

Third World Network  
**BONN CLIMATE NEWS UPDATES**  
**(August-September 2015)**

**TWN**

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## **NOTE**

This is a collection of eight News Updates prepared by the Third World Network for and during the recent United Nations Climate Change Talks – the tenth part of the second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2-10) – in Bonn, Germany from 31 August to 4 September 2015.

# TWN

## Bonn News Update

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### Parties Reflect on Co-Chairs' Tool as ADP Resumes Work

Bonn, 1 September (Indrajit Bose) – The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) resumed its work at the tenth part of its second session in Bonn that is taking place from 31 August to 4 September.

The session offers Parties the opportunity to delve into a tool prepared by the ADP Co-Chairs, which was made available on 24 July 2015. The ADP is a mandated process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) tasked to produce an outcome at the 21st meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP).

(The tool is divided into three parts. Part 1 comprises provisions that are by nature 'appropriate for inclusion in an agreement'; Part 2 contains provisions that are appropriate for inclusion in a decision; and Part 3 contains 'provisions whose placement require further clarity among Parties in relation to the draft agreement or draft decision', as per the Co-Chairs' scenario note issued on 24 July.)

At the opening plenary, Co-Chair **Daniel Reifsnyder (US)** informed Parties that he along with his other Co-Chair **Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria)** had faithfully responded to the mandate given to them by Parties and they had published a tool on 24 July. 'As explained the tool contains three parts and there is no hierarchy among them. The three parts are of equal importance. We want to emphasise this,' said Reifsnyder, adding that placement of a provision in a specific part did not prejudice the importance of an issue. He also said that the objective of the session was to move from compilation text to one that serves as the basis for negotiations.

Groups of Parties in their interventions provided their initial reflections on the Co-Chairs' tool. Speaking for **the Group of 77 and China (G77 and China)**, **South Africa** said the Group is grateful for the work that the Co-Chairs had done intersessionally in preparing the 'Non-Paper

Illustrating Possible Elements of the Paris Package' and making it available well in advance of this meeting. It said that the Group had many concerns, including on the placement of proposals in the different parts of the document, but added that it would raise these in a constructive manner.

Elaborating on the concerns, South Africa said that although the clustering of issues was helpful in focusing Parties' attention on the key issues that would need to be resolved, the Group was of the view that the manner in which many issues had been placed had resulted in the document being 'unbalanced'. 'Many issues such as principle of CBDR (common but differentiated responsibilities), linkage between action by developing country Parties and support by developed country Parties, institutions on adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, loss and damage, response measures and scope of contributions, which are important to the Group are now found in Part III, creating the impression that there is doubt about whether they need to be included in the agreement, or that they may be too controversial or difficult to be agreed on in Paris at all,' said South Africa.

**Malaysia** spoke for **the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** and said the Group's statement posted online appreciated the Co-Chairs' effort to prepare the tool for the session, but expressed concern about the 'unbalanced treatment among different elements of the Geneva text' in the tool.

**China** spoke for **BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China)** and said the group was hoping for a more 'balanced and inclusive tool from the co-chairs to facilitate real text based negotiations in this session'. It said that Part 1 of the current tool lacks the desired focus necessary on some of the core elements including means of implementation in comparison to mitigation. 'We also see that

differentiation, as the most important cross-cutting issue, has not been appropriately addressed in Part one. However, we are willing to work in a constructive spirit to advance the pace of negotiation in a fully party driven manner,' said China.

'We cannot understand how loss and damage is not included in the tool you provided us,' said **Dominica**, recently battered by a tropical storm Erika (see details of the delegate's intervention below).

Speaking for its 28 member states, **the European Union (EU)** said there were aspects in the Co-Chairs' tool that were 'significantly problematic for the EU – both in terms of substance and placement' but the EU was 'broadly in support of the approach outlined in the scenario note'.

Speaking for **the Environment Integrity Group (EIG), Switzerland** said while the Co-Chairs' tool was a useful step towards an agreement the tool was not sufficient, that it had many important gaps, inconsistencies and duplications. However, it added that the tool gave Parties a good idea how the Geneva Negotiation Text (from the February 2015 session) could be structured into an agreement and COP decisions.

**Antonio Garcia, Peru's special envoy on climate**, said the tool would allow Parties to identify the core of the key points, which they need to achieve in the agreement or in COP (Conference of Parties) decisions. It would also allow Parties to begin to negotiate compromise text. 'The Geneva Negotiating text gave us a broad situation and this tool brings clarity to our work,' said Garcia.

Garcia also spoke about the Paris agreement and said that it has to be universal and lasting and it has to be anchored in cooperation and solidarity, reflecting an appropriate political balance.

'We need to establish a long-term goal for reducing emissions so that they don't go above 2°C. We need to ensure we have periodical increases in our independently determined goals. We need to set implementation obligations to ensure we don't take backward steps and we have to ensure we have robust reporting and review criteria to ensure we move forward but we also need to remain flexible. The outcomes of the Paris meeting also need to ensure we have national and global action for adaptation through progressive national commitments and a broad system of technical and financial cooperations for this so that we can transform our economies and societies. We also need to look at a situation where damage is concerned. COP21 should also improve the predictability of climate funding both before and beyond 2020 and also the reporting implication for this and acknowledge the complementary contribution which can be made by all the Parties.

We should also set up the framework for attracting private sector investments. These are the key matters we should not lose sight of in this week's negotiations,' he said.

He added that Peru is collaborating with France to look to forging new lines of dialogue and was holding bilaterals and consultations of an informal nature between negotiators and ministers. 'The hope is we will be able to forge ahead and find new grounds for agreement through these informal meets,' he said.

(Peru is holding the current COP Presidency and COP21 was held in Lima, Peru last year.)

Also present during the opening session was **Laurence Tubiana, French Ambassador for COP21**, who said that three conditions were required for a successful outcome in Paris: trust, trust and additional trust.

Tubiana apprised Parties of the informal ministerial consultations held in Paris in July and clarified that the purpose of the informal consultations was not to work on the ADP draft agreement text, which is the 'exclusive role of the ADP'. She added that the forthcoming informal, to be held in Paris on 6-7 September, would focus on finance, adaptation and loss and damage, technology transfer and capacity building.

She described nationally determined contributions as the 'game changer for universal participation' and said the Paris agreement would be universal, ambitious, durable, equitable and rule-based. Tubiana added that the agreement would cover all the elements and be long-lasting and enable periodical stocktaking of efforts, potentially every five years. She also said that the agreement would reflect common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of different national circumstances, with differentiation applying in each area of the agreement, with clarity on fulfilling the US\$100 billion (a year) goal by 2020 and mobilisation of increased finances from public and private sources thereafter.

Tubiana also said that Paris is not the endgame but the start of the process and asked of Parties to start thinking what should be done between 2015 and 2020 (when intensified climate actions are to take place before the new Paris agreement is expected to enter into force in 2020).

### **Highlights of interventions**

Speaking for the G77 and China, South Africa called for the pace of negotiations to be accelerated if the Durban mandate (on the ADP) were to be successfully fulfilled by the end of the year. It sought

more clarity on the process at this session and the desired outcome. The Group said it needs a negotiating text from this session to be the basis of further work. ‘To achieve this, the process we follow must prioritise balance, party ownership and effective working methods,’ it stressed.

The Group reiterated that the Paris outcome must not be mitigation-centric and must address all the elements mandated by the Durban decision (mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity-building and transparency of action and support), as well as loss and damage and response measures in a balanced manner. It added that for progress in Bonn, it is very important to gain clarity on the mandate and working methods of the facilitators, which must be consistent across the different sections.

‘Parties should also seek to exchange views with each other, not just with the Co-Chairs and facilitators, as this process is and should remain a Party-driven process,’ South Africa emphasised.

The G77 and China also called for sufficient opportunity to coordinate its positions. Referring to the previous session in Bonn in June, South Africa said, ‘At the previous session evening coordination was turned into negotiation time, which has hampered the ability of our Group to work on consolidating our proposals. Therefore when the Group requests additional coordination time, we trust that it will be understood.’

Stressing on pre-2020 action, or Workstream 2 of the ADP, the Group stressed that pre-2020 ambition is crucial for the success of Paris and will lay a solid foundation for the implementation and ambition of post-2020 enhanced action. Workstream 2 is essentially about accelerating the implementation of existing commitments and obligations and ways to promote enhanced ambition and progress in Workstream 2 would be critical for an agreement in Paris, it said.

South Africa also appealed for additional resources to be allocated for future meetings in a manner that supports the adequate representation of delegates from developing countries. ‘At this meeting many delegations are handicapped due to their being under-represented. All efforts must be made to leave no one behind,’ it said. It also added that the UNFCCC process is the only forum where the negotiations on the Paris outcome can take place. (Meetings involving selected Parties are being held in the run-up to Paris to garner political momentum, which critics regard as non-participatory and undermines the UNFCCC process.)

Speaking for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, the **Maldives** called for more

clarity on the specific modalities of work this week and the intended outcome of the session. Referring to several extreme weather events that have put many small islands and low-lying coastal states at risk of severe flooding, including the recent tropical storm Erika through Dominica, the Maldives said, ‘Such extreme weather events are happening in the context of an average global temperature increase of less than 1°C, reminding us that without bold and very urgent action, far worse is yet to come. This inescapable reality should add urgency to our work and inform the agreement that we are developing for Paris.’

On mitigation, the Maldives said it is critical that a pathway to achieving below the 1.5°C global goal is reflected in the Paris agreement. ‘The agreement must do more than institute a new process. It must also deliver outcomes and demand ambitious performance through internationally legally binding and quantified mitigation commitments that increase global ambition over successive commitment cycles,’ it stressed.

On finance, AOSIS called on developed countries to deliver on their commitment of delivering US\$100 billion per year by 2020 and further commit to scale up the provision of support beyond 2020 ‘if we are to realise the level of ambition required to avert the worst impacts of climate change. It is also essential to maintaining trust in the process. Unfortunately we are still a long way short of this climate finance goal to which we agreed in Cancun,’ said the Maldives.

On loss and damage, it said that countries were experiencing impacts from human-induced climate change that could not be addressed through adaptation, such as those from accelerating sea level rise and increasing ocean acidification. ‘To effectively manage these, an international mechanism to address loss and damage must be a central element of the Paris agreement. The Warsaw decision and the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Fifth Assessment Report acknowledge that loss and damage results when climate impacts exceed the limits of our adaptation measures. Loss and damage should be treated as a separate and distinct element of the agreement, and the mechanism defined under this agreement should be mandated to initiate a process to address irreversible and permanent damage. An agreement that purports to take meaningful action, while failing to address the central concerns of SIDS, equates to having no agreement at all,’ it said.

AOSIS referred to Workstream 2 as not being an ‘academic exercise’ but about implementation.

Speaking for **the LMDC**, **Malaysia** reminded Parties that the ADP journey started in Durban four

years ago and that Parties were three months away from adopting an outcome in Paris. This agreed outcome must contain all the six core elements from the Durban mandate in a balanced manner in both the agreement and the COP decision and reflect the principles and provisions of the Convention particularly the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, it said in its statement posted online.

‘Such outcome must result in enhanced action in the context of sustainable development in implementing the UNFCCC both before and after 2020. Our process at this session and all the way up to Paris must be open, transparent, inclusive, Party-driven and consensus-building, marked by direct negotiations among the Parties on the basis of texts that they have produced themselves. Only through this process will the Paris conference have a successful and legitimate outcome,’ the statement read.

The statement further said that with multiple challenges in terms of social and economic development and poverty eradication, ‘the countries of the LMDC have undertaken ambitious domestic actions on climate change including on mitigation and adaptation, and in surmounting the losses and damages arising from climate change-related natural disasters, while pursuing various sustainable development pathways and eradicating poverty. However, as has been most recently seen just a few days ago when Tropical Storm Erika hit Dominica, a single climate-related disaster can set back our development progress by years or decades.’

‘Nevertheless, we will and can do more of these climate actions now, up to and beyond 2020, but doing so will need increased levels of international cooperation from our developed country partners through increasing ambition on their commitments to drastically reduce their emissions and to provide additional, adequate and predictable levels of finance, development and transfer of technology and know-how, and capacity-building support to developing countries,’ their statement read.

The LMDC also called on the developed countries to do more to honour and fulfil their obligations under the Convention – to be more ambitious on mitigation and to provide and substantially enhance financial support, technology and know-how development and transfer, and capacity building support for developing countries to adequate and predictable levels in support of developing countries’ climate change mitigation and adaptation actions.

The Group also said that they had proactively and constructively put forward textual proposals that

reflect the best way through which the Convention’s implementation would be fully, effectively and sustainably enhanced before and after 2020, in which the Convention’s principles, provisions, and structure are fully respected and reflected in a way that is in full accordance with the differentiated obligations and commitments of developed and developing countries, and is consistent with Article 4 of the Convention.

It said that increasing ambition includes holistically reflecting the integrated treatment of mitigation, adaptation and the provision of finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building support to developing country Parties. The Paris outcome must also incorporate a meaningful approach to address the adverse impacts of response measures, the statement read.

The Group also reflected that, ‘The key convergence among Parties is that the Paris outcome must be under the Convention and should enhance action on the implementation of the Convention in order to achieve the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2. It is not to renegotiate, rewrite, restructure or replace the Convention or reinterpret its principles and provisions. The concepts or approaches such as “evolving CBDR”, “Parties in a position to do so”, “single transparency system” or “mitigation-centric cycle” are not consistent with the principles of the Convention and are not acceptable. Therefore these concepts must be removed from the text,’ it said.

On Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), the LMDC said it was ‘extremely disappointed that the INDCs that have so far been communicated by developed country Parties are mitigation-centred only on post-2020 emission reduction targets and do not contain any post-2020 commitments, policies and measures for the provision of finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building support to developing countries. We stress that the INDCs by developing country Parties on post-2020 enhanced action, including as appropriate, mitigation, adaptation and addressing loss and damage are to be prepared, communicated and implemented in the context of achieving sustainable development and the implementation of Article 4.7 of the Convention’.

The Group reiterated that pre-2020 ambition should be primarily achieved through the implementation of the outcomes of the Bali Roadmap. ‘Therefore, accelerating the implementation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Warsaw COP decision 1/CP.19 and paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Lima Call for Climate Action (decision 1/CP.20) must be the priority of the pre-2020 outcomes in

Paris. The workplan on pre-2020 ambition should deal with the accelerated implementation process and technical examination process in a holistic and balanced manner,' it said.

The Group also called on developed countries to fully implement their commitments and significantly increase their ambitions on providing finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support to developing countries, in particular fulfilling the goal of providing US\$100 billion per year by 2020 to developing country Parties and addressing issues relating to intellectual property rights. 'We call on them, in short, to fully live up to their long-standing commitments under the Convention in this regard,' the statement read.

Speaking for the **Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), Dominica** apprised Parties of the damage Erica had caused on 27 August. 'Floods swamped villages and destroyed homes. Some communities are not recognisable. Many people are dead and many are missing. Roads, bridges and houses are destroyed,' said Dominica, adding that a country that did not cause climate change was calling the attention on a tragedy that could have been avoided. 'Effective action is urgent but it has to take place in a framework of solidarity, justice and equity,' it said, calling for the understanding that vulnerabilities are different and the suffering was very unevenly distributed.

'We are here to work on a new agreement to enhance action. We don't have much time left. We need a fair, balanced and comprehensive agreement with the same legal alignment. This means the agreement must be based on equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,' said Dominica.

It added that differentiation (between developing and developed countries) is crucial and that countries with historical responsibility must reduce their emissions and provide the means to other countries to do so. 'This should be done without impairing the rights of developing countries. This is an ethical imperative,' said Dominica. To the developed countries specifically, it said that they should not use new concepts such as national circumstances and evolving responsibility to escape. Dominica also expressed concern on the reduced funding for developing countries.

Speaking for the **Africa Group, Sudan** said the Co-Chairs' tool helps Parties as a basis for negotiations, but that balance must be restored. It said loss and damage is very critical and must figure in the core agreement. It also sought clarity on scaling up financial resources for beyond 2020 and said a deal in Paris would be impossible without this clarity.

Speaking for the **BASIC** group of countries, **China** reaffirmed that the 'process and outcome of ADP should be guided by and be in full accordance with all principles and provisions of the UNFCCC. The 2015 agreement shall address in a balanced manner all six elements identified in the Durban mandate – mitigation, adaptation, finance, capacity building, technology development and transfer, transparency of action and support. An ambitious outcome of the ADP should not focus solely on mitigation, but should also address the other elements in a balanced and comprehensive manner.'

Affirming its expectation of the current session, China said, 'We should focus on the core provisions to be included in the agreement, including all core elements of the Durban mandate. Further detailing of the provisions, including modalities and technical aspects, could be addressed in COP decisions, as agreed by Parties.'

China also reiterated that commitments under the agreement must be in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention. 'Parties' contributions will be nationally determined and reflect each Party's highest possible effort, in accordance with its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Contributions should be comprehensive, addressing mitigation, adaptation and the provision of support by developed to developing countries,' it said in its statement posted online.

It also said that ambition and effectiveness would be achieved by 'maintaining differentiation among developed and developing country Parties in each element of the agreement'.

On Workstream 2, the pre-2020 ambition gap shall be primarily addressed through the implementation of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and the outcome of the Bali Action Plan, said China. 'We are concerned with the inadequacy of developed countries' current commitments on emission reductions and provision of financial and technological support. We underscore the need to shift the focus of the technical examination process from the mere identification of mitigation policy options to the identification or development of instruments that support effective and concrete implementation of such policies, based on the intrinsic social and economic value of voluntary mitigation actions and their co-benefits to adaptation and sustainable development,' said China.

Speaking for its 28 member states, the EU said while there were aspects in the Co-Chairs' tool that were 'significantly problematic for the EU – both in terms of substance and placement', the EU was

'broadly in support of the approach outlined in the scenario note'.

'It is crucial to start to converge on which aspects of the Paris outcome will be in the Paris Protocol, and which will be in the equally important supporting (COP) decisions. We also fully support the assertion in the scenario note that the time for making compromises and building bridges is now. It will also be essential to identify clear options for Ministerial guidance in relation to issues where agreement cannot be reached at negotiator level,' said the EU in its statement posted online.

It also said that progress must be made on substance. 'Firstly on how the 2015 Agreement will deliver transparency and accountability of Parties against their mitigation commitments. Secondly, on how to ensure dynamism in the 2015 Agreement, across all elements. For mitigation this means how to secure a process to regularly revisit and, if

necessary, raise ambition over time to collectively achieve an agreed long-term goal. Thirdly, on how to ensure that the 2015 Agreement contributes to achieving climate resilient sustainable development and reduction of vulnerability through effective adaptation. Fourthly, on how the post 2020 regime will provide support to those countries in need,' the statement read.

On Workstream 2, the EU said it looked forward to strengthening high-level political engagement on the issue.

Speaking for **the Umbrella Group of developed countries, Australia** said that the facilitated groups should avoid line-by-line negotiations and called for a short and concise instrument and for the ministers to easily navigate through in Paris.

(A number of smaller negotiation groups meet in the ADP process under the guidance of facilitators: see TWN Bonn News Update No. 2.)

### ADP Discussions Move into Eight Facilitated Groups with Deep Differences Remaining

Bonn, 1 September (Indrajit Bose and Hilary Chew) – Differences between developing and developed countries remain deep as the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) moves into the facilitated groups mode.

The ADP resumed its work with eight different facilitated groups being convened following the opening plenary on 31 August. It is meeting until 4 September.

At the plenary Parties reflected on the tool **Co-Chairs Daniel Reifsnyder (United States) and Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria)** had prepared for them to develop ‘a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention’ for adoption at the 21st meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris in December.

(The tool is divided into three parts. Part 1 comprises provisions that are by nature ‘appropriate for inclusion in an agreement’; Part 2 contains provisions that are appropriate for inclusion in a decision; and Part 3 contains ‘provisions whose placement require further clarity among Parties in relation to the draft agreement or draft decision’, as per the Co-Chairs’ scenario note issued on 24 July. See [TWN Bonn News Update 1](#) on Parties’ reflections on the tool.)

Facilitated groups were held on adaptation and loss and damage, General/Objective, Mitigation, Preamble, Implementation and Compliance, Technology development and transfer, Transparency of action and support (all part of Workstream 1 on the Paris agreement) and Workstream 2 (pre-2020 ambition). As the day progressed, Parties provided their reflections on the way the tool had been organised for each of the sections, and indicated this to the co-facilitators.

Below are brief updates on the facilitated sessions of Workstream 1.

#### Adaptation and Loss and Damage

The facilitated session on adaptation and loss and damage, co-facilitated by **Andrea Guerrero (Colombia) and Georg Borsting (Norway)**, began with the co-facilitator proposing to the Parties that they focus on concepts and reflect on what was missing from Parts 1 and 2 of the Co-Chairs’ tool. Guerrero asked of Parties to focus on concepts and not necessarily on paragraphs. She also said that for the rest of the week, she would put forth questions to Parties and if they agreed, the Parties could take up the questions and discuss them. The guiding questions, she said, would help figure out what Parties wanted in the package and which should also go some way in resolving the fundamental disagreements Parties had on some of the issues.

Responding to the co-facilitators’ proposal on the mode of work, Tanzania said as suggested in the Co-Chairs’ scenario note, they came prepared with ‘bridging proposals’ and were not comfortable discussing missing concepts. ‘We don’t understand why we have to look for what is missing. We have tried to do what is required and to move forward is to hear the bridging proposals. We feel quite uncomfortable going back to concepts rather than moving forward,’ it said.

To this co-facilitator Guerrero clarified that she was not talking of missing concepts but to get a good understanding of what is in the agreement and in the (COP) decision, in terms of concepts and the next step would be to get to the bridging proposals, she said.

Discussions continued and Parties reflected on what they thought should be added back to either Part 1 or Part 2 of the Co-Chairs’ tool.

Developing countries spoke in one voice and stressed the importance of loss and damage to be included in Part 1 of the Co-Chairs' tool – as elements under the agreement. Since the provision of loss and damage did not figure in that part, developing countries called for the inclusion of the element in the agreement. There is provision on loss and damage in Part 3 of the Co-Chairs' tool.

Speaking for **the Group of 77 and China (G77 and China)**, **Bolivia** said, 'The group made its case quite clearly in June. Now we are being told it is quite unclear. Is it the science, urgency? This is not negotiations. This is the reality of developing countries,' said Bolivia. It also referred to the three storms in the Pacific and added that Dominica was destroyed by another storm where 20 years of development was lost.

'If clarity is needed, I am providing it now,' said Bolivia, and reiterated the call for including loss and damage in the agreement by referring to droughts in central America, floods, heatwaves and typhoons in China, floods in China and India. 'How many calamities do I need to add to make it clear?' it asked. Bolivia also asked of the co-facilitators to convey to the Co-Chairs that this is not a matter of lack of clarity. To take such a stand would be injustice and climate change denial, said Bolivia, demanding that loss and damage be reflected in Part 1 of the Co-Chairs' tool, along with the respective options and institutional arrangements.

**The US** added that since Parties had not had a chance to discuss loss and damage in the June session of climate talks, they were hoping to discuss the issue here in Bonn.

Besides loss and damage, developing country Parties also reflected on a host of issues including finance needs for adaptation and measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) of support and institutional arrangements.

The facilitated session concluded with the co-facilitators presenting a list of 'clarifying questions' for Parties to address. These questions ranged from global goal and long-term vision on adaptation to individual efforts and their communication, to loss and damage. The session on adaptation on 1 September is expected to begin first by closing the list of speakers from the previous day that did not get a chance to present their interventions and possibly take up one of the questions, which the co-facilitator said would be communicated to Parties by the evening of 31 August.

Bolivia added a measure of caution and said that the G77 and China would not want to spend the rest of the week with the questions and called for a stocktake on the mode of work.

## Mitigation

The facilitated session on mitigation was co-facilitated by **Franz Perrez (Switzerland) and Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore)**.

Perrez started the session saying that they had heard that Parties did not want co-facilitators to do things differently in different facilitated groups. He, however, added that the Co-Chairs had said that groups are different. Some were more mature and that 'we should not be prisoners of a common approach'. Perrez said the objective of the session as outlined in the Co-Chairs' note is to accelerate negotiations with a view to produce a clear understanding and articulation of the elements of the Paris package.

On the organisation of work this week, he said that the guidance from the Co-Chairs was clear and it said that 'we should meet, interact in a constructive manner, search for common ground and have different tools such as bilaterals available'. He also indicated the possibility of going into spin-offs and clarified that these would be open-ended and for all countries to engage in these. He further added that work this week would focus on a good understanding of what each of the Parties saw as being part of the agreement and decision. 'The objective is not to start work on the tool. We are not striving for an amended tool,' said Perrez.

He also said that there was a need for good understanding on how the decision and the agreement map mitigation. He asked of Parties to provide explanations but not criticise each other and not negotiate, which he said was the objective of the first facilitated session on mitigation. Referring to the Geneva negotiating text (from the February ADP session), he said that it is a compilation of different stories whereas the tool was clustering the different stories with the need to understand them and bring them back into one story.

Responding to the co-facilitators, Cuba expressed surprise at not having the word 'negotiate'. 'With 10 negotiating days left, the phrase we have heard is good understanding among delegates. We have come prepared to negotiate. When is the point when we can start negotiations? We are entering risky waters here, for then Parties will be told that there is no time to negotiate and to come up with a political decision. We have come ready and prepared,' said Cuba.

It added that the Co-Chairs had provided a very useful tool and asked of the facilitators to discuss and negotiate what Parties needed to bring from the decision into the agreement. 'Let us stop this risky

thing. We want to see an outcome of this session. The best understanding we can get is from the clear text on where we are. If we don't have clear text and we just have the understanding of the lingo, it is going to be extremely difficult,' added Cuba.

**Brazil** also said it had come prepared to react and said it did not see the exercise as picking and choosing from several parts to Part 1 of the tool as that would bring Parties back to the Geneva Negotiating Text. 'We were hoping to react to see what the Co-Chairs have identified as Part 1 and identify the missing elements,' said Brazil.

**Tuvalu spoke for the Least Developed Countries** and said that it would be helpful to understand the end point of the week. 'We are not striving for an amendment tool. What are we striving for? Are we working on text, are we working on impression of the text?' asked Tuvalu.

Speaking for **the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, Malaysia said that one possible approach is to discuss how Parties see the mitigation section in the core agreement. 'This would include what is in Part 1 and then we say there also needs to be this other matter in the core agreement. We could also say what is in Part 1 could be more appropriately handled in other sections or as decisions. By doing this we would have constructed a mitigation section that addresses mitigation as well as cross-cutting issues. On the basis of that, we begin to deepen our understanding, which would also involve bridging proposals where we see alignments. That is how we see work progressing, which is to get a complete picture with a little explanation of why we feel what should go where,' said Malaysia.

To this Perrez responded saying Malaysia had well summarised what Parties should engage in and said, 'That is what we should do as a first step.'

Following this, Parties engaged in substantive matters and discussed issues ranging from long-term temperature goal to clarity on the different types of commitments Parties could take, market and non-market mechanisms, differentiated commitments, link between action and support, institutional arrangements, and joint implementation. (The speakers' list is still not over and will continue on 1 September.)

At the end of a three-hour-long session, the co-facilitators proposed three spin-offs for more clarity on differentiation led by South Africa, non-market mechanisms led by Bolivia and joint implementation led by Brazil. They also invited Parties to get bridging proposals and to think of the next steps in this week.

## Transparency of Action and Support

The facilitated session on transparency of action and support was co-facilitated by **Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore)** and **Franz Perrez (Switzerland)**.

Kwok said in the Co-Chairs' scenario note, there was a clear understanding of the Paris package elements and said the end product was in the hands of the Parties. 'If we are able to make progress, we could make progress on the agreement text. That has to be the objective. We must try for clarity and narrow and crystallise options for ourselves,' said Kwok.

Referring to the other facilitated sessions of the day, Kwok said Parties could present their broad overviews at the first facilitated session. He clarified that this was not a conceptual discussion and told Parties that they were dealing with text. He asked of Parties to explain why they wanted something moved from Part 3 to Part 1 or 2 of the text. He also said that bridging text is about not having 'what you want but also what your opponent wants, but right now the time is to take general reactions to the Co-Chairs' tools and give an overview of how you feel'. He also said that Parties could intervene on the process along with substantive points in their interventions.

Following this, Parties engaged in substantive discussions around MRV of action and support and transparency arrangements. Parties mostly stayed with their traditional lines with developed countries calling for a single accounting regime and developing country Parties calling for differentiated accounting regimes. Developing countries also stressed on the need for transparency of support. 'We have made progress on transparency of action and anything further would depend on progress in transparency of support,' said **South Africa**. **The US**, in its intervention, said it would be good to have a discussion on transparency of support. 'We are happy to talk about transparency of support,' it said. **India** said it was encouraging to see a growing acknowledgement of the fact that transparency of support had not been addressed and that it needs support. 'It is a good meeting ground,' said India.

On process, the US said it was disappointed to see the Co-Chairs' tool as discussions from the June session seemed to be lost. 'In June, we had discussed a map of the section. It seems we are starting over from June again. We don't want to lose convergence on the structure of the section,' said the USA. Kwok responded by saying the mapping is a reference resource and could be projected if the US wanted it to be projected.

On the next steps, Kwok said he would give Parties some points of commonality which he had heard in their interventions. He said if Parties would allow, he would develop ‘something for the Parties’ between 31 August and 1 September and present it to Parties at their next session, scheduled for 1 September.

## Implementation and Compliance

The session co-facilitated by **Sarah N Baashan (Saudi Arabia)** and **Aya Yoshida (Japan)** covered views on the proposal contained in Part 1 of the Co-Chairs’ tool, with many expressing the need to see options reflecting the establishment of a compliance arrangement in Paris, which is not reflected in the tool. The establishment of arrangements would be accompanied by text detailing the development of related mechanisms and procedures in the accompanying decisions.

Discussions on compliance have narrowed to differentiation between developed and developing countries with respect to the compliance mechanism. Many developing countries pushed for a strong enforcement-oriented compliance mechanism for developed countries. Developed countries particularly the Umbrella Group want a common compliance system for both developed and developing countries with a common set of rules. The discussion was characterised by conceptual issues and suggestions raised by Parties in terms of what should go into the Compliance section from Parts 1 and 3.

The co-facilitators called for informal consultations on the elements of an establishment clause and the nature and purpose of the mechanism, and the outcome will be reported to the group at its next meeting. The co-facilitators will also develop questions on differentiation, enhanced transparency and the facilitative nature of a compliance mechanism for the next facilitated group meeting. Several Parties provided views on what those questions could be.

## General/Objective

Parties continue to differ on the need for a separate section on Objective. Most developing countries and other developed countries like the European Union, Norway and the Russian Federation felt the need for a separate section on Objective to guide the implementation of the new agreement.

However, this was opposed by a few developed countries. Led by **the US, Japan, New Zealand,**

**Australia** and **Canada** called for reference to the objective in the preamble.

Japan cited the successful Montreal Protocol as a multilateral agreement without an Objective section. While New Zealand believed that as the guidance comes from the Convention, it thus would expect the preamble to make it clear.

From the outset, **co-facilitator Dian Black-Layne (Antigua and Barbuda)** requested Parties to deliberate on the two options – Option 1 which may eventually contain between three and five paragraphs or Option 2 which is no text.

She said the co-facilitators (the other co-facilitator is **Artur Runge-Metzger of Germany**) would like to get feedback and guidance on how to address this section. She noted that each section seems to be developing its own objectives and this emerging work could be lifted later into this section on General/Objective.

**Saudi Arabia representing the LMDC** sought clarification on the nature of the discussion of the paragraphs in Part 1 only but stressed that other text particularly those in Part 3 of the Co-Chairs’ tool should be brought into Part 1.

To this, Black-Layne said the discussion is moving towards a negotiation text and hoped that by the end of the session Parties could produce a negotiating text.

Saudi Arabia then urged Parties to look at what is missing and to bring back paragraphs in Part 3 into Part 1.

**Brazil** said it is counter-intuitive not to have an objective.

**India** cautioned against substance being sacrificed at the altar of shortness, noting that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and equity were missing. It said reference to long-term temperature goal can be included but needs to be contextualised.

**China** noted that it is important to have the objective laying out the principles and provisions that will apply to other sections of the Paris agreement. It warned that the key principle of CBDR is missing from the Part 1 text and would be problematic as it is a red line for China.

**Argentina, Jordan** and **Bolivia** cautioned against the use of new terms such as ‘climate resilient economies’ and ‘net-zero emission’ that are unclear and do not enjoy multilateral consensus.

**Malaysia** said having an Objective section is crucial when Parties enter a new agreement and need to know the guiding principle or risk being in uncharted sea. It noted that in all recent multilateral agreements, the objective is framed in the operational

part of the agreement instead of relying on the non-operational part of the preamble or objective stipulated in the different sections. It said to exclude the overarching principle of CBDR and equity will not be acceptable as we need to enhance the Convention.

**South Korea** supported the inclusion of a clear and concise objective, noting that CBDR that was agreed in Lima was missing.

Other developing country Parties suggested moving paragraphs from Part 3 into Part 1 which included reference to loss and damage, temperature goal including 1.5°C, human rights, gender equality, reference to vulnerable countries such as Least Developed Countries and small island states, and protection of the integrity of Mother Earth.

**Cuba** and **Kuwait** raised a procedural point on the conduciveness of the meeting room which does not allow all Parties to have a seat around the table.

Black-Layne assured Parties that she would convey the feedback from Parties to the Co-Chairs and will get guidance on what to present to Parties at the next meeting.

## Preamble

Co-facilitator George Wamukoya (Kenya) invited Parties to look at all three parts of the Co-Chairs' tool and how they can inform either the draft agreement (Part 1) or draft decision (Part 2). He also informed Parties to recognise that some preamble paragraphs from the thematic section are starting to emerge and they are very dynamic.

While developing countries expressed their views on the transfer of paragraphs from Part 3 to Part 1 to improve the preamble, developed countries are hesitant to do so. **The European Union, US, Norway, Japan, Australia, Canada** and **New Zealand** preferred discussing the preamble later after substantive sections have taken shape, noting that the discussion of its content is premature and a waste of time.

**Saudi Arabia speaking for the LMDC** said having a concise preamble must also include general issues and proposed moving six paragraphs from Part 3. The six paragraphs are on the guiding principles; historical and current emissions; social and economic development; means of implementation; equality, environmental integrity and rights; sustainable social and economic development.

**Sudan representing the African Group** stressed that the preamble will lay the foundation for the agreement so it is good to reflect science by

adding paragraph 8 (global nature and urgency of climate change) and paragraph 9 (fifth assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) from Part 3 so that science can inform the agreement and enable enhanced actions.

At the end of the 1.5-hour meeting, co-facilitator Wamukoya urged Parties to start thinking about merging their proposed paragraphs and work on the textual formulation before the next meeting on Wednesday (2 September) so that Parties will be able to identify their text and own the paragraphs.

## Technology Development and Transfer

Co-facilitator **Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic Republic of Congo)** invited Parties to look at all three parts of the Co-Chairs' tool.

India and China sought clarification on the basis of allocation of elements in the three parts, noting that they appeared to be extremely unbalanced compared to other sections. To this, Mpanu-Mpanu assured that all three parts have equal footing and no hierarchy, adding that the Co-Chairs may have been 'overly cautious'.

**China representing the Group of 77 and China** (G77 and China) said the tool was not only imperfect but very unbalanced with other sections in Part 1 where only one paragraph containing two options was provided.

It said to keep the integrity of the agreement, the Group proposed transferring all the paragraphs in Part 3 into Part 1, and paragraphs 35 and 38 in Part 2 into Part 1 as well.

China explained that paragraphs 70 and 71 in Part 3 are overarching elements that introduce the framework and idea on how to structure the support for technology development and transfer. It also wanted the whole paragraph 72 in Part 3 to be included in Part 1.

With regard to institutional arrangements, it said it is useful to have paragraphs 35 and 38 of Part 2 and paragraph 73 of Part 3. It also wanted paragraph 61 of Part 3 on linkages for funding, to be transferred to Part 1.

**Argentina** said it is not possible to talk about implementation of the Convention without means of implementation and many paragraphs in Part 3 need to be moved to Part 1 to raise ambition.

**Saudi Arabia** said it is really difficult to accept the tool as a basis for negotiation and supported the G77 and China proposal for global goal for technology, anchoring the institutional arrangement in the agreement for a durable and long-lasting agreement.

**Belize speaking for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** said enhanced actions for technology development and transfer should ensure that the technologies meet the special circumstances of small islands. It expected paragraphs in Part 3 to be moved into Part 1 or Part 2 and Part 3 will disappear. Parties should work on consolidating the text.

**Japan** said it would agreed to strengthening support in terms of giving incentive to the private sector but would not support any legal obligation on technology development and transfer to be included in the agreement. It would therefore support option 1 of paragraph 20 in Part 1 and would not support option 2.

On the global goal for technology, it said it is difficult as technology development in the long term is highly uncertain as it is difficult to determine which technology will contribute to mitigation action.

It also could not agree with a framework for enhanced action (paragraph 71 of Part 3), noting that it could support the strengthening of the existing technology mechanism. It believed that intellectual property rights is not a barrier to technology transfer but an enabler and the issue should be dealt with by the World Intellectual Property Organisation and the World Trade Organisation.

**The European Union** said it could not support the inclusion of paragraphs from Part 3.

It was supported by the United States which said that most paragraphs in Part 3 are not needed and can be dropped off altogether, adding that it is struggling to understand what developing countries intend to do.

China said having heard all the comments, it was disappointed that trust had been lost when Parties said they do not want any paragraphs from Part 3 to be moved to Part 1. Although it was stressed by the co-facilitator that Part 3 is not the dustbin, this was not shared by all Parties.

It urged Parties to focus on what we should do by narrating it in the core agreement while assigning the ‘how’ to Part 2 on decisions, adding that for this session in Bonn, Part 3 should be deleted after migrating all its paragraphs (related to technology) into the other two parts.

In conclusion, Mpanu-Mpanu said there is no consensus in the room on the placement discussion (of Part 3 paragraphs). He urged Parties to come to a common understanding of concepts and encouraged them to discuss informally before the next meeting on Wednesday (2 September). He will report to the Co-Chairs on the pace and spirit of the discussion.

(There will be a separate update on Workstream 2.)

### Developing Countries Make Strong Call for Text-based Negotiations

Bonn, 2 September (Indrajit Bose) – On day two of the ongoing climate talks at Bonn, developing countries demanded text-based negotiations during the facilitated group on mitigation, co-facilitated by **Franz Perrez (Switzerland)** and **Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore)**.

**Perrez** proposed that Parties discuss themes of possible convergence and report back from the two spin-off groups on differentiation and non-market mechanisms. (Following the facilitated group on mitigation on 31 August, Perrez had proposed three spin-off groups: differentiation, non-market mechanisms and joint implementation, as next steps. See TWN Bonn News Update #2: *ADP discussions move into eight facilitated groups with deep differences remaining.*)

Perrez added that the objective of the spin-off group was to advance the work of the specific issue and to develop common understanding in a small group and to then bring it back to the bigger group. He also sought Parties' views to conduct more spin-offs on response measures, collective efforts and its link to the long-term goal, the design element which would look into the balancing or mapping between agreement and decision, progression and international transport.

Speaking for **the African Group**, **Algeria** said while it was ready to engage in any organisation of work, it was not ready to endorse the responsibility of any delay the process could have, keeping in mind the target in Paris. 'Can you clarify when do we start negotiating on text?' asked Algeria and added that the necessary understanding of the issues could be achieved through text negotiations.

**The European Union** sought feedback from the spin-off groups and said it wanted to 'make good use of time'.

**Brazil** also called for a report back from the spin-off groups and added that Parties were way past the state of general views and were ready to identify what was missing in Part 1.

(The Co-Chairs' tool is divided into three parts. Part 1 comprises provisions that are by nature

'appropriate for inclusion in an agreement'; Part 2 contains provisions that are appropriate for inclusion in a decision; and Part 3 contains 'provisions whose placement require further clarity among Parties in relation to the draft agreement or draft decision', as per the Co-Chairs' scenario note issued on 24 July.)

**Australia** said it was concerned how the issues (for spin-offs) were being prioritised and proposed the issue of markets, formalisation of INDC (intended nationally determined contributions) and accounting could be considered for spin-offs group discussions as well.

**Perrez** responded saying markets and accounting could be on the spin-offs list as well. Responding to Algeria, he said the first step is to look at text to discuss concepts but he was not sure whether it was time to negotiate word by word. He said he agreed with Algeria in that there is a problem of time and speed and the need to move to negotiations and to look at text. He also added that deepening an issue implied looking at text. He added that spin-offs were tools to come together to develop an idea and bring it back to the bigger group. He said he would be happy to do whatever Parties wanted.

In response, **Algeria** said that all the issues are very important. 'In our perspective they are of the same importance. There is a need in this second round for textual negotiations. It is better to have on the screen the first reading on Part 1. This would provide more clarity for us to move coherently. More issues cannot be put on the table unless negotiations begin,' said Algeria.

**South Africa** supported Algeria and asked Part 1 of the Co-Chairs' tool to be taken up. Pointing to the limitation of spin-offs, South Africa added that for spin-offs, Parties only looked at one issue. It would be useful to have an overview of all the parts and to have three columns to see what could be moved from Part 3 to Part 1 or 2.

Speaking for **the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, Malaysia stressed that time was of essence and pointed out that spin-offs in the

abstract may not quite be the valuable use of time. Calling for a coherent text, which could be a Paris agreement foreshadow, Malaysia said that Parties had already indicated what was missing and what should be included and what should be deleted. 'It's not that we are going to transfer or migrate the whole thing and populate Part 1, but we want certain issues.' It gave the example of transparency and said there could be three options: one system, two systems and no system, with the idea of capturing all the options in Part 1 so that 'all positions are reflected in one document to facilitate negotiations'.

In response, **Perrez** called for report back from the spin-off groups and to continue with other topics. After the report back, there would be an assessment of the next steps, he proposed.

**Malaysia** clarified that the idea is to not have more spin-offs. The idea is to keep this group intact, it said. 'We can have feedback (from the spin-offs). But we must proceed to try to shape Part 1 with all our views intact, so at least we see it as an integrated cohesive document and then decide on the next stage what to do. If there is need to deepen our understanding and to come to grips with specific issues, we can make a request for a spin-off,' said Malaysia. 'To sum up, no spin-off on a blanket basis. Put text on screen and let's shape a text,' it added.

**India** added its support to the LMDC and said that while the Co-Chairs' tool was not perfect, the idea was to make it perfect so that it becomes the basis for negotiations. 'If we can go paragraph by paragraph and see it holistically, then we can bring sections from Parts 2 or 3. While doing this, we can always discuss ideas if we are not clear,' said India.

**Algeria** said it had not heard any opposition to use the tool as the basis for negotiations. 'The time allocated for spin-offs is four-and-a-half hours. If we used this time for negotiations, we would have advanced somewhere,' said Algeria adding that the Africa Group was not clear about what Parties would end up with in this session. 'Would it be a text for negotiation or another mandate to the Co-Chairs to produce a new text?' asked Algeria.

**The United States** added that some of the colleagues had a 'narrow' idea of what negotiations mean. For the US, clarification was also part of negotiations. It said moving text from one part to the other would not be good use of time.

**Iran** reiterated that according to the Co-Chairs' scenario note, Part 3 belonged to the area that lacked clarity and for it to be included in Part 1 or 2. It said good use of time would be to start the first phase of negotiations, which would be placement and this would entail an exercise to place Part 3 into Part 1 or 2. Having done this, Parties could embark on the

second phase of negotiations, which would be to look at language.

**Perrez** then proposed to first have feedback from the spin-offs and to then discuss the next steps.

Report back from the two spin-off groups followed. **Bolivia** reported on non-market mechanisms and said that non-market was not a standalone issue and it needed to be understood holistically.

**South Africa** reported back on the spin-off group on differentiation, and said there was a broad range of views on differentiation and that the speakers' list could not be completed due to lack of time.

**China** said the spin-off group on differentiation did not resolve the issue or come to landing zones. 'There is no consensus on common but differentiated responsibilities or how to reflect that. The key point was whether we want reference to developed countries and developing countries in the mitigation section. That's the key part of the question,' said China.

**Malaysia** said if Parties are looking at negotiations in a narrow way, what was the broad way? It said the report back on differentiation presented a range of views and wanted to know how it related to the negotiations. 'Which text relates to what? We need to relate to text. This will emerge from text negotiations,' said Malaysia.

**The EU** said it did not expect to find agreement at this point. It added that there were broad concepts and there would be key political alternatives when the time was ripe for that.

**Perrez** proposed that the second step for the differentiation spin-off group would be to build and come back with 'bridging proposal to crystallize text'. On non-market mechanism, he said he had heard there was a need to understand the concept before the idea was brought into the agreement.

**Brazil** expressed support on continuing the discussions on differentiation in a spin-off group and suggested Parties discuss paragraph 4 from Part 1 of the Co-Chairs' tool, titled 'individual efforts'. **The US, New Zealand** and **Canada** supported Brazil.

As next steps, **Perrez** proposed that spin-off groups should continue. He also proposed to begin the next facilitated session on mitigation on 2 September with a table comprising headings of all the three parts of the Co-Chairs' tool so that Parties don't lose sight of the overview mitigation section. This would help Parties agree on which issues to get deeper into, he said.

**Argentina** expressed that it did not make sense to put the titles and have a discussion and that they would prefer to see text and negotiate.

**Perrez** responded that they would post the table and Parties could decide what to do with it.

### Developing Countries Concerned Text-based Negotiations yet to Take off

Bonn, 3 September (Indrajit Bose) – Developing countries at the ongoing climate talks expressed concern over the mode of work including the proliferation of spin-off groups during a stocktake on 2 September.

Many developing countries said they had come prepared for text-based negotiations at the 31 August to 4 September session in Bonn but this has not happened yet.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) convened the stocktaking plenary at the request of developing countries. They had met with the ADP Co-Chairs **Daniel Reifsnyder (USA) and Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria)** earlier in the day and registered their concern about the mode of work being followed.

Opening the meeting, Djoghlaif said, ‘We received this request by a group to have stocktaking. Those who requested this meeting, can we hear from you what is your concern because concern has been raised on the mode of work and other issues.’

Taking the floor on behalf of the **Group of 77 and China (G77 and China), South Africa** thanked the Co-Chairs for responding to their call for a stocktake. ‘Given the urgent need to accelerate the pace of our work, it would be good to assess our work and the little time left in the session and to have a solid basis for October session,’ said South Africa. (The next ADP meet is scheduled for 19-23 October in Bonn.)

South Africa further said that to achieve this, it is important to adopt work methods that are clear, consistent and effective, and that will ensure party ownership in the outcome here in Bonn. (On 1 September, developing country Parties had called for conceptual discussions to stop and for text-based negotiations to begin. See TWN Bonn News Update 3: [Developing countries make strong call for text-based negotiations.](#))

The G77 and China spokesperson said that some progress had been made in some of the facilitated and spin-off groups, but the progress had been uneven and in some groups, work had not progressed and discussions continued to be at the conceptual level. ‘There is a step change in process needed. It can be made if the Co-Chairs give clear instruction and give the mandate to the co-facilitators to capture progress so far. Of course, a certain degree of flexibility is required given the different nature of issues in the spin-off groups but confidence in methodology is essential,’ she said.

(The facilitated sessions started at the June session in Bonn earlier this year and facilitators were appointed to help drive the process. At the ongoing session, the facilitated groups created further spin-off groups to tackle specific issues among Parties: see TWN Bonn News Update 2: [ADP discussions move into eight facilitated groups with deep differences remaining.](#))

‘The mandate we propose is co-facilitators should further work on the elements and get to bridging proposals as the outcome. Spin-off groups can be useful, but many Parties have small delegations and in the light of the budget crisis that has deprived many developing countries of their participation, we request you to keep spin-off groups to reasonable numbers,’ said South Africa and added that the facilitated groups should address the imbalances in the Co-Chairs’ tool by including elements from Part 3 of the tool to the core agreement.

(The Co-Chairs had issued a tool to Parties on 24 July, which contains three parts. Part 1 has provisions that are by nature appropriate for inclusion in an agreement; Part 2 has provisions appropriate for inclusion in a decision; and Part 3 contains provisions whose placement require further clarity

among Parties in relation to the draft agreement or draft decision. See TWN Bonn News Update 1: *Parties reflect on Co-Chairs' tool as ADP resumes work.*)

Calling for clarity on the intended outcome of this session, South Africa said, 'We need you to say what your plans are and how you will capture progress to be able to have a solid basis for negotiations in October.'

**The G77 and China was supported by the Least Developed Countries (LDC), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), the African Group, the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), the Arab Group and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA).**

Developed country groupings such as the **Umbrella Group** and the **European Union** also expressed concern over the slow pace of work (see highlights of interventions below).

Following the interventions, Co-Chair Djoghlaif said Parties had started negotiating and agreed to achieve what they wanted to achieve. He read out paragraph 15 of the Co-Chairs' scenario note, which they had issued on 24 July 2015. The paragraph reads: *The forthcoming ADP session affords Parties the opportunity to accelerate their negotiations. Parties' efforts during the session are expected to produce a clearer understanding and articulation of the elements of the Paris package with regard to both workstream 1 and workstream 2. In this regard, it will be important for Parties to develop bridging proposals and, where required, narrow and crystallize options for further negotiation.*

(Workstream 1 is tasked with negotiating the Paris agreement that is expected to enter into force in 2020 while Workstream 2 deals with pre-2020 ambition.)

He also referred to the 19 bilateral meetings the Co-Chairs had on the mode of work and expected outcome of the session and said that the Co-Chairs had issued a clarification note 15 minutes after their last bilateral on 30 August 2015. He read out paragraph 4 of the note, titled 'Further clarifications by the ADP Co-Chairs on the mode of work at ADP2.10'. The paragraph reads: *The additional tool of 24 July has been conceived and proposed as an attempt to help Parties to accelerate the pace of their negotiations and to assist them in moving from a text containing a compilation of positions to one that can serve as a basis for negotiation.*

'This was what we all agreed,' said Djoghlaif. 'Those asking questions about better clarity (should)

refer to this. The Geneva Negotiating Text is a compilation of positions. The tool you have received is a better compilation of positions,' he said. (The Geneva text was the outcome of the February meeting of the ADP.)

He thanked the small delegations for the 'amazing degree of flexibility shown' to allow Parties to collectively achieve what they had achieved.

On the spin-off groups, he said that where the co-facilitators asked Parties to get together, they were meetings of interested Parties. Then there were spin-off groups to discuss text. 'We have daily meetings in the morning and afternoon with the co-facilitators to coordinate so that all the co-facilitators have the same information. We are pleased to inform you that you will move to text-based negotiations. All of the co-facilitators are at your service and all of them are willing to submit to you,' he said.

On the cross-cutting issues he said there had been movement and joint spin-off groups had been agreed upon. 'For the next phase, we intend to start bilaterals to seek your views. When we leave on September 4, it is important to have a roadmap. Soon you will have text-based negotiations with your co-facilitators,' said Djoghlaif, concluding his intervention.

### **Highlights of Interventions**

Speaking for the LDCs, **Angola** sought further clarity on where Parties were headed. 'We should accelerate the work to fulfill the ADP mandate without any delay. We should focus on migration of elements from Part 3 to Part 1 of the tool for a draft agreement, so that it will form a basis for the October session. We have seven days. We should be mindful that any outcome should be balanced and give explicit recognition to the LDCs in the agreement. Many of our members have small delegations so we request you to consider this while scheduling further spin-offs.'

Speaking for the **AOSIS, the Maldives** said there had been uneven progress and some groups were moving much too slowly. 'The pace of discussions is of critical importance and topics such as financing for loss and damage and adaptation have not been adequately scheduled. We must clarify options and move elements from Part 3 to Parts 1 and 2 of the tool. We are ready to explore options on what the outcomes will be and the terms under which it should be developed. We must have clarity on the way forward before we leave Bonn. Everyone must be on the same page when they arrive in Bonn in October.'

**Malaysia** spoke for the **LMDC** and said Parties came to Bonn on the basis of the Co-Chairs' tool to conduct effective, well-paced and targeted negotiations. 'We came here well prepared. We had preparatory meetings and we were prepared to engage in text-based negotiations because we thought this is the best way to proceed. But problems emerged. The focus was to have targeted text, using your tool because it encompasses all that is there in the Geneva Negotiating Text. We have three parts, but there is nothing missing. Maybe we have to bridge proposals, but the objective was to have text-based negotiations,' it said.

Describing the reason for the Group's concerns, Malaysia said, 'On the first day, we were getting our act together and a lot of glitches happened. On the second day, we found ourselves back into conceptual discussions and sometimes on things that were not even related to the text. This is where we were concerned. We have five more days in the October session and then of course there is Paris.'

Malaysia also said that the journey of a hundred miles begins with the first step and that they were looking for the first step. 'We have heard the voices of all the developing countries expressing this concern. We want text to capture everything when we get to October. Some movement has begun to take shape in the last hour. This little movement must begin. On Friday (4 September), we are looking at a cohesive text, drawn from your tool, which is tightly bound and then we can move forward together,' it said.

Speaking for the **African Group, Sudan** stressed the importance of time. 'We have gone through more than half of the time left. The African Group wants a text, which will serve as the basis for negotiations. It is important to strive for balance in the text and ensure Party ownership. We have concluded the first reading of your tool where Parties have outlined their vision to restore balance. It is important to accelerate work and engage in textual negotiations,' it said. There is a need for clarity on the purpose of the work and on bridging text and a clear and consistent message must be sent to the co-facilitators that Parties own the text, it added, stressing on the need for bridging text proposals.

Speaking for the **Arab Group, Saudi Arabia** shared the group's concern on the pace of negotiations. It reiterated the need for negotiations between Parties on the elements and whether the elements were captured in the agreement. It said it had heard the same positions being repeated and that by 4 September, the group hoped that Parties could come up with elements of an agreement that would provide the basis to build negotiations in October

and December. 'We wish to see all the elements – mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency of action and support – covered. Without these elements, we are not sure how to progress (in) negotiations. We should at least have a skeleton by the end of this week,' said Saudi Arabia.

Speaking for the **ALBA** group of countries, **Bolivia** stressed that Parties had not engaged in substantive negotiations thus far and were stuck in conceptual discussions. It added that there had been no text-based negotiations and there was no clarity among the co-facilitators. It sought the Co-Chairs' guidance on moving forward.

Speaking for **AILAC, Guatemala** said there had been unbalanced progress in the facilitated groups. To secure a significant and balanced output, it encouraged co-facilitators to identify key elements missing from the agreement. Also, co-facilitators should help Parties identify the elements where bridging proposals could emerge. On the outcome of this session, a new iteration of the tool may not take us far enough. It said it recognises the difficulty of creating too many spin-offs and awaited clarity and guidance from the Co-Chairs.

**India** expressed concern that there was neither comfort among Parties with the Geneva Negotiating Text nor the Co-Chairs' tool. India said it was looking for text to be the basis of negotiations.

**Nigeria** said it came to the meeting in high spirit, knowing Parties would negotiate. 'We did not want to waste time in the opening plenary, that was the high spirit with which we left the room but until now, we are discussing conceptual framework and discussing placement of issues. We are not making progress. If there were any concrete progress that we would want to report back home; it would be difficult to send delegates back in October, except for those that will be sponsored. Financing other delegates for the meeting would become a problem. When we demand text-based negotiations, most co-facilitators responded saying this is an informal setting and that text-based could not be done. Is this a new setting? We negotiate on text even in informal-informal setting. This means there is no clear signal from you to the co-facilitators. Perhaps, the co-facilitators were not given clear mandate. When we are saying what we are discussing cannot be undertaken as text-based negotiations, how would discussions in spin-off groups add value to our work? We have very few delegates and some countries have one-member delegations. It is difficult to cover the spin-off groups. We need from you clear signals and clear mandates to make good progress.'

**Tanzania** wished the Co-Chairs had listened to it on ways of progressing. It said Parties were not progressing as was noted in paragraph 15 of the Co-Chairs' scenario note, which they had issued on 24 July. 'The last sentence says it is important for Parties to develop bridging proposals and that was what they had come prepared to do in Bonn. But when we came here, we were surprised because we came back to storytelling, concepts and this has brought us where we are today. It is important to give clear guidance to your co-facilitators and begin negotiations. There are only seven negotiating days to deliver what the world expects us to deliver,' it said.

Speaking for its 28 member states, **the European Union** said it shared the view of the others on the pace of negotiations. 'We were saying we need a short, concise text in February (in Geneva) but in February text more than doubled. We said the same thing in June. We were disappointed when we saw your tool because it was not in a shape to be negotiated. It did have some benefits in terms of structure and drew attention to the fact that the agreement would be short and concise. Parties have engaged with your tool and in many areas we are

seeing major areas of convergence. In October, we need to negotiate on a concise draft agreement and associated draft decision.'

Speaking for the **Environment Integrity Group (EIG), Switzerland** said it shared the frustration that others had expressed. It, however, said that Parties were to blame because they had asked for time to discuss process. 'We don't need more time. We need more commitment to discuss substance,' it said.

Speaking for the **Umbrella Group, Australia** said the group was concerned with the pace of progress and called for the October session to begin with a text that was not a compilation text, but one that was concise, targeted and reflected convergence. It called for the need to accelerate negotiations and said going line by line would not be helpful. It added that many sections did not focus on the Paris outcome and that there were gaps. It said that the work of the co-facilitators was starting to move ahead and some groups had started turning their understanding into text. It also said that the co-facilitators could help by distilling the storyline by what they heard and to help Parties with this.

### Contention Continues over Capacity building Mechanism in Paris Agreement

Bonn, 3 September (Hilary Chiew) – After two meetings of the facilitated group on capacity building, Parties could not agree on the proposal for the establishment of a capacity building mechanism to be included in the Paris agreement.

The meetings were convened under the 10th part of the second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change that is taking place from 31 August to 4 September in Bonn.

Developing countries expressed deep dissatisfaction that this specific demand and their other concerns are not reflected in Part 1 of the ADP Co-Chairs' tool that was described as a non-paper illustrating possible elements of a Paris package.

(The tool is divided into three parts. Part 1 comprises provisions that are by nature 'appropriate for inclusion in an agreement'; Part 2 contains provisions that are appropriate for inclusion in a decision; and Part 3 contains 'provisions whose placement require further clarity among Parties in relation to the draft agreement or draft decision', as per the Co-Chairs' scenario note issued on 24 July.)

At the first meeting of the capacity building facilitated group on 1 September, co-facilitator Artur Runge-Metzger (Germany) asked Parties to provide their views on the ADP Co-Chairs' tool, assured Parties that there was no hierarchy of the three parts of the tool and urged Parties to engage with an open mind and be ready to explore ways forward to land capacity building safely in Paris. As co-facilitator, he hopes to create a positive atmosphere and for the group to act like a harmonious family in building bridges. He further said 'it was lucky' that only two paragraphs of the negotiating text on capacity building were in Part 3.

**China representing the Group of 77 and China (G77 and China)** said although there were

only two paragraphs of text in the capacity building section that were relegated to Part 3, a fair way of treating the call of this large grouping of countries for an international mechanism for capacity building would be to have the proposal placed in either Part 1 or Part 2 of the tool.

It was disappointed that despite the persistent elaboration and clarification of its proposal for a new institution to address the urgent issue of capacity building, the Group's voice was not heard.

Pointing to the fact that there is a mandate on capacity building in the Convention and in the Warsaw decision (meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 2013), it said missing the opportunity to address the matter would not enable developing countries to deliver their efforts to fight climate change.

China stressed that capacity building is related to everything in coping with climate change and currently there is a lack of coordination for all these activities. It also said the Durban Forum on capacity building which is regarded as the institution cannot fulfil the functions and hence the Group has asked for a new mechanism. It reiterated that capacity building is a matter of emergency and without enhancing capability, developing countries cannot address the risks of climate change identified by the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

**Speaking for the African Group, Swaziland** said it would like to see clear and specific activities on enhancing capacity building. It said there is disconnect between the framework and reality on the ground and the review of the framework lacks provision for updating it.

It would like to see in the (Paris) agreement how current institutional arrangements under the Convention can be enhanced for better capacity building needs, noting that developing countries'

reliance on external technical capacity would present problems of implementation. It stressed that the new agreement must provide a clear mandate to establish a home for capacity building that translates all the actions needed.

The African Group wondered how Parties could prioritise capacity building if it is not a core mandate (referring to the agreement) and is confused that Parties are moving in circles.

**Jamaica representing the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** said it is strongly of the view that we need a mechanism to centralise the issue of capacity building correctly for developing countries but this was not reflected in Part 1 of the Co-Chairs' tool. It said what has been provided so far is technical support needs like implementation of reporting requirements, national communication, biennial update report where the typical scenario is a three-day workshop but the actual implementation would require the expertise of consultants and a three-day workshop cannot build such expertise.

It is time, Jamaica said, to resolve the issue of capacity building needs and the Group is looking at having it anchored in the agreement part (of the Co-Chairs' tool) if we are serious. It said Parties can work on the modalities and procedure of the mechanism over the next few years.

**Saudi Arabia representing the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** expressed support for a new institution and requested for paragraph 75 in Part 3 of the Co-Chairs' tool to be moved to Part 1 or 2.

Echoing the concerns of the other developing country groupings, **Iran** described capacity building as the turbo engine that could lift the plane of mitigation and adaptation actions that constitute the new agreement that is applicable to all. It said it is not a question that developing countries are hesitating to take actions but the capacity has to be there. Therefore, it has to be strongly highlighted in the agreement to enable developing countries to follow the right path to achieve the 1.5°C or 2°C temperature rise target before the end of the century. Iran said articles in Part 1 currently do not address this significant need appropriately and it is inclined to support moving paragraph 75 in Part 3 to Part 1.

**Senegal representing the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** reiterated that capacity building is a cross-cutting issue but it is time to treat it as a standalone issue. It noted that there is institutional arrangement for finance and technology which were also dealing with crosscutting issues. It said Parties have been talking but not moving forward and it appeared that maybe some Parties do not want to

move forward. It stressed that we need to produce a negotiation text at the end of this session.

Senegal stressed that the LDCs do not have the capacity to adapt and mitigate and while Parties continue to negotiate, it is the people on the ground and rural areas in LDCs that are suffering the most. It said the Durban Forum is just a platform where all the United Nations agencies come and share their work in the developing countries. The LDC Group wants a new institution to be in the agreement.

This was supported by **Gambia** that wanted also measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) of support of capacity building in the agreement and suggested moving both paragraphs 74 (on objective and focus) and 75 that are currently in Part 3 into Part 1.

Acknowledging the divergence of views at this moment, **Japan** said the differences came from the lack of common understanding on how to build capacity in the pre- and post-2020 period. It said it is good to continue to exchange views and pointed to the capacity building workshop mandated by the Convention's Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) at its 42nd session in June that is to be held back-to-back with the ADP October session.

Nevertheless, it said there is common understanding that all Parties have strong willingness to address capacity building as a matter of urgency.

**The United States** said although Part 1 is not ideal, 'it can be tweaked' and agreed that institutional arrangement is something that should be included in the agreement but believed that the Durban Forum for capacity building will serve the purpose. It struggled to understand what the new capacity building mechanism will do in terms of adding value.

**The European Union** said it is unfortunate that the request for a new institution has presented a binary situation and would risk not addressing the concerns of capacity building but sees there could be convergence of ideas.

**New Zealand** said Parties are discussing capacity building in the abstract. **Australia** preferred having informal meetings to deepen understanding.

In response, **Swaziland** said it is unfair that developing countries have to justify why they wanted to move paragraph 75 to Part 1 while there are items in Part 1 that do not enjoy consensus. It also lamented that Parties are still trying to ask about the role of the mechanism where the proposal has clearly stated the components and functions, which goes to show that perhaps they have not read the proposal.

**China** said we are here to seek support to build our capacity to cope with the general threat of climate change and not here to convince others what we need.

It said developing countries' concern is not to have the door close on us which would be a failure but for us to move quickly with our position and discuss the matter as a capacity building family.

At the end of the meeting, co-facilitator Runge-Metzger proposed two informal meetings to discuss capacity building between 2016 and 2020 which were termed as 'milestones'. The first informal facilitated by Swaziland was held immediately after the 1 September meeting. The second informal meeting followed the second facilitated group meeting on 2 September. It was facilitated by Japan, and discussed enhancement of institutional arrangement. These spin-off groups will report back at the third and last facilitated group meeting scheduled for 3 September.

At the second facilitated group meeting on 2 September, China speaking for **the G77 and China** raised concern about the limited time before the current session ends and reasserted the Group's demand for the new institutional arrangement calling for an international capacity building mechanism to be reflected in the agreement part of the Paris package by the next ADP session in October.

Co-facilitating the meeting, **Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic Republic of Congo)** said the G77 and China's concern has been captured clearly in the meeting minutes and the ADP Co-Chairs are aware of it and it would be addressed at the stocktake meeting later in the day.

Referring to the first informal meeting on 1 September, **the European Union** said the discussion

was encouraging this time as Parties recognised that the Paris package needs to advance capacity building between Paris and the entering into force of the new agreement (by 2020). There was substantive discussion on the mechanism and the EU has suggested the issue of institutional arrangement as part of the interim package. It however pointed out that Parties need to be aware that some issues discussed under this section are also being discussed in other sections such as finance.

**Swaziland speaking for the African Group** supported China on the issue of process. It said Parties need clarity as we move forward but it is unclear on what we are engaging with. It wanted to know if the Co-Chairs' tool could be modified as outlined by the G77 and China to improve on it.

To this, **Runge-Metzger** said the Co-Chairs are fearful of a second round of Geneva negotiations (that took place in February) where things are bracketed and they wanted concrete suggestion to avoid second guessing (what Parties want) as it would lead the process in the wrong direction.

**Swaziland** said it is not convinced that the review of the (existing) framework can solve the issue of capacity building. It said the process lacks trust, pointing out that some Parties that said strengthening of the Durban Forum cannot be done in the SBI at its 42nd meeting in June are now saying that it can be done here in the ADP. 'Try to convince me what has changed now ... make me believe that you are negotiating in good faith,' it said.

### ADP Co-Chairs to Issue Non-paper as the Basis of Negotiations for October

Bonn, 4 September (Indrajit Bose) – The last day of the climate change talks in Bonn ended with the promise of a non-paper that would serve as the basis of forthcoming negotiations.

The Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) announced this at a contact group they convened on 4 September. The next ADP meeting is scheduled for 19-23 October 2015 in Bonn.

‘We have overwhelming convergence in a request for us. The request is to prepare in consultation with facilitators and the Secretariat a non-paper as the basis for negotiation, a Paris climate package consisting of Workstream 1 (post-2020 climate action) and Workstream 2 (pre-2020 climate action), based on the Geneva Negotiating Text, the tool and which takes into full account the views and positions of Parties expressed at this session,’ said **Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria)**, Co-Chair of the ADP.

[Daniel Reifsnnyder (USA) is the other Co-Chair and the ADP is tasked to arrive at a ‘protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention’ for adoption at the 21st meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris in December 2015.

[The Co-Chairs’ scenario note issued on 24 July provided a tool divided into three parts. Part 1 comprises provisions that are by nature ‘appropriate for inclusion in an agreement’; Part 2 contains provisions that are appropriate for inclusion in a decision; and Part 3 contains ‘provisions whose placement require further clarity among Parties in relation to the draft agreement or draft decision’. The just concluded ADP session made use of this tool.]

During the contact group, Djoghlaif also said that they (the Co-Chairs) would make available the non-paper along with a scenario note in the first week of October. ‘The scenario note will specify the mode

of work and we will set up an open-ended drafting committee. There will be spin-off groups moderated by the co-facilitators. This was the unanimous concluding proposal based on the meeting with the heads of the delegations and the bilateral meetings we had,’ said Djoghlaif.

**South Africa spoke for the Group of 77 and China (G77 and China)** and said that it must repeat the approach that has been agreed upon for the benefit of civil society organisations. It highlighted concerns about the mode of work at the Bonn session and called the process ‘fragmented’. It also called for a step change and for real text-based negotiations to begin at the October session of the ADP. It further underscored the importance of Parties negotiating with each other over having bilateral meetings with the Co-Chairs. South Africa also sought clarity on the meaning of an ‘open-ended drafting committee’ and whether it was different from a contact group.

‘On 2 September, the Group had expressed its concern on the pace of the progress and the need for an urgent step-change in the process (see [TWN Bonn News Update 4: Developing countries concerned text-based negotiations yet to take off](#)). As a Group, we have engaged constructively with our partners here in Bonn. However, we need to take on board the lessons we have learned at this session. There has been fragmentation of the process with the proliferation of spin-off groups. This, along with lack of clear instructions to the facilitators, which led to inconsistency in approaches followed in the different groups, have often overwhelmed and disadvantaged delegations from developing countries that are small,’ said South Africa.

Having said that, it is essential that the progress Parties had made during the session, held from 31 August to 4 September, is captured, South Africa stressed. It added that the textual proposals made by Parties, the results of the facilitation and spin-off

groups, proposals for bridging text and clarification of concepts should be captured as milestones in order to ensure Party ownership of the process.

South Africa also said that real textual negotiations must start at the October session. 'For this purpose, a manageable text that is negotiable is needed. In order to achieve this, the Group wishes to give clear guidance to the Co-Chairs on how to proceed. This text must be based on the Geneva text, building on the Co-Chairs' Tool and the inputs made by the Parties at this session,' it said.

(During the ongoing session at Bonn, Parties had expressed concerns about the mode of work and demanded text-based negotiations. See [TWN Bonn News Update 3: Developing countries make a strong call for text-based negotiations.](#))

Outlining the mandate further, South Africa clarified that for Workstream 1, this means a text of the draft agreement with accompanying decisions. The text must be coherently structured, properly ordered and include all the elements that Parties need to see reflected in the agreement. It must also be clear, streamlined, consolidated, simplified and balanced, presenting clear and crystallised options on all elements. Many issues that need to be contained in a decision also need a hook in the agreement and a purely binary approach is not appropriate.

For Workstream 2, a revised text of the decision, capturing the work done at this session is required, said South Africa. 'These texts must be made available inter-sessionally as soon as possible to enable for Parties to properly prepare for negotiations in October in order to allow textual negotiations to start immediately in the October session. At the end of the October session, we need to have a text with clearly identified political options on elements of divergence and convergence in order to prepare our principals properly for Paris,' it said.

South Africa stressed that Parties need an effective method of work going forward. This entails a greater degree of centralisation in the management of the process, it said to the Co-Chairs. 'In this regard, there is a need to engage on an on-going basis during the session on cross-cutting issues and interlinkages in a central place. The utilisation of facilitation groups with clear and consistent instructions to the facilitators that consider specific issues can be very helpful to capture progress,' it said. 'Regular meetings with the Heads of Delegations should be used to inform Parties on the overall status of the negotiations. Stocktaking meetings at appropriate moments in the process could be helpful and should not be regarded as a waste of time,' it emphasised.

South Africa also reiterated that the multilateral, Party-driven process must be honoured and Parties must be able to negotiate and discuss with each other directly and not through the Co-Chairs bilaterally.

Responding to the G77 and China, **Djoghla**f said that issues of fragmentation were raised and the open-ended drafting was a response to the 'perceived impression' that there was fragmentation of the process. 'We used a method of work that delivered better understanding and clarification of process and this was done through facilitated groups and spin-off groups, which we don't believe were meant to fragmentalise the process but to give Parties a tool to further discuss,' said Djoghlaf. He added that the tool was a compilation of proposals but for the forthcoming session, Parties would have 'a single document, containing a COP decision and concise and coherent agreement text'.

To the Parties he said, 'You will sit in a single forum for the time has come not to discuss conceptual issues, but to go line by line. The aim is, without fragmentation, after the first reading, there will be spin-off groups. This is the suggestion. More details will be in the scenario note for ADP 2.11 (the 11th meeting of the second ADP session in October),' said Djoghlaf.

On bilaterals, Djoghlaf said that they were never meant to be a substitute for the ADP. It is just a preparatory mechanism to avoid discussions on the process and that they would follow the principle of openness, transparency, inclusiveness and it will continue to be Party-driven. 'We remain open to meeting any Party or group,' said Djoghlaf, and declared the contact group closed.

A short closing plenary followed the contact group. At the closing plenary the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC announced that they were in a position to fund two candidates each from developing countries for the October session and three candidates each for COP21 in Paris at the end of the year.

(At the opening plenary on 31 August developing countries had expressed concern about reduced funding affecting their participation at the meeting and during the stocktaking on 2 September, developing countries had highlighted that it was extremely difficult for smaller delegations to participate in several spin-off groups that were happening in parallel at the session.)

Djoghlaf though said that he had been very impressed by the spirit of the week and thanked small delegations for the flexibility shown towards the 'number of meetings they had, which made it very

difficult for small delegations to cope with'. Djoghlaif also said that the Co-Chairs would continue to have the pre-session bilateral meetings with groups of Parties.

**Current COP Presidency Peru** said the length of the week's discussions should be captured in facilitators' reports. Echoing the concern that progress had been uneven, Peru said that the existing tool was not the best tool for effective deliberations. Peru also called for a more centralised form of negotiations. It added that during the next session, it

intends to convene, along with France, consultation meetings with heads of delegations.

**France** said it was pleased that Parties had arrived at a common understanding for the ADP negotiations in October. 'We have decided to consult all the heads of delegations right from the beginning of October and support the work of the Co-Chairs. It will be one team one goal,' said France.

In his closing remarks, Djoghlaif said the Co-Chairs would meet those on the way to Paris (for the informal ministerial on 6-7 September) and 'shall discuss issues that are of key importance to us'.

### WS1 Facilitated Groups ‘Deepened Understanding’ but No Text-based Negotiations

Bonn, 7 September (Hilary Chiew) – The 10th meeting of the second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Actions under the Convention (ADP) ended with most facilitated groups under Workstream 1 (post-2020 actions) unable to get into a text drafting mode.

Despite repeated calls by developing countries’ negotiators in the various facilitated groups to begin drafting text on the screen and addressing placement of issues using the Co-Chairs’ tool, most facilitated groups’ meetings and their respective spin-off groups were involved in conceptual discussions ‘to deepen understanding’.

The ADP Co-Chairs are Daniel Reifsnyder (the United States) and Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria). The ADP meeting was held from 31 August to 4 September in Bonn.

The facilitated groups were tasked to work on their respective elements guided by the non-paper called the Co-Chairs’ tool issued on 24 July illustrating possible elements for a ‘Paris package’ that is without prejudice to the structure of the Paris agreement or to the placement of any provision within that structure.

(The tool contains three parts. Part 1 comprises provisions that are by nature ‘appropriate for inclusion in an agreement’; Part 2 contains provisions that are appropriate for inclusion in a decision; and Part 3 contains ‘provisions whose placement require further clarity among Parties in relation to the draft agreement or draft decision’, as per the Co-Chairs’ scenario note issued on 24 July.)

This assurance was further repeated in a clarification note issued by the Co-Chairs on 30 August, the eve of the start of the meeting when many developing country groupings had sought clarification from them on the mode of work during the 19 pre-consultation meetings held between 27 and 30 August. The Co-Chairs reiterated that the tool prepared with a mandate from the Parties (at ADP

2.9) holds no legal status and that its three parts have the same importance and have been submitted without any kind of hierarchical order.

Nevertheless, developing countries across the various facilitated groups expressed their disappointment throughout the five days with the mode of work as many felt that the concepts were not new and Parties were wasting precious time. Parties have another five-day meeting in ADP2.11 from 19 to 23 October before the 21st meeting of the Conference of the Parties in Paris starting 30 November.

Below are some highlights of the facilitated groups on technology development and transfer, capacity building, transparency of action and support, and timeframes and processes related to commitments/contributions/Other matters related to implementation and ambition.

#### Technology development and transfer

At the outset of the second facilitated meeting on 2 September, **China representing the Group of 77 and China (G77 and China)** again asked how Parties are going to deal with the placement of issues and sought assurance that Part 3 (of the tool) is not the dustbin (of unwanted issues by some Parties). On the selection of specific issues for discussion, it cautioned that given the limited time, Parties should prioritise the ‘low-hanging fruits’ issues that have least divergence such as institutional arrangement to serve the agreement (paragraph 73 of Part 3) and research, development and demonstration (paragraph 72.5 of Part 3), framework for enhanced action (paragraph 71 of Part 3) and addressing barriers by developed countries (para 72.1 of Part 3) and by developing countries (paragraph 72.2 of Part 3).

Co-facilitator Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic Republic of Congo) replied that addressing placement now would not serve any purpose as

Parties would find themselves in the same situation (of no consensus) but discussion on those issues would further the understanding of Parties and thus enable ‘the placement to take care of itself’.

**Swaziland speaking for the African Group** presented its proposal on a framework for enhanced actions, noting that the framework has nothing to do with creating new institutions but rather to strengthen them by giving medium to long-term guidance, addressing measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) and transparency of actions.

**The European Union** said it could engage with the discussion of a framework but could not support the wholesale importation of the issues from Part 3 to Part 1. However, efforts made to discuss some of those issues can be a basis for the way forward.

**China** welcomed the concept of enhancing the framework which can be the foundation of the whole institutional arrangement where crucial elements can be built on including MRV and addressing barriers for technology support post-2020.

**Sudan** said without such a framework, technology development and transfer will be mission impossible.

**India** said the agreement has to have actionable points and it opined that paragraph 72 of Part 3 can be broken down with some efforts going to Parts 1 and 2 to make them actionable. (Paragraph 72 refers to individual efforts with seven sub-efforts under Option 1 and ‘no commitment on technology in the agreement’ under Option 2.)

Immediately after the meeting, Parties went into two spin-off group meetings facilitated by Sonja Djukic (Canada) and deliberated on the framework proposal as well as other issues.

On 3 September, Djukic reported back that there was no agreement on how to conclude the discussion on the framework but Parties also discussed and listed high-level elements such as the importance of technology development and transfer, developing and strengthening institution and mechanism, review and how to update over time, restate commitment of developed countries to help developing countries in addressing barriers and commitments to enhance deployment of technologies that should be in the agreement as proposed earlier by the **United Arab Emirates**.

On 4 September, the spin-off group got into a drafting exercise on three points of convergence: cooperative actions; anchoring technology institutional arrangements; and framework on enhanced actions but Parties could not reach agreement and ran out of time.

**China speaking for the G77 and China** stressed that the next session (in October) must focus

on text-based negotiations with discussion on conceptual issues only when necessary.

### **Capacity building**

Parties continued to disagree on the need for an international mechanism for capacity building after a spin-off group on enhancing institutional arrangement.

Developing country Parties had called for the mechanism to be anchored in the agreement while developed country Parties believed the existing capacity building framework called the Durban Forum can be enhanced.

**The United States** said it is not yet convinced that there is a need for the mechanism but there is a need to identify the gaps through a work programme. It said the Durban Forum can assume this task by having experts sharing their expertise and do so in the pre-2020 period in view of the agreement that will come into force. (The agreement to be concluded at the year end’s Paris COP is expected to enter into force in 2020.)

**Gambia** reminded the US that recommendations (for improvement) from the Durban Forum were not implemented simply because there is no mechanism for implementation. In a sharp retort to the US, it pointed out the contradiction with the US policy of finding solutions to international cooperation as demonstrated by the capacity building efforts by its Environmental Protection Agency in building the expertise of greenhouse gas inventory in developing countries. ‘I think you need to rethink ... so that we can fully adapt and commit to actions instead of wasting time as it is not helpful,’ Gambia added.

**Senegal speaking for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** lamented that the Durban Forum is just a talk-shop. It asked if the US negotiator has personally attended the Durban Forum and (knows) what happened after that, noting that after three meetings of the Durban Forum, nothing has happened.

**Swaziland representing the African Group** said the Durban Forum is not to be considered an institution due to the way it is structured. The Group needs to know how it could be strengthened.

**China representing the G77 and China** said little progress has been made, noting that the agreement is about enhanced implementation for both pre- and post-2020. There is emergency need because there is no institution for capacity building under the current arrangement, China says, insisting that the Durban Forum does not fulfil this function and the Group’s request for a new institution should

be included in the discussion for a new agreement by the October session.

**Japan** noted the frustration and that Parties wanted to get into textual negotiation but said there is a need to capture the views and needs holistically, noting that the work cannot be completed at this session.

In response, **China** stressed the need to start the October session with text on the screen but the textual work has to be balanced with the G77 and China's position that is missing. It noted that the Group's position contained both existing and new institutions, adding that the Group had compromised by agreeing to spin-off group meetings to solve the divergence. It said the idea of a work programme can go into the draft decision.

**Saudi Arabia representing the Like-minded Developing Countries, India and Sudan** (in their national capacity) supported having text on the screen and moving paragraph 75 in Part 3 to Part 1.

At the last facilitated group on 4 September, co-facilitator Artur Rung-Meztger (the European Union) presented a textual proposal based on the co-facilitators' understanding of the elements that were discussed in the two spin-off groups on capacity building between 2016 and 2020 and enhancement of institutional arrangements. He said it is a delicate exercise and there is certainly no consensus, noting that it is not going to please all Parties.

To a question from **Gambia**, he said it is not up to the co-facilitators to compile any negotiation text but they would advise the Co-Chairs that these are the rich discussions captured.

(The textual proposal is contained in the working document compiled by the secretariat available here:

[http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp2-10\\_h\\_04sept2015t2000\\_wds.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp2-10_h_04sept2015t2000_wds.pdf))

### **Transparency of action and support**

After two facilitated group meetings, developing country Parties continued to seek clarity on the 'next step' as Parties on the leftover speaking list from 31 August provided their views on the Co-Chairs' tool.

**Botswana representing the African Group** said it needed to have a clear view on placement of the issues, noting that transparency of support relates to fundamental interests and should be MRV'd and proposed that the spin-off group meeting should provide equal time on transparency of action and support.

**Speaking for the Least Developed Countries, Angola** would like to see enhanced transparency for

both mitigation and adaptation and avoid double counting, including support by developed countries to developing countries and to ensure environmental integrity. It believed it is too early to move into a single accounting system. It expressed concern on the limitation of funding of one delegate for each meeting.

**Bolivia and Venezuela** supported the proposal made by **China on behalf of the Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** for reorganising the draft decision in a logical order of transparency of mitigation action; transparency of adaptation action; generally ensuring MRV of support provided and received.

**Bolivia** also underscored that under the Convention, developed country Parties have the commitment to provide finance but not developing countries, thus by nature the transparency section has to be differentiated.

**Venezuela** sought clarity on the 'next step'; if this discussion would be used as input for a streamlined text. To this, co-facilitator Kwok Fook Seng (Singapore) said there is a parallel conversation of negotiators with the Co-Chairs on the matter and asked Parties to bear with their frustration.

**Malaysia** said transparency is not only for enhancing post-2020 but also pre-2020. Transparency should be based on the existing system under the Convention to ensure that the approach is differentiated, and it notes that during the transition period, there is a need for enhancement of capacity and modification of the system.

Co-facilitator Kwok said there is commonality among Parties that we are building from an existing system but there must be a transition which is the evolution of the MRV system itself. Developing countries would need support to build their capability to achieve a high level of the MRV system for both pre- and post-2020. Parties also have to consider the adaptation aspect which is different from transparency of mitigation action.

He recognised that many concepts and issues within this Section had not been fully discussed and lack clarity but they would be covered without prejudice to their placement, adding that Parties' views on linkages with other sections like mitigation and finance have been noted.

Kwok then proposed that Parties consider the texts in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Co-Chairs' tool on the notion that 'developing country Parties need support to participate effectively in the transparency framework' i.e. the support for MRV for the next meeting.

On 2 September, Parties shared their views on support for transparency.

**South Africa** said it is a central issue which determined whether developing countries become mere passengers in a moving bus or become effective participants. It said this element should be anchored in the agreement.

**Bahamas representing the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** said there is lack of resources to support national implementation.

Brazil welcomed support provided for MRV and expects it to be enhanced, adding that timing of the support is important as it takes time to prepare a new MRV system.

**The European Union, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United States and Australia** supported a robust system in general and needs for enhancement with the US noting that it should also provide feedback while **Japan** said in the post-2020 period the system will have to take into account different national capacity.

Due to limited time, Parties also agreed to have two other spin-off groups to deal with differentiation/flexibility and accounting/accountability of the MRV system. **Saudi Arabia** proposed creating a fact-finding spin-off group for differentiation. It was supported by India saying that the key issue is a common but differentiated system.

On 3 September, the fourth facilitated group meeting continued with the unfinished speakers' list.

**Algeria on behalf of the African Group** said developing countries lacked MRV capabilities. It pointed out that we have to avoid a mitigation-centric system and also address adaptation and means of implementation. It also said the focus must not only be on Intended Nationally-Determined Contributions (INDCs) but on other actions that must be taken by Parties.

Co-facilitator Kwok said many Parties have accepted that in terms of scope it is not just about mitigation but also adaptation and other elements.

**Singapore** said for additional transparency and obligations, additional support and capacity building will be provided to help developing countries fulfil obligations under the Paris agreement. Details (on how to do it) like timing, vehicle of provision for support, quantum of support, and types of support can be elaborated in the decision text.

It provided a text proposal **on behalf of AOSIS**: *Developed country Parties shall provide adequate support to developing country Parties in complying with their obligations for transparency under the Paris agreement so as to ensure effective participation of developing country Parties in the transparency system under the Convention.*

**India** said we need a very clear anchoring of how support is built into and how it is accounted for in a transparent manner. Given the scope of support we would like to capture all elements, in view of the fact that post-2020 requirements will be more onerous and more detailed, India stressed, adding that it has a specific formulation for text.

**China representing the LMDC** supported other developing countries on the need for support for MRV and Brazil's statement that the support system cannot be an overnight work and that it takes time. It presented the Group's proposal to amend several paragraphs in Part 1 touching on continuous, systematic and adequate support to build developing country Parties' MRV capacity; that the extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement the MRV arrangements set out in the agreement will depend on the effective implementation of developed country Parties' commitments; that a long-term finance channel shall be established under the GCF (Green Climate Fund) or the Global Environment Facility to build the MRV capacity of developing country Parties. **Saudi Arabia** supported the statement.

**The US** said it is taken with the idea of capacity building for transparency and is happy to work with Angola and China on a bridging proposal on capacity building.

Parties also considered having the co-facilitators from capacity building, technology and finance to participate in informal meetings as done by other groups.

The spin-off on accounting/accountability reported back that accounting is broader than the calculation of quantitative elements in tracking progress as it should include provisions for ensuring environmental integrity (no double counting).

Accountability is harder to define. It refers to the responsibility to explain what was achieved and the steps taken to implement, report and review the information.

The spin-off on differentiation/flexibility reported that Parties identified the following concepts that should guide a proposal: build on experience with the current system; no backsliding/forward progression and support for transparency is needed. Parties also expressed different views on whether flexibility would be determined by category of Parties or would be self-determined on the basis of capacity.

In terms of the bridging proposal itself, two key concepts emerged: Such a proposal should consider the timeframe, whether the system should start in 2020, or whether it should start after 2020.

## **Timeframe and process related to commitments/contributions/Other matters related to implementation and ambition**

Parties engaged in providing their reactions to the Co-Chairs' tool and shared their views on the storylines. The facilitated group meetings were co-facilitated by Roberto Dondisch (Mexico), who from the outset said Parties are invited to bring ideas to bring their positions closer and to have bilaterals with the co-facilitators. The other co-facilitator was George Womukoya (Kenya). Discussion focused on a number of issues around scope, timing, communication of commitments/contributions, collective stocktaking and housing.

**Malaysia speaking for the LMDC** preferred a short and concise section focusing on issues that could be dealt with in the Paris agreement in a pragmatic and implementable way. It stressed the use of simple, neutral words that people are comfortable with and not rewrite the Convention language. We must bear in mind linkages of different sections without prejudice to the outcome of other sections at this stage, Malaysia said.

It stressed the scope is not limited to mitigation but also adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building in a differentiated manner, adding that this is the overarching issue that can build trust.

The timeframe of the contribution is up to each country to define, either five or 10 years. On the aggregate review, it must be a comprehensive assessment of means of implementation and differentiation consistent with Articles of the Convention. The review is about assessing the information rather than serving as a basis for ratcheting up ambition, said Malaysia. But if the purpose is to increase ambition then we should review the entire system of commitment to support, which also includes the decision in Workstream 2 of the accelerated implementation process to ratchet up means of implementation to enable developing countries to increase their ambitions.

**Singapore** agreed with Malaysia that review is both looking at collective aggregate and all the relevant aspects, noting that mitigation is to be linked to support to get us where we are. It said having cycles that force everyone to submit at the same time is not realistic.

Earlier it said the tool is confusing as many issues are being mixed up and Singapore sees benefit to untangle them, noting that there are discussions on cycles in other sections like mitigation and reporting (transparency). It felt that housing which

is not a timeframe issue should be removed and more in-depth discussion on what updating means would be useful.

**China** said the purpose of the storyline is to achieve real ambition and that implementation is the key issue that must be resolved in Paris. Outlining the four issues related to ambition implementation, it said the scope must be linked to differentiation. Timeframe is related to the INDC but we now have two different timelines of 2025 or 2030 based on submissions. In Paris, it is crucial to ensure that Parties submit their INDC from 2021 to 2030 and should be included in the COP decision.

On review, China said it is an information tool to share best practices and a cooperation area to accelerate the INDC as well as increase the level of ambition and realise the full scope of means of implementation. It also thinks that housing is not a timeframe issue and should be in Section L on procedural and institutional provisions and should be in a COP decision.

To reduce anxiety, we must prevent a mitigation-centric timeframe, said China, adding that adjustment or finalisation of INDC will lead to a name and shame game. We also need to identify linkages that will reduce the anxiety of naming and shaming. One linkage is the pre- and post-2020 review that needs to be tested in the pre-2020 timeframe. We need to get experience from the pre-2020 to get a clear idea in post-2020.

Another sensitive concept is the word 'cycle', China said further, noting that in the Chinese belief system, cycle could mean being banished to hell if one performs poorly and that is highly punitive, intrusive and disrespecting national circumstances.

**Saudi Arabia representing the Arab Group** questioned the sincerity of having a timeframe, saying it is merely an exercise for public consumption that Parties are ensuring that the agreement is durable. To limit temperature rise to 2°C would require (greenhouse gas) emission reductions of 40 to 70% and with full provision of finance but it pointed out that the GCF is nowhere near the US\$100 billion pledged. (The pledge made by developed countries is for US\$100 billion a year by 2020.)

The Group said we should not introduce new concepts and the time is better spent in discussing means of implementation and that timeframe issues should be dealt with in Part 2.

**Colombia speaking for the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)** said no backsliding and progression is important. Global stocktake is also important and

housing is important for formalisation. Scope should apply to different elements and not just mitigation, it said.

**Brazil** said it has the feeling that it is watching the same movie twice. It is important to note that the key word for the storyline is ambition, stressing that it is not related to mitigation only but closely related to means of implementation on how to achieve better ambition and targets. It is also related to adaptation in the sense that adaptation needs have to be taken into account.

On housing, Brazil disagreed with having annexes, which are reflected as options. The concept of timeframe is for Parties to increase ambition over time and to reconsider their own choice based on an aggregate evaluation of the way forward and updates on contribution. It agreed that adaptation is a different process and may not be required to be included as a component in the same cycle. It said there are elements in Parts 2 and 3 that need to be reflected in Part 1.

**Japan** said timeframe is related to mitigation action and wanted INDCs to be upgraded either collectively or individually at periodic intervals. It is necessary to have a common cycle to listing them in the agreement, it said, adding that it is important that Parties revisit their mitigation contribution seamlessly so we can evaluate the global situation clearly, so it is desirable to have a common target year whereby the targets will be decided by COP decisions.

**Australia** said the INDCs process is important to have all Parties come together at the same time that signals some kind of harmonised and regular update. On adaptation, it is not in the same structured manner like mitigation but has flexibility and countries can communicate their undertaking rather than account for it.

**New Zealand** sees differences between the initial and subsequent mitigation contributions. The initial contribution is communicated via an INDC and following that a consolidation process and

collective assessment to the long-term global goal. For subsequent mitigation contributions, the order will be changed slightly to engaging, consultation process before finalisation and the collective assessment.

**Norway** said updates would be just as important as the commitments and would be seen in the light of progression and collective efforts and long-term goal for mitigation. It thinks that issues of update, housing and collective stocktake can be set out in decisions.

**The European Union** said it heard a lot of convergence. There is recognition for dynamic elements for mitigation, adaptation and finance but these may not be identical. It said housing is an important issue but does fit into timeframe.

**Canada** said the provision of updating is about ratcheting up ambition. It also agreed that housing is not suited for this section.

(To this, co-facilitator Dondisch said for this session, this will be addressed under this section.)

As a number of countries raised cross-cutting issues, the co-facilitators on finance and on adaptation and loss and damage were invited to brief Parties on the timeframe link in their respective sections.

Parties also worked in a spin-off group focusing on housing where legal, political and practical implications of the various housing issues were discussed.

At the last facilitated meeting on 4 September, co-facilitator Dondisch presented what he had heard for Parties' comment, noting that it is not a textual proposal but just identification of articles and paragraphs in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Co-Chairs' tool as Parties have done the exercise. He further said there is still opportunity to work on them and it is just a tool for clarity containing issues with agreement and no agreement.

(With inputs from Kate Dooley on transparency of action and support.)

### Convergence on pre-2020 Climate Actions still Elusive

Bonn, 12 September (Hilary Chiew) – Divergence among Parties remained on the possible elements for a draft decision on Workstream 2 (WS2) of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) that deals with pre-2020 climate actions.

Discussion on WS2 took place at the 10th meeting of the second session of the ADP held from 31 August to 4 September in Bonn.

Developing country Parties are disappointed with the ADP Co-Chairs' draft decision text which they felt would not result in a successful year-end Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris. They stressed the need to close the implementation gaps which include not only mitigation but also adaptation and the means of implementation (finance, technology transfer and capacity building).

Developed country Parties maintained their positions from the June session of disregarding differentiation (between developing and developed countries) while acknowledging that enhancing pre-2020 mitigation ambition is an essential and integral part of the Durban Platform. They also insisted that there should not be duplication of efforts as there are already existing mechanisms and institutions taking care of implementation. They also felt the existing transparency system of the biennial update report and international consultation and analysis can be further improved to show where mitigation ambition can be increased among developing countries to enhance implementation without changing the character of WS2.

The European Union (EU) in a submission on 31 August said, 'We also welcome the invitation to those Parties with existing mitigation commitments/pledges to consider opportunities for enhancing their efforts as identified through the technical

examination process, **but believe that this invitation should also apply to Parties without existing mitigation pledges.**' (Emphasis added)

The submission is available here: [http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/75\\_99\\_130854828421341486LU-08-31-%20EU%20Workstream%20%20mitigation%20a\\_mb.pdf](http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/75_99_130854828421341486LU-08-31-%20EU%20Workstream%20%20mitigation%20a_mb.pdf)

Two informal meetings – implementation and Technical Examination Process – were held during the Bonn session. WS2 is co-facilitated by Aya Yoshida (Japan) and George Wamukoya (Kenya).

In general, developing countries called for a balanced text with their inputs reflected by the next session in October while developed countries could accept the text as a basis for negotiation.

At the last facilitated group meeting on 3 September, the Group of 77 and China informed that it would make a textual submission taking into account all the inputs, interventions and the co-facilitators' working documents well in advance of the next session.

Yoshida closed the meeting and announced that the next iteration will include all inputs and that the co-facilitators will produce the text.

Below are highlights from country groupings and country Parties on their views on the draft decision text.

**Mali representing the Group of 77 and China (G77 and China)** said the draft decision prepared by the Co-Chairs for WS2 is a good start but 'we are not there yet'. It said for WS2, developing countries are looking for an outcome that drives action on mitigation and action on adaptation in developing countries taking into account provision of finance, technology transfer and capacity building. It said as much as the draft touched on many key issues, it lacks specific actions and is insufficient to make a difference in increasing ambition on the ground.

‘We have been in this for many years now and it is time to go beyond just asking the United Nations body to enhance provision of finance but (we need) to give a specific goal. We need to keep focus on actions necessary to drive and help us get the ambitions,’ the G77 and China statement stressed.

Providing specific comments on the preamble, Mali said the section should recall a number of key decisions: paragraphs 3 and 4 of COP decision 1/CP.17, paragraphs 17 and 18 of COP decision 1/CP.18 and the link between pre-2020 and post-2020 ambitions.

Referring to the synthesis paper to be prepared by the UNFCCC Secretariat on the aggregate effect of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) communicated by Parties up to 1 October by 1 November, Mali said the synthesis paper on INDCs would present Parties with the post-2020 gap and this should stress the importance of early actions and the link for mitigation and greater adaptation.

On the objective section, it said there should be enhancement of mitigation and adaptation as well as providing specific guidance to the Convention bodies, in reference to the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).

Mali further said the Group called for a process of accelerated implementation of actions as in reality the actions taken are simply not enough but it is disappointed that the call was not reflected whatsoever in the draft decision.

It also said Parties are expecting the decision (on WS2) to be taken in Paris to launch this process so we would need concrete activities to assist developing countries. Referring to the capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Mali pointed out that out of US\$10.3 billion announced by Lima (venue of COP20), only US\$2.5 billion are made available today. So it is back to the point that we have a gap and need additional resources and we need to launch a process to mobilise the resources.

On mitigation in developing countries, it noted that the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) registry is there and a number of pilot projects are also getting nowhere due to lack of funds.

Mali warned that the draft decision in its present form is not going to lead to a COP decision and developing country Parties would like to leave the Bonn session with a revised draft.

Concurring with the G77 and China statement, **Saudi Arabia speaking for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs)** stressed that the text does not go far enough to strike the right balance essential for the success of WS2. Meeting existing

commitments is essential but many would remain unfulfilled with the current text. We stand a chance of success if there are accelerated actions with developed countries taking the lead by achieving 45% emissions reduction by 2050 in accordance with science.

Supporting the G77 and China call for an accelerated implementation process, Saudi Arabia said mitigation by developing countries is best through the fulfilment of means of implementation such as a clear roadmap for the US\$100 billion a year by 2020, and transfer of environmentally-sound technology by developed countries.

It said there is no need to remind Parties of the importance of WS2 for the success of Paris as ultimately WS2 is a crucial matter of trust.

**China** urged Parties to cooperate and create new momentum as there is only a short time left before the Paris COP. It said WS2 should not be regarded as a burden but an opportunity to build trust to reach an agreement for post-2020 actions.

It also found the draft decision text far from being a balanced document to reflect the integrity of the Durban mandate and the subsequent decisions of Doha, Warsaw and Lima (COP decisions).

China sees WS2 as an opportunity to transfer science to a policy process where developed country Parties consider the higher mitigation level of 25% to 40% from 1990 levels. It said although Parties have built mechanisms, they are tools for us to make tangible and substantial progress, adding that it is high time for WS2 to identify the substance and make those mechanisms work. For example, on finance, China said the US\$100 billion was agreed in Cancun (COP16 in 2010) and it would be extremely helpful to ensure those financial resources are in place.

Through the G77 and China’s proposal for an accelerated implementation mechanism, China said Parties can identify the gaps in the most pragmatic manner to move mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation in finance, technology transfer and capacity building forward. It said there can be a technical paper and thematic workshop to develop programmes under the current mechanisms or we can practise the transparency measures of the International Consultation and Analysis and International Assessment and Review with a view to improve the measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) to enhance actions.

**Venezuela** said more than innovation, Parties need to prioritise trust by addressing directly the implementation gap of Annex I Parties. It said the G77 and China proposal is on the table but it is not reflected in the draft decision text of the Co-Chairs.

It further expressed concern over the emphasis on the role of non-state actors.

**India** said the draft decision text does not cover the entire range of issues. It stressed that there is an intrinsic link between WS1 (post-2020 actions) and WS2 and Parties need to see through the artificial time slices. It said paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Lima decision has clear elements of what needs to be done and Parties cannot be selective.

(Paragraph 17 reads: *Encourages all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to ratify and implement the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol;*

Paragraph 18 reads: *Reiterates its resolve as set out in decision 1/CP.19, paragraphs 3 and 4, to accelerate the full implementation of the decisions constituting the agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 and enhance ambition in the pre-2020 period in order to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts under the Convention by all Parties.*)

India said we are aware of the aggregate gap and we know that the pre-2020 mitigation gap of 25% to 40% needs to be filled, and if we want to see progression in post-2020, how can it be status quo in pre-2020.

On existing institutions, India said many are inadequate prompting the G77 and China to put forward the idea of an accelerated implementation mechanism to take care of the range of implementation needed to address the pre-2020 gap. Citing the example of TEC and CTCN, it said the activities are confined to advice, guidance, planning and governing issues and no actual collaborative research. Similarly, in finance, with the Standing Committee on Finance and Long-term Finance, there is lack of clarity from these institutions if we are on track to reach the US\$100 billion goal.

In terms of non-state actors, India said it is important that they bring additionality and not result in double-counting of efforts that are already accounted for in National Communications. On the technical review process, it said it has to be anchored in realism of what it is achieving and what it is likely to achieve.

**Brazil** said it is ready to engage in the WS2 discussion in building the missing elements identified by others. It reminded Parties that WS2 was negotiated under the ADP mandate precisely because there was acknowledgment that there is a gap in pre-2020 that needs to be addressed.

It said Parties have been discussing and considering options and had a series of technical expert meetings which identified policy options with high mitigation potential in the last four years and

there are still five years to go. Brazil said it has yet to see evidence that work under WS2 would produce positive outcomes as mentioned by the EU (through its submission on 31 August), at least not at the level that can address the gap.

Brazil is also sceptical that providing more visibility on high-level engagement would be enough, adding that Parties need to take into account the scale of initiatives as not only would there be a pre-2020 gap but the gap would remain when the (post-2020) agreement entered into force, stressing that the missing link is the implementation of financial commitments.

It said there are ways for us to identify instruments or create new instruments to provide guidance to investment funds worldwide to redirect capital into climate-friendly actions and ideas conducive to closing the gap.

Brazil also stressed that WS2 is not about actions of developing country Parties but involves all countries and we expect developed countries to improve and enhance their actions in the pre-2020 period, reiterating the centrality of the UNFCCC as the multilateral process to combat climate change.

**The Maldives representing the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** also emphasised the need for trust, noting that there should be a comprehensive commitment by developed country Parties as existing commitments cannot close the gap. It would like to see a better link between the technical examination process and the political level with COP presidencies organising annual high-level segments and appointment of champions to scale up existing cooperative initiatives, and mobilise resources and identification of new partners. It also wanted the technical examination process to be reviewed to make WS2 more effective.

**Mexico** concurred that WS2 should send out a signal that we are not going to wait for the new agreement before taking actions and it can be considered as early implementation. It noted the missing links with existing institutions to drive more implementation and would like to see clear links to the financial mechanism. It is also sceptical of high-level engagement and urged Parties to be frank and question whether this (approach) will catalyse actions, adding that while it is important, it should be improved by learning from past experiences. Mexico welcomed the launching of the technical examination process on adaptation.

**Speaking for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Bangladesh** said the technical examination process was useful and it understood that the exercise was to allow us to identify policy options and

concrete actions of high mitigation potential, but it wanted to see concrete actions on the ground. It is happy with the EU's submission that the technical examination process is a supplementary effort that can help.

However, the LDCs noted that without a new initiative towards mobilising both financial resources and technological support that is needed, it would be impossible to implement the enhanced actions on the ground. On institutional arrangement, Bangladesh said it is looking for institutions or initiatives that can really make a difference on the ground.

**Colombia representing the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)** said the draft decision text is a good start as a basis to build a consensus text to accelerate actions on the ground and close the pre-2020 gap. It said WS2 should reinforce acceleration and it is therefore crucial that developed country Parties take the lead and scale up support for developing countries. To strengthen the text, it suggested improving the technical examination process where it should be housed under the COP and requiring the GCF, CTCN and TEC to provide direct support to countries. After 2015, it said, the idea of regional technical expert meetings (TEMs) should be explored and a specific TEM session for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions as put forward by developing countries.

**South Africa** urged Parties to focus on the problems we are trying to solve which is the gap. It said that there are two sources of mitigation potential – domestic and international, thus there is opportunity to create sub-regional markets.

**The European Union** introduced its latest submission at the first facilitated group meeting on 31 August and said the submission supports what it saw as an opportunity to inspire improvement by strengthening the architecture to ensure continuity of pre-2020 ambition. The EU recalled that it signalled at the June session (ADP2.9) that it would undertake mapping of on-going processes and a work plan that addressed this issue of pre-2020 actions but it was difficult to find that they are not already taking place.

It said it is interested to explore applying the technical examination process to adaptation. It stressed the importance of involvement of non-state actors to enhance pre-2020 actions and that the technical examination process is worth continuing as it is already showing results, citing the example of renewable energy in Africa that is now growing outside of the Convention. It believed that it is

important to bring high-level attention to the technical examination process and link this with actors outside of the UNFCCC.

**Japan** said the technical examination process should focus on areas with high mitigation potential. On adaptation, it said it has to be kept in mind that the objective of the technical examination process is on mitigation but it is open to conversation on adaptation, adding that it is critical to avoid duplicating the work of the Adaptation Committee. It said many existing initiatives are already working on strengthening implementation. On strengthening linkages to the financial mechanism, it said this is done in Workstream 1 (post-2020 actions) and should not be duplicated by WS2.

**South Korea** said Parties need to bear in mind time constraints and be realistic of what can be done. It said WS2's focus is on mitigation but if all Parties can agree, then it can accept extending the effort to cover adaptation minimally. It said it supports adaptation only when it had direct implications for mitigation, noting that it has no appetite for adaptation as suggested in paragraph 14 though it could support paragraph 6.

(Paragraph 6 reads: *Agrees to further enhance the technical examination of opportunities with high mitigation potential, including those with adaptation, health and sustainable development co-benefits, in the period 2016-2020 with a focus on accelerating the implementation of actions.*)

Paragraph 14 reads: *Decides to conduct a technical examination of adaptation beginning in 2016, building on the lessons learned from the technical examination of opportunities with high mitigation potential, recognizing the unique characteristics, stakeholders, and needs of cooperative action on adaptation, and also recognizing the need to build on, without duplication, existing arrangements under the Convention.*)

South Korea supported engagement of non-state actors as important partners and regarded the technical examination process as the vehicle to implement WS2 and also support the development of regional TEMs. It also said ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol is important and entering into force (of the second commitment period for emissions reduction by Annex I Parties) is a symbolic building block for trust-building.

**Norway** said a substantial decision in WS2 must be made in Paris but there are missing elements in the text. It said the technical examination process should focus on actions with high mitigation potential although it recognised the need for adaptation actions, noting that adaptation should be

dealt with by existing institutions and WS2 could invite the Adaptation Committee to address the WS2. It further said the COP should identify suitable homes for the technical examination process i.e the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the TEC.

**The United States (US)** said the technical examination process is a very well tailored tool which is still in its infancy and is exploring options and would continue to be improved. It sees the work ahead as conceptual discussion involving broad ideas focusing on areas of convergence such as high-level engagement to strengthen the technical examination process.

It said there is broad agreement that we should enhance involvement of non-state actors as critical allies to fight climate change. It said Parties should use this session to discuss the finance issue in depth. On inefficiencies of the Convention bodies, it said a number of them were newly created.

On adaptation, the US said the idea should be taken up in the appropriate fora like the adaptation committee and agreed with Norway that WS2 can invite representatives from the committee to inform Parties of their current work. On the role of champions, it said bringing non-state actors into the process is a powerful way to help the TEM and it is important to hear them early in the process.