TWN Info Service on Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge (Jul25/01)
9 July 2025
Third World Network

Plant Treaty: South wants DSI in SMTA, Asia not ready for scope expansion

Lima, 9 July (TWN) – Discussions to enhance the access and benefit sharing system under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (commonly known as the Plant Treaty) continues this week.

In the opening remarks to the 14^th Meeting of the Ad hoc Open Ended Working Group on Enhancement of the Multilateral System (MLS) of Access and Benefit Sharing under the Plant Treaty, developing countries from Africa, GRULAC and Near East Regions insisted that the use of Digital Sequence Information (DSI) / Genetic Sequence Data (GSD) should be addressed in the Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA), a position supported by developing countries from Asia as well.

The Asia Region’s spokesperson from South Korea explained in their opening remarks that some countries (developing countries) in the region are not ready to fully expand the Treaty’s Annex 1 and some countries (developing countries) also want DSI/GSD to be addressed in the SMTA, which Japan and Korea do not agree with.

Annex 1 deals with a list of the plants covered under the MLS which currently contains only 64 crops. Asia as a region has both developing and developed countries, and on most of the issues there are diverging views within the region. According to sources, India has not participated in regional meetings held prior to the Working Group meetings in its national/ Treaty Party capacity.

The Working Group’s 14^th meeting (WG14) is taking place in Lima from 7 to 11 July 2025. The central agenda is to finalize a draft package of measures as proposed by the Co-chairs and then submit the same to the 11^th Governing Body meeting that will be held in November.

The approach of the Co-Chairs’ draft package of measures is to make the MLS attractive and appealing to the seed industry to generate user-based income. Following the demands and narratives of the Global North to make the MLS attractive, the draft package of measures proposes to address DSI/GSD generated from the MLS material outside of the SMTA and accordingly, its terms and use.

It is now a settled position in the Convention on Biological Diversity that the terms of use of DSI/GSD generated from genetic resources can be addressed in the contracts signed at the time of sharing of the genetic materials. However, the draft package of measures shies away from doing so.

To make matters worse, the draft package also proposes to exempt subscribers to the MLS from obligation to share benefits for their use of DSI elsewhere too by giving a product-based benefit sharing compliant certificate. In this approach, for example, if a subscriber seed company develops a BT Brinjal type seed, using Brinjal materials from the MLS and DSI of Bacillus thuringiensis from a public database or DSI generated from a Bacillus thuringiensis sample collected from a national gene bank, such seed company is exempted from sharing benefits from this DSI use, either with the CBD multilateral mechanism or the national legal system respectively.

It must be noted that the Plant Treaty has no authority to exempt users of DSI from other access and benefit sharing regimes or systems.

Regarding Annex 1 expansion, the draft package of measures proposes to expand the list to “all plant genetic resources for food and agriculture”, meaning any plant genetic material having potential or actual value for food and agriculture research. The problem with this approach is that it removes national sovereignty over plant genetic resources for countries, especially as the MLS lacks transparency, accountability and reliable tracking measures. In fact, the proposal to fully expand Annex 1 is contrary to the Preamble, Articles 10 and 11 of the Plant Treaty. But to make the MLS more appealing to industry, these internal inconsistencies are ignored. At the same time there is no accompanying proposal to improve transparency, accountability of the MLS and recipients, including Article 15 institutions of the Treaty.

The seed industry representative at WG14 warned the delegates against any intention to introduce compliance mechanisms or measures into the operations of the MLS or SMTA. “Compliance makes SMTA not attractive to industry,” said the representative, adding that in case that SMTA include compliance measures,, “the industry won't come to gene banks to avail of materials and the payments won't increase”.

Making MLS Attractive to Breeders

The North America and Europe Region reiterated the need to make the MLS attractive to the seed industry to increase user-based income. Their statements reflect a view that the only way to do so is to fully open up germplasm to the industry through the MLS, without obligating them to commit much.

They also seek to propose multiple modes of access to seeds through the MLS as options so that the seed industry can pick and choose according to their needs. These options now include a whole portfolio subscription, a partial portfolio subscription and a single access system.

However, Norway and Switzerland reiterated their preference for a simple and subscription only system and are actively willing to make compromises to arrive at consensus quickly.

[A whole portfolio subscription means industry (recipient) agrees to pay an annual fee for their access to germplasm from international and national gene banks through the MLS, calculated based on their entire seed sales. They can access any or all materials available through the MLS.

[A partial subscription means industry (recipient) agrees to pay an annual fee for their access to germplasm from international and national gene banks through the MLS, calculated based on the seed sales of selected crops. They can only access seeds belonging to such crops through the MLS.

[A single access system means industry (recipient) will only pay if they develop a new seed variety using MLS material and commercialize it. In these cases, payments will start only after research and breeding of a new variety is completed. This is usually 5-7 years or more.]

Developing countries from GRULAC and Africa also expressed their interest in a subscription only system, while Asia and North America have indicated the need for both subscription and single access systems.

For North America, it is not acceptable to mandate the recipients to pay at the time of access. According to them, such payments are not technically sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources under the Treaty, and therefore payment at access should remain optional. The default legal option should be a single access system. Industry players that willingly come forward to support the MLS may opt for other options such as subscription as a goodwill gesture.

For Asia developing countries, a single access system is an option to be used by primarily non-commercial researchers as well as small scale breeders who want to work on specific and limited number of crops.

Further, according to North America, it is important to bring all the industries on board. The collaboration between gene banks and seed industries and breeders and unquantified non-monetary benefits generated in such collaborations is of more importance to North America. They warned that in an effort to generate user-based income in the MLS, Parties should not alienate users from the gene banks by imposing mandatory payments on them.

The North American support for partial subscription and single access was explained using the examples of soya and maize - two crops that dominate around 70% of the global seed market. The companies who already sell seeds belonging to these crops will not come to gene banks, if they are supposed to pay from their whole portfolio. They already have their own private collections on these crops and are not dependent on gene banks. But they may come to gene banks for other crops but then they should not be forced to pay from the maize and soya seed sales. If they are forced to do so, then they will not come to gene banks, losing any opportunity for national and international gene banks to collaborate with them.

Interestingly North America even suggested a subscription option without soya and maize. Countries like Germany, Japan and Korea supported North America.

GRULAC urged North America to limit and focus the negotiations on subscription options and give up the demand for single access.

Co-Chairs note on making MLS attractive to Breeders

The Co-Chairs circulated a note last week titled “Scenarios For Rates and Thresholds and Further Background Information”, in order to help prepare for this week's discussion.

The note says that the Working Group has requested the Co-Chairs at its 13^th meeting to prepare different scenarios for payment rates and thresholds to trigger payments etc. ahead of the 14^th meeting. The relevant paragraph reads:

“The scenarios are not a forecast or estimate of future user-based income to the Benefit Sharing Fund nor are they an estimate of industry demand from an enhanced Multilateral System (MLS). The scenarios and information below are a tool to illustrate the logic and interrelationships of elements of the package of measures being developed through the enhancement process. It also outlines how the package of measures under development work together to ensure the broadest appeal to potential users from the enhancement process.”

According to the note the Co-Chairs are working on certain assumptions.

First, Improving the terms and conditions for accessing material through the MLS will make the MLS more attractive to the seed industry, in particular with regard to legal certainty and temporal limits to benefit sharing payments.

[Here there are concerns that “improving” means making it industry-friendly, even if it undermines sovereign rights or farmers’ rights over seeds.]

Second, expanding the scope of the MLS will make it more attractive to the seed industry.

Third, providing a means for the seed industry to meet expectations for benefit-sharing from the use of DSI/GSD will make use of the MLS more attractive to the seed industry.

[There are concerns that package of measures is trying to create an exemption for the seed industry, making payments to FAO, from sharing benefits from the use of all DSI in the world, irrespective of whether such DSI is generated from plants under the MLS or other species]

Fourth, there will be continued widespread availability of material outside the MLS.

Interestingly the Co-Chairs make the following assumptions on how the seed industry would behave with regard to the MLS (paragraph 8 of the Co-Chairs’ note):

1. Companies are rational cost minimisers
2. Companies with sales of vegetables are likely to increase use of the MLS if the scope of the MLS is expanded and that material is made available through the MLS. Seed industry has repeatedly stated that vegetable PGRFA are currently of greater interest for their breeding programmes (than row crops such as soybean and maize).
3. Companies with large, in-house collections (particularly tier 1 and 2 companies with high value maize and soybean product lines) are unlikely to access the MLS. Seed industries have indicated current low demand for PGRFA maize and soybean available in ex situ collections in the Multilateral System for their major markets.
4. Companies using the single access option and intending to make products available under forms of IP (intellectual property) protection where it is not freely available for further research and breeding will tend to look for sources of PGRFA outside the MLS.

Based on these assumptions as well as some numbers floated by various actors and sources, the Co-Chairs worked out certain scenarios and rates. The best practical income which the note assumes to be achievable is around USD 7 million USD per annum (Scenario 4 with 100% subscription and a USD 50 million threshold).

The proposal from the Co-Chairs under the draft package of measures is therefore to open up the entire germplasm belonging to Parties through the MLS in exchange for this possibility of an achievable amount of only USD 7 million per annum. There is nothing in the proposals that ensures the integrity of the system, both in terms of recipients of resources making payments, and recipients not diverting resources to purposes beyond the Treaty.

At the same time, on the DSI issue, the draft package seeks to exempt seed companies subscribing to the MLS from making any payments to other national or international access and benefit-sharing mechanisms. This proposal has been challenged by developing countries at the 13^th meeting as the Plant Treaty lacks authority and ability to decide for mechanisms outside of the Treaty. Countries like Norway are pushing developing countries to accept such or similar models with certain variations.

In short, the draft package of measures and developed countries are forcing developing countries to short sell their entire national collections of germplasm to seed industries and at the same time, help seed industries to escape from payment obligations not only under Plant Treaty but also elsewhere.

Meanwhile, the Treaty offers no mechanism that the resources that are shared with seed companies are not diverted to other users or used in other sectors such as pharmaceutical or bioenergy sectors.

No text negotiations on the first day in Lima

The approach of the Working Group is to first arrive at conceptual consensus in principle, before engaging in the text proposals. It is assumed that this will bring countries closer to the deal faster.

However, countries like Switzerland and few others indicated that seeing text will also sometimes help improve conceptual clarity and may allow Parties to make informed choices, though a little slower.