Manipulation by tactics and conquest by drafts: How the WTO produced its Anti-Development Agenda at Doha

There were many battles at (and even more stories on) the World Trade Organisation’s Doha Ministerial Conference on 9-14 November 2001.  From a development perspective, the most important fight was over whether the WTO should stick to its present mandate and focus urgently on redressing the imbalances in its rules, or expand its powers by negotiating new agreements that would further restrict development policies in developing countries. Most developing countries had made it clear before and even at Doha that they did not want negotiations to start on new issues like investment and competition.  But the views of the majority were eventually overcome, not through democratic processes, but through manipulative tactics (that started long before Doha), drafts of a declaration that were biased from the start and became more and more so with each successive version, and the application of pressure, including a marathon ‘Green Room’ session. The outcome of Doha is profoundly anti-development.  The process that produced it is just as shocking in its blatant discrimination and manipulation.

WHAT happened at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha will be debated for many years to come.  It was like no other conference, where normally people come to exchange views which are then accurately (more or less) recorded in a report which everyone has a chance to agree on.

Instead, the Doha meeting was held in pressure-cooker conditions, in which a set of elite countries, aided by the WTO Secretariat, set upon the majority of developing countries and pressed them to accept major elements of a future work programme which this majority had been rejecting up to the scheduled final day.

The developing countries had prepared well for this meeting, and had played strongly and well by the rules.  Many of them had their own regional preparatory meetings, and submitted their views orally and in writing in the months and weeks before Doha. And if the game had been played fairly, they would have had their way in shaping the course the WTO would take in the coming years.

The major countries, with the Secretariat playing its important supporting role behind them, then changed the rules, using manipulative tactics to sideline the views of the majority, and put great pressure on the few that insisted on their position. They were thus able to secure ‘victory’, with a work programme that is intended to skew the WTO into an even more imbalanced and inequitable shape for the benefit of a few countries.

The heart of that work programme is to further the ambition of the developed countries to set up new agreements in the WTO that would enable their corporations to conquer even more market share and economic territory in developing countries, at the expense of the latter’s own enterprises and national economies.

The new issues of investment, competition and government procurement had been introduced at the WTO’s very first Ministerial in Singapore in 1996.  Through the manipulative tactic of a ‘Green Room’ meeting of a few selected countries, the developing countries had been pressurised to accept these issues for discussion in working groups.  Developing countries however staved off the pressure to immediately begin negotiations for new treaties, which is what the major countries had actually wanted.

Anxious

In the five years of discussion that followed on these three issues and another one (trade facilitation), most developing countries concluded they were not suitable subjects on which to begin negotiations. The more they learnt about the intentions of the majors, the more anxious they were to avoid committing to the kind of legally binding treaties that have, under the WTO, already encroached onto the realm of national policy making with devastating effect on development.

Before the 1999 Seattle Ministerial, the developing countries made their position clear, and their views (that the study process on these issues be continued) were faithfully reflected side by side with the views of the majors (that negotiations begin on the four ‘Singapore issues’. In a draft declaration, delegates to Seattle could thus choose between the opposing views in settling the final declaration.

Whilst the Seattle draft was democratic, the process at that Ministerial itself was blatantly non-participatory as most countries and Ministers were shut out totally from the consultations going on in small ‘Green Rooms.’  Angry Ministers from the African and Caribbean regions issued statements that they would not rubber-stamp any declaration thrust upon them on the final day.  Thus, the Seattle Ministerial collapsed without any declaration.

After Seattle, pressures continued to be exerted by the European Union, Japan and eventually also the US to have the Singapore issues on the WTO’s negotiating agenda.  But in the two years after Seattle, more developing countries were opposed to negotiating the Singapore issues than ever before.  Their Ministers had stated this opposition in the weeks or even days before Doha:  in meetings of the least developed countries (in Zanzibar in July), of the African region (in Abuja in September) and of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (in Brussels in November).

At WTO headquarters in Geneva, most developing countries had also spoken up strongly, urging that the WTO focus its energies on resolving the ‘problems of implementation’ (code words for redressing the weaknesses and imbalances of the existing WTO rules) and put aside negotiations on the new issues which in their view would divert attention from the existing problems, overload the system and add on to the developing countries’ burdens. If the WTO did not sink, many developing countries would, under the weight of the old and the new burdens.

With the majority of developing countries more articulate and more unified in their stand, the majors and the Secretariat, having learnt the lessons of the Seattle debacle, changed their tactics this time around. 

Before and at Seattle, the draft was democratic but the process was most non-participatory.  Before and at Doha the reverse tactic was used:  the members were allowed to go through more of the motions of consultation and participation, but the text of the Ministerial Declaration was most undemocratic, one-sided and discriminatory, and it became more and more so with each successive draft.

The first draft, produced on 26 September by the Chairman of the WTO General Council (Stuart Harbinson of Hong Kong) and the Director-General Mike Moore, was already biased against the developing countries’ views. But at least it provided two options each (either start negotiations, or continue to study the matter) for two of the new issues, investment and competition.

For another month, consultations continued at a frenzied pace, but the WTO members came no closer to agreement as most developing countries again voiced their inability to agree to start negotiations on new issues and asked that the next draft reflect this.

It was then expected that these differences would be reflected in a revised draft. To the shock of developing countries, however, the second draft (issued on 27 October) ignored their views, with even the study option removed for investment and competition:  the draft committed Ministers to negotiate new treaties (with only a ‘concession’ that the negotiations be preceded by two years of pre-negotiations!).

When there are disagreements, it is normal practice in international conferences that the differences are reflected by placing the different positions in square brackets or placing the opposing views in different paragraphs. The second Geneva draft was, however,  deliberately made to appear as if it was ‘clean’ in not reflecting the divergent views. It was in fact manipulatively deceptive, as it reflected only one set of views and concealed the views of a large number of countries, and favoured one side against another. 

At the WTO’s General Council meeting on 31 October and 1 November, the majority of developing countries that spoke were very critical of the process by which the draft was issued as well as the content of the draft.  The main criticisms were that the draft did not take account of their views but only reflected the view among major developed countries; it was untransparent and deceiving, as it deliberately did not set out the differences of views of various delegations (especially on the new issues); and thus a terribly unlevel playing field was being set up in Doha, with the majority of developing countries having to argue their case without their position being reflected at all in the important operative parts of the text.

Frustrated

The developing countries were also frustrated at the process by which the General Council Chairman and the Director-General transmitted the draft to the Doha meeting, although there was no agreement or consensus on the text. Many delegations in their statements demanded that their views in areas of disagreement be reflected in a revised text, or at least that their views be noted in the text or an annex or cover letter.  However, the Chair made clear he would transmit an unrevised text. By a letter dated 5 November, Harbinson and Moore transmitted the draft declaration to the Trade Minister of Qatar, unrevised, and this covering letter did not explain the differences of view, even in the important sections. Thus the worst fears of the developing countries were realised. 

At Doha, the same manipulative pattern continued. Under the programme, Harbinson was listed to present the controversial draft at the ceremonial opening (instead of at the first business meeting), so there was no opportunity for comments to be made on the draft.  Then at the first business meeting, the Chairman of the Conference announced he had appointed six ‘friends of the Chair’ to carry out consultations on six contentious issues.  All six were known to be from a certain camp, that was pro-new round.  How they were selected, why the bias in favour of only one camp, what powers the ‘facilitators’ would have, were not discussed beforehand.  Neither was the choice of the issues.  Some issues (such as negotiations on industrial tariffs) on the draft which had been disputed by many developing countries were not on the list of the six issues for consultations.  Reservations were raised by several delegations, but the process continued along the lines announced.  (See the article ‘Doha meet kicks off to ‘democratic’ start’ elsewhere in this issue.)

During the consultations on the new issues, it again became clear that most developing countries were opposed to the parts of the draft that asked for negotiations to begin. They openly stated their position at the plenary consultation on the subject. (See article ‘Majority of developing countries reject text on new issues’ in this issue.)  Many developing countries’ Ministers, in their official plenary speeches, also affirmed their opposition to negotiating the new issues.  And even as late as 13 November, the scheduled last day of the meeting, a statement was presented on behalf of the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries as well as the least developed countries to the effect that they were not prepared to negotiate the new issues.

The presentation of views by developing countries had no effect where it mattered, for the next draft to come out (on 13 November morning) even more firmly to negotiations on the Singapore issues. It became clear that the participants were only being asked to go through the motions of consultation, at least where the new issues were concerned.  Their views were not reflected in the next draft-a procedure that is not acceptable in normal international conferences. The question of who drafted the texts has never been answered.  In other conferences, the drafting and redrafting is a transparent exercise.

The majors and the Secretariat were by then desperate to avoid failure.  Failure to them meant a declaration devoid of negotiating commitment on the new issues. If the meeting were to end as scheduled on 13 November, there would not have been agreement based on the draft. A decision was made to extend the meeting by another day. It is even unclear whether the views of the members were formally sought for this extension. Several delegation heads, not being able to change their schedules, left before the meeting ended and thus could not be party to the crucial final stage.

Then was organised the last big push by the majors and the Secretariat - a marathon Green Room pressure-cooker meeting that lasted from 6pm of 13 November to 6am of 14 November, to which only 24 countries were invited to participate.  The developing countries who attended were placed at a great disadvantage.   

In the late morning of 14 November, another draft Ministerial Declaration was produced which was even more biased than that of the previous day, in terms of committing Members to negotiate agreements on the Singapore issues after the Fifth Ministerial. 

At a final afternoon informal meeting for delegation heads, the Indian Minister protested that the draft did not reflect his country’s views, and asked for some changes to be made, as otherwise India could not go along with the text.  Another dozen countries also expressed their unhappiness with the text on the new issues and requested changes. In the lobby area outside the meeting hall, it became clear that intense pressure was being applied on India, with delegates from some developed countries making comments to the media that a single country was trying to wreck the whole conference.  It was not clear, until almost the end, what would happen:  whether there would be a final declaration passed or not.

As it turned out, a final compromise was worked out under which the Conference Chairman, the Trade Minister of Qatar, read out a ‘Chairman’s understanding’ that an explicit consensus was indeed required before negotiations could begin on the issues of investment, competition, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation. This statement gave greater protection to developing countries that did not want to commit to negotiations, as the text of the declaration states that negotiations would begin after the Fifth Ministerial on the basis of an explicit consensus on the modalities of the negotiations.

After the Chairman’s statement on the understanding, India announced it would ‘join the consensus’ and thus the conference ended, after more speeches.

Controversies

One of the first controversies when work resumes in earnest at the WTO will be which of the two versions of the Doha decision stands: the Declaration (in which the Ministers appear to have already agreed to negotiate the new issues after the Fifth Ministerial and a consensus is needed only on the modalities) or the Chairman’s interpretation (that a consensus is needed on the very question of whether to begin negotiations).

In any case, through its manipulative procedures and pressure-cooker tactics, the Doha meeting has certainly advanced the cause of the new issues further along the road towards the ambition of the majors to expand the powers of the WTO over these areas.

Doha also produced a work programme that is even more onerous than the Uruguay Round’s. Trade expert Bhagirath Lal Das, in a preliminary comment, estimates that the post-Doha work programme is at least 50% heavier than that of the Uruguay Round.

The work programme will include the built-in agenda of services and agriculture negotiations; the mandated reviews of the TRIPS and TRIMs agreements; the implementation issues; new negotiations on non-agriculture market access (industrial tariffs); negotiations on some aspects of WTO rules (such as anti-dumping and dispute settlement); negotiations on some aspects of trade and environment; intensified work on investment, competition, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation (which could lead on to negotiations); and new working groups on trade, debt and finance, and on technology transfer.

At Doha, the Declaration placed on record that developing countries require ‘technical assistance and capacity building’ for the forthcoming work.

But these terms  - even if some attempts are made to implement them - cannot hide the fact that the developing countries lost heavily in Doha and that they will not be able to have the strength or resources to carry the heavy load imposed on them in the years ahead.

The outcome of Doha is profoundly Anti-Development in content, despite the rhetoric of developed countries and the Secretariat that they launched a Development Round or a Development Agenda at the Ministerial.  The process before and at Doha, without which the outcome would have been very different, was undemocratic, discriminatory, deceiving and untransparent, based not on rules but on power-based tactics - a shame and a mockery to the supposed principles of the WTO: ‘non-discriminatory, transparent, rules-based.’  It should not be allowed to happen again.   

Martin Khor is Director of Third World Network.