The Singapore issues

Despite strong resistance by developing countries, the issues of investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation, i.e. the Singapore issues, have now been incorporated into the WTO post-Doha work programme for the next two years. Although a consensus is still necessary before any negotiations can be undertaken on these issues, such an outcome will have serious implications for developing countries.

Martin Khor

THE most contentious aspect of the WTOs Doha Ministerial Conference, and the preparatory process before it, involved the Singapore issues (investment, competition, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation).  During the preparatory process, a large number of developing countries (mainly from Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Central America) had made their views known that they were opposed to the commencement of negotiations on these issues, and that instead the study process on these subjects should continue in the WTO.   However, these positions were not reflected in the draft Ministerial Declaration transmitted to Doha.   At Doha many developing countries again stated (in their Ministers statements presented at the official plenary, and during informal consultation meetings) their opposition to the draft Declaration committing the WTO to negotiate the Singapore issues.  However, once again such a negotiating commitment was placed in two further drafts during the Conference. In the final draft, which the WTO Secretariat released on the Conferences last morning on 14 November, Ministers agreed, on all four Singapore issues, that negotiations would take place after the Fifth Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken by explicit consensus at that Conference on modalities of negotiations.

In the operational part of the relevant paragraphs of the Doha Declaration (para 20 on investment, 23 on competition, 26 on transparency in government procurement and 27 on trade facilitation) the wording is as follows:  ....we agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations.  This implies that a decision has already been taken in principle to start negotiations towards new agreements, and only the modalities of the negotiations have to be agreed to.

Chairman's understanding

In a final consultation meeting on the same afternoon, more than 10 developing countries suggested that the text be changed, to remove the commitment to negotiations on the four issues. India indicated it could not agree to the Declaration unless amendments were made.  Eventually a compromise was worked out, in which at the formal closing ceremony the Doha Conference Chairperson, Mr Youssef Hussain Kamal, the Minister of Finance, Economy and Trade of Qatar, read out a Chairmans understanding that in relation to the four issues, a decision would indeed need to be taken at the Fifth Ministerial Conference by explicit consensus before negotiations could proceed on the four issues. He also clarified that this would give each Member the right to take a position on modalities that would prevent negotiations from proceeding until that Member is prepared to join in an explicit consensus. 

The statement that was read out at the closing session was as follows:  I would like to note that some delegations have requested clarification concerning Paragraphs 20, 23, 26 and 27 of the draft declaration.  Let me say that with respect to the reference to an explicit consensus being needed in these paragraphs, for a decision to be taken at the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, my understanding is that at that session a decision would indeed need to be taken by explicit consensus, before negotiations on trade and investment and trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation could proceed.

In my view, this would also give each member the right to take a position on modalities that would prevent negotiations from proceeding after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference until that member is prepared to join in an explicit consensus.

This statement gave greater protection to developing countries that did not want to commit to negotiations.  The text of the Declaration states that negotiations would begin after the Fifth Ministerial on the basis of an explicit consensus on the modalities of the negotiations.  However, the Chairmans statement clarifies that a decision by consensus needs to be taken before negotiations could proceed.  By not stating that the required decision is on the modalities, the implication of the statement is that a consensus is needed on whether there should be negotiations. 

Does the Chairman's statement have legal status?  B L Das  gives this opinion: The Chairman has termed the first part of it [i.e. his statement] as ‘(his) understanding’. Normally a chairman gets such understanding by a process of consultations with the participants in the meeting and he/she includes agreed formulations in his/her understanding. If there is no objection or reservation from the participants after the chairman has expressed his/her understanding, it is considered to be the collective wish of the meeting. In this plenary during this Conference, there was no objection or reservation from the participants after the Chairman expressed his understanding. All this makes this part binding on the WTO process unless it is modified by a later WTO Ministerial Conference.

In any case, the Declaration has already laid out a work programme for the next two years for the four issues, with an agenda of specific topics that appear to be in the pre-negotiation mode (for example, in the area of investment, work will focus on scope and definition, transparency, pre-establishment commitments, exceptions, dispute settlement, and so on). Thus, there is already a serious and very heavy work programme in respect of the Singapore issues in the period up to the Fifth Ministerial;  and if a decision is taken then to begin negotiations, the workload will be increased further.  And should the negotiations lead to the establishment of new agreements, the burden of obligations on developing countries will be much heavier and the scope of the WTOs mandate would expand immensely.

Whether that happens will depend on whether the developing countries deepen their understanding of the issues in the several months ahead, whether they consider it in their interest to have these proposed new agreements in the WTO, and whether they can persuade the developed countries to come around to their position (or stand up to the latters pressures) in the event they do not want these issues to be developed into WTO treaties.

Below is a description of each of the four Singapore issues (investment, competition, transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation) and the implications for developing countries should agreements of the type envisaged by their proponents be established.

Relationship between trade and investment

At the Singapore WTO Ministerial (1996), Ministers agreed to form a working group to study the relationship between trade and investment.  It was explicitly stated that there was no commitment to negotiate an agreement.  For the next five years (1997-2001) the WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment held several discussions.  Major developed countries pressed very hard to have the working group transformed into a negotiating group that would negotiate an investment agreement in the WTO. However, the majority of developing countries were extremely reluctant to agree to this. Some of these countries were strongly opposed.  The reasons included: the inappropriateness of an investment regime in a trade organisation; the resulting loss of developing countries policy autonomy over investment policy would damage development options;  the lack of understanding of the issues and their implications for development;  harmful effects of new obligations;  diversion of time and human resources from other vital work in the WTO.  They wanted the study process to continue, and were adamant that negotiations for an agreement should not start.

They made their views known before and at Doha.  However, these views were not reflected in the various drafts of the Declaration, including the final draft that stated that negotiations would begin after the Fifth Ministerial on the basis of a consensus on modalities. As explained above, this was offset by the Chairmans statement at the final session in Doha.  Thus, it is still not clear that there has been a binding commitment to establish an investment agreement in the WTO.

Between now and the Fifth Ministerial, work will proceed in the working group on trade and investment. This will be guided by:  (1) the working out of the issue of modalities of negotiations, that had been mentioned in para 20 of the Doha Declaration;  (2) subjects mentioned in para 22 for clarification, i.e., clarification of scope and definition, transparency, non-discrimination, modalities for pre-establishment commitments based on a GATS-type positive-list approach, development provisions, exceptions and balance-of-payments safeguards, consultation and the settlement of disputes;  (3) other subjects mentioned in para 22, i.e., any framework should reflect in a balanced way the interests of home and host countries, take account of development policies and objectives of host governments and their right to regulate in the public interest.  There is mention also that the special needs of developing countries should be taken into account;  due regard should be paid to other relevant WTO provisions; and account should be taken of existing bilateral and regional investment arrangements.

The diplomats in the WTO will be preoccupied with these issues in the investment working group, which will meet several times during 2002.   It is urgent that developing countries prepare their views and put forward their positions on the above issues at the working group.

The main proponents of an investment agreement would like internationally binding rules that allow foreign investors the rights to enter countries without conditions and regulations, to operate in the host countries without most conditions now existing, and to be granted national treatment and MFN status.   Performance requirements and restrictions on movements of funds would be prohibited. There would also be strict standards of protection for investors rights in relation to expropriation of property.  (A wide definition could be given to expropriation; the NAFTA experience is worth noting in this regard.)

Due to the unpopularity of this extreme model, the major proponents are now offering watered-down versions, such as a GATS-type approach, and possibly a plurilateral approach (in which countries not wanting to join an agreement can opt to stay out).  These step-by-step approaches are aimed at getting Members to agree to the concept that investment rules belong in the mandate of the WTO; and then drawing them into an agreement which appears not to be so harmful and which allows some space to make choices; and then later on to pressure them to liberalise more and more in terms of sectors and depth of policy measures. It should be recognised that such watered-down versions are only shifts in tactics and not in the ultimate goals.   

An international agreement on investment rules of this type is ultimately designed to maximise foreign investors rights whilst minimising the authority, rights and policy space of governments and developing countries.   This has serious consequences in terms of policy-making in economic, social and political spheres, affecting governments ability to plan in relation to local participation and ownership, balancing of equity shares between foreigners and locals and between local communities, the ability to build up the capacity of local firms and entrepreneurs, and the need for protecting the balance of payments and the level of foreign reserves. It would also weaken the bargaining position of government vis-a-vis foreign investors (including portfolio investors) and creditors.

Thus an agreement of the type envisaged by the proponents could be damaging to the development options and interests of developing countries. The position that they could take is as follows. Investment is not a trade issue, and thus bringing it within the ambit of the WTO would be an aberration and could distort the trade system.  It is certainly not clear that the principles of the WTO (including national treatment and most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment) that apply to trade in goods should apply to investment, nor that, if applied, they would benefit developing countries.  Traditionally developing countries have had the freedom and right to regulate the entry and conditions of establishment and operation of foreign investments;  restricting their rights could cause adverse repercussions. 

With the principles underlying this position, developing countries could engage actively in the discussions of the working group on the issues mentioned in the Doha Declaration (see above).  Das (2002) has provided some suggestions for positions to be taken on the issues for clarification and discussion.   For example: 

·        on scope and definition:  the coverage of investment should be as limited as possible;  

·        transparency: the coverage should also be limited to availability of information;

·        non-discrimination: it can be argued that for development purposes, developing countries need to have differential treatment of foreign and local investments and that thus the national-treatment principle is inappropriate in an investment framework; 

·        modalities for pre-establishment commitments based on GATS-type positive-list approach: even if a country can theoretically choose the sectors, depth and speed of liberalisation, a framework would have been created in which the developing countries will be subjected to pressures to liberalise, in contrast to the present where countries have flexibility and discretion over their investment policies;  

·        development provisions: one appropriate provision would be that a developing country will be totally free to apply conditions on the entry and operation of foreign direct investment in accordance with its own perception and decision on its development process;  it should have full policy autonomy and should not be required to justify its policies bilaterally or multilaterally.

·        consultation and dispute settlement between Members:  the normal dispute settlement system of the WTO should not apply.

Besides engaging in the issues listed in the Declaration, developing countries can also put forward issues of their own, for example the obligations of foreign investors to the host country, and the obligations of the home governments of foreign investors to ensure that the investors obligations are fulfilled.

Interaction between trade and competition policy

At the Singapore Ministerial, Ministers decided to set up a Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy.  There was specific mention that this does not commit Members to negotiate an agreement in the WTO on competition. As in the case of the investment issue, most developing countries have voiced reluctance or opposition to the establishment of a WTO agreement on competition policy. However, with their views not adequately represented in the drafts of the Doha Declaration, there will now be a more intensive discussion of the issue in the working group. As with the investment issue, the Declaration states that negotiations (on the interaction between trade and competition policy) will take place after the Fifth Ministerial on the basis of a decision on modalities.  Similarly with investment, it is not clear that a decision has been made to negotiate an agreement.

In the meanwhile, more intensive discussions are scheduled on the issue. The Doha Declaration (para 25) mandates that in the period until the Fifth Ministerial, the working group will focus on clarification of: (1) core principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hardcore cartels; (2) modalities for voluntary cooperation; and (3) support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries through capacity building.  Full account shall be taken of the needs of developing and least developed countries and appropriate flexibility provided to address them.

Developing countries should try to engage as fully as possible in the discussions. It can be challenged whether the principle of non-discrimination is appropriate if applied to competition law and policy in developing countries.  The needs of developing countries in general and the need for policy flexibility should also be clarified in the discussions. Moreover, since explicit consensus is also required on the modalities, it is important for the discussions to clarify this issue, especially since there is no agreed definition of modalities.

At present, there is hardly any common understanding, let alone agreement, among countries on what the competition concept and issue means in the WTO context, especially in terms of its interaction with trade and its relationship with development. The whole set of issues on competition, competition law and competition policy and their relation to trade and to development is extremely complex. The proposal of the proponents of a WTO agreement is to have multilateral rules that discipline Members to establish national competition law and policy. These laws/policies would incorporate the core principles of the WTO, defined as transparency and non-discrimination (MFN and national treatment). Thus, the location of the competition issue and the agreement within the WTO would bias the manner in which the subject and the agreement are treated.  In this case, the core WTO principles would be applied to competition.

Competition law and policy, in appropriate forms, are beneficial, including to developing countries. However, each country must have full flexibility to choose a model which is suitable, and which can also change through time to suit changing conditions. Having an appropriate model is especially important in the context of globalisation and liberalisation where local firms are already facing intense foreign competition. In particular, developing countries must have the flexibility to choose the paradigm of competition and competition policy/law that is deemed to be more suitable to their level of development and their development interests.

The EU proposal for competition policy to provide effective opportunity for competition in the local market for foreign firms, and thus to apply the WTO core principles to competition law/policy, would affect the needed flexibility for the country to have its own appropriate model or models of competition law/policy.

Competition can be viewed from many perspectives.  From the developing countries perspective, it is important to curb the mega-mergers and acquisitions taking place which threaten the competitive position of local firms in developing countries. Also, the abuse of anti-dumping actions in the developed countries is anti-competitive against developing countries products.  The restrictive business practices of large firms also hinder competition.  However, these issues are unlikely to find favour with the major countries, especially the US, which wants to continue its use of anti-dumping actions as a protectionist device.  If negotiations begin, the EU interpretation of competition, i.e., the need for foreign firms to have national treatment and a free competition environment in the host country, could well prevail, especially given the unequal negotiating strength which works against the developing countries. The likely result is that developing countries would have to establish national competition laws and policies that are inappropriate for their conditions.  This would curb the right of governments to provide advantages to local firms, and local firms themselves may be restricted from resorting to practices which are to their advantage.

What is required is a paradigm to view competition from a development perspective.  Competition law/policy should complement other national objectives and policies (such as industrial policy) and the need for local firms and sectors to be able to successfully compete, including in the context of increased liberalisation. From a development perspective, a competition and development framework requires that local industrial and services firms and agricultural farms build up the capacity to become more and more capable of competing successfully, starting with the local market and then, if possible, internationally.  This requires a long time frame, and cannot be done in a short while.  It also demands a vital role for the state in nurturing, subsidising and encouraging the local firms.  The maintenance and enhancement of the domestic sectors competitiveness also require protection from the free and full force of the world market for the time it takes to build up the local capacity.  This means that development strategy has to be at the centre, and competition as well as competition policy has to be approached in such a manner as to meet the central development needs and strategy. 

Therefore some of the conventional models of competition may not be appropriate for a developing country. On the other hand, other models may be more appropriate but their adoption may be hindered or prohibited by a WTO agreement on competition that is based on the core principles of the WTO.

There is as yet no convincing case for a multilateral set of binding rules to govern the competition policies and laws of countries;  and there are especially justified grounds for serious concern if such an agreement were to be located within the WTO, as it is likely to be skewed against the development interests of developing countries as a result of the attempt by proponents to apply the core principles of the WTO to the issue and to the agreement.

If a multilateral approach is at all needed, there are other venues that are more suitable, for example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which already has a Set of Principles on Restrictive Business Practices. Moreover, if the objective is to arrange for cooperation among competition authorities of countries, then it is unnecessary and inappropriate for the WTO to be the venue.

In the discussion on the issues mentioned in the Doha Declaration for the working group, the above points should be taken into account, especially in relation to the needs of developing countries and their need for policy flexibility. As the list of issues in the Declaration is not an exhaustive one, developing countries can also add other issues for discussion. Das (2002) suggests that the following additional issues could be put forward:

·        Obligations of the foreign firms to the host country.

·        Obligation of the home government to ensure the foreign firms fulfil their obligations.

·        Competitiveness of domestic firms:  to consider measures to be undertaken by domestic firms, government and a possible multilateral framework to enable local firms (especially small firms) to remain competitive and to grow.

·        Competition impeded by government action (for example, anti-dumping action).

·        Competition impeded by IPR protection.

·        Global monopolies and oligopolies and their effect on local firms in developing countries.

·        Big mergers and acquisitions (by transnational companies) and their effects on developing countries.

Transparency in government procurement

The Singapore WTO Conference agreed to establish a working group to conduct a study on transparency in government procurement practices, taking into account national policies, and based on this study, to develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate agreement.  The decision does not specify that this must result in an agreement; it only commits Members to set up a working group to study the subject of transparency and, based on this study, to develop the elements to include in an appropriate agreement.  It is thus important to discuss what an appropriate agreement, if any, should be like, from the perspective of the interests of developing countries and also their need for policy flexibility. 

Before and at Doha, many developing countries put forward the view that they were not ready to negotiate an agreement on transparency in government procurement. However, these views were not adequately reflected in the Doha Declaration.  As with the other Singapore issues, the Declaration (para 26) states that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Ministerial on the basis of a decision to be taken by explicit consensus on modalities of negotiations.   Similarly with investment and competition, it is not clear that a decision has been made to negotiate an agreement, especially when account is taken of the Chairmans statement at the closing session at Doha.

The Declaration also states (in para 26) that negotiations will build on progress made in the working group on transparency in government procurement and take into account participants development priorities.  Negotiations shall be limited to the transparency aspects and therefore will not restrict the scope for countries to give preferences to domestic supplies and suppliers.

The study in the working group, and the agreement, is only mandated to cover transparency (and not the practices themselves), and this limited scope has been reaffirmed by the Doha Declaration. However, the major countries advocating this issue had made clear their ultimate goal to fully integrate the large worldwide government procurement market into the WTO rules and system.  At present, WTO Members are allowed to exempt government procurement from WTO market-access rules. The exceptions are those Members which have joined the WTOs plurilateral agreement on government procurement. Hardly any developing country is a member of this plurilateral agreement. Since developing countries have found it unacceptable to integrate government procurement and its market-access aspect into the WTO, the major developed countries devised the tactic of a two-stage process: firstly, to draw all Members into an agreement on transparency; and secondly, to then extend the scope from transparency to other areas (for example, due process) and then to the ultimate areas of market access, MFN and national treatment for foreign firms. This is clear from various papers that have been submitted to the WTO. 

If the integration of procurement into the WTO eventually takes place (as is clearly the aim of the major developed countries), governments in future will not be allowed to give preferences to local companies for the supply of goods and services and for the granting of concessions for implementing projects.  The effects on developing countries would be severe.

Government procurement and policies related to it have very important economic, social and even political roles in developing countries:

·        The level of expenditure, and the attempt to direct the expenditure to locally produced materials, is a major macroeconomic instrument, especially during recessionary periods, to counter economic downturn.

·        There can be national policies to give preference to local firms, suppliers and contractors, in order to boost the domestic economy and participation of locals in economic development and benefits.

·        There can be specification that certain groups or communities, especially those that are under-represented in economic standing, be given preference.

·        For procurement or concessions where foreign firms are invited to bid, there could be a preference to give the award to firms from particular countries (e.g., other developing countries or particular developed countries with which the procuring country has a special commercial or political relationship).

Should government procurement be opened up through the national treatment and MFN principles, the scope and space for a government to use procurement as an instrument for development would be severely curtailed.  For example:

·        If the foreign share increases, there would be a leakage in government attempts to boost the economy through increased spending during a downturn.

·        The ability to assist local companies and particular socioeconomic groups or ethnic communities would be seriously curtailed.

·        The ability to give preferences to certain foreign countries would similarly be curtailed.

Given the great importance of government procurement policy as a key  tool required for economic and social development and nation-building, it is imperative that developing countries retain the right to have full autonomy and flexibility over their procurement policy.  The attempts to draw this issue into the WTO are thus of grave concern.

Given the ambitions of the major countries, it is realistic to anticipate that following the establishment of an agreement on transparency, there will be strong pressures to extend its scope to also cover market access, or the rights of foreign companies to compete on a national-treatment basis for the procurement business.  Thus, the discussions on transparency and on a transparency agreement should be seen in the light of the strategic objective of the majors to draw the developing countries into the real goal of market access and full integration of procurement practices.  Therefore if there is an agreement on transparency, it is likely to be the start of a slippery slope that could lead, in years ahead, to a full market-access agreement.

Developing countries have yet to fully comprehend and appreciate the desirability, degree of appropriateness and implications of even a transparency agreement in the WTO,  especially as to how it would affect social, economic and political development. This point should be made clear in the discussions in the working group.  Some of the key issues of interest to developing countries which should be brought up in the forthcoming discussions are: 

·        Clarifying the definition and scope of transparency and ensuring that the elements to be agreed on do not go beyond transparency. Although the Doha Declaration specifies that the negotiations shall be limited to transparency aspects,  the definition of transparency should be made clear and agreed to so that the exercise does not in any way transgress into the area of market access.  According to Das (2002), transparency means the availability of information on the rules and practices and also the final decisions, and may also include availability of information on tenders and specifications of products to be procured. It must not include the areas of evaluation of offers, decision-making process and relief to the unsuccessful tenderers, as these are the elements of substantial decisions and not transparency.  During the work in the Working Group in 1999, some major developed countries had placed proposals in this area which went much beyond transparency and tried to cover the area of decision-making. This type of effort should be resisted (Das 2002).

·        The costs and practical requirements of administering and implementing even a transparency agreement.  The resources and expenses as well as practical aspects of implementing a transparency agreement are likely to be prohibitive.  The working group should arrange for an assessment to be made of any proposed agreement.

·        Making use of the development perspective in deciding on the scope of coverage (e.g., the threshold of value of procurement, the type of procurement, the definition and level of government).

·        Addressing the serious concern that introducing the subject, even in the limited transparency aspect, would lead step by step to market-access issues.  This concern has to be adequately addressed first for there to be a reasonable degree of comfort to discuss transparency;  what are the ways in which these concerns can be fully addressed? 

·        The issue should not be linked to the dispute settlement system in the WTO;  the agreement, if any, should be in the form of non-binding guidelines and not a legally binding agreement.  

Trade facilitation

As with the other Singapore issues, a decision on negotiations on this subject will be taken at the Fifth Ministerial.   It is thus also not clear whether there will be negotiations towards an agreement on trade facilitation in the WTO.  The Doha Declaration (para 27) states that until the Fifth Ministerial the WTO Council for Trade in Goods shall review and as appropriate clarify and improve relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X of GATT 1994 and identify the trade facilitation needs and priorities of Members, particularly developing and least developed countries.  [Article V is on freedom of transit, Article VIII is on fees and formalities connected with import and export, and Article X is on  publication and administration of trade regulations.]

Although the term trade facilitation may seem innocuous, the establishment of multilateral rules in this area may be disadvantageous to developing countries as they may find it difficult to adhere to the standards or procedures envisaged.  According to Das (2002):  There are grave dangers involved in the potential agreements in this area if the proposals of the proponents are incorporated in the form of binding commitments. The main objective of the proponents is to have rules and procedures similar to theirs adopted by the developing countries. It ignores the wide difference in administrative, financial and human resources between the developed countries and developing countries. Also it does not give weightage to the wide difference in social and working environments.  For example, it may be proposed that physical examination of goods by customs authorities should only be carried out in a small number of cases selected on a random basis, in order to improve the flow of goods through the customs barrier. But this increases the risk of avoidance of payment of adequate customs duties. Such a practice may be appropriate for the major developed countries where the chances of leakage are negligible, but it may not be appropriate for the developing countries where leakage is higher.

Das adds that clarification and improvement of the rules in these areas will add to the commitments of the developing countries in the WTO, adding new burdens, and may have adverse implications too. Negotiators at the WTO should obtain the input of the trade and customs administrative machinery so as to know the possible problems and adverse effects of proposals being put forward.  Developing countries should put forward the view that improvements in trade facilitation should be made through national efforts aided by technical assistance, rather than through imposing additional obligations in the WTO. If the consideration of the problems in these areas results in some solutions, these should, at best, be adopted only as guiding principles or as flexible best-endeavour provisions, not enforceable through the dispute settlement process (Das 2002). 

References

Das, Bhagirath Lal (2002). The new WTO work programme. Paper presented at a forum organised by Third World Network in Geneva, April 2002.

European Communities (1999). The relevance of fundamental WTO principles of national treatment, transparency and most favoured nation treatment to competition policy and vice versa. Communication to the WTO, 12 April 1999.

Khor, Martin (2000). Proposed new issues in the WTO and the interests of developing countries. Paper presented at the Third World Network seminar on Current Development in the WTO, Geneva, September 2000.