

Third World Network  
**GENEVA CLIMATE NEWS UPDATES**  
**(February 2015)**

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# TWN

## Geneva News Update **1**

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### **Parties Commence Work to Produce Negotiating Text for Paris Agreement**

Geneva, 9 February (Indrajit Bose and Meena Raman) – Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) commenced their work in Geneva, Switzerland, on Sunday, 8 February, with the task of producing the negotiating text for a new climate agreement that is to be concluded in Paris in December this year.

This work is being done by the UNFCCC's Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), which is set to meet for six days in Geneva.

At its last session held in Lima, Peru in Dec. 2014, the ADP elected two new Co-chairs, who are Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria) and Daniel Reifsnyder (United States).

At the opening plenary of the resumed session of the ADP on Sunday, Reifsnyder reminded Parties that in Lima, they had agreed that the ADP 'intensify its work with a view to making available a negotiating text for a protocol, another legal instrument or an outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties before May 2015'.

Since the Geneva session is the only negotiating session planned before May 2015, the ADP Co-chair said that the objective is to make available on Friday, 13 February, the negotiating text of the Paris agreement.

Reifsnyder said that the work of the ADP contact group will focus on converting the 'Elements for a draft negotiating text', which was annexed to the decision adopted in Lima (in decision 1/CP.20), into a negotiating text for the Paris agreement. He stressed that the main task of the contact group will be to ensure that the negotiating text fully reflects the positions of all Parties. He added that the task was also to streamline language and eliminate redundancies, better present alternatives and divergences and clarify and complement the proposals and concepts.

According to the ADP Co-chair, the contact group will also endeavour to identify elements that are of a durable nature and that need to be enshrined in the Paris agreement, and aspects that are more suitable to be included in an accompanying decision of the Conference of Parties (COP) that would allow for further adjustments over time through subsequent decisions.

Day one of the ADP meeting convened with an opening plenary, which was then followed by the meeting of the contact group, where discussions focused on two sections of the elements text viz. the general/objective section and the mitigation section. (The elements text comprises the following sections: the preamble, general/objective, mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building, transparency of action and support, timeframes and process related to commitments/contributions/other matters related to implementation and ambition, facilitating implementation and compliance, and procedural and institutional provisions.)

The contact group saw the relevant sections of the elements text being projected on the screen, as requested by several developing country groupings during their pre-session bilaterals with the ADP Co-chairs. (This practice of placing text on the screen began only in Lima last year, after much insistence by developing countries.)

At the opening plenary, COP20 President, Manuel Pulgar-Vidal (the Minister of Environment of Peru) asked Parties to sustain the spirit generated in Lima and to maintain the same momentum in Geneva with a view to getting an agreement by the end of the year. He also asked of Parties for clarity on pre- and post-2020 pathways on finance and to consider voluntary intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) on adaptation and for 'political and practical parity' to be achieved between mitigation and adaptation. He reiterated the

expectation of some Parties to give the issue of loss and damage a specific place in the agreement and urged countries to ratify the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.

Pulgar-Vidal also reminded Parties of the need for urgent action as he referred to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the recent findings of the World Meteorological Organisation that 2014 was the warmest year in recorded history. He urged Parties to work with responsibility to achieve ambition and work efficiently and in the spirit of compromise. ‘We need a document that is concise and more articulate. We need a document that focuses on the issues. We need to find innovative solutions,’ he said. He also said that all the actors in the process must work as a team with no sense of competition. He further said Parties must explore pragmatic compromises on elements with particular attention on the needs of developing countries.

On process, Vidal said that the ADP process must be open, inclusive and create an atmosphere of transparency and trust and warned against negotiations behind closed doors and for it not to exclude anyone, especially the smaller delegations. ‘It must be a Party-driven process all the way through,’ he said.

He also asked of Parties to use the consensus language arrived at in Lima on differentiation, which is common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in light of different national circumstances.

The opening plenary also heard brief statements by groupings of Parties. Speaking for the **Group of 77 and China (G77 and China), South Africa** said, ‘Any attempts to redefine, rewrite, renegotiate or reinterpret the Convention and its principles and provisions that would result in watering down or weakening of the Convention will not be acceptable and will only complicate and delay the process.’

Other developing country groups such as the **African Group, Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Least Developed Countries (LDCs), BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), Coalition for Rainforest Nations, Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA), the League of Arab States and the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)** supported the statement by the G77 and China and refrained from reading out their statements in the interest of time but posted their statements on the UNFCCC website.

Speaking for the **Umbrella Group** of countries, **Australia**, referring to the decision reached in Lima,

said Parties underscored their commitment to reflect the principle of CBDR-RC in light of different national circumstances in the Paris agreement. ‘Neither an extreme of retaining the current binary fixed approach (of developed and developing countries), nor an extreme of no differentiation will be acceptable,’ said Australia.

(Highlights of some of the statements by Parties are reflected below.)

Following the opening plenary, in the ADP contact group, Parties focused on section C of the elements text on ‘General/Objective’. A range of interventions followed through the two-hour-long session, where the Co-chairs asked Parties to add proposals that were not reflected in the section. A discussion ensued over whether the objective should be an elaborate one or short and succinct, with a range of views being expressed.

To a suggestion by the Co-chairs to have a focused and facilitated discussion to consider the text in this regard, several countries such as India, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and the EU were of the view that while the idea of having a facilitated discussion was not a bad idea in itself, it would be more productive to have such a discussion after Parties had gone through a round of discussion on all the elements in the text, as it was currently premature to do so.

Section D of the elements text on ‘mitigation’ was also taken up for discussion in the afternoon of Sunday, where Parties presented proposals to be included in the text.

Negotiations on streamlining the text will begin after Parties have completed adding all their proposals to all of the sections of the elements text from 10 February onwards, said ADP Co-chair Djoghlaif, who presided over the discussion on ‘mitigation’.

The contact group ended its meeting earlier than expected at around 4.30 pm, after exhausting the list of speakers who took the floor to introduce new text.

### *Highlights of interventions/statements at the opening plenary*

Speaking for the **G77 and China, South Africa** said that the process leading up to Paris should be open, transparent, inclusive, Party-driven and consensus building in order to arrive at a comprehensive, balanced and equitable outcome. It recalled that the objective of the ADP is to enhance action and promote full and effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through the strengthening of the multilateral rules-based regime

under the Convention. ‘Any attempts to redefine, rewrite, renegotiate or reinterpret the Convention and its principles and provisions that would result in watering down or weakening of the Convention will not be acceptable and will only complicate and delay the process,’ it said.

It added that the tasks of the ADP session here in Geneva are very clear in light of the decisions Parties have committed themselves to since Durban and that the elements paper is an expression of multiple views, which must be considered in light of the decisions adopted in Lima. It said that Parties had agreed that the ADP would make available a negotiating text before May 2015. It said to deliver on the task, trust and mutual reassurances from all Parties, as well as necessary political will and determination to find solutions for key issues, are essential. ‘Any streamlining of the options should be based on consensus among Parties collectively and constructively, with Parties’ views to be reflected in a balanced and comprehensive manner in the negotiating text,’ it said.

South Africa added that the 2015 agreement must be under the Convention, applicable to all Parties and based on its principles and provisions, in particular the principles of equity and CBDR-RC. ‘Any agreement without equity and CBDR-RC is not in accordance with the Convention,’ it said. The 2015 agreement must be comprehensive in dealing with all the agreed elements, inter alia mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency of action and support from developed country Parties to developing countries in a balanced manner.

The Group also reiterated the importance of appropriately, effectively and meaningfully addressing adaptation, finance and the need to secure progress of loss and damage in the 2015 agreement. Other issues such as the adverse impacts of response measures and anchoring specific implementation mechanisms and frameworks in the 2015 agreement should be addressed. The 2015 outcome should provide for enhanced financial and technological support from developed to developing countries for ambitious mitigation and adaptation actions after 2020, especially to those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

On enhancing pre-2020 ambition under workstream 2, the G77 said that it has a direct bearing on the successful adoption of the 2015 agreement (workstream 1) and that the work of workstream 2 should continue until the pre-2020 ambition gap is

closed. Doing that would avoid higher costs and risks associated with adaptation and mitigation in the long run. ‘Through Workstream 2, we must work with the objective that countries increase mitigation ambition in the pre-2020 period and developed countries must take the lead, through enhanced actions, increasing emission reduction targets to at least 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, and the level of ambition providing finance, technology and capacity building support to assist developing country Parties in achieving the pledges that they have made. The speedy ratification of the Doha Amendment would be an important signal to the world that Parties are committed to closing the pre-2020 ambition gap. Scaling up climate finance towards the goal of US\$100 billion by 2020 will also provide the resources required by developing countries to enhance pre-2020 mitigation and adaptation actions,’ it said.

‘As the primary bearers of the impacts of climate change, who have been asked to do so much and have made many concessions in these negotiations through the years, the Group looks forward to see what our partners are prepared to bring to the table. We have heard much talk of action outside this process, now we need all country Parties to bring their positive intentions to this process to strengthen the multilateral rules-based regime under the Convention,’ it added.

In its statement posted online, **Bolivia for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** said that the outcome under the ADP must reflect the agreements reached in Lima ‘without backsliding or reopening the consensus achieved such as the work of the ADP is under the Convention and guided by its principles, provisions, and structure, including the differentiated commitments in accordance with Article 4 of the Convention. The Paris outcome shall reflect the principle of CBDR as it is under the Convention. Concepts or approaches such as “evolving CBDR” or “Parties in a position to do so” are not consistent with the Convention and are not acceptable. There has been consensus among Parties in Lima that such concepts shall be removed from the outcomes of the COP.’

For the LMDC, the agreement ‘must address in a balanced manner all elements’ and ‘shall strengthen adaptation action to address the particular vulnerabilities of developing countries, duly taking into account the relationship between poverty eradication and adaptation actions’. ‘It must also reaffirm the COP’s decisions on the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage and make these operational. Developed country Parties

must provide financial, technology transfer and capacity building support consistent with their obligations under the Convention to developing country Parties for ambitious mitigation and adaptation actions before and after 2020, especially to Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.’ The LMDC statement also states that ‘there will be no ex-ante review’ (of the contributions of Parties).

It also stressed that ‘increasing the level of ambition on pre-2020 mitigation and pre-2020 finance, technology transfer and capacity building support by developed country Parties must be fully implemented and operationalised as essential components of the Paris 2015 outcome’. It expressed concerns that since the adoption of Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, only two developed country Parties have ratified the amendment.

**The African Group’s** statement posted online states that ‘in streamlining (the text), Parties shall have the flexibility to draw from their own positions’. It cautioned that ‘insertions and proposals explicitly contradicting either in spirit, or literally, any fundamental principles or provision of the Convention such as CBDR in Article 4 and equity in Article 3’ ‘would only delay and protract our work and not lead us to any constructive engagement’.

On the process of appointing facilitators for focused groups, the African Group states that ‘in the formation of focused groups and the identification of their mandate, a transparent selection of facilitators in contact with their respective sub-groups is warranted. In addition an inclusive approach to the participation of the focused groups should be followed’.

On scheduling, the African Group asks of the Co-chairs to explore possibilities of ending the meetings at 6 pm to allow time for groups’ coordination meetings, and to ensure that the text to be taken forward is circulated to all Parties well before the end of the meeting to allow for the Parties’ endorsement.

On substance, the key points that the African Group submission includes are: meaningful reflection of adaptation support commitments from developed countries; inclusion of temperature goal, associated emission reduction goals, adaptation goal, with its associated finance and technology support; the Warsaw international mechanism to be anchored in the new agreement and fully operationalised to ensure that developing countries are provided with support – including finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building to address loss and damage; clear quantified targets that link the

level of support to the temperature target and stresses on the linkage of actions of developing countries and support provided to them and in line with their needs as identified by them, with a process to regularly review and update the level of support to be provided to developing countries; clarifying the sources of finance and allowing for transparency and MRV (measuring, reporting and verification) of financial flows from developed country Parties to developing countries; operationalising agreed criteria of new and additional, predictable, sustainable, adequate and burden sharing criteria among developed countries.

The **AOSIS** statement states that the 2015 agreement should be an ambitious, legally binding Protocol capable of limiting warming to below 1.5 degrees. It must address all elements of the Durban Mandate, as well as Loss and Damage and Compliance. It also says that Loss and Damage is distinct from adaptation and that loss and damage and adaptation should be treated as two separate and distinct discussions in Geneva.

The **LDCs** in their statement underscore the importance of Parties taking significant steps to reduce emissions and to ensure there is new, additional and substantial finance to underwrite this effort.

The **BASIC** countries state that the Lima decision clearly underlines that the 2015 outcome should be under the Convention and be guided by its principles and provisions. They underline that the so-called ‘self differentiation’ approach is not consistent with the Convention, nor with the Durban mandate or the Lima decision. The 2015 agreement is a vehicle to enhance the implementation of commitments in accordance with Article 4 of the Convention. This requires honouring and implementing existing commitments and responsibilities by developed countries. Enhanced action will not be achieved by shifting these to developing countries. ‘We note with concern that the pre-2020 ambition gaps exist not only in mitigation but also in adaptation and finance, technology and capacity-building support to developing countries,’ the statement reads.

**The European Union (EU)** in its statement at the opening plenary spelt out four issues in particular to achieve the objective of working towards adopting a legally binding agreement at COP21: (1) How to ensure dynamism in the 2015 agreement through the regular review of mitigation ambition; (2) How the 2015 agreement would deliver transparency and accountability of Parties against the mitigation commitments they will make in Paris; (3) Ensuring that the 2015 agreement delivers climate resilience

through effective adaptation; and (4) To further consider how the post-2020 regime will provide climate finance to those countries in need. It reiterated the critical importance for all Parties to come forward with ‘ambitious INDCs’ and said that it expects all ‘major and emerging economies’ to provide INDCs in the first quarter of this year.

Speaking for the **Environment Integrity Group (EIG)**, **Switzerland** said ‘the outcome of Paris needs to be a legally binding instrument containing the enduring elements of the 2015 agreement, COP decisions with dynamic and technical elements, and nationally determined contributions for the period from 2020. The 2015 agreement needs to address all relevant areas: mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and transparency of action and support.’ It hoped ‘to leave Geneva with not only a negotiation text that is acceptable as a basis for the further negotiations by all but also a text which is further streamlined and makes clear which elements should be addressed in the agreement and which in COP decisions’.

Speaking for the **Umbrella Group** of countries, **Australia** said that the first draft text of the agreement must accurately reflect Parties’ proposals.

The text should be streamlined by removing duplication and deleting provisions that have no support and where possible improving the structure; content appropriate for a legal agreement should be distinguished from content more appropriate to decisions – that is more detailed or needs updating, overtime. It should steer away from a one-size-fits-all treatment of mitigation, adaptation, support and transparency. ‘We must give more thought to how the new agreement will interrelate with the Convention and its institutions, ensuring we do not duplicate work that will continue under the Convention post-2020, nor pre-empt how this work will evolve,’ it said.

‘We are cognizant of the decision Parties reached in Lima where we underscored our commitment to reflect the principle of CBDR-RC, in light of different national circumstances in the Paris agreement. Neither an extreme of retaining the current binary fixed approach, nor an extreme of no differentiation will be acceptable. We need to look at specific approaches that treat very different national circumstances appropriately, and encourage Parties to regularly increase their ambition and improve their transparency,’ it said.

### Parties Present New Proposals for Negotiating Text

Geneva, 10 February (Meena Raman) – Parties at the Geneva climate change meeting under the UNFCCC's Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), presented proposals to be included in the negotiating text to be produced for a new climate agreement that is to be concluded in Paris in December this year.

On Sunday 8 February the ADP Co-chair, Daniel Reifsnyder (the United States), told Parties that the work of the contact group will focus on converting the 'Elements for a draft negotiating text', which was annexed to the decision adopted in Lima (in decision 1/CP.20), into a negotiating text for the Paris agreement. (The other ADP Co-chair is Ahmed Djoghlaif of Algeria.)

(Parties had agreed at the 20<sup>th</sup> session of the Conference of Parties in Lima to make available a negotiating text for the new agreement before May 2015.)

The contact group began work on Sunday, by hearing proposals for addition to the elements text on two sections viz. the general/objective section and the mitigation section. On Monday, Parties presented new proposals on the sections relating to adaptation and loss and damage, finance, technology transfer, capacity building and transparency of action and support.

On Tuesday, 10 February Parties are expected to present further proposals on the remaining sections, viz. timeframes and process related to commitments/contributions/other matters related to implementation and ambition, facilitating implementation and compliance, and procedural and institutional provisions, including the preamble and definitions.

Reifsnyder said on Monday that the goal of the Geneva session is to produce a revised text to make sure it accurately reflects the proposals of Parties. He explained further that the revised text, following the additional proposals made by Parties, will be provided to Parties, with a deadline to provide

feedback. Once the text is 'an accurate reflection' of the proposals of Parties, 'it will be closed and that is the text that will go to the secretariat for translation (into the various UN languages), unless there is agreement to change, streamline or improve the text'.

According to the daily programme posted on the UNFCCC website today, the contact group will, on Tuesday afternoon, consider 'streamlining' the text.

Highlights of some of the proposals by Parties for addition to the mitigation section of the text are as follows.

**The United States**, in reference to mitigation commitments, wanted the use of the term 'Parties in Annex X' wherever there was a reference to 'developed countries' in the text and to 'Parties not included in Annex X' when the term 'developing countries' is used. It wanted the reference to 'Parties in Annex Y' as an alternative to the references to developed countries providing support for finance, technology and capacity building support.

It also wanted a new paragraph introduced that reads: 'Parties to submit INDCs (intended nationally determined contributions) no earlier than 12 months before and no later than 6 months before the beginning of each cycle, to allow for sufficient time for consultations.' It also proposed that the UNFCCC secretariat 'shall make available a web page on the UNFCCC website where questions can be posed by Parties and accredited observer organizations to other Parties about their INDCs, so as to enable the respective Parties to provide responses to those questions'.

In relation to the commitments/contributions/actions on mitigation, the **Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** proposed the following:

'In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Convention, developed country Parties shall commit to undertake Absolute Emission Reduction Targets (AERTs) during the period 2021–2030, in accordance with their historical responsibility,

through quantifiable, economy-wide mitigation targets, covering all sectors and all greenhouse gases, implemented mainly domestically, which can be aggregated and which are comparable, measurable, reportable and verifiable, with the type, scope, scale and coverage more ambitious than those undertaken under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol during the pre-2020 period, and communicated and implemented without any conditions.'

'In accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 1, 3–, 4, 5 and 7, of the Convention, developing country Parties should commit to undertake Diversified Enhanced Mitigation Actions (DEMAs) during the period 2021–2030. Such nationally-determined DEMAs may be based on and be more ambitious than their nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) under the Bali Action Plan. They may include, inter alia, relative emission reductions; intensity targets; REDD-plus activities and other plans, programmes and policies; joint mitigation and adaptation approaches; net avoided emissions, or also manifested as adaptation co-benefits, in accordance with their special circumstances and specific needs. They will be communicated and implemented in the context of sustainable development, subject to and enabled by the provision of adequate finance, technology and capacity-building support from developed countries in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 7 of the Convention, in a measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner.'

On the long-term global goal, the **Maldives** for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** proposed the following: 'Ensuring significant and rapid global greenhouse gas emission reductions of at least a 70-95 per cent reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions below 2010 levels by 2050 and zero emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> and other long-lived greenhouse gases in the period 2060-2080.'

**The European Union** proposed that 'in meeting the 2°C objective, Parties agree on the need for global sectoral emission reduction targets for international aviation and maritime transport and on the need for all Parties to work through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop global policy frameworks to achieve these targets'.

**The African Group** proposed that the 'low emission strategies of developed countries should have a time frame for zero emissions'.

Several Parties, from both developed and developing countries, made proposals relating to the use of market mechanisms in their mitigation contributions.

This included the **Coalition of Rainforest Nations** that proposed that units emanating from UNFCCC-approved mechanisms, including REDD-plus (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) mechanisms will be transferrable and can be used to meet contributions of Parties under the new agreement. They also proposed that 'mitigation outcomes and units emanating from mechanisms outside the UNFCCC can be used to meet contributions ... of Parties under the new agreement provided that they meet conformity requirements established by the COP'.

In relation to the meeting of mitigation commitments, Japan supported the use of market mechanisms and actions in the land-use sector. It proposed that 'the use of actions in the land-use sector is to accommodate national circumstances and proper incentives so as to facilitate actions and stakeholder cooperation'.

**AOSIS** proposed that 'the governing body of this Protocol (AOSIS wants the Paris agreement to be a new protocol) shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from the use of market mechanisms is used to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to climate change to meet the costs of adaptation'. It also wanted a new platform for enhancing mitigation ambition.

On the use of market mechanisms, **Tanzania** said that it should be supplementary to domestic action and a cap will apply to ensure that mitigation commitments are mainly domestic actions.

**Brazil** proposed an 'Economic Mechanism' 'to facilitate the fulfilment of NDCs (nationally determined contributions) by Parties with quantified economy-wide absolute targets in the mitigation component and to incentivize developing country Parties to take on such targets over time'. It suggested that the 'Economic Mechanism shall be comprised of: an Emissions Trading System (ETS); and an enhanced Clean Development Mechanism (CDM-plus)'.

**South Africa** proposed that 'the Conference of the Parties shall review the adequacy of the sum of individual commitments by Parties, the relation of the aggregate effort for keeping temperature increases to below 2/1.5°C, and the equity of relative efforts. The review shall be an integral part of the dynamic contribution cycle ... Based on this review, the Conference of the Parties shall take appropriate action, which may include the adoption amendments to the commitments'.

Highlights of proposals in relation to other sections are forthcoming.

### Guidance for Intended Nationally Determined Contributions Criticised by Developing Countries

Geneva, 10 February (Hilary Chiew) – At the briefing session on support for Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) held on 9 February on the sideline of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), several developing countries questioned the lack of attention given to adaptation and the mitigation-centric nature of the guidance for preparation of INDCs.

The two-hour briefing session saw presentations of various initiatives to help countries prepare and put forward their INDCs, notably from the Global Environment Facility, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Global Climate Change Alliance, France and Germany. Two developing countries – Saudi Arabia and Mexico – were also invited to make presentations on their respective INDC preparation.

Voicing its strong concerns about the guidance materials prepared by the UNFCCC's secretariat, **China** expressed surprise over the INDCs submission portal, noting that any guidance for INDCs should be endorsed by the Conference of Parties (COP). Referring to the mitigation-centric materials, it said the secretariat should not provide any misleading materials and requested those materials to be deleted as they were not discussed by the Parties.

China said that as noted by other developing countries, INDCs is a very sensitive issue and it is not just about mitigation. It would like to see developed countries and other UN agencies and organisations spend more energy and money in helping developing countries to prepare other aspects of the 2015 agreement.

Quoting paragraph 2(d) of the Warsaw decision, it reminded developed country Parties, the operating entities of the financial mechanism and any other organisations in a position to do so to

provide support for the related activities referred to in sub-paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c) as early as possible in 2014.

China further pointed out that sub-paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c) were not only referring to developing countries. Therefore, such initiatives should also help developed countries to prepare their INDCs so that they can produce ambitious INDCs in terms of financial and technology transfer.

[Paragraph 2(b) reads: *To invite all Parties to initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions, in the context of adopting a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2 and to communicate them well in advance of the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties (by the first quarter of 2015 by those Parties ready to do so) in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the intended contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions;*

Paragraph 2(c) reads: *To request the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action to identify, by the twentieth session of the Conference of the Parties, the information that Parties will provide when putting forward their contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions, referred to in paragraph 2(b) above; ...]*

**Egypt** reminded Parties of the delicate outcome in Lima (see background information below) and warned against facing the same political dilemma of balancing the treatment of mitigation and adaptation. It strongly asked that adaptation be treated equally as mitigation. It also said financial

support alone is insufficient and that it would welcome assistance on the technical level in preparing its INDC.

In supporting China, **Argentina** said it is important to stress that INDCs are to be nationally-determined and all elements must be addressed in a balanced manner.

**Saudi Arabia** in its presentation said at the regional level, Arab nations were unhappy that support was only for mitigation and they want to see a process that will really help countries to prepare their INDCs in a manner that will not prejudice the outcome in Paris. At the national level, it said the process is on-going but the targets for the four sectors are difficult and challenging.

**Iran** said developing countries' perspective on INDCs is that all elements of the Convention should be addressed in a balanced manner and wondered how the UNDP is going to provide finance and technical support to all developing countries.

**Timor Leste** said the guidance to be developed by the UNDP and others would need to consider paragraph 11 of the Lima decision, noting that the guidance needs to be based on national circumstances.

'It means do not push us for our quantified INDCs as we (as least developed countries) can only do low greenhouse gas emission. It is not possible for Timor Leste to quantify our emissions. The methodologies should be flexible and should include adaptation needs as per paragraph 12 (of the Lima decision),' Timor Leste stressed.

[Paragraph 11 reads: *Also agrees that the least developed countries and small island developing States may communicate information on strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emission*

*development reflecting their special circumstances in the context of intended nationally determined contributions;*

Paragraph 12 reads: *Invites all Parties to consider communicating their undertakings in adaptation planning or consider including an adaptation component in their intended nationally determined contributions; ...]*

In its presentation and subsequent response to Parties' interventions, the UNDP asserted that a chapter on how to consider adaptation in the preparation of INDCs is currently being developed in response to the Lima decision. The chapter will be distributed for comments to all countries by the end of March and integrated in the INDC guide by the end of April.

The UNDP said it will publish the guidance that is under development with the World Resources Institute and the UNFCCC at the end of March as a request from participants at its regional technical dialogues, and that the guidance has gone through an extensive comment period where it was reviewed by dozens of countries and non-governmental organisations.

At the 20<sup>th</sup> session of the Conference of the Parties in Lima last December, the dilution of adaptation actions became a contentious issue. Developing countries were united in their demand that adaptation has to be part of the 2015 agreement and fought for insertion of adaptation in the Lima decision text. In the earlier drafts, there was no provision that referred to strengthening of adaptation action in the new agreement. This was a major concern of developing countries which saw the developed countries pushing for a mitigation-centric agreement, with the issues of adaptation and means of implementation being marginalised or omitted.

# TWN

## Geneva News Update

# 4

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### Parties to Propose Ideas for Streamlining Negotiating Text

Geneva, 11 February (Meena Raman) – Parties at the Geneva climate change meeting under the UNFCCC's Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), were tasked with proposing ideas on how to 'streamline' the negotiating text for the new climate agreement to be concluded in Paris in December this year.

Since the meeting began on Sunday, 8 February Parties have been making proposals for addition to the elements text which was annexed to the decision adopted in Lima (in decision 1/CP.20). On the afternoon of Tuesday, 10 February, the ADP Co-chairs, Daniel Reifsnyder (the United States) and Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria) convened the contact group to discuss the issue of 'streamlining'.

Confusion reigned in the contact group when Reifsnyder began by asking Parties to take the elements text from Lima and provide thoughts on ways to streamline it, adding that he was not asking Parties to streamline the new ideas (presented during the Geneva session). He said further that the views of Parties will be recorded in a separate document that would be useful as Parties prepare for negotiations in the June session of the ADP, to be held in Bonn, Germany.

He added further that if some Parties are not able to do this 'this afternoon', there will be other opportunities to do so in June, saying that 'this is the beginning of streamlining'. He also wanted Parties to consider what aspects belong to the Paris agreement and what can be in the decisions of the Conference of Parties (COP) and invited Parties to look at section C of the text on 'general/objective'.

Following the interventions by various Parties, from both developing and developed countries, it was agreed that the text that would be looked at on how streamlining can be done should be the text from Geneva and not Lima. Parties also stressed the need for the establishment of clear ground rules for the

streamlining exercise that would be discussed further on Wednesday, 11 February.

When the contact group session began afternoon of 10 February, **Tuvalu**, speaking for the **Least Developed Countries (LDC)**, said that Parties were 'entering a new realm of the process' and there is a 'need for further clarity on the rules of the game'. It added that in seeking proposals from Parties to streamline, there could be other Parties who may not agree with those proposals as 'you may get a biased view'.

In response, Reifsnyder said that the document containing the views of Parties will be a listing of various ideas and is not about reaching consensus. 'If there are differences, it will be useful to elucidate them,' he added.

**Malaysia**, speaking for the **G77 and China**, also said that Parties were 'moving into a new phase' and asked what proposals for streamlining would be entertained and if the Co-chairs were referring to deletions, replacements etc. in the text. It also asked how the proposals will be captured and said there is a need for clarity on how this work in progress is carried forward to Bonn.

In response, Reifsnyder said that the 'answer is yes' as to what is to be deleted; what is combined; and what is replaced. On how to capture the views, he said that 'the goal will be to have a document of all the written submissions' and which 'can be attributed' to Parties.

When **Chile**, for the **Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, began to make suggestions on the text on what it would like to see amended and merged, a number of countries raised their flags on a point of order.

**Malaysia**, speaking for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, said that it thought that the purpose of the session was to discuss the criteria to be established for the streamlining so that

the basic ground rules are clear. It added that Parties need to agree on the fundamental rules on the criteria, the methodology etc. and there is a need for a consensus on the approach to streamlining. There is a need to see the negotiating text in its entirety (referring not just to the Lima text but the work done in Geneva too). ‘We should not embark on actual streamlining until the rules are clearly established,’ said Malaysia.

**Egypt** agreed with Malaysia and wanted the negotiating text to be put on the screen, which was agreed to by the Co-chairs.

**Venezuela** said that there was a risk in moving too quickly and that it was not possible to look at the ‘general/objective’ section without looking at the entire text as there were cross-cutting issues and linkages with other sections. It also said that there should be no streamlining before having clarity on the rules of procedure.

**Nicaragua** also expressed similar views and said that Parties need to agree step by step on how to proceed.

When Reifsynder asked for views based on the Lima text, while several countries appreciated the ADP Co-chairs’ efforts at being transparent, countries including **China, Venezuela, Argentina, India, the African Group, the European Union, the LMDC, Tanzania, Belize** and **Mexico** questioned the usefulness of going back to the Lima text when Parties at the Geneva session had made useful additions to the negotiating text which had moved beyond Lima and was more collectively owned.

**Malaysia**, speaking for the **LMDC**, said that Parties ‘have built a substantial text and we should not go back to the Lima text’. It said that Parties have gone a step further in providing alternatives to the Lima text and that it ‘would be regressive to go back to Lima’. So, it proposed that Parties work on this text from Geneva. It also said that the process was ‘entering a new stage’ on how to go about streamlining. All Parties need to agree ‘to the criteria and the ground rules and methodology’ by which work will be conducted.

Malaysia, recalling how the Lima COP nearly ‘blew up’, gave an example and said that one criterion for streamlining could be ‘to align the text with the Convention and the Lima decision and there should be no stepping back. Those aspects of proposals that are in conflict with the Lima decision or the Convention can go out the window.’ There should be a discussion on the establishment of the

ground rules on how the streamlining is done, reiterated Malaysia.

**Sudan** for the **African Group** said that in Geneva, Parties have gone a step further from the Lima text which can be Party-owned. It also stressed the importance of ‘procedural fairness’ and the need for clarity on the rules of engagement, supporting the views of Tuvalu and Malaysia. On how to move forward, it said repetitions and similarities in the text could be identified and suggested that the Co-chairs prepare a table to reflect this. Then, there could be facilitated discussions among Parties, which should be ‘light-touch’ that does not get into ‘a deep dive into the substance of the text’. On the issue of what matters should be in the agreement and what should be in COP decisions, it cautioned that ‘we are negotiating under a single mandate in a single outcome’.

**The EU** said that there were interesting suggestions from Malaysia and Sudan and was prepared to move forward on the basis of the text from Geneva which had ‘growing collective ownership’.

**Brazil** said that Parties had not reached the right moment to go deep into language of the text to start streamlining. It said there might be a need for ‘a table’ or a ‘non-paper’ which showed where the differences and redundancies are while ‘preserving the integrity of the elements text’.

**The Russian Federation** also did not concur on going deep into the ‘negotiation on language’ in the text in the streamlining exercise.

**Saudi Arabia** also said that it was not ready to get into a discussion about textual changes. It stressed the importance of looking at the entire text and to see how to handle the different elements through a ‘higher-level’ discussion.

**Uganda** also stressed the need to get the ground rules right.

In his concluding remarks, Reifsynder said that the full negotiating text will be posted on the UNFCCC website and discussions can continue (on Wednesday afternoon) on how to streamline the text. In addition, he wanted Parties to also give their views on the ‘structure of the Paris agreement and how it will look like’. On the request by some Parties for a table on redundancies, this could be done for the June session if Parties desired this as this was a ‘Party-driven process’ and he asked for further reflections in this regard on how the ADP should proceed.

### Parties Complete Work on New Proposals for Negotiating Text

Geneva, 11 February (Indrajit Bose) – On day three of the ongoing climate talks in Geneva, Parties completed their work on adding new text proposals to the various sections of the elements text. The work, under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), is underway to produce a negotiating text for a new climate agreement that is to be concluded in Paris in December this year.

After going through adaptation and loss and damage, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency of action and support on Monday 9 February, Parties focused on the remaining sections of the elements text on 10 February: Section K on ‘Time frames and process related to commitments/contribution/other matters related to implementation and ambition’; Section L on ‘Facilitating implementation and compliance’; Section M on ‘Procedural and institutional provisions’; the preamble and definitions. The afternoon was devoted to discussing process issues on how to streamline the text (see TWN Geneva News Update #4: *Parties to propose ideas for streamlining negotiating text*).

Speaking during the session on definitions, the United States said that there are three ways of looking at differentiation on the basis of the annexes it had proposed during discussions on mitigation. (With reference to mitigation commitments, the US had said it wanted the use of the term ‘Parties in Annex X’ wherever there was a reference to ‘developed countries’ in the text and to ‘Parties not included in Annex X’ when the term ‘developing countries’ is used. It wanted the reference to ‘Parties in Annex Y’ as an alternative to the references to developed countries providing support for finance, technology and capacity building support.)

The first option, the US said, is based on Annex I and Non-Annex I of 1992 (referring to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change), which it said is ‘untenable’. The form and the content of the agreement is on changing categories and the global level of ambition will not be sufficient to achieve our shared goals through this approach, it said. ‘No country should do more than it can but neither should any country do less,’ it added.

The second option, said the US, is a spectrum of countries based on Parties’ real and present circumstances, but not categories. ‘We prefer this option and from the mitigation point of view, this is already embedded in the Nationally Determined Contributions,’ it said. Stressing that this is self-differentiation, the US said that countries cannot be compelled to take action.

The third option is categories where countries will graduate from one category to the next as the countries’ circumstances change. This is not our preferred option, but this is to maintain the operational bifurcation, not differentiation, which Parties will have with respect to their obligations, it said.

It said that a new list of countries was needed which has evolved over time, based on established criteria of the World Bank and one that reflects the contribution of a country to global emissions as a percentage and per capita income.

It proposed the addition of a new Annex X to the definitions, for which it suggested that placeholder language would be negotiated subsequently and which would be updated regularly, and an Annex Y that would require similar placeholder language based on criteria related to capability and economic trends and which would also be regularly updated.

Highlights of some of the proposals Parties made on 9 February for addition to the different sections of the elements text are as follows:

### ***Section E: Adaptation and Loss and Damage***

There was a clear demand from most developing countries through the **Group of 77 and China (G77 and China)** to separate discussions on adaptation from loss and damage. Their argument was loss and damage should be treated independently in the Paris agreement and it should therefore feature as a separate section in the negotiation text. The **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** and the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** led this call.

On the long-term and global aspects of adaptation, the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** called for a long-term vision on adaptation based on the findings of science, the urgent need of adaptation and historical cumulative greenhouse gas emissions. The LMDC also called for prioritising developing countries that are most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change on adaptation and for developed countries to support initiatives, actions and programmes that are nationally determined by developing countries.

On commitments/contributions the LMDC proposed that developing country Parties should integrate adaptation with national development planning and undertake adaptation plan (NAP) process and Annex II countries to enhance their support subject to the modalities and procedures to be developed and adopted by the governing body. The group asked of the developed country Parties to take the lead in combating climate change and commit, under Article 4 of the Convention, to support country-driven processes and proposals by developing countries.

The LMDC also called for the establishment of and maintaining stronger linkages with the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and other funds, and follow the balanced 50:50 approach of the allocation of financing between mitigation and adaptation. It also called for an adaptation registry that builds on NAP-Central, an information system that will serve as the main information platform for supporting the NAP process. It also called on the Adaptation Fund to serve as the Adaptation window to the GCF.

**The African Group** proposed a global goal for adaptation with the purpose of enhancing the implementation of adaptation actions in developing countries. As per the group's proposal, under the global goal for adaptation, a platform would be established for developing countries to communicate

their efforts towards achieving the global goal on adaptation, as well as for the exchange and sharing of best practices of all countries on adaptation in the formulation and implementation of adaptation measures.

The global goal for adaptation shall provide for supporting enhanced adaptation planning and sharing of best practices by all Parties; the understanding of adaptation needs in light of mitigation ambition; the available support for developing countries to meet their adaptation needs; and recognition for adaptation investments by developing countries as part of their contribution to the global effort, the Group said.

Speaking for the **LDCs, Tuvalu** said that Annex II Parties to the Convention, and those Parties in a position to do so, shall support the LDCs in the implementation of national adaptation plans and the development of additional activities under the LDC work programme, including the development of institutional capacity by establishing regional institutions to respond to adaptation needs and strengthen climate-related research and systematic observation for climate data collection, archiving, analysis and modelling.

Tuvalu also called for regional adaptation centres to be established in all major regions to help facilitate a regional knowledge base on the most appropriate adaptation responses for the region to provide capacity-building on adaptation responses and facilitate research into adaptation measures. It also called for all existing UN institutions and international and national financial institutions to provide information to the international clearinghouse and registry for adaptation on how their development assistance programmes and finance incorporate climate-proofing measures.

Calling for a separate loss and damage mechanism, Tuvalu said the purpose of the mechanism has to be stated, adding that Parties recognise that inadequate mitigation and insufficient adaptation lead to more loss and damage and that financial and technical support shall be made available to vulnerable developing countries and communities to address Loss and Damage related to both extreme events and slow onset events. It also called for a comprehensive approach to climate risk management and for a financial technical panel under the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage to provide support for micro-finance initiatives and explore compensation finance for slow onset events.

**South Africa** called for a global goal on adaptation with both 'qualitative and quantitative aspects'.

**Ghana** stressed that in order to determine levels of adaptation support (finance, technology, and capacity) required for a given commitment period, the ex ante assessment of aggregate mitigation action and associated temperature rise action shall be used as a basis, including the consideration of nationally determined needs for adaptation, under the adaptation goal.

**Brazil** said Parties are encouraged to prepare, maintain, communicate and implement an adaptation component in their nationally determined contributions, which may include, inter alia, their undertakings in adaptation planning, taking into account the relevant guidance developed under the Convention and following the processes and timelines for the development of national adaptation plans. It also proposed text to say that developing country Parties may further include in the adaptation component of their contributions an assessment of vulnerabilities and specific needs with regard to finance, technology and capacity building to implement their adaptation actions. It asked for the provision that the Secretariat shall keep and update an online registry of adaptation actions, with a view to strengthening and enhancing cooperation on adaptation through the relevant institutions, mechanisms and channels of the Convention.

Following its call on Annex X and Annex Y that was made while adding proposals to the mitigation section, **the US** reiterated again during discussions on adaptation that ‘developed countries’ be replaced with ‘Annex X’ and ‘developing countries’ be replaced with ‘Parties not included in Annex X’.

### ***Section G: Finance***

Speaking for **the G77 and China, Bolivia** proposed that ‘all developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex II provide climate finance as a means to enhance action towards achieving the objective of the Convention including through this agreement, in line with the needs of developing countries, in accordance with their obligations and commitments under Articles 4, paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, of the Convention, the principles under the Convention, in particular the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and equity, noting that the extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments related to financial resources, transfer

of technology and capacity-building, acknowledging that the need for support by developing country Parties may change over time and be accommodated under Article 4, paragraph 7, of the Convention, and acknowledging the need for financing for forestry in line with the Warsaw Framework for REDD-plus; including alternative approaches to results based actions such as joint mitigation and adaptation for the integral and sustainable management of forests’.

It called for financial resources provided by developed country Parties, and for the means of implementation, to comprise ‘new, additional, adequate and predictable financial resources provided by developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex II to developing country Parties for the full and enhanced implementation of the Convention, as part of promoting sustainable development in developing countries, including through enabling enhanced mitigation and adaptation actions’.

The Group also called on developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex II ‘to provide financial resources for the enhanced implementation of the Convention under this agreement, in order to / in a manner that: aims for a balanced allocation of financing between adaptation and mitigation, while assuring a minimum of 50% of resources for adaptation and an equitable distribution between different regions of developing countries and enhances country ownership in the disbursement of financial resources’.

It said all financing for adaptation should be ‘grant based, prioritizing the urgent and immediate needs and special circumstances of developing countries particularly vulnerable to climate change, including in particular LDCs and SIDS and African States’. It also called for further options to simplify access procedures to funds, especially for LDCs (least developed countries) and SIDS (small island developing states).

The Group called for a ‘clear process for periodic reviews and assessment of the finance goal based on the needs assessments of developing country Parties, addressing gaps in the delivery of resources and in line with an agreed goal on the limit of temperature increase’, to be established under this agreement as well as an effective measurement, reporting and verification of support mechanism, including of all means of implementation, to be developed.

On anchoring institutions under the new agreement, the G77 and China stressed that ‘the Financial Mechanism of the Convention under Article 11 shall serve as the financial mechanism of

the 2015 agreement; the related funds established under the Kyoto Protocol will also serve as instruments of the legal agreement. This will also apply to all rules and guidelines developed by the COP and the CMP in relation to the operation of the financial mechanism, its operating entities and associated Funds and to the decisions related to the transparency and MRV of support; with the GCF acting as the main operating entity of the Financial Mechanism.'

It called for the GCF to be strengthened through developed country Parties providing 'a list of specific amounts/percentages reflecting the required share of climate finance to be provided to the GCF, subject to review and in accordance with Article 11 and the arrangements between the COP and the Fund; developing linkages with the thematic bodies under the Convention and this agreement, in order to provide the GCF with the necessary expertise to serve its funding windows, both present and future'.

The Group also called for 'funding windows to be established by the GCF on Technology development and transfer and Loss and Damage'.

It said that the provision of finance should be 'based on a floor of USD 100 billion and shall take into account the different assessments of climate finance related needs prepared by the Secretariat and reports by other international organizations'.

The G77 also proposed, 'A periodic process for assessing the needs of developing countries to implement the Convention including through this agreement, is established. The assessment process will be based on country parties submissions and other relevant reports and will be performed every four years aligned with replenishment cycles of the operating entities of the financial mechanism, the outcomes of the process should serve as input in the replenishment process.'

It further proposed 'new and additional finance, independent of adaptation budgets, to be provided for the financing and operationalization of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage'.

Endorsing the G77 and China's statement, **the LMDC** said that climate finance shall be provided as new, additional, adequate and predictable financial resources by developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex II for the full and enhanced implementation of the Convention as part of promoting sustainable development in developing countries. 'In accordance with the principles of the Convention, developed country Parties will submit their intended nationally determined contributions of financial resources in their INDCs. Developing

country Parties will submit their requirements of funds in their INDCs, for the same cycle,' it added.

**The African Group** called for a quantitative goal on finance, and added that there should be periodic assessment of financial flows from developed to developing countries. It also called for deletion of portions from the text that did not conform to the Convention.

**The LDCs** called for a 50:50 balance in financing mitigation and adaptation and said 50% of financing should go to SIDS and LDCs and said all funding should come in the form of grants.

The Group proposed a special window for loss and damage to be established under the GCF, which 'shall, inter alia, provide finance for regional risk pools, micro-finance initiatives, and measures to address compensation'. It also called for a replenishment cycle of the GCF to be established.

The LDCs further called for 'financial support under the agreement to be regularly scaled up and be subject to a triennial review'.

On sources, it said that 'in establishing the levy scheme, ICAO and IMO are encouraged to take into consideration the needs of developing countries, particularly the LDCs, SIDS and countries in Africa heavily reliant on tourism and international transport of traded goods'. (One option in the elements text encourages the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation to develop a levy scheme to provide financial support for the Adaptation Fund.)

It also said: 'The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session decide on a process to identify and implement new sources of finance for the implementation of this agreement, in particular for adaptation finance, and take a decision on these sources at its subsequent session.'

**AOSIS** called for concrete commitments for SIDS and said wherever 2°C is mentioned, to replace it with 1.5°C. It called for a readiness programme to be established as well as a placeholder for 'financing loss and damage' and for a 'proposal to include subsection on MRV of climate finance that should also include a specific reference to a regular cycle of climate finance'. It also called for 'taking into account the urgent and immediate needs and special circumstances of the LDCs and SIDS' to be included in the text.

**The Arab Group** said developed country Parties, and other Parties included in Annex II, should provide new, additional, and adequate climate financing to assist developing country Parties in implementing commitments and actions under the

Convention. Any funding from private/other sources shall in no way diminish the obligation of developed country Parties to provide financial assistance to developing country Parties in accordance with the terms of the Convention and the agreement, it reiterated.

**Brazil** added, ‘All Parties committed under Article 4.3 of the Convention shall prepare, maintain, communicate and implement a financial component in their nationally determined contributions, including, as appropriate, quantified financial pledges, targets and actions to mobilize climate finance to developing countries and to assist the implementation of the NDC of developing countries, primarily through the financial mechanism of the Convention. Developing country Parties may clarify in their NDC the extent to which the implementation of their nationally determined contributions is dependent upon the provision of international financial support, technology transfer and capacity building, including particular gaps and needs to this regard. The communication of the components pursuant to this paragraph shall follow the processes and timelines required for national budgets, taking into account the agreed communication channels and relevant guidance developed under the Convention.’

It also suggested that ‘developing country Parties implementing REDD+ activities may utilize the positive incentives and results-based finance provided in accordance with the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, and any other related decisions, to support the implementation of their nationally determined contributions’.

**The European Union** proposed all Parties individually or collectively to mobilise climate finance.

**The US** added that the agreement must ensure that the climate finance captures ‘phasing out maladaptive investments’ and proposed: ‘Parties to reduce international support for high-carbon investments, including international fossil fuel subsidies.’

**Australia** added its voice and called for annexes to be replaced with ‘all countries in a position to do so’.

**Canada** called for bilateral and multilateral sources to be mentioned in the agreement.

### ***Section H: Technology development and transfer***

The discussion on technology development and transfer was a short one. Developing countries stressed on the need for technology development and transfer from developed to developing countries.

**The LMDC** stressed on the need to promote access to public sector technology; for developed country Parties to support the development and enhancement of endogenous capacity and technologies of developing country Parties; and for the technology mechanism to enhance cooperation and synergy with other institutional arrangements under the Convention. It proposed the following language: ‘Developed country Parties shall support the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties.’

‘The GCF, in operationalizing its adaptation and mitigation windows shall ensure adequate financial resources for technology development and transfer and capacity building for all climate change actions. Assessments of the effectiveness, adequacy and implementation of the institutional arrangements for technology development and transfer shall be conducted,’ the LMDC said.

It also called for ‘Developed country Parties, in accordance with the principles of and obligations under the Convention, to establish means to promote access to and the deployment, application, diffusion, including transfer of technologies, practices and processes while enhancing and rewarding innovation in environmentally sound technologies for adaptation and mitigation’.

The LMDC further said: ‘The Green Climate Fund, in operationalizing its adaptation and mitigation windows shall ensure adequate financial resources for technology development and transfer and capacity building for all climate change actions; assessments of the effectiveness, adequacy and implementation of the institutional arrangements for technology development and transfer shall be conducted.’

**China** proposed: ‘A global goal of technology development and transfer shall be established, in order to meet the technology requirements for achieving an emission pathway consistent with limiting the global average temperature increase to below 2°C or 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and considerably improving the adaptation capacity of developing countries. Under this global technology goal, developed countries shall commit to conduct regular assessment on technologies that are ready for transfer, and make the list of ready-to-transfer technologies, and set target for supporting the development and transfer of each technology in developing countries, and mobilize resources to deliver the support. The aggregate effect of the supported technology development and transfer shall be reviewed with a view to achieving the 2°C or

1.5°C target and considerably improving the adaptation capacity of developing countries.’

‘An ad hoc review and monitoring mechanism shall be established and conduct a periodic assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of the Technology Mechanism/institutional arrangements for technology development and transfer. The Technology Mechanism/institutional arrangements shall improve their performance, and be mandated new functions as needed, according to the result of the assessment,’ it said.

**Saudi Arabia** spoke for the **Arab Group** and said that Parties shall cooperate to promote and enhance the technology development and transfer of technology from developed country Parties to developing country Parties to enable developing country Parties to effectively implement their nationally determined commitments under the Convention and the agreement.

**India** said it is important to enhance clarity to access climate smart technologies and asked for a provision for funds from the GCF to be allocated to meet the full cost of intellectual property rights of environmentally sound technologies and knowhow and that such technologies would be provided to developing countries free of cost to enhance their actions to address climate change.

**Brazil** proposed: ‘All Parties committed under Article 4.5 of the Convention shall prepare, maintain, communicate and implement a component related to technology development and transfer to developing countries, as well as to capacity building, including, as appropriate, actions, policies and measures for technology development and transfer to developing countries and to promote capacity building, with a view to assisting the implementation of the nationally determined contributions of developing countries.’

**Sudan** asked for a placeholder on ‘Framework for scaling up technology development and transfer’.

### ***Section I: Capacity Building***

Speaking for the **LMDC**, **Egypt** said that capacity building must be guided by responding to national needs and fostering country ownership, including at the national, sub-national and local levels and build on existing provisions and lessons learned on capacity building under the Convention. It also said that developing countries would enhance their climate change actions subject to the means of implementation provided by developed country Parties. It proposed that text should be included to say that the developed country Parties shall cooperate

to enhance the capacity of developing countries to support the implementation of their climate change actions based on the principles and provisions of the Convention.

The **LMDC** called for an international capacity building mechanism building on previous and ongoing work and lessons learned from existing institutional arrangements on capacity building established under the Convention, including the the Durban Forum on capacity building.

**AOSIS** called for an international capacity-building mechanism with a capacity-building coordination centre. ‘The centre’s mission will be to stimulate/foster cooperation on capacity-building and to enhance and support capacity-building. In addition, the centre will assist developing countries in areas of capacity-building consistent with their respective capabilities and national circumstances and priorities,’ it said.

**Saudi Arabia** spoke for the **Arab Group** and said that enhancement of capacity may provide important and relevant guidance to developing country Parties, but it shall not interfere with the nature, scope or substance of the developing country Parties’ nationally determined contributions.

**South Africa** called for MRV of capacity building support against the needs of developing country Parties.

**The European Union** spoke of developing national capacity to determine MRV requirements.

### ***Section J: Transparency of action and support***

**Jordan** spoke for the **LMDC** and called for a transparency framework, applicable to developed country Parties, to promote transparency of action and support by providing information on the implementation of developed country Parties’ commitments/contributions in an efficient and flexible manner. It also called for strengthening the mandate of the Standing Committee on Finance in relation to the MRV of support and ensure that commitments and provision of support by developed country Parties are implemented and complied with and verified through a robust verification system, and facilitate the comparison of MRV of all types of support provided with the needs expressed and identified by developing country Parties.

The group said double counting of financial support provided from developed country Parties to developing country Parties must be avoided. With respect to the transparency framework, the group stressed on avoiding onerous burdens on particularly vulnerable developing countries, with respect to

support received for adaptation, capacity-building and access to and development and transfer of environmentally sound technologies.

**The Africa Group** called for the section on transparency and support to remain as a standalone chapter in the agreement. It said that there have to be MRV arrangements on support provided by developed countries.

**The EU** said that there need to be structural changes in the elements text as some of the content from Section J would be more appropriate in Section D, on mitigation. It said that establishment of mitigation commitments shall be applicable for all Parties. It said that the existing text misses the opportunity to establish MRV arrangements and called on each Party to maintain MRV arrangements

which reflect their national circumstances. It called for a common framework with common MRV provisions for all and to adapt those to different commitment types. It also called for common guidelines on reporting as per national circumstances.

**China** supported the LMDC and stressed that information provided through biennial update reports that would be subject to technical analyses should not be intrusive and should respect sovereignty.

**Saudi Arabia** spoke for **the Arab Group** and said that the transparency section does not address the adaptation component.

(Highlights of proposals discussed on 10 February will follow in a separate update.)

### Parties Exchange Views on Structure of 2015 Climate Agreement

Geneva, 12 February (Indrajit Bose) – Parties at the Geneva climate change meeting under the UNFCCC’s Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) exchanged views on the structure of the 2015 agreement on 11 February.

ADP Co-chair Daniel Reifsnyder (the United States) presented a few questions to the Parties for their consideration: what is it Parties think this agreement should do? How will it advance what we have in the Convention? Are we negotiating a one-time agreement or is it meant to endure through multiple commitment periods? How will the institutional mechanisms created since Copenhagen be dealt with in the new agreement? Should identical provisions apply to both mitigation and adaptation or should it be of a different nature? The same question stands for means of implementation. Some said it is useful to discuss rules of the agreement. What would belong to the agreement and what would be better suited to COP (Conference of Parties) decisions and why?

In response, many Parties gave their views. Broadly, there were differences between developed and developing countries on what should feature in the agreement and what should feature in COP decisions. A number of developing countries were of the view that it is too early to discuss the issue and that the content and the legal form of the agreement needed to be agreed upon first.

Some developing countries also responded sharply to developed countries’ proposals on differentiation.

**Malaysia**, for the **Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, said there should be no backsliding, especially on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and the agreement should be aligned with the Convention and the Lima decision. Referring to some Parties (the United States and New Zealand) who talked about

having an approach based on ‘bifurcation’ and not ‘differentiation’, Malaysia said that this is a dangerous route to travel and sows the seeds of collapse (of the climate talks).

(On 10 February, the US had proposed a bifurcation approach on the basis of new annexes that do not differentiate between developed and developing countries but on the basis of new categories of countries that could be based on World Bank criteria.)

Echoing the views of the LMDC, **India** said that ‘the present exercise is not meant to steam roll a new Convention by the backdoor with new definitions, categorization, annexes ... Going down that road may call for another ad hoc platform for enhanced interpretation, if all Parties are willing to embark on that journey.’

While several members of the **Umbrella Group** called for the Paris agreement to be one that is durable, several developing countries including the **LMDC** and **China** said that the Convention is the durable agreement, which should be enhanced in its implementation.

Responding to Switzerland’s statement that the objective of the new agreement is not to have more finance, but to have more impact, **Brazil** said, ‘If we are aiming at a balanced outcome, such statements are not helpful at all.’

There were several other key proposals by Parties and some sharp responses by developing countries, which are presented below.

Speaking for the **LMDC**, **Malaysia** said that Parties are enhancing action under a durable Convention. Parties should consider the durability of the Convention. There is a very clear durable regime in Articles 2 (Objective), 4 (Commitments), 7 (COP) and 12 (Communication of Information related to Implementation) of the Convention, it said. ‘So we have an extremely durable agreement. It should deal with enhanced action at every stage to enhance the implementation of the Convention.’

Referring to Switzerland's intervention on changed technology and prices (see below Switzerland's intervention), Malaysia said that it is important to know what kind of resources will be made available to implement the obligations under the agreement.

On whether there should be identical provisions between the different elements, Malaysia said that they are not talking of different nature with regard to the elements. 'We are talking about balanced treatment of the elements. We need to treat the ambition issue and have the same time frame for mitigation and finance. The idea is to provide synergy between the elements like mitigation and finance and not de-link the two; or look at them as being of a completely different nature,' it said.

On the rules of the agreement, Malaysia said that the LMDC feels that the new rules must be directed to strengthening of the existing rules. For example, MRV (Measuring, Reporting and Verification) of support needs to be strengthened, it said.

On what goes to the agreement and what is in the decisions, it said that there should be no hierarchy and COP decisions could provide the details. 'We must look at the nature of the agreement, the content of the provisions and only then can we decide what are the methods and the minutiae,' it said, adding that it is premature to have that discussion.

On institutions, it said that there seems to be convergence that existing institutions should be strengthened, with a mandate for new institutions.

The structure, it said, should reflect and operationalise the durable aspect of the Convention, and focus on action with respect to the six core elements and differentiation between developed and developing countries.

Malaysia said that it heard with concern the reflection of some Parties who talked of 'bifurcation not differentiation', stressing that, 'This is a dangerous road to travel and sows the seeds of collapse.' Developed countries must fulfil their commitments and not shift the burden, it said. 'We are talking about enhanced action; we are not talking about everybody starting at the same level. We will be building on the Convention. There should be no backsliding, especially on the CBDR principle and it should be aligned to the Convention and the Lima decision,' it stressed.

Speaking for the **Arab Group** on the structure of the agreement, **Saudi Arabia** said that there is a mandate that sets a structure for the text. The mandate is clear: the six elements (mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency of action and

support) need to be the structure of the text. We need to make sure we achieve a balance. 'Once the structure is acceptable to all, comes the form and then the objective is to deliver on the form. The form is nothing but a tool and the legal nature is a tool to execute the agreement. These tools should not be discussed before we discuss content,' it said.

Speaking for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, **Tuvalu** said it is comfortable with the structure of the elements text since there is a logical flow. 'Of course, as we are aware, there is a separate section on loss and damage that is reflected in a footnote in the document.'

It added that elements related to transparency and MRV apply across the agreement. 'We would not like to see those brought into other sections. We need to see a parallel approach to MRV with respect to the other elements,' it said and added that Parties are in a new world where developing countries are being asked to make efforts in mitigation. 'We need to have a clear indication of what support will be made available for that effort,' it said.

Calling for a protocol, Tuvalu said the new agreement should be a Marshall Plan to address climate change. It also said that while there is a need to give existing institutions a permanent base since Parties are in a 'new world', new institutions should also be there. 'New institutions for loss and damage are critical,' it said. It called on all the elements to be reflected in a balanced way. It said it is premature to discuss what belongs to the agreement and what should be in COP decisions.

Speaking for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, the **Maldives** said that the Durban mandate is clear on the options on the legal form that Parties will adopt in Paris. It said that the objective needs greater specificity and for loss and damage to have its own dedicated heading. It called for clarity on markets and said that institutional arrangements need attention as a cross-cutting issue. It said that Parties would be crafting text in a legal way that will be for a 'serious' duration and that the text needs to be structured for this purpose. 'We need clear and concise articles for an extended timeframe into the middle of the century,' said the Maldives. On agreement versus accompanying decisions, it said that it is premature to discuss that and would need to see further work on structure.

Speaking for the **Independent Association for Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**, **Guatemala** called for an agreement that is ambitious and universal, applicable to all, one that has political buy-in and is a race to the top with no backsliding and gradual scaling up of commitments.

**China** said that the structure of the agreement has been laid out by the Convention itself and matters on structure have to be alongside the Durban mandate. The 2015 agreement should be based on Articles 4 (Commitments) and 12 (Communication of Information related to Implementation) of the Convention and the annexes which reflect differentiation between developed and developing countries.

On the purpose of the agreement it said that the purpose is to reach the objective in Article 2 and which can be done only through enhanced action in mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity building in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention. On whether it is a one-time or durable agreement, China said that the only durable thing in the entire exercise is the Convention itself, which is long-lasting. The 2015 agreement is about implementing the Convention, not replacing it, stressed China. The agreement could also contain trigger on a post-2030 timeframe, it said.

On institutional arrangements, China said the existing institutional arrangements could be anchored and enhanced in the agreement, but any other new institution to be established should also be anchored.

It said paragraph 2 of the Lima decision says Parties should address all the elements. The balanced manner should apply for both content and legal nature, it said. It called for equal treatment of the mandated elements. On what should go to the agreement and what should be part of accompanying decisions, China said it is too early to discuss the issue and that the content and the legal form need to be agreed upon before embarking on such a discussion. It also said that the current structure of the negotiating text cannot pre-judge the structure of the final agreement.

**India** said that it is for a short preamble and the objective section must cover the essential elements. ‘The Durban mandate provides what we can call the kernel of the 2015 outcome, for the enhanced implementation of all elements. This was further reiterated in the Lima decision. The nature of information and level of details may vary for each of them, but all these elements have to find a place in the core agreement. We may have details of implementation or MRV for all of them worked out in subsequent decisions.’

‘We need to make sure that the elements text is in line with the Lima decision, without backsliding or reopening the consensus achieved there. The 2015 outcome must be under the Convention, it must be balanced, in accordance with CBDR, also focus on

Adaptation, Loss and damage as another element, emphasize on Finance. There should be no ex-ante process of assessment for INDCs as they are country driven,’ said India.

‘The present exercise is not meant to steamroll a new Convention by the backdoor with new definitions, categorization, annexes X, Y, Z or whatever you want to call it. Going down that road may call for another ad hoc platform for enhanced interpretation, if all Parties are willing to embark on that journey,’ said India and added that it is clear that the Durban mandate is for enhanced implementation by all Parties under the Convention and in accordance with its principles and provisions.

On the legal nature, it said that countries are still unclear about the legal nature of the 2015 outcome and therefore the organisation of the contents would have to be deferred till Parties obtained clarity on it. India also suggested a workshop ‘to clarify the three options – an agreement or Protocol or an agreed outcome with legal force – to understand what implications they have on the Parties, compliance and so on and so forth’.

On the question of what should feature in the core agreement and what would be appropriate for COP decisions, India said that it would depend on the content of the agreement. ‘But what we certainly know is that the 2015 outcome must address all elements in a balanced manner,’ it stressed.

India said it cannot agree to a process ‘that drives us towards a mitigation centric agreement at the core and relegates all other elements to COP decisions. Clear articulation of Means of implementation and specific goals for enhancing them – Finance, Technology Transfer and Capacity Building – in the core agreement is a necessary and integral part of it,’ it said.

India clarified that while the agreement would have universal application, it would not be a uniform application. Equity and differentiation will inform each and every aspect of the entire 2015 outcome – each of its elements and provisions for MRV etc. ‘Developing countries would definitely contribute but in a differentiated manner,’ it said.

On the question of institutions, India said many institutions had not delivered. ‘We need to plug the loopholes, reorient and strengthen them and anchor them in the 2015 outcome,’ it said. India also emphasised on a ‘crucial design issue, which needs to be addressed’. ‘How are the results on 2013-15 Review, IPCC 5th AR, and work of subsidiary bodies (SBI, SBSTA, GCF, Technology Mechanism) going to inform the ADP work, especially the draft text, between Geneva and Paris?’ it asked.

India also highlighted that Workstream 2 (on pre-2020 ambition) decisions and texts for the same and timelines need to be finalised before Paris.

Speaking in its own capacity, **Saudi Arabia** said, 'We have already discussed what we want in the agreement are ambition and universal participation. It is very important to take the mandates we have and build a good agreement that takes into account those objectives that we have already agreed to.' On mitigation and adaptation, Saudi Arabia said that both are very important. 'They have different characteristics but we need to have clarity in the general main objective. We need to make sure we are helping both the processes,' it said. One is performance oriented and the other is facilitative. 'If we are doing one, then how much do we have to do on the other? If we want to do more, without means of implementation, that will never happen,' it said.

**Argentina** stressed that it is essential to align the elements text with the Lima decision by deleting concepts such as 'evolving CBDR' and 'Parties in a position to do so' that were left out in Lima. Argentina also called for the land sector to be excluded in the new agreement since the terms proposed were not in accordance with the Convention and is against food security, social development and poverty eradication.

**Iran and Pakistan** also supported the LMDC in their interventions.

**Venezuela** said to those who think that ADP is about creating a new regime that the process did not begin in Durban. It is a long-term process that builds on the Convention and Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Action Plan. It stressed on the need to build on what is existing and how to transition.

**Brazil** agreed with the EU that for accountability, there needs to be a mandate in the agreement and the details could be in the decisions. It said it was disappointed to hear Switzerland say that the objective is not to have more finance. 'If we are aiming at a balanced outcome, such statements are not helpful at all,' it said. It also added that Switzerland's proposal on flexibility to reflect different circumstances was not in line with what was agreed in Lima. 'The Lima decision refers to the Convention and CBDR,' it said.

In response to Japan, it said, on allowing accounting for markets at national level, any Party is free to implement domestic market as per its own legislation, but at the international level, it is important to have common understanding of agreed accounting rules.

On the objective of the agreement, Brazil said that Switzerland had made an interesting comment

about the need for a new agreement. 'There is a clear demand from our societies that we act and that is what motivates us to be together to make rules that are ambitious and fair and for us to provide them a greater response,' it said. Article 2, it said, is the starting point, not the end point. 'We need to know what we need to include, which is a common goal and that is a temperature limit relative to pre-industrial levels. When temperature limit is mentioned, it is not about mitigation, but also about adaptation and means of implementation,' it stressed.

On what goes into the agreement versus COP decisions, Brazil said that there should be no hierarchy of elements. It is important to keep the balance, it said. COP decisions in this regard will provide the package, procedures and methodologies, it said. It also said that it is important to have a general section and address differentiation in each of the components.

**The European Union** said that it wants a legally binding agreement, a protocol. 'It is important to distinguish between what needs to be in the agreement and what needs to be in decisions and it is not an issue of importance here. We need to adopt an agreement as part of the political package and see what needs to be endured and what needs to be adjusted,' the EU said. It also said that its priorities are transparency and accountability and that while the basic mandate for accountability should be set out in the agreement, more detailed rules and methodologies could be part of decisions. It also said that while it agrees that mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation should be in the agreement, they are not the same and the provisions need to be worked on, which reflect the needs of these different issues. 'We need to focus on what is needed for each one and not let one hold hostage to the others,' it said. The EU said the agreement needs to have all the structures for a protocol. The EU also called for a provision and the need to start working on a compliance regime and said the structure would assume priority for the session planned in June 2015.

**Norway** said the agreement's structure should promote overall clarity of provisions; it should be simple and concise; and avoid duplication. Referring to its submission on structure, Norway took Parties through its proposal where it groups provisions into eight sections. It added that universal commitment on mitigation and adaptation should be clearly set out in the agreement and that commitments for both would be different and set out in different paragraphs. On institutions, Norway said that those established under the Convention should serve the new agreement.

**Switzerland** said that MRV should be tied to specific thematic areas and it would be better to develop understanding on what it should look like for finance, adaptation and mitigation. It also reflected on why Parties agreed in Durban in 2011 to move towards a new agreement. The reason is some felt the need for a new regime to bring everybody on board post-2020, a regime that offers the flexibility required to reflect the very different circumstances of each of us.

On institutions, Switzerland said that there are many new institutions and the question is of anchoring them. It referred to the changes in investment flow and prices of green technology and said that Paris needs to reflect on technology and finance flows. It added that Paris must make sure there are no duplications. 'We need not anchor certain institutions that we might have to build in the future. We were doing very well without anchoring new institutions. We need to streamline them, which is a continuous process and not stop them by locking them in one process,' it said.

On the treatment of mitigation and adaptation, Switzerland said that adaptation would be given importance. 'Switzerland is ready for commitments but the question is do they have to be in the same article. Not necessarily,' it said. The objective of mitigation is to reduce emissions and the objective of adaptation is resilience, it said. 'We need rules to help reach that resilience. We need a framework that does not control but which helps us reach that resilience,' it said. On finance, the objective is not to have more finance but to have more impact and therefore different rules are needed to achieve these in different elements. On agreement versus decisions, Switzerland said putting something in an agreement or a decision is not an issue of flexibility. It may be of dynamism and the degree of detailing will be different, it added.

**The US** said that the agreement can add significant value by creating a durable framework that is built to last, which is applicable to all and which evolves over time and promotes more effective action. There is huge value in establishing an agreement where we are able to focus on implementing the agreement, it said. On structure, it said that it agreed with Parties that see the structure of the agreement as different from the elements text. 'Going forward in this (the elements text's) structure does not mean we have settled the structure,' it said. It added that the preamble should state the objective of the Convention and no general section is required, which should be embedded with the provisions of the agreement itself. It said the agreement must

define what Parties are expected to do in mitigation and adaptation and the provisions for adaptation and mitigation must reflect the distinct nature of responses to climate change. It said that review provisions on mitigation and adaptation support should go into their respective parts.

It did not see the need for an annex for the nationally determined contributions, adding that this is not the Kyoto Protocol. 'We cannot expect to reflect 195 NDCs, which will be voluminous, reflect diversity since they will be nationally determined.' It said there should be another more appropriate format for this.

On existing institutions, the US said that the institutions that have been created are appropriate for the new agreement. We would like to evolve our approach over time and reflect institutions in a way that allows us to do that. On what is in the agreement versus decisions, the US said that they see an outcome to include an agreement that is durable and concise and which would have accompanying decisions that evolve over time and need updating. 'For us, upfront information and reporting are areas where we see a hook in the agreement and accompanying decisions. Those are very important areas for us and the content of the decisions is just as important as what is in the agreement itself. There is no hierarchy of importance,' it said. The US also called for 'a cover decision that could be short to enable the outcome to be achieved'.

**Australia** said that the agreement must be effective to reduce emissions and build resilience. It needs meaningful participation by all and it should be durable. It highlighted five guiding principles: effectiveness, simplicity, durability, participation and no duplication. It said form must follow function and a one-size-fits-all approach will not help. The core agreement, it said, needs to be precise, 'something that politicians and public can understand'.

**Japan** stressed it would be useful to clarify what is the right vehicle for the elements. 'We had a similar discussion in the run up to COP20 on INDCs. INDCs are not the only vehicle and we can see what vehicle fits where.' Each vehicle should facilitate Parties' efforts. The legal agreement should be simple and stand the test of time, it said. The core of the agreement should be durable and should contain a package of COP decisions. Some go to COP decisions not because they are not important, but because they fit there. Those that do not need ratification should also be COP decisions, it said.

Stressing on markets, Japan said that markets may be used for INDCs and market enables more effective emissions reduction. On adaptation, Japan

said that the core agreement should encourage Parties to evaluate their effort and adaptation options. It said it recognises the differences in the nature of mitigation and adaptation and there is no need to have ‘parallelism’ between mitigation contributions and adaptation. On finance, it said that since the core agreement would stand the test of time, it should encourage not just developed countries but those countries in a position to do so.

**New Zealand** said that they would structure the agreement to focus on key obligations to meet the Convention’s Article 2 objectives and have obligations around those areas. On institutions, it said it is important to clarify the role of existing institutions in the agreement.

On what goes into the agreement and COP decisions, New Zealand said Parties must think of the principles that should be applied. ‘Fitness for purpose is our guiding objective in placing the elements,’ it said and added that universality is the thing that will be legally binding on all Parties. It also added that it wants the agreement to be durable. ‘We want something that has longevity and something that does not need to be negotiated frequently,’ it said. Those that require prior certainty, review cycles for instance, should be outside the legal

agreement. Then, if an institution has been created by a COP decision, it has to be amended by a COP decision.

Details of processes to review, update and formalise schedules should be for COP decision. ‘We need to establish hooks for these processes in the core agreement but the details should be in supporting decisions. The technical guidelines on land sector and use of markets should be in decisions.’ Accountability mechanisms should also be through COP decisions, it said and added that the emphasis of what would figure where would be determined by ‘fitness of purpose’.

**The Russian Federation** said that the structure of the agreement should not be subject to extensive innovative approaches. It should be a durable, universal agreement. ‘We should have core chapters that would be needed for the legal instrument, including objectives, principles and major thematic issues such as mitigation and adaptation. The important thing is it should be implementable. For that we need compliance.’ It added that Parties should build on all the principles of the Convention, including CBDR. ‘We have to learn from the Kyoto Protocol and have to be wise enough to envisage the type of provisions for entry into force such that the treaty becomes operational as soon as possible.’

### ADP Workstream 2 Should Not Remain an Academic Exercise, Say Developing Countries

Geneva, 13 February (Hilary Chiew) – Developing countries pointed out that workstream 2 (WS2) of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) risks being an academic exercise if there is no ‘more, faster and now’ implementation.

There was also concern that so far the discussion on the technical examination process (TEP) of WS2 has been overly emphasising the mitigation potential of developing countries compared to similar potential of developed country Parties.

This was expressed at the one-day dedicated meeting on ways and means to advance the TEP in 2015, which was co-facilitated by Tosi Mpanu Mpanu of the Democratic Republic of Congo on the sideline of the ADP on 10 February.

(WS2 deals with enhancing ambition in the pre-2020 period in order to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change by all Parties.)

The developing countries also pointed out that so far the work under WS2 of the ADP has been merely an academic exercise that identified the areas of high mitigation potential but that concrete actions are needed to accelerate the work in closing the ambition gap in the pre-2020 period. Means of implementation to enable them to enhance their actions was stressed.

Several developing country Parties also expressed deep concern over the presentation by the Food and Agriculture Organisation that highlighted the mitigation potential in the agriculture and land use sector. Brazil lamented over the focus on mitigation actions in developing countries, while little attention was given to the fact that without global efforts, mitigation actions in the forestry sector of Brazil will be seriously compromised. Argentina called for respect for the objective of the Convention,

that is to ensure food production, and said that agriculture in the Convention is in the context of cooperation on development and transfer of technologies but not on mitigation in absolute terms.

The meeting was divided into two parts with a set of three questions each to facilitate discussion.

Part one was titled *Consultations on impacts and outcome of the TEP in 2015*. Parties were asked to discuss and share their views on the ways to implement the Lima Call for Climate Action with regard to the TEP in 2015 in light of the global political momentum and the need for enhanced climate action in the run-up to Paris.

The questions were: How could the technical examination process contribute to enhancing mitigation ambition and implementation of high-impact climate action in developed and developing countries? Building on the previous meetings, how could the technical examination process be strengthened and focused on actionable policy options in 2015? What should be done to ensure dissemination of information and engagement of non-State actors?

Part two was on *Consultations on the ways to engage the UNFCCC institutions and relevant leading international organisations in the TEP in 2015*. (More details below.)

Speaking for the **Group of 77 and China, Mali** said that Parties have been exchanging views on this matter for three years now and the challenge is to turn the identified potential into reality. It said actions in a ‘more, faster and now’ manner should be adopted not in 2020, 2025 or 2030 but now in 2015.

It said it is important that WS2 not be just a developing countries’ effort but due consideration be given to harness the mitigation potential in developed countries as well.

‘That has been the main challenge. We had said time and time again that when we designed the work,

our colleagues (in Annex 1) also engage in a meaningful manner so that the potentials are unlocked,' Mali stressed.

Representing the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, the **Maldives** reflected that WS2 is to rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to close the pre-2020 mitigation ambition gap and is something that was agreed in Durban that was a high priority.

However, it said, emissions are not reduced by climate negotiators sitting in meetings but by concrete actions by governments and the private sector. The TEP cannot stop there as this is not an academic exercise.

Noting that there exist concrete actions that are transforming the way we produce and use energy not only for addressing climate change but also to increase energy security, extend energy access, improve public health etc, it added that both developed and developing countries to some extent are already doing these things but we need to do more, faster and now and these efforts can be accelerated through more effective international collaboration.

It pointed out that in many areas, this will require mobilising resources in an efficient and effective manner where the infrastructure built under the Convention can play an important role. Despite the principle that action should be country-driven and therefore the impetus is on the individual country to access the support mechanisms under the Convention, that does not mean there cannot be better focused coordination of the Convention bodies around specific opportunities.

WS2, it said, should serve as a vehicle for the financial mechanism, the technology mechanism and the capacity-building forum to interface with each other and with relevant outside entities to coordinate their efforts and make it easier for Parties to take advantage of specific mitigation opportunities.

On barriers to implementation that are not being effectively addressed by any of the Convention bodies, the **Maldives** said WS2 should be the incubator of new initiatives that could take any number of forms – an innovative financial instrument, a specialised capacity building task force or maybe a narrow technology sharing agreement, adding that if the international cooperation is not happening, then let's make sure it starts.

**Brazil** was of the view that to turn the ideas identified in previous technical expert meetings (TEMs) into reality is closely related to means of implementation, in particular finance, and the intention here should be focused on how to scale up incentives for finance, scale up liquidity of resources

to allow voluntary engagement to bring results in implementing policy options in key sectors. It said what is required at the political level is recognition of efforts.

It proposed that a TEM this year should address the question of how to recognise the social and economic value of voluntary mitigation activities and to translate their verified results into units of convertible financial value, for the purpose of leveraging scalable, replicable, innovative and complementary funding, to further promote the implementation of mitigation policy options by Parties, based on nationally-determined sustainable development priorities.

**India** said it is important to recognise that actions under WS2 must be undertaken by the developed countries to enhance implementation of their commitments to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts under the Convention. In this regard, WS2 must also focus on the provisions of means of implementation including technology transfer, finance and capacity building support to be provided by developed country Parties to the developing country Parties to enhance ambition in the pre-2020 period. It suggested the development of a catalogue of available technologies, identifying the costs and the financing options.

In its written intervention submitted to the secretariat, India said there is a need to move forward from the present stage of WS2 that primarily provides generic information on high potential areas. Future work shall be focused on translating potentials into workable options, in both developed and developing countries, that take into consideration country-specific requirements. This may require quantification of opportunities and establishing linkages with technology providers and financing institutions, mapping capacity building requirements and facilitating the same. It further said that in the absence of these, WS2 may remain largely an academic exercise.

**China** said while many countries are excited over the Paris agreement (expected at the year-end COP), in terms of the post-2020 actions, the discussion in WS2 is equally important as dealing with the issue of increasing ambition is for both pre- and post-2020 actions. It said the TEP cannot be treated in a vacuum but needs to bring in the information from other processes such as the multilateral assessment (for developed countries) and the Standing Committee on Finance that is assessing the financial flow for climate financing.

It also noted the lack of early planning for the TEP where many Parties could not engage actively in last year's TEMs as the agenda was only made

available right before the session. It is important to create a positive atmosphere to identify best practices by Parties and give recognition to those best practices.

**South Africa** said it is an opportune moment to move to the implementation phase instead of going on with presentations by experts, and risk WS2 being a dialogue. For the next phase, it said the TEP should clearly identify high mitigation potential actions that had been undertaken and scale them up with clarity on support to be provided, noting that the various UNFCCC institutions can overcome some of the challenges.

It said the main message is ‘we need implementation and implementation now’, stressing that increasing ambition is not a matter for developing countries only but for all Parties. To that extent, it said, we can all contribute by making sure we ratify the second commitment period (of the Kyoto Protocol).

**Saudi Arabia** reminded Parties that WS2 forms the basis for and is an enabler of post-2020 climate action and is essentially about accelerating the implementation of existing commitments. In this regard, it said the G77 and China have highlighted several areas where more is to be desired, particularly by developed countries.

As such, Parties would be ill-advised to rush into any new actions without going back and seeing these commitments through, it cautioned.

As far as the TEMs are concerned, it valued them as a space to exchange practices and experiences to better inform actions at home. However, as useful as these TEMS had been, it said they were lacking in terms of adaptation co-benefits.

‘As a developing country and as a region, adaptation is an area that we are eager to explore and exchange experiences on. Furthermore, continuing to focus on mitigation will not undermine adaptation but mitigation itself since each is a side of the same climate action coin,’ it stressed.

Saudi Arabia, therefore, requested the TEMs to be readjusted in favour of adaptation co-benefits and proposed the following areas:

1. Water resources and conservation – this area has further trickled down mitigation co-benefits as water is conserved and reused in arid and semi-arid regions, thereby reducing water distillation
2. Marine protection and blue carbon
3. Economic diversification
4. Desertification and land use
5. Urban planning
6. Food security.

**Colombia** said it believed WS2 will maintain the political momentum to close the ambition gap and lead us safely to a post-2020 regime. It would support moving into more implementation as a priority for 2015 and said that it is important to continue exploring policy areas, both that are missing like the transport sector but also to dive more in-depth to other identified areas.

**The United States** said WS2 is engaging a broad range of actors and not just purely state actors. It agreed with the acronym of MFN (more, faster and now) suggested by Mali but it also felt that the mode of implementation needs to be built over time. Let the institutions develop themselves and continue to refine what we are doing here (in the WS2). It said the discussion so far is not enough to carry the work forward and it is time to dive even deeper and focus on specific areas of work.

**The European Union** said the TEP is an important part of facilitating actions and creating an enabling environment to close the gap. It said the TEP needs to link better with the technology mechanism and financial mechanism. However, it noted that this technical process needs to be linked to the political process where a summary for policy makers can give options to ministers to rally the issue at high level events.

**Friends of the Earth International (FOEI)** said the clear mandate of WS2 is to increase the mitigation ambition of Parties and that focus on non-state actors and sub-national entities is a form of distraction. The representative said he would like to see a reorientation of the process to close the mitigation gap of Parties to create a safe environment, noting that FOEI has made several submissions like distributed energy system in both developed and developing countries and is heartened that we are not just addressing demand side but also supply side of the energy system. He asked if Parties could look at ending fossil fuel subsidies and shifting them to renewable energy sources and financial transaction taxes to address the financial barriers for renewable energy.

In the second part of the meeting, five UNFCCC institutions, namely the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), the Durban Forum for Capacity Building, the Executive Board of Clean Development Mechanism, the Green Climate Fund, as well as the Global Environment Facility (an operating entity of the UNFCCC financial mechanism) updated participants on actions taken in relation to the TEP and informed about their planned activities in 2015 relevant to the TEP.

Participants were invited to discuss and share views on the way for the UNFCCC institutions to contribute more effectively to the TEP and identify opportunities to further enhance collaboration and synergies among these institutions and provide support for implementation work.

**Mali speaking for the G77 and China** welcomed the TEC 2014-2015 workplan but the challenge is how do we inject the sense of urgency into the workplan. It hoped that there will be clear indication of the development of the linkage between the technology mechanism and the finance mechanism. It said the Durban Forum on capacity building should foster concrete actions on the ground.

**Brazil** said one might have the wrong impression that WS2 is for action in developing countries only and Parties should bear in mind that there is a broader range of Parties that are targeted for the exercise of WS2. It said the voluntary cancellation of the certified emission reduction (CER) units of the Clean Development Mechanism provides a clear mitigation option and low hanging fruits and could do with some marketing expertise to mainstream this opportunity and what is needed is to increase demand for CER.

**China** shared the views of Brazil about the impression that WS2 is on developing countries' actions which was definitely not the case. It said it has been said many times that the UNFCCC institutions are handling tasks that are relevant to the work of WS2 and are important for enhancing the collaboration and would need linkages between the institutions to support the projects. It is not sure if the CTCN has sufficient resources to address all the requests that it received.

**Australia** said it appeared that under the WS2, Parties are also similarly interested in mitigation and adaptation and since Parties are considering what to do in the TEP this year, it wondered if the work of TEC can be accelerated.

To this, the **Chair of the TEC, Gabriel Blanco**, replied that Parties should give TEC the mandate but unfortunately at the Lima COP Parties cannot agree to do so. He said there are almost 300 projects in the technology needs assessment (TNA) pipeline and there is a need to work with CTCN to strengthen those project ideas and for the GCF to finance them.

**Switzerland** said it got the impression that Parties are saying there is money (for project implementation) but maybe Parties should hear this in the other workstream to depoliticise the process (referring to workstream 1 on the 2015 agreement).

In the afternoon, the discussion on the role of international organisations was divided into action

areas, namely energy, cities, land use and agriculture, and non-CO2 gases.

Responding to the presentation on non-CO2 gases, **Brazil** said in WS2, Parties must avoid over-emphasising short-live climate pollutants and the exaggerated importance assigned to industrial gases that will distract from the actual greenhouse gas emissions. Citing the example of nitrous oxide, it said Brazil managed to bring the emission to zero but due to the lowered price of the CDM credits, these projects are facing many difficulties.

In response to the Food and Agriculture Organisation's presentation on the mitigation potential in land use and the agriculture sector, **Argentina** highlighted the fundamental importance of the relationship between agriculture, climate change and food security, taking into account the need to feed a growing world population in the coming decades.

'In this sense, two main elements should be taken into account when dealing with these matters: the central role of agriculture in food production and in the achievement of economic and social development and poverty eradication, in particular in developing countries; and the particular vulnerability of the agricultural sector to climate change adverse effects,' it stressed.

Argentina said there is a need to respect the objective of the Convention that the stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions should be achieved in such a manner as not to threaten food production, while taking into account that in the Convention agriculture is mentioned only in the context of the cooperation on development and transfer of technologies, but not on mitigation in absolute terms.

'At the same time, it is worthy to note that as decided in the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) in the agenda item on issues relating to agriculture, the SBSTA will address the issue of adaptation of agriculture to the adverse effects of climate change and, in this regard, we are looking forward to engaging in the four technical workshops that will be held on this matter in 2015 and 2016,' it added.

It asked how the work presented by the organisations on 10 February will be consistent with the principles and provisions of the Convention with the UNFCCC being the primary forum to address climate change and the main priority of the international community is to safeguard food security.

FAO's representative Xiangjun Yao said mitigation in the agriculture sector should not be distinguished between developed and developing countries. She said there should be collective efforts if there is mitigation potential.

### ADP Workstream 2 Should Not Discuss Workstream 1 Issues, Say Developing Countries

Geneva, 13 February (Hilary Chiew and Chee Yoke Ling) – The workstream 2 discussion in the contact group of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) on 12 February had a rocky start with a delay of nearly 30 minutes when Co-chair Daniel Reifsnyder (the United States) used the time to introduce the Co-chairs' proposed idea of work for the afternoon session.

This triggered many developing countries to question the appropriateness of the announcement of matters pertaining to workstream 1 in the contact group session dedicated to workstream 2 (WS2) as they urged Reifsnyder to start the meeting.

Reifsnyder proposed to have two conversations with an allocation of 1.5 hours each to discuss two issues.

The first issue proposed was that of 'cycle' (referring to Section K on the timeframe or process related to commitment of the elements text for the 2015 agreement) for mitigation and adaptation. He said this is for Parties to consider what kind of 'cycle' that they see can be adopted for the Paris agreement.

(WS2 deals with enhancing ambition in the pre-2020 period in order to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change by all Parties. Workstream 1 deals with the 2015 agreement for the post-2020 period.)

The second issue was on market and non-market mechanisms, particularly in Section D on mitigation with the additional proposals that Parties had made. He said he just wanted to provide a platform for brainstorming broadly.

For the Friday (13 February) morning session, he said the Co-chairs thought it would be useful to ask for Parties' thoughts on the June session in Bonn. (The other Co-chair is Ahmed Djoghlaflaf of Algeria.) Reifsnyder said there may be additional time for another subject if the discussion on the June session does not take up all the three hours (from 10 am to 1

pm). Further, he hoped to start the closing plenary at 3 pm to adopt the 'Geneva text'.

Since the six-day session of the resumed ADP started on 8 February, Parties had worked on the negotiating text which was annexed to the decision adopted in Lima (decision 1/CP.20) by inserting new proposals into the various sections to make available on the last day (13 February), the negotiating text of the Paris agreement. The text is now known as 'the Geneva text'. The Geneva session is the only negotiating session planned before May 2015.

**India** pointed out that most of the issues that the Co-chair raised were pertaining to workstream 1 (WS1) but Parties in the room are here for matters of WS2.

To this, Reifsnyder replied that those issues he raised are for the afternoon session. 'It is 10:30 am now and we have until 1 pm to talk about WS2,' he said. He explained that he and Co-chair Djoghlaflaf thought that there is an opportunity to share views on many issues but they have chosen these specific issues.

**Argentina** took the floor to join India in seeking clarification. It said WS2 is a very important matter and needs time for discussion, stressing that it is confusing that the Co-chair is raising WS1 issues while colleagues in the other room should have to decide on the process. (Most WS1 negotiators were attending an informal session chaired by Djoghlaflaf in another room. Earlier, Reifsnyder had also informed Parties of the informal discussion in the other room. He said Parties were looking into five paragraphs identified on 11 February and if there is appetite to streamline those five paragraphs. He assured Parties that if there is an agreement there, the matter will be brought back to the contact group for a decision to accept or not.)

**Jordan** echoed Argentina that WS2 is a very important issue and expected more attention to be given to it. It is grateful that the WS2 issue was given

the opportunity to be discussed in a contact group setting. In fact, more than one session is needed, it said.

**China** said it shared the concerns of others. It pointed out that the idea to have two slots to discuss the proposed ideas of the Co-chairs was not in their scenario note. They are totally new ideas, it said, adding that mitigation and adaptation are not the only issues when it comes to discussion on ‘cycle’, referring to means of implementation (finance, technology and capacity building).

It also wanted another slot for WS2 on 13 February and said that Parties do not have to rush for a closing plenary at 3 pm.

In supporting others that spoke earlier, **Iran** stressed that what Parties are likely to achieve for post-2020 is dependent on pre-2020. It also believed that more time is needed to discuss issues that are relevant and pertinent to WS2.

**The European Union (EU)** said it is a little confused. It said it heard that we are ready to get down to substance discussion. As ‘the Geneva text’ is locked down, we can make progress on substance in terms of understanding Parties’ proposals. It was happy to follow the Co-chairs’ proposals.

At this juncture, **Mali representing the Group of 77 and China (G77-China)** raised a point of order. Reifsnnyder said he hoped it is really a point of order, and not that Mali wanted to jump the queue of Parties asking to take the floor.

**Mali’s Houssen Alfa (Seyni) Nafa** said it is difficult to continue this discussion as WS1 negotiators are not in the room as indicated by others. He asked for the discussion to stop. However, Reifsnnyder ignored the plea and continued to give the floor to Parties on the speaking list. He assured that no decision (on the proposed ideas for the afternoon session) will be taken that is not acceptable to Parties.

**The Marshall Islands** said it interpreted Reifsnnyder’s announcement as some upfront information and not going into the details. It hoped there will be no extended debate on the matter as it will then take up time for WS2 which is an important matter.

**Japan** said it believed that it is important to get into substance discussion and that the two issues raised by the Co-chair are very important as there are so many options and ideas. It would support the idea of having the two conversations.

**India** pointed out that the Co-chairs’ idea was not in the daily programme. It said if Parties want to discuss something else (other than on the agenda), sufficient notice should be given. It said we should now go ahead with WS2 discussion.

Reifsnnyder said it is his intention to move straight ahead with WS2 but the Co-chairs have the policy of no surprise. He explained that what he was trying to do is to orient the Parties as soon as we (the Co-chairs) are able to tell you what we are doing this afternoon.

‘That said and we had been through this (debate). It is time now to move into WS2,’ he declared. When Mali’s Seyni Nafa began to deliver his statement for the G77 and China, Reifsnnyder interrupted him as he (Reifsnnyder) wanted to make an introduction to the session (on WS2).

By this time, word had spread about the confusion in the WS2 contact group to the informal meeting in the other room. The Singapore delegation raised its concern over WS1 issues being discussed in the contact group of WS2.

**Mali speaking for the G77 China** reminded that WS2 is a mandated agenda item related to the implementation of paragraphs 7 and 8 (of decision 1/CP.17). And indeed we do have an implementation crisis; demonstrated inter alia by the low number still of ratifications of the Doha Amendment of the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period (CP2) or the lack of transparency on the US\$100 billion (a year by 2020) mobilisation effort.

Therefore in Lima, we reiterated our resolve as set out in decision 1/CP.19, paragraphs 3 and 4, to accelerate the full implementation of the decisions constituting the agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 and enhance ambition in the pre-2020 period in order to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts under the Convention by all Parties.

Our resolve, said Mali, as manifested by ‘The Lima Spirit’, should materialise through the adoption of a systematic and comprehensive approach addressing all the building blocks of pre-2020 action if we are to achieve More, Faster, and Now.

Mali suggested that to master this challenge, it is of critical importance that WS2 proceeds on three permanent and parallel tracks:

1. Track 1 – An Accelerated Implementation process to accelerate implementation and ambition in the pre-2020 period;
2. Track 2 – A Technical Examination Process (TEP) which builds on the existing TEMs, to realise practical opportunities with high mitigation potential and co-benefits for adaptation and sustainable development; and
3. Track 3 – A High Level Action Platform where political, private sector and civil society leaders can work together to launch voluntary concrete mitigation actions with adaptation and sustainable development co-benefits.

Focusing on the Accelerated Implementation Track (AIT), he said its purpose is to assess and improve coherence and implementation of pre-2020 action under the Convention. Its focus is to stock-take, evaluate and, if appropriate, recommend improvements to work under the relevant Convention bodies relating to pre-2020 action.

Parties must receive and discuss, in a consolidated and comprehensive manner, the technical inputs (such as status reports, etc.) that would be submitted by existing subsidiary bodies and processes under the Convention in relation to the implementation of paragraphs 17 and 18 of decision 1/CP.20, and paragraphs 3 and 4 of decision 1/CP.19, in relation to the Bali Action Plan outcome and the KP CP2 (e.g. on mitigation pre-2020 – from the IAR/ICA processes; on KP CP2 – from UNFCCC secretariat; on finance – from Standing Committee on Finance, Global Environment Facility, Green Climate Fund; on technology – from Technology Executive Committee and Climate Technology Centre and Network; on capacity building – from Durban Capacity Building Forum). The discussion on these reports should be focused on understanding the policy implications and identifying the policy recommendations for Parties for adoption by the ADP and subsequent endorsement to the Conference of the Parties (COP) for the COP to adopt as COP decisions.

He said that there will be not be a duplication by this process of any work or discussions being undertaken in any other UNFCCC body.

He further suggested that taking the technical inputs from the Convention bodies and the results of the TEP, the policy discussion under the ADP would revolve around the following:

- Ratification of the Doha amendment of the KP;
- Revisiting Annex 1 2020 Cancun and KP CP2 quantified emission limitations and reduction objectives (QELROs) to increase these to at least 40% below 1990 by 2020;
- Evaluating whether Annex 1 QELRO conditions are being removed;
- Reviewing the adequacy of, and identifying gaps in, the pre-2020 provision of means of implementation (finance including the finance pathway pre-2020, technology, capacity building) to support the implementation of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) of developing countries; and
- Further actions to address identified gaps in the pre-2020 provision of means of implementation

(finance including the finance pathway pre-2020, technology, capacity building) to support the implementation of NAMAs and NAPs of developing countries.

In addition to the technical inputs from the various Convention bodies above, the AIT could also receive and consider the Synthesis papers from the TEP.

This AIT, said Mali, should report to the ADP Co-chairs, who could either chair its meetings similarly, or delegate it to co-facilitators. It should meet at every session of the ADP, at least twice a year in conjunction with the meetings of the subsidiary bodies and the COP (i.e. mid- and end-year).

He said the group is confident that if the resolve – the ‘Lima Spirit’ – is manifested through the three tracks of Accelerated Implementation under the ADP, coupled with the TEP and a High Level Action Platform comprising a Ministerial Ambition, it could continually increase ambition on all elements in the pre-2020 period to provide a strong and ambitious basis for the start of the implementation of the 2015 agreement in 2020.

**China speaking for the Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** said WS2 is an essential part of the work under the ADP that needs serious consideration by Parties on the way to Paris. It said the LMDC has consistently called for the urgent implementation of the needed pre-2020 enhanced actions in the context of Workstream 2 in order to lay down a strong, solid, and ambitious basis for enhanced post-2020 ambition under WS1. In short, WS2 is the stepping-stone to WS1. Pre-2020 ambition must be addressed in a comprehensive manner, covering mitigation, adaptation and finance and technology support.

It called for urgent and immediate ambitious action in the pre-2020 period that must not be delayed by developed countries, adding that any delay threatens the credibility of their ambition and commitment to combat climate change. The pre-2020 mitigation gap would not even have existed if the developed countries had committed to an emission reduction of 40% below their 1990 levels by 2020, it added.

For the LMDC, the outcomes of WS2 with respect to the pre-2020 period must lead to the closure of the ambition gaps between what is required of developed countries with respect to their mitigation, financing, technology development and transfer, and capacity building commitments under the Convention, and what has actually been done.

Doing so will allow the ADP process to move forward rapidly and in an ambitious manner in collectively constructing the post-2020 outcome.

The LMDC welcomed the Lima decision, which reflects the progress made so far on this important matter. It also clearly lays out key directions that we need to further advance our work under the WS2. These include accelerating implementation of current commitments, and identifying further potential and means of implementation, high level engagement.

‘We have a good discussion on technical examination process on Tuesday; we have successfully conducted Lima Climate Action High Level Meeting last year. However, we were not advancing the acceleration of implementation in the same pace as we expected. During the year of 2014, we have worked very closely with many colleagues to develop a specific accelerated implementation mechanism to order to advance the mandate given by para 3 and 4 in Warsaw decision. There are concerns on the time constraint of the negotiation process in this year. However, this should be the excuse for us not considering these key issues,’ said China.

It added that there are many important implementation issues explicitly listed in para 4 of the Warsaw decision and reiterated by the Lima decision we need to consider under the WS2 discussion which include but are not limited to:

1. The immediate and early ratification of the Kyoto Protocol amendment for its second commitment period by the Parties listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol as well as other Parties;
2. Party that has not yet communicated a quantified economy-wide emission reduction target or nationally appropriate mitigation action, as applicable, to do so;
3. Developed country Party to implement without delay its quantified economy-wide emission reduction target under the Convention and, if it is also a Party to the Kyoto Protocol, its quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, if applicable;
4. Developed country Party to revisit its quantified economy-wide emission reduction target under the Convention and, if it is also a Party to the Kyoto Protocol, its quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, if applicable, in accordance with decision 1/CMP.8, paragraphs 7–11;

5. Developed country Party to periodically evaluate the continuing application of any conditions associated with its quantified economy-wide emission reduction target, with a view to adjusting, resolving or removing such conditions;
6. Developed country Parties to increase technology, finance and capacity-building support to enable increased mitigation ambition by developing country Parties;

China said that some of these issues have been addressed by other processes but some of them are not. The LMDC did not want to repeat the work undertaken by other processes but stressed the need for a place to look at overall implementation in an integrated manner. The ADP WS2 is exactly the right place where we should consider these issues, it said further.

In this regard, the LMDC asked the ADP Co-chair to allocate sufficient time during the ADP session to consider how Parties can further accelerate the implementation in a comprehensive manner. It also wanted to put back its proposal of AIM on the table.

**India** said the pressing question before us is, are we in suspended animation in the pre-2020 period or have we suspended ambition till the post-2020 arrangements are in place?

It outlined the basic implementation requirement for the pre-2020 period at this point:

- Urgent ratification of the second Commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol by all Annex I Parties.
- Revisiting and ratcheting up of ambition by developed country Parties. In Warsaw, it was also agreed that the KP Parties will revisit their targets with a view to increasing their ambition. However, this still remains an unfinished task.
- There is a need for removal of conditionalities associated with KP commitments of Annex I Parties.
- Provision of finance, technology and capacity building support by developed countries is a must in the pre-2020 period. It needs to be noted that developed countries Parties will provide and mobilise enhanced financial support to developing country Parties for ambitious mitigation and adaptation action. The need to scale up to US\$100 billion and beyond it has been inadequately addressed. The mobilisation of US\$10 billion through the GCF for four years is much below target and backsliding from earlier pledges, noting the

US\$10 billion per year under the fast-start finance for 2010 to 2012.

It pointed out that while international negotiations on an effective set of actions needed to address climate change are going on, India has already taken a number of actions on a voluntary basis with its own resources in pursuance of a sustainable development strategy, including change in energy mix, urban policy on climate smart cities.

It said during Lima, the multilateral assessment process which is part of the newly established international assessment and review (IAR) process for developed country Parties, it was learnt that only a few countries have met their target under the first commitment period of the KP.

India also said it is important to assess how the 2013-2015 review and the 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change were to inform the ADP process on adequacy and link to the 2015 agreement. Thus we feel the need for adequate allocation of time for WS2 issues in this and future sessions of the ADP.

Associating with the G77 and China statement, **Bolivia** said the KP is a durable agreement which requires Parties to look at subsequent commitment periods. The other great fallacy, it said, surrounds the remark that developing countries have no obligations. It said Articles 10 to 12 of the KP are about how developing countries will be able to undertake more mitigation actions in order to enhance their implementation of their commitments through technology and financial support (by developed countries) while Article 11 is about financing. However these provisions were not fully operationalised.

Pointing to Article 12, it said the Clean Development Mechanism has been in operation and has indeed advanced the developing countries in moving forward in their sustainable development pathway but at the same time produces certified emission reduction units that assisted developed countries to meet their commitments.

On finance, it said there is a process going under the long-term finance Standing Committee and biennial high level ministerial dialogues on climate finance. Therefore, there are mechanisms in place that we can capture that will allow us to address the pre-2020 gap in finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building.

Bolivia also said that it would be dangerous for the integrity of Mother Earth and negative for the 2015 agreement if pre-2020 ambition is not enhanced.

**Brazil** said WS2 is as important as WS1 as it is part of the confidence-building process, stressing that WS2 is here to facilitate our understanding of full implementation rather than negotiations. The outcome in Paris is for WS2 to be fully implemented and WS2 is not limited to actions by developing countries. It said to further elaborate work under WS2 does not mean that the technical examination process (TEP) which has been given special attention has exhausted our possibility for our work in WS2; rather it is an important tool to bring in more expertise and opportunity to engage with non-State actors and stakeholders in a facilitative mode.

However, it cautioned against direct engagement with non-State actors. It cited the example of the secretariat establishing formal engagement with those not Parties to the Convention.

When Co-chair Reifsnnyder asked for further explanation on Brazil's note of caution, it explained that the Convention is part of international law and the formal channel of communication is through national focal points. This is without prejudice to engagement with local governments and non-State actors, but should not be taken as a mandate to create a parallel formal channel of communication.

(Member States of the World Health Organisation are currently deliberating on a policy for engagement with non-State actors. Among the issues are the distinction between public interest and industry non-governmental organisations, role of the private sector, transparency and conflict of interest. For more information please see: [http://www.twn.my/title2/health.info/2015/hi150\\_106.htm](http://www.twn.my/title2/health.info/2015/hi150_106.htm) – 'WHO: Members States propose guidance for engagement with non-State actors'.)

**Nicaragua** cautioned that the pre-2020 period could well be yet another lost decade of no ambition, no commitments and no finance. It said the mere existence of the ADP is a collective understanding that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action will end and a new track begins; yet pledges were unfulfilled and the CP2 has not been ratified in 2015.

Responding to the G77 and China's suggestions on the three tracks, the United States said it is clear from the Lima decision language that we did not create a new process or new track for WS2 work. It said it is best to continue the work in a pragmatic manner rather than duplicate work and revisit work in Lima. Instead we should move forward to catalyse our work to further advance the TEP this year.

**The EU** said we have heard colleagues talk about implementation crisis that leads to emissions crisis; and that we cannot disregard decisions taken

in Lima. It said that with regard to conversations that had led to frustration in the past, such as pledges and KP commitments, those kinds of conversation will only lead to continuing frustration. It said the CP2 is for Parties to change their commitments and not whether we are implementing or performing our commitments. It said the TEP is a process that adds value without being political and allows us to be creative and innovative.

The EU also said that the GCF pledge of US\$10 billion (for four years) is a record, with the speed it was made, adding that this is part of the US\$100 billion that is to include the private sector, and part of billions flowing into energy investments.

**New Zealand** said the TEP could look into actionable policy such as fiscal instrument to reform and promote renewable energy development. On finance, it said it is important to remember that there are multiple sources of finance and channels of distribution. For New Zealand, it is currently providing by a factor of six times more than what it is paying to the GCF.

**Japan** said it totally supports the views of New Zealand and the US, adding that WS2 needs further collaboration and communication with the exiting institution such as TEC and CTCN.

**Australia** said it has reservation that the WS2 work under the ADP should include items in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Lima decision (1/CP.20).

(Paragraph 17 reads: *Encourages all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to ratify and implement the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol;*

Paragraph 18 reads: *Reiterates its resolve as set out in decision 1/CP.19, paragraphs 3 and 4, to accelerate the full implementation of the decisions constituting the agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 and enhance ambition in the pre-2020 period in order to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts under the Convention by all Parties; ...)*

**South Africa** said we need meaningful discussion on means of implementation (MOI) which it had raised many times. Without that discussion on MOI we will continue to talk in circles. We need an honest discussion – shelving away the issue of MOI will lead us to talk and identify actions of mitigation potential and we will get nowhere. It stressed that we cannot continue to park this issue.

**Norway** said that the United Nations motto in Geneva is, ‘The place where global solutions are shaped for you’ and that no matter how valuable the TEMs are, it is the follow-up that matters and Parties’ actions. On the 2015 work plan for WS2, it said that our experience is that TEMs with participation of both public and private sectors is useful and public-private partnerships are key.

**Iran** said that not just island states, but its region (Middle East and North Africa) have climate impacts and events such as dust storms in Iran that had not been experienced before.

In closing, Co-chair Reifsnnyder said he counted some 20 interventions and the discussion had been rich. He noted the interesting range of views and proposals. He said the TEP is laid out in paragraphs 19 and 20 and in the latter paragraph, he noted that there is a request for the ADP to further advance the TEP including the review process, to COP21 in Paris.

Referring to paragraph 17, he said many Parties that addressed the issue do not seem to think that there is anything in that paragraph except for the ADP to ‘encourage’ Parties to ratify and implement the Doha Amendment to the KP.

On paragraph 18, he said the question is, what does the word ‘reiterates’ mean and what to do with that, adding that it is not clear how to take the paragraph forward or is it really requesting us to do anything. He said it is up to the Parties, and that the matter can perhaps be discussed and heard from Parties on how to advance this topic when Parties discuss tomorrow (13 February) the approach for the June session.

### Substantive Negotiations to Begin in June for New Climate Agreement

Geneva, 16 February (Meena Raman) – Parties at the Geneva climate change meeting under the UNFCCC’s Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), will begin substantive negotiations for a new climate agreement in June, on the basis of a negotiating text that was agreed to on Friday, 13 February.

Since the meeting began on Sunday, 8 February, Parties have been making proposals for addition to the elements text which was annexed to the decision adopted in Lima (in decision 1/CP.20).

At the closing plenary of the ADP held afternoon of 13 February, Parties agreed to the ‘Geneva text’, which is 86 pages long (comprised of the Lima text and the additions made in Geneva), as the basis of negotiations which begin in Bonn, Germany, in early June this year (from 1 to 11 June).

Agreement on the ‘Geneva text’ as the basis of negotiations was greeted by Parties with applause, in what they saw as a text which was ‘more collectively owned’ with their own proposals, compared to the Lima text which was produced by the previous ADP Co-chairs.

In general, the conduct of the Geneva ADP session by the new ADP Co-chairs, Daniel Reifsnyder (United States) and Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria), was viewed positively by Parties as being transparent, inclusive and ‘Party-driven’.

Reifsnyder, at the formal closing plenary, said that the negotiating text ‘reflects the proposals by all Parties’ and that the ADP has fulfilled the request by the Conference of Parties (COP) to make available a negotiating text for the new agreement ‘well in advance of the May deadline’. He added that the secretariat ‘will communicate your effort well in advance of May deadline, not later than March’.

(Parties had in agreed in Lima to ‘intensify its work with a view to making available a negotiating text for a protocol, another legal instrument or an

outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties before May 2015’.)

The ADP Co-chair informed Parties that as a first step, the secretariat will edit and issue the negotiating text as an official document. He said the text will not be subject to modification but to only editorial changes, which will be translated and communicated to Parties. He said the communication will not prejudice the legal form of the agreement and will not prejudice the legal nature of any of the paragraphs of the text or their placement or the structure of the agreement. He added that the ADP has not yet identified which text is to be included in the agreement and which text could be in decisions.

Reifsnyder said that the contact group in the morning of Friday had explored ideas on how to make significant progress in the June session. (See further details below). He said the Co-chairs will issue a scenario note outlining the proposed organisation of work and will continue to consult with Parties.

He said that at this session, Parties also heard views on Workstream 2 (WS2) on enhancing pre-2020 mitigation ambition viz. on implementation of the decisions since the Bali Action Plan, the urgency of ratifying the Doha Amendment of the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period (CP2) and address the gaps in finance.

In his remarks, Co-chair Djoghlaif said that the Geneva session had been ‘an extraordinary experience’ and ‘a turning point in the way we worked in order to respond to our common challenges of the UN’. He said the ‘negotiating text will help our common trajectory’.

Prior to suspending the ADP session, Reifsnyder said that in addition to the June session, there will be two additional sessions of the ADP prior to the Paris COP, which will be from 31 August to 4 September and 19 to 23 October and will also be held in Bonn.

## Ideas for the Bonn session

At the contact group in the morning, Co-chair Djoghlafl invited Parties to give their views on how to start the June session and deliver the Paris agreement.

**South Africa** speaking for the **G77 and China** thanked the ADP Co-chairs for the manner in which the meeting was conducted to finalise the Geneva text. It said the text is now owned by Parties as it was produced in an open and transparent manner.

In Bonn, the G77 and China said negotiations must begin immediately and called for a scenario note from the ADP Co-chairs well in advance. It wanted clarity on how work will advance and how progress will be captured from the Bonn session. It said that spin-off groups might be needed and if facilitators are selected, there should be a balance between developed and developing countries. It said there should not be more than two parallel sessions taking place at the same time, taking into account matters being discussed during the meetings of the other subsidiary bodies. It stressed that discussions on adaptation and mitigation should not be separated and disconnected from the other elements of the means of implementation.

It said that WS2 has not enjoyed sufficient attention in Geneva and wanted to know how the two tracks under the workstream will be organised in relation to the technical expert meetings (TEMs) and the accelerated implementation of decisions. It called for consultations with Parties on what should be discussed in these two streams. It also requested the Co-chairs to ensure that the meeting space is appropriate and not small and cramped.

**Sudan** for the **African Group** called for one of the additional sessions of the ADP to be held in April. (Although this call of the African Group was supported by other countries including China and Argentina, Djoghlafl said that it was difficult to hold a meeting in April 'for practical reasons'.)

**Saudi Arabia** for the **Arab Group** said that during the negotiations, while negotiating groups could speak, the right of any Party to also do so should be maintained. For this purpose, it did not support a 'square shaped' seating arrangement.

**Tuvalu** for the **LDCs** said there was value in having Parties give some explanation of their ideas and then go into textual negotiations. In relation to the text, it wanted to first look at the overlaps. Within the Co-chairs' scenario note, it said it would be helpful if information in the text could be provided on where the overlaps are without giving any textual proposals, in the form of a commentary or table. This could help facilitate the work of Parties in June.

**Malaysia** for the **Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** said that what has transpired is that Parties have produced a text reflecting all their positions in the Geneva text, and by this, Parties have begun building confidence in the process. Although the text has doubled, it said that this was the nature of negotiations on issues of importance that affect the whole world. It said that the mode of work established in Geneva should continue, adding that the process must be Party-driven and called for a balanced approach on all the six core elements of the negotiating text as well as WS2. (The six core elements are mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building and transparency of action and support.)

In an apparent reference to the remarks by the EU (see below), Malaysia said that a 'short text' has been suggested but this can be considered at the appropriate time. It said that substance should not be sacrificed at the altar of efficiency. So far, the process has been open-ended, and it expected this mode of work to continue.

**The Maldives** for the **Alliance of Small Island States** expressed support for transparency in the conduct of work. Given the small size of delegations of its members, it wanted a limit on the number of parallel sessions that are held. It expected 2015 to focus on the 2020 agreement. In relation to WS2, it expected the TEMs to be more focused than in the past on policy outcomes.

**India** said that the ADP process was proceeding with 'no surprise'. The immediate task was to further streamline the negotiating text, by addressing the redundancies and duplication. During the inter-session, it said Parties could make suggestions on how to reduce the various options. If there is convergence, the Co-chairs could capture how the text can be merged or brought together. It said that greater discussions were needed on important issues of equity, differentiation, finance and WS2 issues. One of the key tasks in WS2 is for accelerating implementation of ambition pre-2020, adding that it cannot just be about the technical examination process.

**Ecuador** was happy with the 'no surprise policy' of the Co-chairs. It wanted a 'light streamlining exercise' in the beginning as Parties go through various stages of seeing where duplications are. It also said that a 'square-room' setting was not favourable and preferred negotiations in a plenary setting with texts on the screen, which could be held with parallel sessions.

**China** wanted a balanced approach for discussions in WS1 where all the elements are treated equally; and in WS2, balance should be reflected on

the TEMs and the acceleration of implementation, which is important for confidence building. WS2 needs adequate time. While there is a negotiation text for WS1, China was concerned about a lack of text for WS2 and did not want a situation where there was ‘no deal in the last minute’ in relation to pre-2020 ambition in Paris. It also called for a technical paper by the secretariat to identify paragraphs in the Geneva text which were similar ‘without touching the text’. It did not expect the Co-chairs to provide any guiding text for further negotiations. It supported the call by the African Group for one more session to accelerate work in April.

**Egypt** stressed the importance of transparency in the future process and agreed with the EU that there ‘should not be last minute deals’. It was cautious about negotiations through representatives and wanted an inclusive process for every country to be able to negotiate.

**Venezuela** also stressed the importance of transparency and clear methods of work. It said it was ‘good not to have evolving methods of work’.

**Argentina** supported the African Group for an ADP session in April or May and not to have more than two parallel sessions.

**Nicaragua** said that every motion that increases transparency will be the way that will be acceptable by all.

**The European Union** said that Parties have achieved the bare minimum in Geneva and that the pace of progress needs to be accelerated. It did not want last minute deals and wanted a clear short text with minimum options. It said that the Geneva text

was double that of Lima. It said the mode of work cannot be the same as that in Geneva and clarity in the process was needed. It called for leadership from the Co-chairs with engagement on substance. It called for a Co-chairs’ reflections note to guide Parties. It also wanted the secretariat to do a simple analysis of the duplications and redundancies and ideas of the paragraphs to be consolidated.

On the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs), the EU wanted the ‘major and emerging economies’ to submit their INDCs in the first quarter.

**Australia** for the **Umbrella Group** said that Parties had missed an opportunity in Geneva to eliminate duplications and improve navigability of the negotiating text. For Bonn, it hoped for convergence on options and wanted clarity to be provided in the scenario note of the Co-chairs.

**Norway** said there is a need to look at the issue of differentiation in relation to the whole text and was concerned about approaching the elements in silos.

**Switzerland** expressed agreement with many elements referred to by the G77 and China. It also did not support having more than two sessions in parallel in Bonn.

**Russia** appreciated the way the Co-chairs conducted their work and that the efforts in Geneva were a ‘major breakthrough’ that ‘should not be underestimated’.

**New Zealand** said that the Geneva text was only a starting point and there is a need for fresh iterations as Parties moved forward in the negotiations.

# TWN

## Geneva News Update 10

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### UN Agencies and Other Bodies Share Interesting Climate-related Information

Kuala Lumpur, 18 February (Hilary Chiew) – Interesting climate-change-related information was shared by various UN agencies and Convention bodies at the UNFCCC's Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) meeting, held on 8 and 9 February, on the side-line of the Geneva climate talks.

The second part of the fourth session of the SED resumed in Geneva following the adjournment of the first part at the 20<sup>th</sup> Conference of Parties (COP20) in Lima, in December last year. It continued with Part 3 and Part 4 of the fourth and final session of the SED.

The meeting started with Part 3 of the meeting looking at information from United Nations agencies and international organisations, and from processes under the Convention in the afternoon of 8 February. Part 4, which focused on regional and emerging information, took place in two sessions on 9 February.

Presentations were followed by discussions centred on two themes. Theme 1 was on the adequacy of the long-term global goal in the light of the ultimate objective of the Convention while theme 2 was on the overall progress made towards achieving the long-term global goal, including a consideration of the commitments under the Convention.

(The SED was set up to support the work of the joint contact group of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), to ensure the scientific integrity of the 2013-2015 Review and to consider the relevant inputs through scientific workshops and expert meetings. The first in-session workshop was held during the SB38 in June 2013 and subsequent sessions during following SBs meetings.)

The meeting was presided over by co-facilitators Zouji (China) and Andreas Fischlin (Switzerland).

In his opening remarks, Chair of the SBSTA Tomasz Chruszczow (Poland) said the review of the adequacy of the long-term global goal calls for a science-based management pathway. He said it is essential for SBSTA and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to collaborate closely to make sure the assessment of the pathway is carried out.

Noting that the IPCC is also at the turning point in its history and discussing its future work including terms of the next assessment cycle, Chruszczow said the coordination between the two bodies will be of key importance in 2016. (The IPCC has been following a seven-year assessment cycle and there has been talk of it adjusting its cycle period to a shorter period to better assist in formulating the global policy on climate change under the UNFCCC.) He said the coordination will further strengthen the science-policy interface, adding that the 2013-2015 Review has been a step forward in that direction.

Chair of the SBI, Amena Yauvoli (Fiji), said the 2013-2105 Review comes at an extremely timely part in the UNFCCC process and in global climate policy in general. He said Parties were in a critical decade for climate policy-making and 2015 is a key year.

He said the Fifth Assessment Review (AR5) of the IPCC showed that total anthropogenic emissions have continued to increase over 1970 to 2010 with absolute increase towards at the end of the period despite a growing number of global policies. According to the AR5 report, he said, limiting temperature rise to 2°C in the context of a risk management approach as a basis for decision-making is still technically feasible. He said it was imperative to track closely the development and implementation of effects of specific policies and actions that countries undertake in shifting to a low carbon future.

Therefore, transparency in this regard particularly through the Multilateral Assessment process is of particular relevance, said the SBI Chair. Noting that the review of developed countries' actions began in Lima where 17 Annex 1 Parties were assessed and will continue this year, he said assessment of developing countries' mitigation efforts will start this year. He pointed out that such a tracking system is needed but is currently less mature in terms of tracking adaptation actions and the means of implementation and these gaps need to be addressed. He said the Review is a comprehensive process that looks at the climate problem and solutions in an integrated manner.

### ***Highlights of Part 3 – UN agencies and international organisations, and from processes under the Convention***

Highlighting the 2013-2015 workplan of the **Adaptation Committee**, its Co-chair Juan Hoffmaister (Bolivia) said there was no specific focus on the long-term global goal per se but the AC would take the opportunity to highlight the Cancun Adaptation Framework in responding to the issue emerging in light of the long-term global goal.

He said the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) are a coherent, participatory and transparent national adaptation process informed and catalysed by the international climate regime. It helps to reduce vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, by building adaptive capacity and resilience and facilitates the integration of climate change adaptation into new and existing policies, programmes and activities, development planning processes and strategies, within all sectors and levels.

Most countries have already conducted some kind of analysis of observed changes in the climate system, for example on temperature, precipitation and extremes as seen in the NAPs. Such climate scenarios were applied in projections in their national communication and mainstreaming of adaptation into poverty alleviating projects.

He further said that some bilateral organisations have reported that they are receiving very few requests from countries for individual support for the process to formulate and implement NAPs. This, however, stands in contrast to the high number of requests for support under the NAP global support programme.

On how countries are preparing themselves for this challenge, some organisations and agencies reported that they are struggling with the lack of clarity for funding, concerns of funds being voluntary and financing that is inadequate and unpredictable.

'Many Parties have indicated that there is lack of clarity on procedures to apply for funding from the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund for the process to formulate and implement NAPs. Some Parties have also indicated that both funds are based on voluntary contributions, and suffer from inadequate and unpredictable financing, and therefore pose barriers to further scaling up and mainstreaming adaptation into national development planning,' he added.

In terms of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) (of adaptation actions), Hoffmaister said M&E frameworks need to be appropriate, relevant to the needs and tailored to country circumstances. A common set of global indicators is not useful, owing to the context-specific nature of adaptation.

He said it is important for M&E to facilitate a positive learning environment which encourages formal and informal learning, including peer-to-peer learning and which encourages learning from negative as well as positive experiences, adding that planning and allocation of resources, both technical and financial, are keys for effective M&E systems.

Paul Leadley, the coordinator for the **Convention on Biological Diversity's** Global Biodiversity Outlook 4 report, said many organisms and ecosystems are already impacted by recent climate changes; so additional change will exacerbate impacts. Thresholds are often difficult to identify, he warned. He said biodiversity can play an important role in increasing resilience to climate change. Pathways to remain within 1.5 or 2°C will require careful management to conserve biodiversity and ecosystems and optimise their contribution to climate mitigation and adaptation.

On ocean acidification, Leadley said there is strong interaction between acidification and temperature rise. More dissolved CO<sub>2</sub> would lead to lower pH and reduction in carbonate ion. The latter is already showing impacts on oyster, coral, shell and other calcifying organisms. At temperature rise of 1.5 or 2°C, we will see very high calcification of marine organisms, he added.

He stressed further that warm-water coral reefs are already under stress with more than half currently in poor health. Ocean acidification will slow calcification and hence recovery from bleaching. However, when the reef carbonate budget becomes negative, coral reefs would stop building, he said further. Hence protecting coral reefs would require both global (emission mitigation) and local actions (reduction in pollution).

On the link between climate change and biodiversity of forest, Leadley said forests are being negatively impacted by climate change sooner than

had been anticipated with impacts varying substantially across tree species and regions. 'Reinforcing species and genetic diversity of trees can enhance the adaptive capacity of forests to climate change. Reducing deforestation can make a substantial contribution to climate mitigation and biodiversity protection. Restoration using diverse tree species mixes or natural re-growth can contribute to climate mitigation and biodiversity protection,' he added.

Although planted forests could make an important contribution to future bio-energy (systems), he warned that if they replaced primary forest, they would have negative impacts on biodiversity and medium-term carbon balance (from the loss of carbon stocks). He said the most recent Global Biodiversity Outlook states that we are not progressing well in preventing forest loss. However, there are some bright sparks in the massive reduction of deforestation in Brazil resulting in about 120GtCO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent protected which is as much as carbon in non-protected areas in Brazil.

Special Adviser of Global Issues of the **UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)**, Sergio Zelaya, said much more research needs to be done as we know warming leads to drought and desertification. He said the AR5 of the IPCC showed that dry areas are expected to increase in many parts of the world, increasing the current extent of semi-arid areas and the risk for proper functioning of ecosystems. As the productivity and availability of land resources falls, he said, so does adaptive capacity and resilience.

The UNCCD Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN) approach could contribute to a low carbon world where restoring 12 million ha/year at a cost of US\$1.7 billion would result in sequestration of 6.75GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/year. It has set a target of 180 million ha to be restored by 2030. He said the LDN approach is not a global target which requires a top-down protocol or international agreement and each country may declare its own level of ambition.

Focused action towards achieving LDN, said Zelaya, can be a starting point when reporting on intended nationally-determined contributions (INDCs) implementation, adding that UNCCD could offer support to countries requesting assistance, in the development of land components in the INDCs.

Other presenters included the director of the **Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)** Jukka Ousukainen, who presented the work of CTCN, and SBI chair Yauvoli, who presented on the progress made by the **Durban Forum on Capacity-building**.

During discussion time, referring to the CBD's remark on tree mortality, **Brazil** urged Parties to pay attention to the fact. It said despite efforts at reducing deforestation, if there are no significant efforts on mitigation, the impacts of climate change on forests will continue.

In response to **Switzerland's** question on how long it will take for restoration of coral biodiversity if there is a temperature overshoot, another representative from CBD said some improvements take five to 15 years in marine protected areas, noting that once things are on the downward path, recovery is not going to be easy and would take a long time.

Posing its questions to the CBD and CCD speakers, **the United States** said there were many factors contributing to making many ecosystems vulnerable and it would like them to elaborate on those non-climate stressors and the success stories.

Zelaya said climate change exacerbates land degradation in both dry land and non-dry land areas. He said to be successful, CCD's Land Degradation Neutrality framework needs to be part of the climate actions, stressing that while the land component is an option for INDCs, the means of implementation needs to be clearly defined, suggesting that perhaps the Green Climate Fund can take this on board.

Guy Midgley, the IPCC representative, said some non-climatic stressors that interact with climate change are invasive species particularly with island ecosystems, noting that New Zealand has done a good job of controlling the introduction of invasive species.

Responding to the US, **Leonard Nerve of the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC)** said as a co-lead author for the island chapter in Working Group II of the AR5, he would acknowledge that while non-climate stressors pose risks, it will take a long period of time and study to separate them out on how they conflict with climatic factors. He said there are studies showing that where there was intense sea temperature elevation, disregarding pollution level, mass bleaching occurred. The only conclusion, he maintained, is that thermal stress remains the key driver based on evidence.

**India** said it will be good to look at who owned the climate technologies and linked them to incentives that could build confidence of investors as a long-term vision to deploy a wide range of those technologies.

In response, Ousukainen said the CTCN tried to give neutral advice on technologies, presenting both risks and possibilities. He said CTCN did ask Parties to establish a library of technologies and their providers.

#### ***Highlights of Part 4 – Regional and emerging information***

**Chair of the CCCCC**, Leonard Nurse, said observed temperature changes between 1950 and 2000 in the Caribbean reflect the global trend of more warm days and nights and less cool days and nights. The observed sea level rise in the small island states region (SIDS), including in the Caribbean, is also higher than the global average. He said impacts of climate change range from water stress, salinity intrusion to loss of coral reef and livelihood.

In terms of human health, Nurse said there is a higher incidence of vector-borne diseases since the 1970s, increase in mortality from hydro-meteorological events since the 1950s, sanitation and hygiene-related problems from water scarcity from the 1960s and a higher incidence of ciguatera fish poisoning in the last four decades. He also presented on a range of renewable energy and energy-efficiency initiatives in the Caribbean and South Pacific as the SIDS contribution to achievement of the long-term global goal. In conclusion, he said delaying 'aggressive' mitigation will frustrate the achievement of the long-term goal and impose further limits on adaptation.

Diane McFadzien of the **Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Programme** said Pacific small islands rank high in relative exposure to tropical cyclones with losses amounting from 15% to 25% of the islands' GDP, hampering economic development. The Pacific, she said, has a substantial economic dependency on climate sensitive sectors such as ecosystem services and tourism, with limited opportunities for economic diversification.

She also pointed out that for many of the observed impacts of climate change – limited fresh water availability, sea level rise, extreme events, ocean acidification and coral reef degradation – adaptation potential is limited. If it is available, it comes at very high costs in relation to countries' national budgets.

Lars-Otto Reiersen of the **Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme** said ice-sheets in the North Pole region are getting younger and thinner. A lot of older and thicker ice north of Alaska is melting away during summer. He said more polar bears are aggregating in the north of Canada and disappearing elsewhere in the region. Thawing of permafrost is a big issue and Arctic marine waters are experiencing widespread and rapid ocean acidification as cold water absorbs more CO<sub>2</sub>, he revealed, adding that new diseases and parasites are surfacing from animals that indigenous communities hunt for food.

Sonja Vermeulen, head of research of the **Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research**, said recent results reconfirmed the IPCC's AR5 findings of climate change impacts on crops, livestock and marine fisheries at global and regional levels. She said wheat shows a 6% yield loss for each degree Celsius rise, equivalent to 42 metric tonnes or ¼ of global trade. Cash crops such as coffee are also facing major impacts and shifts in growing areas. Negative impacts are due in this generation with a likelihood of a 10% yield loss in the next 20 years corresponding with an increase of demand for food, turning small changes into major concerns.

She said there is less information on livestock and marine fisheries, noting that output from livestock is dependent on complex factors particularly availability of feed. Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka, Angola and Namibia will likely see yield losses in the marine fisheries sector while yield gains are expected for Iceland and the southern coast of West Africa, she added.

Clifford Polycarp, representing the **Green Climate Fund**, provided an update on the resource capitalisation. He said 50% of GCF resources will be allocated for adaptation in Least Developed Countries and SIDS but Parties will need to build or strengthen capacity to access the fund. He said GCF will provide support in this area (of capacity building) by accrediting the national entities and develop guidelines for proposal-making.

Following the presentations, **Saudi Arabia** pointed out that some adaptation measures have co-benefits for example reusing water will reduce dependency on water desalination that is energy-intensive. It said there is a need to be careful in dealing with emerging data, noting that new data will have to be evaluated on the same level of robustness as data used in producing the IPCC AR5.

**China** asked if there were any adaptation plans for the Caribbean and whether there is analysis for the financial needs for mitigation and adaptation. Nurse replied that the mitigation efforts are being implemented as part of larger adaptation and mitigation measures, all with the goal of achieving sustainable development in the region, noting the co-benefits derived from savings on foreign exchange where nearly 95% of electricity is generated from fuel oil.

India wondered if scientific knowledge of climate impacts is accompanied by quantification of losses. It asked what the adaptation costs are for the Caribbean and other regions of the SIDS and the availability of technologies and their costs, including for capacity building.

To this, Nurse said there was a national-level study related to costs but he was not in a position to provide a comprehensive cost structure, adding that the figures are highly variable. He said insurance and re-insurance are important in the Caribbean. Although expensive, it is part of the suite of measures, he added.

**Trinidad and Tobago** asked the GCF what the priority areas are that have been identified to ensure the limited resources are channelled to areas with high impact potential. **India** asked how much of the US\$10.5 billion pledged has been received and if the GCF will rejuvenate the Adaptation Fund that is starved of liquidity due to the low carbon price.

Polycarp replied that GCF has identified four areas within its results-based framework i.e. energy, transportation, forests and land-use, and building and cities. He said given the significance of the energy sector, he expected a lot of demand from that sector. To India, he said the process of realising the pledges into agreement is underway and the goal is to reach 50% of the pledges made by 30 April. He also said there is no decision from the GCF Board or the COP as regards the Adaptation Fund.

**World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)** director of research Deon Terblanche said everything we learnt about the state of the greenhouse gases in the global atmosphere is based on the high quality long-term globally harmonised observation. He said the complexity of the carbon cycle is such that tracking the adequacy of aggregate measures to achieve the Convention global goal will require monitoring system enhancements, stressing that emission reduction approaches require independent, scientific monitoring to support verification and policy decisions.

Among the gaps in the current integrated observing system are insufficient density of the observations over the ground, sea and in the free atmosphere; insufficient measurements of isotopes and co-emitted gases for source attribution; incompatible observations on different scales and in different media; and insufficient complexity and performance of transport models on global/regional and local scales.

He said there is a strong need for the development of the observing system in all domains; development of the modelling tools to deliver products on the temporal and spatial scales relevant

to decision-making; collaboration between the 'spheres'; and inter-agency coordination. Terblanche said to some extent we have been lucky that about half of the emissions have been absorbed by the oceans and terrestrial spheres but warned that there is no complete understanding of how the sinks work and there is a need to consider that the sinks are changing over time.

**Trinidad and Tobago** noted the importance of this segment on emerging information as many are dealing with post-AR5 findings. Referring to several studies pointing to the instability of ice-sheets in eastern Antarctica, it asked for the views of WMO and also IPCC's Thomas Stocker on the implications on sea level rise.

Stocker, who was the Co-chair of Working Group I of the AR5 dealing with the physical science, said WGI is looking at new, comprehensive assessment of sea level rise and that a proposed dedicated chapter on the matter has been approved by the panel. He noted that sea-level rise estimates and projections varied in the scientific literature during the time the fifth assessment was carried out, reasons being the use of different models that are based on physical processes and semi-empirical models.

He acknowledged that closer to the cut-off date of March 2013, alarming projections such as thermal expansion, melting of larger ice-sheets were provided, adding that ice-sheet instability can lead to a very large increase of sea level rise of up to 7 metres by 2300 if the Greenland ice-sheet is sent on a path of meltdown. AR5 revised downward the threshold for the melting of Greenland reported in AR4. Stocker further said the science emerging in the past two years with new insights is limited to observation, noting that the interaction between ocean warming and the ice sheet is crucial to understand the process.

'This is a relatively young science but we are confident we will see important results in the short term,' he concluded.

In closing the meeting, co-facilitator Zouji said he and his co-facilitator Fischlin will work on the two reports mandated by the Lima COP where the full report of the SED will be submitted by 20 March and the final technical report including technical summary will be made available by 4 April. He also said a special presentation will be made at the June session in Bonn this year.