based on their national efforts, and for adoption of CMA decisions thereon accordingly.

Many other developing countries such as the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, the **African Group** and the **Arab Group** pointed out that such reports would amount to a mini-GST occurring annually, which is contrary to the architecture of the Paris Agreement, according to which the collective assessment of progress has to be done every five years, as provided for under Article 14 of the Agreement. They stressed that the GST outcomes inform the preparations of Parties’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and national adaptation plans (NAPs), which are “nationally determined”, and that the next collective assessment process is the GST itself, conducted every five years, and which is not an annual process.

Given these divergences since the start of the Belém talks, there was a breakthrough on the

final day with the decision adopted following compromises reached. The main highlights of the decision are as follows.

In paragraph 1 of the decision, Parties agreed that “the UAE dialogue on implementing the global stocktake outcomes will take place in the spirit of international cooperation, be facilitative and non-prescriptive, and respect the nationally determined manner and different national circumstances, pathways and approaches”.

In paragraph 2, it was decided that the dialogue “will facilitate the sharing of experience and of information on opportunities, challenges, barriers and needs, including with a focus on the provision of finance, capacity-building, and technology development and transfer, as well as strengthened international cooperation as key enablers, in implementing the global stocktake outcomes”.

Paragraph 4 of the decision requests “the Chairs of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to appoint, in consultation with Parties, two co-facilitators for the UAE dialogue, one from a developed country Party and one from a developing country Party, taking into account the goal of gender balance”.

In paragraph 5, it was decided that “the UAE dialogue will be held annually in conjunction with the first regular session of the subsidiary bodies in 2026 and 2027, after which it will conclude”. (This would mean June 2026 and 2027.)

The decision in paragraph 7 requests “the co-facilitators of the UAE dialogue to prepare, in a timely manner, with the support of the secretariat, a factual and non-prescriptive summary report on each dialogue based on the inputs provided and discussions held at the dialogues”.

It was also decided that reports from the dialogue “will serve as inputs to the second global stocktake” (which will take place in 2028).

Through paragraph 8, it was agreed that “a high-level ministerial round table” on the dialogue will be convened at CMA 9 in November 2027.

### **Annual GST dialogue**

The mandate for the annual GST dialogue stems from paragraph 187 of the GST decision, which is under the “Guidance and way forward” section and requests the Subsidiary Body Chairs to “organize an annual GST dialogue” “to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practices on how the outcomes of the GST are informing the

preparation of Parties’ next NDCs in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement”, and also requests the secretariat to prepare a report for consideration at its subsequent session.

At CMA 7 in Belém, Parties were invited to consider the summary reports for 2024 and 2025 of the annual dialogues and to take any action deemed appropriate. The main issue was over the purpose and continuation of the dialogue itself, when many Parties have already submitted their NDCs.

In Belém, paragraph 12 of the decision “notes with appreciation the information, views and perspectives shared by Parties and non-Party stakeholders at the 2024 and 2025 global stocktake dialogues, including on how the outcome of the first global stocktake is informing the preparation of Parties’ next round of NDCs”. Paragraph 13 “encourages Parties to utilize and draw on the lessons learned and good practices from the summary reports on the annual global stocktake dialogues, as appropriate, in their national contexts and processes”.

The main decision in this regard is in paragraph 14, where Parties decided that “the annual global stocktake dialogue will conclude at the sixty-fourth session of the subsidiary bodies (June 2026)”, and also that “it will consider the resumption of the dialogue in the context of its consideration of the outcome of the second global stocktake”.

### **Refinement of the overall GST process**

The second GST (GST 2) will need to conclude in 2028, with the process for inputs commencing in 2026, and the technical assessment phase taking place from 2027 to 2028.

Paragraph 192 of the GST decision from Dubai decided that “consideration of refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process on the basis of experience gained from the first global stocktake” shall commence at the 60th session of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB 60 held in June 2024) and conclude at CMA 6 (November 2024). However, at CMA 6 Parties adopted a procedural decision for continuing consideration of the matter at SB 62 in June 2025.

At the SB 62 discussions, Parties had diverging views on three key issues in this regard: (i) providing a prescriptive timeline to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for completing its seventh Assessment Report (AR7) to align it

with GST 2; (ii) the timeline of the technical and political phases of GST 2; and (iii) the role of the high-level committee in the political phase of the GST.

In the decision adopted in Belém, paragraph 19 “encourages the scientific community to provide best available scientific inputs to feed into the global stocktake, recognizing the critical importance of the outputs of the IPCC to the global stocktake, as well as the importance of comprehensive and representative scientific inputs from developing countries and relevant reports from regional groups and institutions to the stocktake, and invites those organizations to consider how best to provide inputs for the global stocktake in a timely manner, as available”.

The decision clearly reflects that the IPCC is not the only source of scientific inputs, which also include scientific inputs from developing countries and other reports.

Paragraph 20 of the decision “encourages the co-facilitators of the technical dialogue to endeavour, as appropriate, to enhance the consideration of efforts related to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, addressing the social and economic consequences and impacts of response measures, and international cooperation”.

Through paragraph 21, the decision requests the Chairs of the SBs “to ensure sufficient time for each component of the global stocktake, particularly the consideration of outputs component, while taking into account lessons learned from the first global stocktake, as well as the constraints faced by Parties and other stakeholders with limited capacity, and notes that this time may include intersessional work, as appropriate”.

Many Parties had expressed the need to have a longer timeframe for the political consideration of the outputs from the technical phase, learning from the lessons of the first GST.

# TWN

## Belém Climate News Update 18

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### Belém “Mutirão” decision: A delicate balance between implementation and ambition

Kathmandu, 3 December (Chhegu Palmuu) – The COP 30 climate talks in Belém, which concluded a day beyond schedule on 22 November, saw protracted negotiations in nailing a consensus on the lead “Mutirão” decision of the Belém Political Package, fought over with much intensity and through sleepless nights, to reflect a “delicate balance” between “implementation” and “ambition” to address climate change.

The adopted “Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change” decision comprises preambular language followed by operational paragraphs under three headers: “I. United in celebration of the 10-year anniversary of the Paris Agreement”; “II. From negotiation to implementation: Paris Agreement policy cycle fully in motion”; and “III. Responding to urgency: Accelerating implementation, solidarity and international cooperation”.

Led by the COP 30 Presidency in the form of “consultations”, as agreed during the adoption of the agenda (see Update 3), the Mutirão – “collective mobilization” – text dealt with the following four agenda item proposals: “Implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement” (on the mandatory provision of finance from developed to developing countries), proposed by the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**; “Promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate-change-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures”, by the **LMDC**; “Responding to the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and addressing the 1.5°C ambition and implementation gap”, by the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**; and “Reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement: Synthesis of biennial

transparency reports” (BTRs), by the **European Union**.

These highly contentious issues involving implementation and ambition gave rise to entrenched divergent views among Parties throughout the negotiations, which saw a push-and-pull exercise, mainly along North-South lines, that eventually led to the final, delicate compromise reached in a nail-biting finish.

According to sources familiar with the negotiations, the major behind-the-scenes drama centred on a failed attempt to secure agreement on a “roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels”. This push became the focal point of a broader battle, as developed countries effectively worked to dilute language on tripling adaptation finance – a demand strongly advanced by the **African Group** and the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, and widely supported by other developing nations. (See details below.)

#### Guardrails for the talks

The Presidency consultations on the Mutirão text were guided early on by “guardrails for safety and trust: preserving the architecture and the policy cycle of the Paris Agreement; constructive and respectful engagement on issues related to all four agenda item proposals (which means no finger pointing); preserving the nationally determined nature of NDCs; and preserving the scope and mandate of GST 2” (the second global stocktake, which will take place in 2028).

Despite these “guardrails”, negotiations unfolded quite differently – particularly around the persistent push for the annual consideration of NDCs linked to mitigation ambition, the reporting

of implementation gaps, and their connection to the first global stocktake (GST 1). Many Parties viewed this as undermining the established five-year GST cycle of collective assessment and as a challenge to preserving the architecture and policy rhythm of the Paris Agreement.

By contrast, discussions on the financial obligations of developed countries and on unilateral trade measures – issues that are explicitly provided for under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and warranted a “top-down” operational approach – were met with staunch resistance. Developed countries drew firm lines in the sand, treating these matters as their “super red lines”.

The critical issue of means of implementation, in particular, the “provision of finance” by developed countries as reflected in the proposal on Article 9.1, saw the usual North-South battle. The G77 and China was in support of this, while developed countries vehemently pushed back, despite this being a mandatory legal obligation. The **G77 and China**, led by **Iraq**, stated the importance to developing countries of Article 9.1, “which is key to the implementation of climate action. This includes the provision of finance under Article 9.1 of the PA from developed to developing countries, as well as Article 4.3 of the Convention.”

The issue of unilateral trade measures was primarily opposed by the **EU**, which called for deletion of the entire “trade” text from the final decision. The issue of annual consideration of the NDCs and BTRs synthesis report and its linkage to the implementation of the GST 1 outcomes (in particular, paragraph 28 on global efforts to “transition away from fossil fuels”) was mainly opposed by the **LMDC**, the **Arab Group** and **Russia**, which similarly called for deletion of text in this regard.

The developed countries’ reluctance to show political will and good faith on financial commitments and international cooperation – while at the same time pressing for a one-sided, top-down “annual” ratcheting of mitigation ambition by individual countries, absent any principles of equity or differentiation – remained at the heart of the deep divide over the Mutirão text until the very end.

The Presidency grouped the key sticking points into three clusters – Article 9.1/finance for mitigation and adaptation, NDCs, and trade – which ultimately demanded a carefully balanced text to secure consensus after long hours of arduous negotiations.

## The push and pull in finding balance

In the morning of 21 November (the scheduled day of closing of the Belém conference), when the Presidency proposal of a revised Mutirão text was presented as a “very delicate, fragile package” of “finding balance”, it was rejected outright by the **EU** led by **Denmark**, the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, and **Colombia** for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, who bemoaned the absence of a “roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels” in the text and a very weak “mitigation” component in the context of NDC implementation to “keep 1.5°C alive”. An option contained in the preceding first draft text (of 18 November) that carried references to the “roadmap” on “transitioning away from fossil fuels” had been dropped from the revised text.

The **EU** warned the Presidency of a “real risk” of not reaching an agreement. The COP 30 President, Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago, stated that, with no clear consensus on the issue with irreconcilable divergences, it wasn’t included in the text.

The other “red line” stated by the **EU** and the **EIG** was the issue of “provision” of “adaptation finance” in the text. They made clear that their commitment was solely within the parameters of the COP 29 decision on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG) adopted last year (referring to a mobilization goal with developed countries taking the lead). This view was supported by the **United Kingdom**.

Furthermore, **Denmark** for the **EU** also called for deletion of the “trade” text.

Consultations spiralled into a deadlock, mainly due to absence of consensus to discuss the issue of the roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels.

In the afternoon of 21 November, following the deadlock in the morning talks, there was a shift in mode of work into “smaller group” consultations by the Presidency, with only two representatives per group and countries without groups present and held behind closed doors. This final stretch was meant to iron out a “consensus” Mutirão decision to be adopted as the lead COP 30 outcome the next day.

In the smaller group consultations that followed, sources who spoke to TWN shared that in stark contrast to the hue and cry and eventual deadlock in the morning talks, there was no

discussion at all on the fossil fuels roadmap, which was then revealed as no longer being a point of contention and red line for developed countries.

It then came to light that for the developed countries, the issue of adaptation finance (paragraph 53 of the Presidency proposal of 21 November) instead took precedence as the top red line.

Developed countries also made clear that their other red-line issue was in ensuring the “strengthening” of NDCs’ mitigation ambition and implementation gaps (particularly in paragraph 42 on the “Belém Mission to 1.5”), which they lamented as missing in the text, with their push on linkage to GST 1.

It is worth noting that when the revised Presidency proposal of 21 November was presented “as is”, without being reopened, it was initially acceptable to the **LMDC**, the **Arab Group**, the **African Group**, **BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China)** and **ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America)**. This formed the starting point for negotiations during the smaller group consultations convened by the Presidency.

However, **AILAC**, the **LDCs** and **AOSIS** wanted “small tweaks” to the text, while the **EU**, the **UK** and the **Umbrella Group** of developed countries did not support the text at all. The EU Commissioner for Climate Wopke Hoekstra, and Ministers Ed Miliband (UK) and Chris Bowen (Australia) were all present in the talks – and thus, the text had to be opened to “tweaks” or “surgical insertions” to reach an agreement.

Sources said that groups wanted edits mainly to paragraph 42 (Belém Mission to 1.5) and paragraph 53 (adaptation finance), while some wanted to open the text on “trade” and also on “forests” (the other roadmap on halting and reversing deforestation). Paragraph 42, however, faced considerable pushback from some developing countries, given the rationale that the decision already focused enough on NDC “ambition”.

(Paragraph 42 read, “Also decides to launch, under the guidance of the Presidencies of the sixth, seventh and eighth sessions of the CMA, the ‘Belém Mission to 1.5’, aimed at enabling ambition and implementation of NDCs and NAPs, to reflect on accelerating the implementation and international cooperation and investments in NDCs and NAPs across mitigation and adaptation, and requests these Presidencies to produce a report summarizing the work as they conclude the work by the eighth session of the CMA”.)

Negotiations eventually focused on the following paragraphs, with text opened for “tweaks”: paragraph 53 (on adaptation finance); paragraph 41 (on “Global Implementation Accelerator”); and paragraph 56 (on dialogue related to international cooperation and role of trade). Further, paragraph 35 (on NDC alignment towards net zero) was also opened for a tweak to ensure “balance” in the text. (See details below.)

### **The roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels**

Following the release of the first draft text (18 November) as a Presidency proposal, bilaterals were conducted, followed by continued consultations and shuttle diplomacy on 19 November, including with political engagement elevated to a meeting between Brazilian President Lula and negotiating groups with the purpose of deliberating on the “key COP 30 issues” and on the “way forward”. The issue of the “roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels” was said to have emerged during the talks with President Lula.

The draft text contained sets of options with language such as “just, orderly and equitable transition roadmaps, including to progressively overcome their dependency on fossil fuels” (paragraph 35), and “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner” (paragraph 44).

This direction of the negotiations triggered many delegates, representing diverse groups and Parties (from Asia, Africa, the Arab region and Latin America), to meet the Presidency on the night of 19 November, expressing their strong objection to the issue of “fossil fuels” which had failed to adhere to the guardrails of the consultations and crossed their “red lines” in terms of the right to development, national sovereignty, and the nationally determined nature of the NDCs.

It is learnt that the Presidency next presented compromise textual proposals for consideration which later appeared in the revised Presidency proposal of 21 November, but this text was totally rejected by the EU, led by Denmark, the EIG, and Colombia for AILAC, since it no longer contained references to the “roadmap” and on “transitioning away from fossil fuels”.

However, as mentioned above, this particular issue on fossil fuels did not emerge in the subsequent smaller group Presidency consultations, and was thus no longer considered a contentious, red-line issue.

## Main highlights of the final compromise

### *Work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1*

In the first draft text of 18 November, a stronger option appeared which read: “Decides to establish a three-year Belém work programme and legally-binding action plan on the implementation of Article 9, paragraph 1, with a view to, inter alia, developing a common climate finance reporting and accounting methodology, improved budgetary processes and fair burden-sharing arrangements among developed country Parties”. This language was pushed by the **LMDC** and the **Arab Group**.

In the revised text of the 21 November Presidency proposal, the language had been diluted: “Decides to establish a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9 paragraph 1 in the context of Article 9 as a whole”. (Footnote 2: “Without prejudging the process on the implementation of the new collective quantified goal.”)

The final paragraph 54 of the adopted Mutirão decision reads: “Decides to establish a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement in the context of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement as a whole”. (Footnote 5: “Without prejudging the process for the implementation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance.”)

This watered-down formulation, especially in the context of “Article 9 as a whole”, was driven by the **developed countries** who made clear that they were willing to discuss Article 9.1 but in the context of the entirety of Article 9, alluding particularly to Articles 9.2 and 9.3 on voluntary contribution by other Parties and mobilization of climate finance, respectively, as well as in the context of the NCQG decision. Nonetheless, the work programme is a considerable win, given the stiff opposition to the issue.

### *Tripling of adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of the NCQG*

In the revised text of the Presidency proposal of 21 November, paragraph 53 read, “Recalls paragraph 18 of decision 1/CMA.3, calls for efforts to triple adaptation finance compared to 2025 levels by 2030, and urges developed country Parties to increase the trajectory of their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties”.

However, the final paragraph 53 of the adopted Mutirão decision states: “Reaffirms the

doubling by 2025 in paragraph 18 of decision 1/CMA.3 [from Glasgow], calls for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of decision 1/CMA.6, including paragraph 16 thereof, and urges developed country Parties to increase the trajectory of their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties”.

The call for the tripling of adaptation finance (in the context of the Glasgow COP 26 goal of doubling the provision of adaptation finance to developing countries) had been strongly led by the **African Group** and the **LDCs**. They did not link this call to the NCQG decision and premised it instead in the context of Article 9.1 with the provision of finance on adaptation by developed countries.

This became the topmost red-line issue for **developed countries**, and at the smaller group Presidency consultations, it was the first priority tackled and then agreed upon following difficult talks and maximum flexibility shown by developing countries.

The final, watered-down formulation by developed countries removes the baseline of “2025 levels” and links the tripling of adaptation finance to the NCQG decision, extending the goalpost to 2035 from 2030, in alignment with the NCQG decision.

In order to balance the text, the reference to paragraph 16 of the NCQG decision was proposed by the **African Group** and the **LDCs**. (Paragraph 16 of the NCQG decision is on provision of public resources via the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and multilateral climate funds, and also points to efforts to “at least triple annual outflows from those Funds from 2022 levels by 2030”.)

### *Global Implementation Accelerator: Reference to the UAE Consensus*

Paragraph 41 of the adopted Mutirão decision provides: “Decides, in responding to urgency, gaps and challenges, accelerating implementation, solidarity and international cooperation, to launch the Global Implementation Accelerator, as a cooperative, facilitative and voluntary initiative under the guidance of the Presidencies of the seventh and eighth sessions (November 2026) of the CMA to accelerate implementation across all actors to keep 1.5°C within reach and supporting countries in implementing their NDCs and NAPs taking into account the decisions referred to in paragraph 15 above, such as the UAE Consensus, requests the Presidencies to present a report



summarizing their work in this regard to the CMA at its eighth session, invites the Presidencies to conduct open and inclusive information sessions held in conjunction with the sixty-fourth (June 2026) and sixty-fifth (November 2026) sessions of the subsidiary bodies [SBs], and decides to exchange experiences and views on related matters at a high-level event in 2026”.

This formulation was based on the EU’s initial textual proposal that consistently pushed for linkage to the first GST for NDC implementation. The insertion of paragraph 15 in the text was proposed by the UK. The reference to the “UAE Consensus” was a compromise as it refers to other decisions as well and not just the first GST. The insertion of “information sessions” and “high-level event in 2026” was a compromise offered by developing countries which was accepted by the EU and the UK.

#### ***Dialogue, high-level event on international cooperation related to role of trade***

The final treatment of the “Promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate-change-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures” proposal, as reflected in paragraphs 56 and 57 in the adopted Mutirão decision, ended up being a considerable win, considering that it had been a red-line “no text” issue for developed countries.

Paragraph 56 “Reaffirms that Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change and also reaffirms that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”.

Paragraph 57 requests the SBs “to hold a dialogue at their sixty-fourth, sixty-sixth (June 2027) and sixty-eighth sessions (June 2028), with the participation of Parties and other stakeholders, including the International Trade Centre, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the World Trade Organization, to consider opportunities, challenges and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade, taking into account paragraph 56 above, decides to exchange experiences and views on related matters at a high-level event in 2028 and

requests the SBs to present a report summarizing the discussions at the high-level event”.

The addition of holding a “high-level event in 2028”, with the SBs to “present a report summarizing the discussions at the high-level event”, is considered another big win, especially with the push by **Egypt** and supported by other developing countries. This additional language is seen as securing a “balanced” treatment with paragraph 41 on the Global Implementation Accelerator, which also involves a reporting mechanism and a high-level event.

#### ***Paragraph 35 on global net zero***

Following the resolution of the sticky issues, sources who spoke to TWN said, paragraph 35 of the Presidency proposal of 21 November was also opened in the end, to ensure a final “balance” to the Mutirão text, with the insertion of “global” next to “net zero” in the paragraph.

Paragraph 35 of the adopted Mutirão decision provides: “Notes the importance of aligning NDCs with long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies and encourages Parties to align their NDCs towards global net zero by or around mid-century with a view to keeping 1.5°C within reach”.

#### ***Preambular paragraphs on equity, differentiation and developed-country mitigation gaps***

Developing countries, in securing “balance” in the Mutirão decision, ensured reflection in the preambular paragraphs of the fundamental principles of “equity” and “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC) (Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the PA).

The decision also underlines the “critical role of multilateralism based on United Nations values and principles, including in the context of the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and the importance of international cooperation for addressing global issues, including climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty”.

Further, the Mutirão decision recalls “concerns” on the “pre-2020 gaps in both the mitigation ambition and implementation of developed countries and that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had previously indicated that developed countries must reduce emissions by 25–40 per cent below the 1990 level by 2020, which was not achieved”. It also expresses “concern that

the carbon budget consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal is now small and being rapidly depleted and acknowledging that historical cumulative net carbon dioxide emissions account for at least four fifths of the total carbon budget for a 50 per cent probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C”.

These crucial texts reflecting “historical responsibility”, “carbon budget” and the “right to development”, and the bedrock principle of CBDR-RC had been firmly pushed by the **LMDC** and the Arab Group to ensure “equity” and “differentiation” in the final decision.

Much work awaits in the follow-up to the Mutirão decision next year.

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## ***Belém Climate News Update 19***

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### **COP 30 marks milestone on adaptation agenda**

Kuala Lumpur, 4 December (Eqram Mustaqeem) – COP 30 and the seventh session of the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 7) will be remembered as an important milestone on the adaptation agenda, with key decisions on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), along with the establishment of a new adaptation finance goal.

On the GGA, Parties had three mandates to deliver on. The first was the two-year “UAE-Belém work programme on indicators” (UBWP) as per decision 2/CMA.5; the second was to develop the modalities for the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) as per decision 3/CMA.6; and the third was to continue consideration of “transformational adaptation” as per decision 2/CMA.5.

(In Dubai in 2023, via decision 2/CMA.5, Parties agreed that the GGA thematic targets will cover water, food and agriculture, health, ecosystems and biodiversity, infrastructure and human settlements, poverty eradication and livelihoods and protection of cultural heritage, while the dimensional targets are impact, vulnerability and risk assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring, evaluation and learning.)

It was an arduous task, particularly on finalizing the list of indicators through the UBWP. This was undertaken through discussions in “informal-informals” format (among Parties only and closed to observers) that went on for hours on end, on top of informal consultations that dealt with other aspects of the GGA decision.

Ultimately, the GGA decision delivered on all three mandates. The UBWP was concluded with a finalized list of indicators, attached as an annex to the decision. Further guidance was given to the BAR, and transformational adaptation was given consideration in the decision text. (See details below.)

On the NAP negotiations, which had not seen a decision since COP 27, Parties were able to arrive at a decision in Belém, largely due to compromise on the part of developing countries. The compromises and bridging proposals advanced by developing countries – from June 2023 through to COP 30 in Belém – were pivotal in breaking the deadlock and enabling a long-awaited decision on NAPs. This outcome came after nearly three years of negotiations that had stalled largely due to developed countries’ resistance to language affirming their obligation to provide finance for the formulation and implementation of NAPs. (See further details below.)

Further, a new adaptation finance goal was reached to triple adaptation finance by 2035. The proposal, put forward by a united bloc of developing countries, had received vehement opposition from developed countries from the very start of the GGA negotiations until the final day of the Global Mutirão negotiations on 22 November which dealt with the adaptation finance decision. (See Update 18 for further details.)

This article provides a breakdown on the key aspects of the GGA and NAP decisions, along with the new adaptation finance goal.

#### **Global Goal on Adaptation**

The adoption of the GGA decision at the closing plenary on 22 November attracted much controversy, with several countries expressing concern over the indicators list. However, as the objections came after the gaveling of the decision, no changes could be made to the decision adopted. The countries that raised objections included **Colombia** for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, **Panama**, **Uruguay**, **Argentina**, **Paraguay**, **Sierra Leone**,

the **European Union, Switzerland and Canada.** (See Update 13 for further details.)

### ***The Belém Adaptation Indicators***

The work of the UBWP concluded with a list of 59 indicators based on a final list of 100 indicators developed by technical experts, named the Belém Adaptation Indicators. The indicators were adopted as an annex to the main decision text.

A thorough list of disclaimers was made on the indicators as outlined in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the text. Paragraph 7 states that the indicators “are voluntary, non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, global in nature, respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances and country-driven, and that the indicators should not create additional reporting burdens, particularly for developing country Parties, are not intended to serve as a basis for comparison among Parties, shall not become a barrier and shall not be used under any circumstances as a condition for developing country Parties to access funding under the Convention and the Paris Agreement”. Paragraph 8 states that “the Belém Adaptation Indicators do not create new financial obligations or commitments, nor liability or compensation”.

Paragraph 9 “affirms that the Belém Adaptation Indicators are intended to inform national approaches to tracking adaptation action and progress and shall not create new obligations for developing country Parties, benchmarks or evaluation criteria, nor establish global standardized methodologies or data-collection processes, nor establish any compliance frameworks, nor prejudice any Party’s position or imply acceptance of elements inconsistent with national circumstances or with the principles and provisions of the Convention and the Paris Agreement”.

Parties through paragraph 10 also emphasized “the importance of cross-cutting considerations, including by acknowledging the contributions of children, youth, people with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, people of African descent and migrants to adaptation, and the importance of consideration of gender, human rights, intergenerational equity and social justice, and participatory and fully transparent approaches”.

Paragraph 11 “encourages Parties, as appropriate and at their discretion, to test the Belém Adaptation Indicators, including in consultation with relevant practitioners and other stakeholders”.

Paragraph 12 “invites Parties to integrate the targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5 and the Belém Adaptation Indicators into, and to make use of these indicators as appropriate and as relevant in, their reporting and planning processes, including with regard to their biennial transparency reports, adaptation communications, national adaptation plans, nationally determined contributions and national communications”.

Further, the annex to the decision carrying the list of indicators outlined that the indicators may be disaggregated by: (a) social categories; (b) climate-related hazards (with this category remaining flexible to reflect the different hazards faced by countries); (c) geographical characteristics, accounting for different physical and regional contexts; (d) ecosystems; (e) administrative and settlement levels; (f) type of adaptation measures; (g) (1) to disaggregate the dimensional target indicators referred to in paragraph 10 of decision 2/CMA.5, in order to reflect the full adaptation cycle characteristics of each thematic sector and (2) disaggregation by thematic sector under the thematic target indicators to capture interlinkages between different thematic targets; and (h) subcomponents of the targets referred to in paragraph 9 of decision 2/CMA.5.

Further, as outlined in paragraph 16, the secretariat will prepare a technical paper, to be considered by CMA 8, on “the targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5, and the Belém Adaptation Indicators, by 30 September 2026, which will (1) consider the use of the indicators; (2) include a mapping of existing synthesis report processes on adaptation information relevant to the global goal on adaptation; (3) identify synergies as well as gaps and potential ways to fill those gaps; and (4) analyze guidelines, tools and methodologies for aggregating the Belém Adaptation Indicators”.

Through paragraphs 17, 18 and 19, the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund were all invited to support developing countries in implementing the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience.

Paragraph 13 emphasized that the Belém Adaptation Indicators will constitute a source of input, including through reporting by Parties, to the global stocktake.

### ***Belém-Addis Vision***

The Belém-Addis Vision (BAV) was established through paragraph 21 of the decision

adopted. It comprises a two-year policy alignment process by Parties and technical work aimed at developing guidance for operationalizing the indicators under the BAV.

If the UBWP was intended to establish the indicators, the BAV can be seen as post-indicator-establishment work, for the purpose of operationalizing the indicators.

It was also agreed in paragraph 22 that the work under the BAV on adaptation will be carried out jointly by the subsidiary bodies (SBs). As per paragraph 23, the SBs are requested “to undertake technical work on improving metadata and methodologies for the Belém Adaptation Indicators, to be considered by CMA 9 (November 2027), including by establishing a technical taskforce to contribute to that work”.

### ***Review of the indicators***

The review of the indicators will be undertaken as part of the review of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience after the second global stocktake in 2029 as outlined in paragraph 32 of the decision. Further, in paragraph 33, it was decided that the terms of reference for the review shall be developed and agreed by the SBs in 2026–2027.

### ***Baku Adaptation Roadmap***

The BAR was launched with the aim of advancing progress in line with Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement, and to support the implementation of the elements outlined in paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5 from Dubai on the GGA. The SBs were requested to develop modalities for work under the BAR. Understanding the work mandate of the BAR is critical in understanding how the GGA decision will further guide the BAR work.

(Article 7.1 of the PA states: “Parties hereby establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2.”)

[Paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5 requests “the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to initiate consideration of matters ... focusing on, inter alia:

- (a) The exchange of knowledge, experience and information related to implementing the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience,

including in relation to efforts to achieve the targets..., with the aim of fostering implementation;

- (b) The identification of potential inputs to future global stocktakes related to achieving the global goal on adaptation, including by considering how the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience can facilitate the analysis of information required for assessing progress towards the goal;
- (c) The enhancement of understanding of, inter alia, the risks and impacts associated with different temperature increases across different regions;
- (d) The opportunities for building on the best available science, including collaboration with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other organizations, to provide information relevant to facilitating implementation of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, including in relation to the targets...; to developing indicators, metrics and methodologies; and to identifying adaptation capacity gaps, challenges and the needs of developing countries;
- (e) The development of terms of reference for reviewing the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, including the time frame for the review”.]

In the GGA decision adopted in Belém, Parties decided in paragraph 28 that “the work under the BAR shall be guided by the following:

- (a) Aligning adaptation action with adequate adaptation responses in the context of the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, ensuring that national and global adaptation strategies and actions reflect the risks and needs arising from different warming increments within the temperature goal;
- (b) Strengthening implementation of the targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5;
- (c) Enhancing knowledge-sharing;
- (d) Ensuring access to means of implementation for adaptation, for adequate, predictable and accessible financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support, including from developed country Parties to developing country Parties, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 1, and Articles 10–11, of the Paris Agreement”.

Paragraph 29 decided that the first phase of the BAR, covering 2026–2028, “will focus on

initial implementation of activities consisting of two workshops per year organized by the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies, and the preparation of a technical paper by the secretariat, aimed at enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening cooperation and facilitating adaptation planning and implementation in line with different national circumstances and in the context of Article 2, paragraph 1(a), of the Paris Agreement [which relates to the temperature goal]”.

The decision invites Parties to submit views on the focus of the workshops and the technical paper.

### ***Transformational adaptation***

In relation to the issue of transformational adaptation, paragraph 31 of the Belém decision emphasized that “no single adaptation approach shall be presented as the default, superior or universally applicable pathway, recognizing the essential role of diverse, nationally led, context-specific adaptation approaches that reflect national circumstances, priorities and needs in achieving the global goal on adaptation and strengthening global climate resilience”.

### **National Adaptation Plans**

The evolution of the NAP draft text – especially in the sections addressing finance – alongside the compromises advanced by developing countries to secure consensus, underscores their strong commitment to achieving progress on the NAP agenda.

Despite sustained attempts by developed countries to dilute or eliminate references to the gaps and needs for finance in relation to NAPs, key provisions on this issue remained embedded in the final decision text.

Below are the highlights from the decision text encompassing the assessment of the NAP process and further work.

From the decision text, the NAP financing needs and gap that have been an issue for developing countries were made clear. Paragraph 9 noted “with concern that funding provided to developing country Parties for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, bilateral and multilateral programmes, and other channels, remains inadequate and that the resulting significant financial gap remains a barrier to the effective and timely implementation of national adaptation plans”.

Paragraph 10 also noted with concern that “despite efforts made by relevant actors to streamline and simplify access to finance for the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans, delayed access to such finance continues to significantly hinder progress in adaptation action and resilience, including towards achieving the global goal on adaptation”.

The importance of effectively tracking the provision of adaptation finance for the formulation and implementation of NAPs by developing countries was noted in paragraph 11.

Paragraph 12 “Requests the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to compile from relevant reports, in collaboration with the Adaptation Committee and the Standing Committee on Finance, an overview of climate finance flows and financial support provided by developed country Parties to developing country Parties for formulating and implementing national adaptation plans for inclusion in the 2026 report on progress in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans to be prepared for consideration at the sixty-fifth session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (November 2026)”.

The importance of the NAP as a channel for the achievement of the thematic and dimensional targets of the GGA was reiterated in paragraph 23.

On further work, paragraph 17 noted “the gaps and needs referred to in the 2024 synthesis report by the secretariat on progress towards the achievement of the objectives of the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, including in terms of the provision of adequate and predictable finance, technology transfer and capacity-building support, and in relation to access to adequate data on downscaled and localized climate scenarios for use in impact, vulnerability and risk assessments, and to tools for collecting and assimilating national data on climate variables and on socioeconomic risks and vulnerabilities and for designing adaptation actions to address medium- and long-term needs”.

Through paragraph 18, the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group were requested to enhance their work on addressing the gaps and needs referred to in paragraph 17 above and to include information thereon in their annual reports.

Further, paragraph 24 decided that the next assessment of progress in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans will take place at COP 35 (2030). Paragraph 25 then requested the Subsidiary Body for Implementation

to make recommendations on the actions and steps necessary for it to initiate the assessment at SB 70 (June 2029) for consideration and adoption by COP 34 (November 2029).

### **New adaptation finance goal**

Undoubtedly, the biggest political fight related to the adaptation agenda at COP 30 was over the new adaptation finance goal, which was fiercely contested and opposed by developed countries in both the GGA and Global Mutirão negotiations.

The need for a new adaptation finance goal was critical, particularly as the original goal outlined in the Glasgow Climate Pact was due to expire in 2025. That goal was outlined in paragraph 18 of decision 1/CMA.3 and read: “Urges developed country Parties to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources, recalling Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement”.

The original proposal made by developing countries on the new adaptation finance goal called upon developed country Parties to at least triple their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2025 levels by 2030, reaching at least to \$120–150 billion per year by 2030, in line with Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement.

However, due to strong resistance by developed countries who made it clear that the new adaptation finance goal was their “super red line”, the final agreed-upon language in the GGA decision was as follows:

“34. Takes note of paragraph 53 of decision -/CMA.7 [which refers to the Global Mutirão decision], in which it reaffirms the doubling by 2025 in paragraph 18 of decision 1/CMA.3 [which refers to the Glasgow decision], calls for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of decision 1/CMA.6 [which refers to the Baku decision last year on the new collective quantified goal on finance (NCQG)], including paragraph 16 thereof, and urges developed country Parties to increase the trajectory of their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties.”

[Paragraph 16 of decision 1/CMA.6 from Baku reads: “Decides that a significant increase of public resources should be provided through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund and also decides to pursue efforts to at least triple annual outflows from those Funds from 2022 levels by 2030 at the latest with a view to significantly scaling up the share of finance delivered through them in delivering on the goal contained in paragraph 8 above.”

[Paragraph 8 of decision 1/CMA.6 “reaffirms ... Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and decides to set a goal, in extension of the goal referred to in paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP.21, with developed country Parties taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action:

- (a) From a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources;
- (b) In the context of meaningful and ambitious mitigation and adaptation action, and transparency in implementation;
- (c) Recognizing the voluntary intention of Parties to count all climate-related outflows from and climate-related finance mobilized by multilateral development banks towards achievement of the goal set forth in this paragraph.”]

It is evident that, compared with the original proposal from developing countries, the decision on the new adaptation finance goal was significantly diluted. Whereas the initial proposal set a clear target to triple adaptation finance by 2030 relative to 2025 levels, the final agreement is vague on the baseline year and pushes the timeline back to 2035.

Further, while the original draft contained clear language on tripling adaptation finance – specifically as provision from developed to developing countries, amounting to a minimum of \$120–150 billion annually – the final text shifts this commitment into the framework of the Baku NCQG decision. This reframing emphasizes mobilization from a broad mix of sources – public and private, bilateral and multilateral – without establishing any concrete target for the provision of finance.

(See also Update 18 on the Global Mutirão decision.)

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## ***Belém Climate News Update 20***

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### **Consensus reached on TIP modalities but ambition falls short**

Kuala Lumpur, 4 December (Hilary Kung) – Parties reached consensus on the modalities for the Technology Implementation Programme (TIP) at the climate talks that concluded on 22 November in Belém. The outcome however fell short of the level of ambition envisioned by developing countries.

**Palau**, for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, in a statement (submitted online) at the closing plenary on 22 November, said, “Regarding the TIP, this outcome does not fully reflect the ambition we had envisioned. Nevertheless, we see it as a starting point. We urge all stakeholders to implement the TIP mandate with determination and to work toward removing the persistent barriers that hinder Small Island Developing States [SIDS] from deploying climate technologies at scale.”

**Iraq**, for the **G77 and China**, in its remarks at the closing plenary, said that “the true breakthrough on technology lies in the new functions and hosting criteria of the Climate Technology Centre and Network” (CTCN), adding that “by agreeing on [the] new functions and hosting criteria, we have made this Centre fit for [addressing] climate change”.

Along with 15 other agenda items, the TIP is part of the delicate Belém Political Package. One important outcome of the TIP decision, which provides developing countries with a measure of reassurance, is the agreed duration of the TIP. Its implementation will begin immediately after Belém and undergo a review in 2034, reflecting developing countries’ interest in ensuring the TIP functions as a long-term programme, instead of the two-year programme preferred by developed countries.

[The TIP was established at COP 28 in 2023 through the first global stocktake (GST 1) decision (decision 1/CMA.5). Huge divergence on the

modalities of the TIP emerged between developed and developing countries and no agreement was reached in Bonn at the 62nd sessions of the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Bodies (SB 62) in June 2025 (see TWN update).]

During the second week of COP 30, the TIP remained one of the outstanding agenda items and continued to be addressed through technical consultations co-facilitated by Omar Alcock (Jamaica) and Elfriede Anna More (Austria). In parallel, ministerial consultations led by Chris Bowen (Australia) and Bhupender Yadav (India) focused on several issues that would benefit from political guidance. These included: references to the Convention; the emphasis on aligning the TIP with the implementation of GST outcomes, especially paragraph 28 on global mitigation efforts; the need to address trade barriers and intellectual property right (IPR) regimes; and financial support for the TIP – all key concerns for developing countries with regard to technology development and transfer.

Developing countries envisioned a mandate to effectively operationalize the TIP consistent with the mandate coming from the GST 1 outcome – one that would prioritize technology needs of developing countries as identified by them in their technology needs assessments (TNAs) and technology action plans (TAPs), address the challenges faced by the Technology Mechanism (TM) in fully realizing technology development and transfer, and ensure predictable and adequate financial support through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism (FM).

Developed countries preferred the TIP to be limited to implementation through the CTCN and the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), and resisted explicitly inviting the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to incorporate financing



the TIP into their replenishment processes, also arguing that support comes in various forms and not solely through the operating entities. They also opposed any discussion on trade barriers and IPR regimes for accessing climate technologies, and preferred the TIP to prioritize implementation of GST outcomes by imposing targets related to renewable energy in a top-down manner.

(The Technology Mechanism was established by COP 17 in 2010 and consists of two bodies: the TEC as the policy arm and the CTCN as the implementation arm.)

### References to the Convention and aligning the TIP with GST implementation

The adopted decision confirmed that “the objectives of the technology implementation programme, supported by, inter alia, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, are to strengthen support for the implementation of technology priorities identified by developing countries and to address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism”.

During the informal consultations, reference to the Convention was opposed by developed countries including **Norway**, the **European Union**, **Australia**, **Canada**, **Türkiye** and **Switzerland**, which argued that the TIP, having being created by the GST, is under the Paris Agreement and not under the Convention.

Norway said it was “very clear that this is under the PA and not under the Convention”. The EU agreed and further noted, “The scope of this programme must focus on supporting developing countries especially the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and SIDS in the implementation of technology priorities, if they are aligned with all the directions set by the GST.”

In contrast, **Chile**, for the **G77 and China** and later in its national capacity, the **Arab Group**, the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, **China** and **India** insisted that the principles of both the Convention and the PA should be reflected in the text, given that both of them are instruments that should be read and implemented together.

The adopted decision recalls Article 2.1 of the PA in the preambular section, which provides that the PA, “in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty”.

On whether the TIP should prioritize implementing technology needs identified by developing countries or emphasize alignment with the implementation of GST outcomes, especially paragraph 28 of decision 1/CMA.5 on global mitigation efforts, the final adopted text, in paragraph 5, reads: “Agrees that the technology implementation programme shall support the implementation of Parties’ nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans and long-term low-emission development strategies, noting their importance for implementing the global stocktake outcomes.”

In paragraph 6 of the decision, Parties decided “that the technology implementation programme shall:

- (a) Be implemented in a coherent, inclusive and results-oriented manner;
- (b) Be based on the technology priorities of developing countries in alignment with their national circumstances, including at the local level, and draw on Indigenous Peoples’ knowledge and capacities, and endogenous technologies;
- (c) Be gender-responsive, enhance gender equality, empower women and recognize the special needs and circumstances of children, youth, persons with disabilities and local communities;
- (d) Contribute to the availability of and access to enhanced financial, technical and capacity-building support for developing countries, recognizing the special needs and circumstances of the least developed countries, small island developing States and other developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;
- (e) Take into account the report on the evaluation of the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer and the findings of the independent reviews of the Climate Technology Centre and Network.”

### Trade barriers and IPR regimes

During the informal consultations, the issue of trade barriers and IPR regimes proved contentious, with the **G77 and China**, supported by the **LMDC**, the **Arab Group**, **India** and **China**, advocating for their inclusion, while the **EU**, **Australia**, **Canada**, the **UK** and **Japan** were opposed to having this discussed in the TIP.

As listed below, a total of three paragraphs addressing this issue had been included in previous draft versions of the decision, but were ultimately excluded from the final decision following strong pushback from developed countries:

- “Exchanging information, including on good practices, challenges and lessons learned, regarding enablers for and barriers to, including trade barriers and intellectual property rights, the implementation of the technology priorities of developing countries at all stages of the technology cycle.
- Addressing systemic and structural barriers for technology development and transfer, including trade barriers and restrictive intellectual property regimes.
- Decides that the topics of the global in-session dialogues ... are to include ... the addressing of financial barriers and enablers, including the capacity to develop proposals for fundable projects; trade barriers and enablers, including intellectual property rights...”

During the informal consultations, **Chile**, for the **G77 and China**, commented that the above wording mentioned trade barriers and IPRs but was framed too narrowly, focusing only on exchanging information and good practices without capturing the need to address the underlying barrier elements.

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **Arab Group**, said, “For decades, the promise of effective technology development and transfer under the Convention and its PA has not been realized. The result is a persistent structural imbalance, a two-tier system that has kept developed countries dominating the value chain of restrictive intellectual property regimes, proprietary software, patent-dependent platforms, and closed-source technologies. This has constrained market access, reduced affordability, and limited meaningful participation by developing countries.”

**China**, for the **LMDC**, commented that the draft versions “didn’t reflect some key points raised by developing country Parties in the first informal consultations, especially the restrictive intellectual property regimes, closed-source technologies, and unilateral trade measures that limit the access, affordability and capacity of technology innovation, absorption, adoption and incubation of developing countries”.

The **United Kingdom** said the issue “goes beyond the mandate of the TIP”, while **Australia** said “trade barriers and IPR should be removed”.

The **EU** said “the Technology Mechanism is not the appropriate [place] to address IPRs” and that the Mechanism was already cooperating with a wide network, so “this room is not to have this discussion”. The EU also provided a textual proposal to replace “regarding enablers for and barriers to, including trade barriers and intellectual property rights,” with “regarding enabling barriers such as those identified in TEC reports and UNEP Climate Technology Progress Reports”.

The textual proposal was supported by **Canada**, which added that the dialogue topics should be left to the TEC to decide. (Trade barriers and IPRs were also listed as one of the areas to be included in the global dialogue topics.)

In response, **India** said that it was hard to see how this issue could be deemed irrelevant to the TIP. It added that while each country had its own experience with developing and using climate-related technologies, developing countries faced substantial, material barriers to accessing, deploying and adapting such technologies, barriers that went beyond issues of policy or enabling environments.

“Intellectual property rights are one such barrier ... The development of technologies is made possible in developed countries by many years of unfettered and unrestricted use of the global carbon budget, leading to the warming we are experiencing today. The enablers in developed countries are not just a matter of policy and governance but the actual availability of public finance, support for research and development, all in turn also made possible through the availability of infrastructure. Enabling environments are therefore not abstract and intangible governance and policy structures but the material availability of the means to develop technologies,” stressed India.

This remained a major point of contention throughout the informal and ministerial consultations. Paragraph 8 of the final adopted decision, which listed the key elements that the TIP should include, saw the issue of trade barriers and IPRs removed. The text reads:

“(a) Addressing challenges to implementing the technology priorities of developing countries at different stages of the technology cycle and challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism, including through the exchange of information on enablers, good practices, challenges and lessons learned;

- (b) Strengthening national systems of innovation as well as enabling environments, such as policy and regulatory environments, for technology deployment and diffusion, while ensuring research, development and demonstration continue to inform effective technology implementation, including for Indigenous and endogenous technologies;
- (c) Providing support to developing countries, including national designated entities, for integrating their climate technology priorities into national policies, programmes and projects;
- (d) Building capacity for the development of project concept notes and the preparation of fundable projects, and fostering matchmaking and partnership-building to enhance access to support for climate technology implementation by leveraging the resources and expertise of relevant bodies and entities;
- (e) Mobilizing both financial and non-financial resources to enhance the support provided to the Technology Mechanism for supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement”.

### **Financial support for the TIP to ensure all decisions are implemented**

Financial support for the TIP was another issue of contestation between developed and developing countries.

During the first informal consultation on 11 November, **Chile** proposed having a standalone paragraph in the decision text to transmit specific guidance to the Financial Mechanism and its operating entities. The proposal led to a “Placeholder for a draft decision of the COP regarding guidance to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism” in the second iteration of the text. However, due to opposition from developed countries, the details of this proposal never saw the light of day.

Throughout the informal consultations, the **G77 and China** and many sub-groups highlighted the persistent gaps and challenges developing countries face and the importance of predictable and enhanced financial support in fully realizing technology development and transfer.

However, developed countries largely argued that support comes in various forms and not solely through the operating entities of the FM. Hence, for them, the issue was not about providing guidance to the FM, and they suggested that the TEC and CTCN identify opportunities across different

financial institutions. Developing countries, however, felt that this was not sufficient due to longstanding concerns over the governance and ability of these institutions to promote coherence, consistency and responsiveness to developing country needs for action and support with respect to technology transfer.

The final agreed language in the TIP decision in this regard is in paragraph 18, which states that Parties invite “the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and the Adaptation Fund to support the implementation of the technology implementation programme, within their mandates”. (This paragraph was watered down from an earlier draft version where it explicitly invites the operating entities of the FM to incorporate financing for the key elements of the TIP into their replenishment processes.)

Further, the decision in paragraph 19 requests “the CTCN, with the support of the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and interested partners, where applicable, to undertake demand-driven programmatic capacity-building efforts in support of the implementation of the elements referred to in paragraph 8 above, and to report on such efforts as part of its annual reports”.

Another point of contention concerned a draft text that would “invite developed country and other Parties in a position to do so, as well as multilateral development banks and other financial institutions, United Nations entities, private sector entities and philanthropic organizations, to provide support for work under the technology implementation programme”.

The **EU** said it would like to replace “Parties in a position to do so” with “encourages developing countries to make contributions, through South-South cooperation, on a voluntary basis”, which it argued was an “agreed text from Baku” (from COP 29).

The **LMDC** rejected this, saying that this seriously deviated from the differentiation of responsibilities for contributions as stipulated in Article 9.1 of the PA, which is that developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties. (This is based on the view that there is no equivalence between the obligations of developed countries to provide financing under the Convention and PA and the voluntary support that developing countries provide to each other through South-South cooperation.)

The final agreed language in paragraph 22 reads: “Invites developed country Parties and encourages other Parties, on a voluntary

basis, as well as multilateral development banks and other financial institutions, United Nations entities, private sector entities and philanthropic organizations, to provide support for work under the technology implementation programme.”

### Other main aspects of the decision

On the duration and review of the TIP, the **G77 and China**, in response to an earlier draft text for the TIP to conclude in November 2027, said that a two-year implementation for the TIP was too short. It reiterated that it was in Article 10.1 of the PA that “Parties share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”.

In contrast, **Japan** suggested to “revisit the TIP in 2027 and discuss whether there is a need to continue the activities under the TIP or if it needs to be amended”. This was supported by the **EU** and the **UK**. **Australia** said the programme should respond to the first GST and conclude in 2028, when the second GST will take place.

The final decision in paragraph 24 reads, “Decides that the implementation of the technology implementation programme shall commence immediately after the seventh session of the CMA and shall be reviewed at the sixteenth session of the CMA (2034) with a view to deciding on its continuation taking into account the outcomes of the third global stocktake”.

Therefore, the TIP will have a nine-year duration, commencing immediately after Belém and undergoing a review in 2034, an arrangement that aligns with developing countries’ preference for a long-term programme.

In paragraph 9 of the adopted decision, Parties agreed to “request the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network to incorporate, as appropriate, the elements [of the TIP] referred to in paragraph 8 ... into their workplans and programmes of work respectively, as well as into the joint work programmes of the Technology Mechanism, which should also inform the monitoring and evaluation of their activities”.

Paragraph 10 requests the TEC and the CTCN “to include information on actions taken to implement the technology implementation programme in their joint annual reports to the CMA”.

On modalities of the TIP, paragraph 11 of the decision “requests the Technology Executive

Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, with the support of the secretariat and interested partners, in consultation with the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, and with the participation of a broad range of stakeholders, to convene global in-session dialogues at the first session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation each year, starting in 2027, to address the element referred to in paragraph 8(a) above”.

There is also a call for submissions in paragraph 12 which “invites Parties, observers and other non-Party stakeholders to submit via the submission portal, annually, by 1 July, starting in 2026, suggested topics in line with the technology implementation programme to be discussed under the global dialogues”.

Under the decision in paragraph 13, the topic of the global in-session dialogues will be decided by the TEC, taking into account the submissions, the key messages and recommendations contained in the joint annual reports of the TEC and CTCN, and also the challenges identified in the most recent periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism. The TEC is also tasked with preparing a summary report on each global in-session dialogue, which will be included in its annual report to the CMA, as per paragraph 14 of the decision.

Further, in paragraph 15, Parties agreed to convene a high-level ministerial dialogue on technology development and transfer at CMA 10 in November 2028.

The decision in paragraph 16 requests “the CTCN, in collaboration with the TEC and with the support of interested partners, to convene regional dialogues in conjunction with its regional forums for national designated entities, starting in 2027, subject to the availability of resources”. In addition, the CTCN is requested to ensure that the regional dialogues are thematically aligned with the topic of the respective year’s global in-session dialogue and to prepare summary reports of the regional dialogues for inclusion in its annual reports.

Developed countries including the **UK**, **Norway** and the **EU** preferred to have the two constituted bodies, the CTCN and TEC, as the responsible bodies to implement the TIP and expected them to play a major role in the governance of the TIP. Developing countries, on the other hand, remained wary about the persistent challenges faced by the TEC and CTCN, which they said needed to be addressed, instead of burdening them with further guidance.

**Papua New Guinea** made a remark on the funding of the TIP during one of the final informal

consultations, saying that the proposed modalities of the TIP were “putting a lot of pressure and responsibility on the CTCN, and doesn’t come necessarily attached with resources towards these extra services that are expected ... When we are adding all these actions and capabilities to the TIP, we should consider how it will carry them out and keep funding question in mind.”

**Chile, for the G77 and China**, said, “This is an essential question regarding the funding of the TIP – supported inter alia by the governing entities ... Significant funding for the TIP will come from the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism.”

The coming years will be critical to ensuring that the TIP is able to fully deliver on its technology development and transfer objectives.

# TWN

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### **“Veredas Dialogue” to build on Article 2.1(c) dialogue, with review in 2028**

Kathmandu, 8 December (Chhegu Palmuu) – At the recently concluded COP 30 climate talks in Belém, the finance outcome on the way forward with regard to the “Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue” on the scope of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the PA, decided to build on the dialogue and hold deliberations under the “Veredas Dialogue”, with a review in 2028.

Through paragraph 10 of the adopted Belém decision, Parties decided to “hold deliberations under the Veredas Dialogue” on the “implementation” of Article 2.1(c) of the PA and its “complementarity with Article 9” of the PA, “building on the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue” and taking into account concerns and the need for safeguards raised by Parties in the context of the implementation of Article 2.1(c). The focus is thus now on the “implementation” of Article 2.1(c), as compared with the previous dialogue’s focus on its “scope”. Paragraph 21 of the adopted Belém decision decides to “review” the Veredas Dialogue in November 2028. (“Veredas” is a Portuguese word for paths/trails.)

[Article 2.1(c) of the PA is on “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development”. Article 9 of the PA is on climate finance, with Article 9.1 stating that “Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention”.]

In the first contact group of negotiations on 14 November, co-chaired by Zaheer Fakir (UAE) and Ralph Bodle (European Union), the imperative need for safeguards due to various concerns on

Article 2.1(c) interpretation and implementation became the foundation of any further engagement on the matter, as demanded by the developing countries. Their concerns and challenges stemmed from the push by developed countries for “top-down”, “prescriptive”, “common” or “global” implementation, which was viewed as a “red line” in proceeding with any further discussions. The negotiations started with a focus on the safeguards to be secured before agreeing to any decision on the matter.

At the core of this longstanding, contentious issue are the fundamentally different interpretations of the scope of Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9, which did not get resolved during the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue in 2023–2025. The adopted Belém decision in paragraph 2 provides that “there is no common interpretation of the scope” of Article 2.1(c) “or the manner of its implementation”.

In the Belém decision, the final language on safeguards and concerns contains a truncated list of issues (in paragraph 3), as compared with an elaborative one in two previous draft texts. However, it captures the basic “guardrails” for consideration of the matter, such as “nationally determined”, “national sovereignty”, “national circumstances”, and “bottom-up” nature of the PA, as driven by developing countries. (The previous draft texts contained language on a “collective, global and inclusive nature of implementation”, which was dropped from the final decision.) The Veredas Dialogue deliberations are to be undertaken in a “facilitative, enabling, non-punitive and non-prescriptive manner”. Most importantly, the safeguards provide that Article 2.1(c) is “complementary to and no substitute for

the provision and mobilization of financial support to developing countries under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement”. The decision also highlights implementation to reflect the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in light of national circumstances.

Going forward, the Veredas Dialogue is expected to respect the basic safeguards as the foundational element, giving cause for “cautious optimism” among developing countries on the decision.

Paragraph 3 of the decision provides the safeguards as follows: “Acknowledges various concerns and the need for safeguards raised by Parties in the context of the implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, including:

- (a) The need to pursue all three long-term goals of the Paris Agreement together, so that implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement will facilitate the collective achievement of the goals articulated in Article 2, paragraph 1(a–b);
- (b) That Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement is complementary to and no substitute for the provision and mobilization of financial support to developing countries under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement;
- (c) That efforts for making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development are nationally determined, taking into account country-driven strategies and the bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement, respecting national sovereignty and taking into account different national circumstances, time frames and approaches of Parties, in particular developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;
- (d) The need to ensure that collective efforts for and deliberations on implementing Article 2, paragraph 1(c), are undertaken in a facilitative, enabling, non-punitive and non-prescriptive manner;
- (e) The need to ensure transparency and to avoid creating an additional burden for Parties, including with regard to reporting and implementation”.

## Other major highlights of the decision

Paragraph 7 of the adopted Belém decision “recognizes the efforts already being made by Parties, in a nationally determined manner, for making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development”.

This is an important paragraph which recognizes the “nationally determined” implementation of Article 2.1(c).

Paragraph 12 decided that “at least one meeting per year under the Veredas Dialogue will be held in conjunction with the first regular sessions of the subsidiary bodies of the year”.

Paragraph 13 “requests the Presidency of the CMA to convene the Xingu Finance Talks under the Veredas Dialogue and in consultation with the co-chairs thereof, as an annual high-level round table with a view to facilitating a cooperative exchange of views among all interested Parties and non-Party stakeholders, in particular academia, international financial institutions and the private sector, on practical solutions that address the challenges and opportunities” in the implementation of Article 2.1(c) of the PA.

Paragraph 15 “requests the co-chairs [of the Veredas Dialogue] to prepare an annual report on deliberations under the Veredas Dialogue, including the annual high-level round table referred to in paragraph 13 above, during the respective year, for consideration by the CMA”.

Paragraph 16 “resolves that the Veredas Dialogue and the considerations by the CMA ... should aim towards progressing support to Parties in their efforts to implement Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement in a nationally determined and facilitative manner and to contribute to other ongoing work and processes under the CMA, as appropriate”.

Paragraph 17 decided that “the Veredas Dialogue will include consideration of challenges and opportunities in the implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, including as identified under the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue in 2023–2025”. A footnote to this paragraph refers to document FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/10.

This important paragraph is a watered-down version of two earlier draft texts which had explicitly listed out the challenges and opportunities highlighted by developing countries. The referenced document is the report by the Co-Chairs of the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue.

Paragraph 20 decided “to consider matters related to the implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1(c) of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement”.

Paragraph 21 decided “to review the Veredas Dialogue at the tenth session of the CMA (November 2028)”.

The Veredas Dialogue deliberations will thus be guided by paragraph 3 (on safeguards); paragraph 12 (at least one meeting in conjunction with the sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies); paragraph 13 (convening of the Xingu Finance Talks as an annual high-level round table); paragraph 14 (appointment of two co-chairs); paragraph 15 (annual report); paragraph 16 [considerations to aim towards progressing support to Parties to implement Article 2.1(c) in a nationally determined and facilitative manner]; paragraph 17 (consideration of challenges and opportunities); paragraph 19 (invitation for submissions); paragraph 20 [consideration of matters related to Article 2.1(c) implementation and its complementarity with Article 9 of the PA]; and paragraph 21 (review of the dialogue in 2028).

In terms of “high-level” political engagement, mainly pushed by developed countries, paragraph 13 of the decision requests the Presidency of the CMA to “convene” the “Xingu Finance Talks under the Veredas Dialogue and in consultation with the co-chairs thereof, as an annual high-level round table with a view to facilitating a cooperative exchange of views among all interested Parties and non-Party stakeholders, in particular academia, international financial institutions and the private sector, on practical solutions that address the challenges and opportunities” in the implementation of Article 2.1(c).

Given their key concerns and challenges, developing countries preferred to keep the talks at the technical level in the form of a technical dialogue.

The following provides a summary of the negotiations on the safeguards and how these eventually culminated in the adopted Belém decision.

## **Safeguards, concerns, challenges**

In the first contact group of negotiations on 12 November, Co-Chair Fakir called for Parties’ reflections on the 2023–2025 work undertaken as outlined in the report by the Co-Chairs of the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue Mohamed Nasr (Egypt) and Gabriela Blatter (Switzerland). He also sought views on “deciding on the way forward” (paragraph 14, decision 9/CMA.5) and the next steps.

(In the report by the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue Co-Chairs, “taking into account all work conducted under the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue in 2023–2025, including key findings, challenges and opportunities identified”, they had arrived at “conclusions, recommendations and suggestions for a possible way forward”, and suggested a “continued engagement on efforts, challenges and opportunities ... in the format of a dialogue ... building on the experience of and lessons learned” from the dialogue over the past three years.

(Further, the Co-Chairs suggested that this dialogue include consideration of the challenges and opportunities identified under the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue, including, in particular, efforts related to adaptation and climate-resilient development; just transition pathways; unintended consequences; data and methodological gaps; assessing progress and ensuring the credibility of efforts; addressing fragmentation and promoting coordination; and enhancing the visibility of nationally determined approaches. The Co-Chairs also recognized that “future work will be facilitative, enabling and non-prescriptive and will not create an additional burden for Parties”.)

**Iraq**, on behalf of the **G77 and China**, stated that “while there remains no common interpretation” related to Article 2.1(c), the work related to it is “being implemented by developing countries”. It highlighted the importance of “Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9 should benefit developing countries, and vital that safeguards are a core focus”.

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **Arab Group**, made clear that it did not see a continuation of the process “unless” necessary safeguards were in place, and proposed the “option of no continuation of work”. It did not want to give a mandate for new iteration of text given too premature a stage, and asked for focus on, first, the procedural elements of any decision and, next, on safeguards ensuring



certain elements to proceed towards a decision. It reiterated its position on refusing any notion of “harmonization” of standards and policies, and the monitoring and “reporting” of implementation of Article 2.1(c), placing the bottom-up nature of the PA centrestage and the context of sustainable development, poverty eradication, equity and CBDR-RC, referenced in the whole of Article 2 of the PA. Reminding the room about recent discriminatory practice in the treatment of Oman’s project proposal at the Board of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (developed countries voted on the proposal, rejecting it on the basis of Oman being a “high-income” country), it stressed that such bad conduct all the more justified the underlying importance of the clear “linkage” of Article 2.1(c) with Article 9 in this process.

**South Africa**, for the **African Group**, voiced its position of interpreting Article 2.1(c) in the full context of Article 2 of the PA, particularly sustainable development and poverty eradication and the principles of equity and CBDR-RC, as outlined in Article 9 of the PA and without any imposition of unilateral trade measures (UTMs) or impinging national fiscal sovereignty and decision making. It highlighted that the scope must underpin the transition of developing countries recognizing “different” timeframes and informed by “national” priorities and national circumstances and the critical linkage to Article 9 of the PA, instead of current focus on “domestic” actions to align with the financial flows. It highlighted that there had been limited appreciation of safeguards – such as developing countries not being cut off from climate finance, capital flight and disinvestments – and that there had been no discussion yet on the impacts of UTMs such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) on industries and fiscal sovereignty. Citing the Oman project proposal, South Africa stated that such a “punitive” measure was not in line with the principles of the GCF, depleting “trust” in the process. “We do see the potential in continuing the discussion on the issue, but only with specific safeguards in place, in support of development of developing countries,” it emphasized. It provided the mandate for a draft decision text based on consideration of inputs made.

**India**, for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, underlined the importance of safeguards that discussions or a decision would not infringe upon sovereign policy decisions. It emphasized the context of the “whole” of Article 2 of the PA, the equity and CBDR-RC principles

and the provisions of the Convention and its PA. It further linked complementarity with “Article 9.1” of the PA, making clear that Article 2.1(c) was not a substitute for the provision of finance to developing countries under Article 9.1. It stressed on “no conditionalities” on developing countries’ access to climate finance such as regulatory modifications, harmonization of reporting standards, standard taxonomies, etc., and highlighted more focus on adaptation finance.

**Bangladesh**, for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, sought further clarity on the modality and process of going forward given “no consensus” in the interpretation of Article 2.1(c). It said that Article 9.1 was about “provision” of climate finance by developed countries, while Article 9.3 was about “mobilization”; thus Article 9 served as a component for Article 2.1(c) implementation. It highlighted that Article 2.1(c) included all economies and sectors and traversed national and international sources of finance including public resources, and that it would not accept a focus on domestic resource mobilization given that climate change was an imposed burden on LDCs. It stated that the operationalization must go beyond the UNFCCC due to involvement of whole economies, sectors and international financial institutions.

**Finland**, speaking for the **EU**, highlighted the convening power of the UNFCCC process, and said that even if there was no common definition, countries were already implementing Article 2.1(c) and it was a “work in progress”. It also acknowledged the call for safeguards and guardrails from developing countries. However, it pointed out that the “current” format had important “limitations” – the dialogue as structured was no longer sufficient to cater to the growing scope and emerging political dimensions – and that it needed to evolve. It said that the Co-Chairs’ report contained important recommendations and mandated a draft text based on it.

**Switzerland**, for the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, also highlighted the Co-Chairs’ recommendations as “balanced and reasonably comfortable going forward” and supported the mandate to develop a draft decision text.

**China** reiterated different understandings on the scope of Article 2.1(c) and that governments, public and private sector actors globally were already implementing it through a diverse range of nationally determined, region-, sector- or institution-specific approaches. It underlined

that extension of the dialogue should be based on “refocusing or reframing the dialogue” on the “complementarity relationship with Article 9.1 of the PA”. Safeguards should include “no additional reporting and implementation burdens on Parties”.

**Maldives**, for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, stressed that Article 2.1(c) implementation should not impair the ability of developing countries to secure adequate finance for adaptation and climate-resilient development. In terms of “guidance”, it highlighted “equitable” implementation in terms of scope, definition of climate finance, and actions to implement low greenhouse gas emissions including financial flows consistent with the “energy transition outcome of the first global stocktake” in a nationally determined manner.

**Honduras**, for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, saw Article 2.1(c) as an “enabler” to achieve the goals of the PA including sustainable development and poverty eradication. It also asked how equity and CBDR-RC must be reflected, given no common understanding of Article 2.1(c) and its operationalization. It said that in the dialogue discussions, there had been strong focus on “national” aspects and how to operationalize at the national level and hence, it did see “space” for continuation of discussions with relevant safeguards. It stressed on focusing on the complementarity with Article 9, also including just transition issues, role of the international financial architecture and its reform to serve developing countries in their transition. It looked forward to collectively building safeguards and how the dialogue was to continue with what focus so that it led to discussions that could be taken forward by countries in a bottom-up, not top-down, approach.

**Canada** said that it was encouraging to see actions already taking place recognizing different pathways, and that the core message was that there was “no 1.5°C and global resilience without Article 2.1(c)”. It underlined the need for aligning financial flows and a “systematic shift” to mobilize trillions with “domestic” public and private finance as without it no international flows could be achieved. It acknowledged that Article 2.1(c) complemented Article 9 and how to sensitize the financial system to respond to “investment gaps” including barriers to developing countries like high cost of capital, limited adaptation, and constrained fiscal space. It also called for reform of the international financial architecture.

## Elements of the safeguards

The **G77 and China**, led by **Iraq**, outlined the scope of the safeguards as follows: “bottom-up, nationally determined; that there is no common interpretation of Article 2.1(c); [that the dialogue should be] non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative exchange of views; respectful of national sovereignty, including fiscal and monetary sovereignty; will not place additional burden; is consistent with the principles and provisions of the PA – with CBDR-RC as a key element, equity, country-driven and owned, sustainable development and poverty eradication”.

The **EU** stressed that it did not seek any “prescriptive” outcome and shared the concerns of developing countries about the need for a bottom-up, nationally determined approach, including the context of the whole of Article 2 of the PA. It supported addressing the safeguards and wanted to also see “necessary ambition” and referred to “harmonization” of measures and approaches as “possible good practices and examples”. It assured that there was no one-size-fits-all, in line with the spirit of the PA, and “no finger pointing and prescription to Parties’ domestic policies”. It clarified that Article 2.1(c) was “additional and not substitute” to Article 9 of the PA, and that international public finance was “part” of the global financial flows. It said that “means of support is important but not the sole scope”. It also saw the UNFCCC giving “guidance” due to its leveraging power.

**South Africa**, for the **African Group**, pointed to empowering national actions through the “just transition” lens that considers “different” pathways and timeframes, adding that a country may take years to transition but cannot access finance to support its transition. “We need to avoid the misuse of Article 2.1(c) to enforce UTMs such as CBAMs.”

**India**, for the **LMDC**, reiterated the need to focus on “fiscal challenges”, the key relationship with Article 9.1 of the PA, and the whole of Article 2 in the context of equity and CBDR-RC. It pointed to pegging on national circumstances, and said that with country regulatory frameworks already in place, this could not be about “harmonized” concepts, which would in fact not promote climate action but “take away development” from developing countries. It said further that UTMs impacted development goals.

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **Arab Group**, did not agree with notions of harmonization or standardization that impinged on national sovereignty and policy space, and hence underscored the need for “safeguards in totality”.

**Norway**, the **EU**, **Canada**, the **EIG** and the **UK** supported “high-level inputs” of the dialogue into the GST, but this was pushed back by **India** for the **LMDC** and **Saudi Arabia** for the **Arab Group**. **South Africa** for the **African Group**, **India** for the **LMDC**, **Saudi Arabia** for the **Arab Group**, **Maldives** for **AOSIS** and **China** were not in favour of any “high-level” events at a premature stage and preferred only a technical dialogue.

The first draft text (of 15 November), which was a restricted document, received a mixed response. **Saudi Arabia** for the **Arab Group** pointed out that “current safeguards don’t satisfy”, hence the need to “continue to have the option of not continuing further work”. An explicit reference to the principles of equity and CBDR-RC was missing from the chapeau of the “safeguards” paragraph 2, and the context of “nationally determined”, “national sovereignty” and “national circumstances” was missing in some of the sub-paragraphs; in particular, paragraph 2(j) referenced “sectoral” circumstances and realities, which was its red-line issue. This was also pointed out by **Iraq**, which called for its deletion. Furthermore, paragraph 2(k) spoke to the need for a “collective, global and inclusive nature of implementation”, which went against the “nationally determined” approach and thus was considered a red line for the **LMDC**, the **Arab Group** and **China**.

**South Africa**, for the **African Group**, reiterated that the Group was not ready for a “formal” agenda item or formal work programme under the CMA but just a technical dialogue with no “high-level” political discussions (referring to paragraph 18 of the draft text on high-level ministerial dialogues during the CMA with summary reports). It was supported by **India** for the **LMDC**, **Maldives** for **AOSIS**, **Nepal** for the **LDCs** and **Honduras** for **AILAC**. The push for political, high-level engagement was primarily driven by **developed countries**.

The issue of UTM<sup>s</sup> was proposed by the **LMDC** and supported by the **African Group**, the **Arab Group**, **AOSIS**, **Kenya** and **China** but was a red line for developed countries. It was therefore noteworthy that one of the sub-paragraphs on the safeguards read, “The need to avoid unintended consequences, such as capital flight, illicit flows, and impacts of unilateral trade measures,

conditionalities on access to climate finance, and additional burden for Parties, including with regard to reporting and implementation”. And, in the key paragraph 16 of the draft text in relation to consideration of challenges and opportunities, one of the sub-paragraphs read, “The complementarity of implementing Article 2, paragraph 1(c) with the implementation of Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement” – this had been pushed by **India** for the **LMDC**, **Saudi Arabia** for the **Arab Group**, **China**, **Iraq** and **Kenya**.

The **EU** lamented that the “further work” options (of either further work or no further work) did not duly reflect its option. (It is learnt that the EU favoured a “platform”, and this option would be reflected in the second draft text.) It said that the sub-paragraph on UTM<sup>s</sup> was not acceptable, a view supported by the **UK**.

The **EIG** saw the need for a high-level forum. **Canada** expressed disappointment that the text did not reflect the “forward-looking” section for “CMA mandate” on next steps, and that “future work” did not contain the range of proposals or tangible outcomes that Parties requested. It wanted concrete deliverables such as “better input to the GST without creating new burden”, and said also that what mattered was the utility of the process, whether it be a work programme, a dialogue or a platform. It supported the **EIG** on convening a high-level forum on systemic barriers and stressed the need for language in relation to “transparency and reporting”. The **UK** said it had proposed language from the first GST but that it did not see it reflected in the text.

The second draft text (of 17 November) ballooned in size and was entirely in brackets (denoting lack of agreement). It comprised a compilation of all options and views expressed during the negotiations along with written submissions. Developing country negotiators who spoke to TWN pointed to several red lines in the text and said they would stick to the option of “no further work” if the safeguards provided insufficient comfort to take any decision on the matter. The EU’s proposed “platform” option, through a technical and political dialogue, appeared in the draft text in paragraph 21. Further, paragraph 22 contained textual proposals on “development of high-level, non-prescriptive guidance” and “common principles” to inform Article 2.1(c) implementation.

After the release of the second draft text, there were no further negotiations held except ministerial and Presidency bilaterals with the

negotiating groups on the draft text, the red lines and possible landing zones. It is learnt that the Presidency requested from Co-Chairs Fakir and Bodle a text iteration based on the second draft text. Meanwhile, negotiations intensified in the parallel Mutirão consultations by the Presidency aiming to build consensus towards the Belém Political Package deal, which included Article 2.1(c) as one of the subjects.

On 21 November, a concise three-page draft text was shared as the “Presidency proposal”. Without reopening of the text, this got adopted as the final decision as part of the Belém Political Package on 22 November.

Compared with the 17 November second draft text that had numerous red lines, developing country negotiators who spoke to TWN said that the truncated final decision – with concise text and containing basic safeguards relating to “nationally determined”, the “bottom-up” nature of the PA as well as deliberations to be undertaken

in a “facilitative, enabling, non-punitive and non-prescriptive manner” – appeared to be a “more comfortable” text and was received with “cautious optimism” to move forward on the Veredas Dialogue.

Most importantly, the safeguards provide that Article 2.1(c) is “complementary to and no substitute for the provision and mobilization of financial support to developing countries under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement”. The decision also highlights implementation to reflect the principles of equity and CBDR-RC, in light of national circumstances. One important sub-paragraph that got dropped from the safeguards was on “the need to avoid unintended consequences, such as capital flight, illicit flows, and impacts of unilateral trade measures, conditionalities on access to climate finance, and additional burden for Parties, including with regard to reporting and implementation”. This issue had been pushed by the **LMDC**, the **African Group**, the **Arab Group**, **AOSIS**, **Kenya** and **China**.

### COP 30 stalemate: No agreement on Adaptation Fund transition to Paris Agreement

Kathmandu, 9 December (Chhegu Palmuu) – The recent COP 30 climate talks in Belém failed to agree on the arrangements for the transition of the Adaptation Fund (AF) to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement (PA), a key ask by developing countries in the negotiations.

This lingering thorny matter on the institutional arrangements (covering trustee arrangements, memorandum of understanding regarding secretariat services, and governance-related decisions necessary for the smooth transition of the AF) has been bogged down since the mid-year talks in June this year. This has been mainly due to developed countries' insistence on linking this matter to a separate and highly divisive issue relating to the membership of the AF Board, seen as being highly "political".

Given irreconcilable divergences on the AF Board membership issue, the matter was deemed not possible to be resolved at the technical level, thus requiring political engagement with ministerial consultation during the second and final stretch of the Belém talks. However, despite all efforts, no agreement was possible in Belém, with further work required at the next session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) in June 2026.

At the closing plenary on 22 November, the COP 30 President, Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago, proposed the following CMP/CMA conclusions on the matter:

"The CMP/CMA requested SBI 64 (June 2026) to continue consideration of matters relating to the membership of the Adaptation Fund Board, the matter of the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and the initiation of the fifth review of the Adaptation Fund on the basis of the work undertaken at SBI 63 [in Belém] available on the [UNFCCC website](#).

"The CMP/CMA noted that this work does not represent agreement among Parties, does not prejudice further work or prevent Parties from expressing their views in the future, nor does it prejudice the number of draft decisions on these matters that Parties may wish to recommend or consider."

[The CMP refers to the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (KP) while the CMA refers to the Conference of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.]

Corrêa do Lago also presented CMP/CMA draft decisions on matters related to the AF as part of the [Belém Political Package](#), and in relation to the AF transition, the decision "Acknowledges the continued consideration by the Adaptation Fund Board of arrangements for the transition of the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serving the Paris Agreement and requests the Board to complete, as a matter of priority, its consideration of this matter with a view to preparing for a smooth transition and prompt monetization of the share of proceeds under Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement" (see further details below).

The issue concerning membership of the AF Board involves entrenched divisions over change in terminology regarding the representation of groups of Parties, viz., from "Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties)" and "Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I Parties)" as referenced in decision 1/CMP.3 under the KP, to "developed country Parties" and "developing country Parties" respectively, aligning with the terminology used in the PA.

(Under the UNFCCC, there are two annexes. Annex I Parties include developed countries and "countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy", including Eastern

European countries and the Russian Federation, as well as Türkiye. Annex II Parties include developed countries but not the economies in transition nor Türkiye. The Annex II countries have mandatory obligations under the Convention to provide financial resources to developing countries. The PA, on the other hand, has no annexes and uses the terms “developed country Parties” and “developing country Parties”).

Despite the lack of consensus on the membership issue, developed countries have been staying firm on the need for a package deal linking it with the matter of institutional arrangements. Developing countries, on the other hand, have been maintaining that the latter issue is not subject and not linked to the membership issue and therefore warrants an independent decision on an urgent basis for the developing countries which want to ensure a timely and smooth transition of the AF.

Under the “finance” agenda item of the SBI, the matters related to the AF deal with three issues: arrangements for the AF to exclusively serve the PA; membership of the AF Board; and the fifth review of the AF.

By decisions 1/CMP.14 (paragraph 2) and 13/CMA.1 (paragraph 3) taken at COP 24 in 2018, it was decided that the AF shall exclusively serve the PA once the share of proceeds from the PA’s Article 6.4 carbon market mechanism becomes available. The critical issue in this regard is for the CMA to mandate the AF Board to develop and conclude new trustee arrangements with the World Bank (WB) to enable monetization of the share of proceeds under the Article 6.4 mechanism, thus making the resulting funds available to trigger the AF transition to exclusively serve the PA. The existing trustee arrangements with the WB are under the CMP [which enables monetization of the share of proceeds from the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) generated by the KP’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)]. Additionally, there are governance-related issues to be addressed under the PA, given that the AF is currently governed by decision 1/CMP.3 under the KP.

The inclusion of the institutional arrangements issue into the agenda at SBI 62 in Bonn in June this year was led by South Africa for the African Group, pointing to decisions 2/CMP.19 (paragraph 23) and 13/CMA.6 (paragraph 25) adopted at COP 29 in 2024, which requested SBI 62 to consider the matter of the “arrangements for the AF to exclusively serve the PA” and to make recommendations on this matter for consideration at CMP 20 and CMA 7 in Belém.

At SBI 62, significant progress was made towards a consensus text in principle on the required

institutional arrangements: trustee arrangements, memorandum of understanding regarding secretariat services, and governance-related decisions. However, there was no eventual agreement. Developed countries continued to push for a package deal that would include the membership issue, leading to a deadlock in Bonn.

In order to retain the progress achieved at SBI 62, the transmission of the work to Belém was in two formats: an informal note prepared by the co-facilitators with no formal status; and a conference room paper (CRP) by the developing countries represented by the **G77 and China**, led by **Iraq**, containing the same substance of the text as the informal note, but with three annexes denoting three separate decisions on the issues, namely, institutional arrangements, membership of the AF Board, and fifth review of the AF (see TWN update).

In Belém, the draft negotiating texts (of 12 November and 14 November 18:30) were in brackets denoting lack of consensus. They captured the titles of the arrangements and membership issues as follows: “[Decision on the arrangements of the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement] [Decision on Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund]”; and “[Separate decision on Membership of the Adaptation Fund Board][Continuation of decision on Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund]”. This divergence of two options reflected the crux of the matter – either an independent decision on the arrangements of the AF or a package decision on both arrangements and membership.

With no resolution to the deadlock, the talks concluded with a request to “SBI 64 (June 2026) to continue consideration” of the matter.

At the closing plenary on 22 November, **Iraq**, for the **G77 and China**, expressed regret on “not reaching successful outcomes” on the institutional arrangements of the AF to ensure its smooth transition to exclusively serve the PA, and highlighted that “the effective functioning of the Adaptation Fund remains an utmost priority for us, and we are concerned about not having reached a decision on this agenda item”.

Further work on this important issue at SBI 64 is much awaited.

The following provides a summary of the negotiations at Belém.

### **Deadlock in Belém**

On 11 November, at the first informal consultations, co-facilitator Isatou Camara (Gambia) introduced both the informal note and the CRP by the G77 and China, bringing forward the work from SBI 62. On 13 November, following the first draft text (of

12 November), another informal consultation took place. On 14 November, the closing contact group met, but the talks were deadlocked. Although work was forwarded to the second week of negotiations, with the draft text of 14 November 18:30, there was no movement seen on the matter.

**Iraq**, on behalf of the **G77 and China**, stressed the need for “significantly scaling up the provision of climate finance and means of implementation to enable ambitious and urgent climate action at the scale and speed required”. It highlighted that the AF was of “great importance for developing countries”, and reaffirmed the need to ensure a successful outcome on the agenda item related to climate finance, including on the AF. The G77 and China proposed to advance engagement on this agenda item based on the CRP submitted during SB 62.

The **European Union** said that technical elements such as arrangements were covered in the informal note, and that there was common ground on support for the AF. It added that it was the appropriate time to tackle the issue of terminology as well, but was not in favour of a separate decision text. In Bonn, “we found a landing space in Option 4”, it said, referring to its proposed option on amendment of terminology from “Annex I and non-Annex I” to “developed” and “developing” with a footnote stating “This does not alter the status of countries, nor does it prejudice future negotiating positions or views of Parties in this regard”. In relation to the fifth review of the AF, it preferred the review to be initiated by the CMP and concluded by the CMA.

[In the first draft text (of 12 November), “Option 4” on the change in terminology read: “Invites the CMA, at its seventh session, to decide that the composition and number of members of the Adaptation Fund Board will remain unchanged upon the Adaptation Fund’s transition to exclusively serving the Paris Agreement; Also invites the CMA, at its seventh session, to decide to apply, effective upon the Adaptation Fund’s transition to exclusively serving the Paris Agreement, paragraph 6(d-e) of decision 1/CMP.3 with respect to the composition of the Adaptation Fund Board with the following changes: (a) in paragraph 6(d) ‘Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties)’ shall read ‘developed country Parties’; (b) in paragraph 6(e) ‘Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I Parties)’ shall read ‘developing country Parties’.” A footnote read: “This does not alter the status of

countries, nor does it prejudice future negotiating positions or views of Parties in this regard.”]

**South Africa**, for the **African Group**, stated its understanding that there was already agreement on the institutional arrangements, but no agreement related to the membership terminology issue, which it thought best to put aside. It made clear that the latter issue could be resolved only at the Presidency level with political engagement. It said that significant progress had been made in Bonn and a decision was ready to be taken in Belém, so there was a need to focus on the core elements of the decision. On the issue of the fifth review of the AF, it preferred to defer it, but said it could be flexible under the condition that the review was only under the CMP. It also flagged that when it came to decision making at the CMP, it did not support participation of Observer Parties (i.e., countries that are not Parties to the KP, such as the United States and Canada), adhering to the rules of procedure.

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **Arab Group**, supported working off the CRP and agreed with the African Group on the institutional arrangements, agreeing on the reference to Annex I Parties in the text. It said a decision on the membership issue was not necessary for the AF transition and stressed on moving forward on the institutional arrangements without linking to other contentious issues. On the fifth review of the AF, it preferred to deal with that after the transition.

**India**, for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, supported working off the CRP as the basis, and also agreed with the African and Arab Groups to move forward on the institutional arrangements reflected in Annex 1 of the CRP. It also said that decisions on the other two annexes (on membership and fifth review) were not necessary for the transition to occur.

**Honduras**, for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, said that the transition should be at the earliest for the AF to receive funds from the Article 6.4 share of proceeds. It preferred Option 4 on the membership issue but made clear that this matter should not impede the transition. On the fifth review of the AF, it also preferred it after transition of the AF.

**Maldives**, for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, preferred the initiation of the fifth review of the AF.

**Nepal**, for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, emphasized on a smooth AF transition as soon as possible and preferred the fifth review to be undertaken following the transition.

**China** echoed interventions for a separate decision on the institutional arrangements and aligned with the Arab Group and the LMDC that the membership issue was not necessary for the AF transition.

**Russia** reiterated its Option 3 reflected in the text which states, “Invites the CMA, at its seventh session, to decide that the composition of the Adaptation Fund Board, the number of Board members and the procedure of their nomination will remain unchanged”. It said that Option 4 was a red line and amounted to attempts to renegotiate the PA.

**Ukraine** said it supported the transition, but Option 4 on the change of terminology pertaining to the membership issue was not acceptable.

On 14 November, in the closing contact group, co-facilitator Camara introduced the revised draft text and stated that in order to ensure the AF transition, the Presidency wished to provide more time in the second week of the negotiations to undertake work on outstanding political issues. She suggested forwarding the draft text as work in progress to the CMP/CMA.

**Türkiye** said that it could not accept the current text (with Option 4) with its “red line”, pointing out that the change in terminology reopened the PA and that it could not accept any such decision on the matter. (Türkiye is in Annex I of the Convention.)

The COP 30 Presidency said that it recognized the crucial importance of the functioning of the AF for developing countries, and encouraged Parties to consult further.

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **Arab Group**, suggested forwarding the draft text as an informal note to the Presidency, to adopt the institutional arrangements and drop the other two issues, which was supported by **India** for the **LMDC**.

**Antigua and Barbuda** for **AOSIS**, **South Africa** for the **African Group**, **Nepal** for the **LDCs**, **Honduras** for **AILAC**, and **Group SUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay)** were all flexible with the format of the draft text and agreed that it should be forwarded to the second week to ensure a decision on the institutional arrangements.

The **EU**, the **United Kingdom**, **Switzerland** and **Australia** supported forwarding the draft text, reiterating however that it should be as a package, with the change in terminology as part of the AF transition.

During closing of the consultations, when co-facilitator Camara checked to confirm general consensus to move the draft text to the level of the Presidency in the form of an informal note, **Türkiye** objected to sending any text with its red line on Option 4 on the terminology issue, reiterating its firm stance on retaining the “Annexes” with no change in terminology.

This deadlock was followed by informal “huddles” among Parties attempting to resolve the language issue of Option 4 by exploring alternative formulations comfortable to Türkiye. One of them, proposed by **New Zealand**, was to replace the “Annexes” clause of Option 4 with the following: “Two other representatives from developed country Parties, and two other representatives from developing country representatives” – effectively changing the numbers and composition of the Board. This exercise of exploring substitute textual changes did not break the deadlock, however.

On 15 November, at the closing plenary of the SBI, the draft text of 14 November 18:30 (based on the preceding draft text of 14 November 16:00) was forwarded to the second week to the CMP/CMA for further consideration.

**China**, for the **LMDC**, expressed disappointment “to see our partners continuing to link the institutional arrangements of the AF for its transition to serve the PA to the membership issue, where there were clear political divergences”. It added that “we do not see it as a package deal, [and] there is no relationship between the two, and request our partners to adopt a decision in Belém, without holding the institutional arrangements hostage to the smooth transition of the AF which is of critical importance to all developing countries”.

In the second week, no further consultations were conducted on the matter by the Presidency.

It is learnt that developed countries continued to emphasize that agreement on the institutional arrangements could not be reached unless there was agreement on the terminology issue of the AF Board membership.

As stated earlier, at the closing plenary on 22 November, consideration of these matters has been kicked down the road to the SBI meeting in June next year.

Given the various entrenched positions of Parties, whether and how the AF transition will happen remains to be seen.