Concerted moves to undermine a strong biosafety agreement

At the biosafety negotiations in Denmark in July 1996, the biotech industry and some Northern countries continued their concerted drive to frustrate attempts at the negotiation of a biosafety agreement.

by Chee Yoke Ling

Core Southern solidarity stands firm

CONFLICTS of interests among a handful of countries with relatively advanced biotechnology programmes broke the solidarity of Southern developing countries as biosafety negotiations started in July in Denmark.

Two controversial issues which broke the G77 consensus were liability and compensation, as well as socio-economic consequences of modern biotechnology. In an unprecedented move for the Convention process, 38 of 51 member countries of the G77 present and China, led by the Africa Group, endorsed a common proposal which included these two elements. Many Southern delegations felt that this was a good development. It was better, they said, to have a strong Southern core group position than to maintain a G77 common front at the lowest minimum compromise in a negotiation process that promises to be tough.

This was at the first week-long meeting of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety in the Danish city of Aarhus. The Working Group was set up in December 1996, under the Convention on Biological Diversity, to negotiate an international agreement on biosafety in genetic engineering.

Industry and some Northern countries, whose priority is to open the way for commercialisation of genetically engineered products, had fully exploited the situation. Observers of the process said that this creation or deepening of dissension can at best be called 'lobbying' and at worst 'intimidation'.

The heated negotiations in the last two years over the urgent need for a legally binding international biosafety protocol saw intense resistance from the United States (even though it is still not a Party to the Convention on Biological Diversity), Japan, Australia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany.

Strong support for a protocol by Denmark, Sweden, Austria and Spain ensured a pro-protocol stance by the European Union, but one that is to be confined to only transboundary movement. Meanwhile the EU continues to promote voluntary international technical guidelines of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). These were first formulated by the Netherlands and the UK, and then adopted by UNEP, and have been widely criticised as scientifically unsound and incomplete. Many delegates and observers also fear that the aggressive promotion of these guidelines would pre-empt or delay an effective and legally binding protocol.

Norway, as a non-EU member, has been able to be independently vocal in its insistence for a strong protocol, and continues to be a critical bridge for Southern needs and concerns.

At the second meeting of the Conference of the Parties (the term used for countries that have ratified an international agreement, thus taking on full rights and obligations) in Jakarta last December, the vast majority of countries supported the speedy negotiation of a strong protocol. The Danish Government offered to host the first meeting in which delegations put forward their views and positions on items for inclusion in the protocol.

Industry on the offensive

As the momentum for protocol negotiations to begin strengthened in 1996, industry representatives moved quickly to directly participate at inter-governmental meetings. US officials themselves openly asked the biotechnology industry to defend their interests at UN negotiations.

During the Aarhus meeting, the US sent an 11-member delegation, with key persons in constant consultation with representatives from US industry. As a number of Southern delegates observed, the US interest is powerful given that their biotechnology industry is anxious and aggressive in commercialising their products on a global scale.

It was industry's vehement objections to the provision for a biosafety protocol under the Convention on Biological Diversity that was a major reason for the refusal of the Bush Administration to sign on to the Convention. Even when the Clinton Administration subsequently became a signatory, ratification of the Convention has been refused by the US Congress. But now that a protocol is on its way, despite attempts by the US and other industrialised countries of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to block the process, some sectors of the biotechnology industry have begun mobilising support for ratification to ensure their maximum influence in the negotiations.

Meanwhile, industry is already working hard to undermine a strong and effective protocol. At the Aarhus meeting, the Bio Industry Organisation, the Japan Bioindustry Association, the Senior Advisory Group on Biotechnology and the Green Industry Biotechnology Platform jointly proposed a structure for a protocol that was minimal. Liability/compensation and socio-economic impacts of biotechnology were excluded. In separate statements made throughout the week, these organisations stressed that certain categories of LMOs should be identified as risk-free, thus not to be subjected to biosafety assessment, an assertion that is rejected by independent scientists and many delegations as scientifically unsound. Underlying all the industry statements was the warning that benefits may not be 'harvested' if biosafety is given priority.

To promote the acceptability of genetically engineered products, in the face of growing public awareness and failures in a number of crops, industry is spending more resources on image building. After the Jakarta meeting of the Parties the biotechnology industry organisations mentioned above sponsored the production of a Braille version of the Convention on Biological Diversity as a sign of their 'commitment' to biodiversity.

It was unfortunate that the Convention Secretariat went out of its way to publicise and congratulate this image exercise, calling it a 'remarkable event'. This is particularly so since industry representatives had blatantly spoken against a biosafety protocol even until the Jakarta meeting, and when the process was inevitable, those same sponsors then openly launched their campaign to ensure a weak protocol.

The Clinton Administration is part of the industry crusade, and in the weeks before the Aarhus meeting, US Embassies in developing countries sent messages to relevant ministries asking for their position in Aarhus. The messages also carried underlying threats that a 'badly drafted protocol' would deny developing countries the benefits of genetic engineering and may even be illegal under the trading rules of the World Trade Organisation.

At the Jakarta meeting, the Conference of the Parties agreed to the terms of reference and a list of elements to be included in a biosafety protocol. This followed intense negotiations at an experts' meeting held in Madrid in July 1995. Three issues that were proposed by the Group of 77 and China, but not supported by the North, were liability and compensation, socio-economic factors and financial issues related to the protocol.

Southern majority maintained

A small number of G77 members themselves had reservations on the first two issues, but were willing to stand behind a united Southern front.

Between December and July, industry reportedly organised informal and formal meetings where selected Southern participants were invited. The Clinton Administration also 'communicated' with relevant ministries in a large number of Southern capitals via the local US embassies. The reaction of sources who informed Third World Network of these efforts ranged from anger at such tactics to 'I just threw the document into my waste bin'.

Unfortunately, a handful of countries which are already involved in some form of commercialisation activity, often in collaboration with multinational corporations, seem to be victims to the exaggerated lure of biotechnology. During the Aarhus meeting Argentina stuck out like a sore thumb, driving a wedge in a united G77 and China position for a strong and comprehensive biosafety protocol.

Existing arrangements between Argentina and multinational corporations such as Pioneer Seeds International, as well as the growth of local companies in this field, seem to have resulted in a sacrifice of environmental safety, human health and the negative socio-economic impacts of modern biotechnology.

The negotiator for Argentina was from its Geneva United Nations Permanent Mission, whose priority was clearly trade interests. Thus the delegate stressed that the inclusion of liability/compensation issues and socio-economic factors would deter foreign investors and may be GATT/WTO, illegal. Such a view has been actively encouraged by industry and major OECD countries as a scare tactic - transfer of technology and investment in modern biotechnology, they claim, will be undermined if biosafety rules are too strict.

Delegates from Ethiopia, India, Indonesia and Malaysia dismiss this, stating that assessing the environmental, health and socio-economic impacts of genetic engineering is a crucial part of ensuring that any technology that enters their countries will indeed be safe and beneficial. Malaysia's A H Zakri pointed out that the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment was currently discussing the harmonisation of multilateral agreements with trade agreements. As a free-standing agreement, the protocol would have its own legitimacy, and it was not the sole prerogative of the WTO to determine legitimacy. Another Southern delegate pointed out that if the logic is that trade is the ultimate goal, then the trafficking of narcotics should not be stopped for any reason.

According to sources, Argentina seemed to have been persuaded, during a late night session of small G77 drafting group, not to undermine a G77 and China position at this early stage. After all, it was reasoned, delegations were only putting forward items for consideration, and actual negotiations had not begun. However, at the G77 plenary meeting the following morning, Argentina took the hard line again.

Key Southern delegates finally stressed that it would be foolhardy to have a weak G77 position even before formal negotiations had begun. The Working Group was only at the stage of putting forward proposals, not negotiation text. It would thus be better not to have a G77 position, but rather maintain a strong proposal of items for the protocol which would be supported by the majority of members. Following Argentina's recalcitrance, an angry and frustrated African delegate described the situation as one of the Group of 7 and Argentina (the G7 is the grouping of rich OECD countries).

Brazil had also appeared to be willing to be part of the stronger G77 position but when Argentina refused to join the consensus, Brazil reverted to its original stance. Like Argentina, Brazil was also reluctant to include those two clusters of issues.

Although South Korea has consistently been reluctant on several issues, it had to a large extent been willing to support the South. In previous meetings leading to the Jakarta decision to negotiate a protocol, African delegates had frankly and forthrightly stated their concern that South Korea did not seem to support a strong protocol which would safeguard vulnerable countries from unauthorised field tests and the export of genetically engineered products from the North. In Aarhus, South Korea stated its support for the inclusion of socio-economic factors.

List of main elements

Finally, 38 Southern countries proposed a structure and list of main elements for a protocol which included socio-economic considerations and liability/compensation. Delegates described this as a painful but necessary move. South Korea was conspicuously absent from the list of signatories.

A separate proposal by members of the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Group (GRULAC) was submitted, which contained all the other elements of the core group proposal. Except for Argentina and Brazil, the other GRULAC members were supportive of the core group proposal, but Brazil had reportedly indicated that in the absence of a separate GRULAC paper, it would join the EU's position. Colombia, Venezuela and Peru reluctantly joined the regional consensus in the spirit of GRULAC solidarity, but were firm that when actual negotiations begin they would support the core Southern position.

As G77 Chair, Costa Rica signed on to the core position but the sole delegate was obviously unconvinced himself. The delegate, Pedro Leon Azofeifa of Universidad de Costa Rica, voiced views that dissented from the Southern majority in the formal meetings, and was reportedly assuring some Northern delegates that he personally did not support the G77 majority and China position on a number of key issues.

Scope to be fought out

The scope of the protocol is also unresolved. With few exceptions, OECD countries want to limit it to transboundary movements of genetically modified organisms. As the G77 and China together with progressive Northern countries pressure for intended and unintended movements, it is likely that this will be a key element of the protocol.

A few Southern countries, including Brazil and Argentina, share the view of some OECD countries that there should be no minimum national standards provided by the protocol, and that research and development as well as other handling aspects at the national level should be the prerogative of national laws. Again, pressure and persuasion from the majority of G77 members enabled a consensus in Jakarta that the biosafety protocol would cover 'the safe transfer, handling, and use of living modified organisms, ... specifically focusing on transboundary movement, of any [LMO] resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity ...' The argument for a wider scope is that national activities also have transboundary effects, and that differences in standards may lead to exploitation by commercial operators resulting in a race for the lowest standards.

India stood out as a country which clearly distinguishes between capacity in modern biotechnology and capacity in ensuring biosafety. With its own research and development programme also underway, Indian delegate P K Ghosh from the Ministry of Science and Technology stated that India supported the inclusion of contained use in the protocol. He said that it was not enough to only deal with transboundary movements of LMOs in the narrow sense. Ghosh also said that in Research and Development (R&D), DNA samples and fragments were constantly exchanged among scientists and laboratories and that the protocol needs to cover these categories, too.

Industry and some OECD countries will continue to attempt to assert that there are no differences between traditional breeding and genetic engineering, and to push for classification of LMOs that can be excluded from biosafety assessment. Independent scientists from the US, UK and Germany who were at the Aarhus meeting expressed shock at such an unscientific claim, and emphasised that existing risk assessment rules and models in their countries are already inappropriate or inadequate.

At the last plenary session, non-governmental organisations that have been working on the biosafety issue reiterated their call for a moratorium on the release and marketing of genetically modified organisms and products. The statement reaffirmed that the precautionary principle and approach is the basis of Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration and the Convention on Biological Diversity. 'Precaution necessitates that until safety measures and a strong biosafety protocol are in place, there shall be such a moratorium.' The endorsing organisations were the Christian Council of Sweden, ECOROPA, German Working Group on Biosafety, Greenpeace International, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, M S Swaminathan Research Foundation, The Edmonds Institute, Third World Network, US Biotechnology Working Group, US National Biosafety Council.

A number of government delegations privately sounded their support for this call while the Mauritius delegate, Sateeaved Seebaluck, openly endorsed the statement in plenary.

Chee Yoke Ling, a former university law lecturer, is an environment representative of Third World Network.