WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1999 FLAWED ON MANY FRONTS
by Prof Alejandro Nadal*
Mexico City, 27 Sep99 -- UNCTAD's World Investment Report 1999 (WIR-99), on the most recent trends and main characteristics of foreign direct investment (FDI) as it evolved during 1998, examines this year the trends, and the impact of FDI on financial resources, technological capabilities, employment and the environment.
Unfortunately, the report is flawed on several fronts. In the first place, it continues the tradition of previous reports in which FDI is presented as an autonomous or independent entity evolving in an economic and institutional vacuum. In doing this, the report fails to even look at the main determinants of FDI flows between and amongst developed and developing countries.
The report makes many references to the globalization of production and finance, but takes this phenomenon as something which befell humankind from the skies-as if deregulation of capital accounts, or trade liberalization, or inter-capitalist competition, or massive deregulation and embarrassment, all the result of policy choices (enforced by conditionalities or voluntary) are not of consequence. In this sense, it follows a sad tradition of studies which present FDI as an autonomous engine bringing about the benefits and calamities of 'globalization'.
The WIR-99 fails to recognize that FDI moves in a macroeconomic environment where deregulation and privatization, reduced State intervention and balanced budgets, restrictive monetary policies and wage repression (under policies for inflation control), are the dominating lines. The key actors of FDI, the transnational corporations (TNCs), thrive in this environment. This macroeconomic climate, and policy objectives, are more related to stability of the general price level and thus, restrictive monetary policies, as well as to fiscal policies resulting (at least in Latin America) to massive cuts in public investment in health, education, housing, and infrastructure. The alleged purpose has been to avoid public indebtedness and thus prevent hikes in interest rates and crowding out of private investment.
The truth is that in several very important cases, such as in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the resources liberated have thus far been allocated to rescue bankers and corporate groups from the harshness of market discipline.
FDI takes place today under the aegis of market determined flexible exchange rates and deregulated markets for international capital movements. This macroeconomic atmosphere is also closely related to the notion that there is little or no autonomy for macroeconomic policy- making. The phenomenal volume of financial capital as well as its great mobility have encouraged national governments to a conservative stance designed to avoid disturbing financial markets that could trigger capital flight. This explains why macroeconomic policies have become more restrictive, why monetary and fiscal policy decision-making is designed to reduce or eliminate budget deficits, and aim more at reducing inflation even in the context of high unemployment and low growth - abandoning any pretence to foster development through growth promoting measures.
The question of degree of autonomy for macroeconomic policies is quite relevant to the analysis of FDI. It also finds a mirror reflection at the sector level due to what WIR-99 calls the 'new rules of trade liberalization'. This is examined below in the context of policy recommendations of the report which run counter to this macroeconomic posture which is adopted in many developing countries, and is peddled by the World bank, the IMF and the OECD.
Unfortunately, WIR-99 fails to establish a connection between trends in FDI flows and events in the sphere of financial and capital market interdependencies. The year 1998 was a particularly important year from this perspective, as the effects of financial crisis that began in Asia ricocheted through the world economy, and the unilateral debt restructuring in Russia sent shock waves through the financial markets. These events bolstered the so-called mature financial markets as a 'flight to quality' took place, with investors shifting funds away from Asia and other emerging markets.
Thus, the search for large scale portfolio balancing in the light of drastic changes in risk assessment and the search for short- term financial gains, are as important as strategic repositioning of firms looking for better and more reliable partners in foreign markets in the bulk of mergers and acquisitions. But WIR-99 ignores these and other events, such as the successful launch of the European Monetary Union, and fails to analyze the linkages between productive foreign direct investment and developments in the world's financial markets. This is a major omission as growth of FDI in 1998 is explained by operations called Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) which are essentially different from new greenfield investments (i.e., new plant and productive installations). M&As are simple ownership transfers and do not add new physical production capacity. They are more related to events in highly securitized financial and capital markets than to the expansion of global production facilities.
Besides, M&As in 1998 were also fuelled by financial integration between major banking systems (an important element considering that M&As in banking frequently rely on cross-exchanges of equity and do not involve financial flows).
Because of this failure to set the analysis in a more general context, FDI is once again portrayed as an autonomous force emanating as a consequence of unexplainable imperatives. From here to a mystified view of FDI there is only one small step. And WIR-99 takes it.
The WIR examines general and regional trends, as well as the impact of FDI on technological development, export competitiveness, employment, and the environment. But the failure to set FDI in the context of the more general economic model (the old Washington consensus) leads to inexact and, all too frequently, naive policy conclusions and recommendations. All of this tends to deliver a over-arching general message that FDI is, essentially, commendable for all the right and proper things it generates and brings along.
The WIR also maintains the tradition of previous reports, where the diplomatic tone of UN documents becomes more apologetic, and in some cases frankly turns to advocacy for the TNCs which are the main actors in foreign direct investments. The rhetoric of UN Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, in the preface betrays something important which marks the WIR at every turn of the road. This rhetoric delivers the comfortable message that FDI has a basically positive role on technology ('enhancement' of technological capabilities), trade balance ('boosting export competitiveness') employment ('upgrading of employment'), the environment ('protecting the environment').
The corollary of this general message is that all economies in the world will benefit if they 'create the conditions that attract FDI'. To promote development, governments need to maximize the positive contribution of FDI, and to minimize any negative effects. But, as WIR-99 does not analyze the role of FDI in the context of deep structural reforms which include, among other things, the central policy objective of less State intervention in economic life, it is hard to understand how Annan conceives attempts to minimize negative effects in the context of a State that has its hands tied behind its back, or, even worse, one in which special interests and corporate groups have hijacked the springs of power mechanisms, and are able to commandeer the power of State agencies and use them for their own benefit.
The WIR-99 thus sets the stage for its discourse of advocacy, instead of analytical rigour.
General Global and Regional Trends FDI in 1998 reached $644 billion, up from $464 billion in 1997.
This 39% increase represents the highest growth rate since 1987. How did this growth occur in a bad year which showed a growth rate for world GDP of two percent?
The increase in FDI appears indeed impressive. But there are two key elements behind this spectacular growth. One is the role of M&As: FDI was not so much, then, the mythical engine of globalization of production, but rather of restructuring of assets, speculation, and oligopolistic reorganization. M&As are closely related to generation of significant rent transfers among countries.
Decomposing total FDI flows by host country reveals that most of the increase is due to flows between developed countries. In fact, developed countries were responsible for $460 billion or 71 percent, while developing countries received only $166 billion, or 25% of total FDI inflows.
According to the WIR-99 data itself, FDI in developing countries dropped from $173 billion in 1997, and remained stable at $19 billion in transition economies. At the same time, it increased by 68% in developed countries.
FDI growth is also explained by the burst of growth of M&As. These operations accounted for $544 billion, or more than 84% of the total flows identified as FDI in 1998. As already mentioned, M&A operations do not really represent a new productive investment, but simple changes in ownership. M&As are more related to huge reorganization of rent flows at the international level-a far cry from the popular notion that huge flows of new and fresh capital is constantly adding to new productive capacity and reorganizing production at a global scale.
Finally, FDI growth is also explained in part by a significant amount of re-invested profits, which more appropriately should be considered domestic savings if we use the 'lieu de residence' economic criterion. Instead, WIR-99 adopts the conventional view which sees in reinvested profits a phenomenon akin in nature to FDI. The report offers very little by way of data on reinvested profits by categories of economies. It does appear that reinvested earnings have dropped as a share of total FDI in the case of developing countries from a high 40% in the early nineties to 17% of total FDI flows in 1997.
On the other hand, WIR-99 fails to analyze the full implications of FDI from a balance of payments perspective for developing countries. UNCTAD's report considers that FDI flows help stabilize capital inflows into developing countries, but it should be noted that there are multiple explicit and implicit costs which are associated with this. On the cost side of the equation we have to include repatriated earnings and profits from the accumulated stock of FDI in host countries. WIR-99 provides little data on repatriated profits, but they appear to add up to more than $33 billion in 1997. Thus, on average according to WIR-99 data, for every dollar of repatriated profits, there were three dollars of FDI inflow during the period 1991-1997.
UNCTAD's report on FDI does not offer this information for 1998, but if the decade's trends are used to estimate 1998 levels of repatriated profits, it is likely that the figure is $30 billion. If one subtracts this and considers the net inflow of FDI, we are left with $130 billion to developing countries. A significant amount of this figure corresponds to M&As, and another chunk comes from loans and other funds raised in the host countries' own money and capital markets. So the net contribution to all developing countries of new and fresh (so-called greenfield) investments is significantly lower than what the ritual incantations on FDI suggest. And if we take into account that FDI is intensely concentrated in a small number of countries, the rest of the developing world is merely receiving a trickle of total foreign direct investments.
Repatriated profits should be considered when analysing the full balance of payments implications of FDI. But, in addition, there are other costs involved, as affiliates of transnational corporations (TNCs) can be parties to intra-firm operations where over and/or underpricing of intermediate and capital goods can lead to intercountry transfers of profits. The WIR-99 considers that possibly these transactions are less important today in the light of trade liberalization and taxation agreements. This view is incorrect, for taxation agreements do not mean homogeneous tax rates on profits, intrafirm transactions or royalty receipts. On the other hand, the importance of intra-firm transactions is a clear indication that the avenues for inter-country transfers of profitability are greater today than at any other time. In fact, the WIR-99 itself mentions a study in which 84% of developing countries participating in an UNCTAD survey estimated that the affiliates they hosted shifted income to their parent companies through some of the channels mentioned above in order to avoid tax liabilities. The study also quotes data on income adjustments made by the United States tax authorities to reflect these transfers in the year 1994 for a total of $3.5 billion. That figure probably reflects the tip of a huge iceberg that UNCTAD and other agencies should examine carefully.
The WIR-99 seems to embrace the idea that FDI is a critical tool for enhancement of technological capabilities. The title of Chapter VII implies this. But how do we know FDI is enhancing technological capabilities in host countries?
The basic criterion used by WIR-99 is that technology flows can be measured by the amount of technology payments. One of the most unfortunate statements of WIR-99 upholds the notion that since technology payments worldwide have risen steadily since the mid-1980s, they reflect 'the growing importance of technology for international production.' This is ridiculous. Although in licensing agreements between firms in developed countries there may be some ground for the view that royalty payments are related to technology flows, this may or may not be so in cases where big information and technological asymmetries exist. In the case of licensing agreements between a licensor in a developed country, with a strong technological and scientific base, and a licensee in a developing country, royalty payments do not necessarily reflect a substantive flow of technology.
Royalty payments and license fees can reflect all sorts of things other than a real flow of technology. Firstly, when inserted inside a TNC system (as an intrafirm transaction) these payments become channels for transfers of profits (this applies to both developing and developed countries). In fact, these payments are frequently unjustified when relating to licensing agreements between a 100% wholly owned subsidiary and a parent company. In those cases, the costs of replicating that technology are marginal, and more often than not, total indirect and capital costs for generating that technology have been completely amortized. There is no economic justification for these royalty payments within a TNC system except that they may serve as channels for transfer of profits.
When technology transfer takes place between non-affiliated firms, the 'steadily growing' licensing fees and royalties may also reveal greater market asymmetries between licensor and licensee. This loss of bargaining power is an alarming truth which says much of the disadvantageous position of developing countries. This is a consequence of the fact that at the world level, R&D expenditures are predominantly taking place in developed countries. In fact, WIR-99 clearly reveals there is very little R&D carried out by TNC affiliates in developing countries. And as many scholars pointed out twenty years ago, most of this inventive activity is related to adaptation of processes to local conditions or simply to technical support and trouble-shooting.
In addition, royalties are also paid for trademarks and brand names, items which are far from being process or product technology. WIR-99 does not even mention this important fact. But any licensing executive of a TNC will acknowledge the well known fact that trademarks have traditionally been as important as patented and un-patented technology in so far as royalty payments are concerned. In many business surveys trademarks are even more important than patents. For obvious reasons, in transactions with developing countries, it is highly probable that royalties associated with trademarks may be even more important than royalties on patents.
The WIR-99 also considers patents taken up by affiliates of TNCs as yet another indicator of technology flows. By making this extravagant claim, the report's authors reveal they are more interested in advocating the cause of TNCs than in monitoring their activities. They also disclose their deep ignorance of how the international patent system operates. The fact is that patents by TNC affiliates do not by any stretch of the imagination allow one to consider patents taken by affiliates as 'attributable to research in foreign locations,' as the WIR-99 pretends.
First, this naive view of patenting by TNCs ignores the importance of cross-licensing strategies of TNCs in market segmentation. Second, it shows ignorance of the operations of the international patent system where a belt of protective patents helps preserve the core industrial property rights against infringement. This tactic of protective patenting explains why most patents are never used in commercial applications and why they are not a good indicator of technological innovation, specially in the case of patents taken in developing countries.
Contrary to what WIR-99 suggests, technology is more centrally controlled today than it was twenty years ago. And contrary to the notions transmitted by the report, patents taken by affiliates are more closely related to strategies aimed at strengthening oligopoly configurations than to inventive activity in host countries. Patents taken by subsidiaries and affiliates of TNCs have very little to do with, and certainly does not show an alleged trend towards the 'globalisation of technological innovation'.
The analysis of the Agreement on Trade-related aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) is yet another serious omission in WIR-99. TRIPs is a big factor in strengthening the trend towards greater central control of technology by promoting longer patent life and expansion of the list of sectors eligible for patent protection and other forms of intellectual property protection. Aside from the use of shoddy indicators, WIR-99 does not have anything else to show in relation to this important point. In fact, the authors of WIR-99 ignore the statistics in front of them. The overwhelming majority of patents granted by industrial property authorities in developing countries has traditionally gone and continues to go to TNC affiliates, but the level of R&D carried out by these same affiliates in those developing countries is insignificant.
The apologetic rhetoric in parts of WIR-99 about 'TNC R&D is clearly globalizing' has to be taken with a big dose of caution. Although there are important exchanges between TNCs in developed countries, the same cannot be said for developing countries. In fact, WIR-99 itself has a revealing story about down-grading of innovation capacity in an important example from Brazil, where a number of TNCs acquired several large domestic auto parts producers. Subsequently, the R&D activities of the local firms were downgraded and their frontier research was relocated to the parent firms_ R&D centres in the home countries.
The examples are also present in the industries of telecommunications equipment (electronic switching systems) where affiliates exposed to increasing international competition are scaling down local R&D activities and centralizing it in parent firms as a cost-reducing strategy. By some estimates from studies in Brazil, R&D expenditures in the telecommunications industry may have dropped by as much as 50%.
In these examples, and in similar studies in Argentina, R&D activities geared to development of new products was discontinued in several cases and efforts shifted to the simple adaptation of imported processes to local conditions (inputs, specifications, etc.). In most cases, this has meant that highly qualified engineers engaged in R&D are transferred to other less specialized functions such as production, technical trouble-shooting, maintenance, quality control, sales or marketing.
The analysis is faulty and thus it is not surprising that the policy recommendations regarding technological development and FDI are naive and in some cases, impractical. This important section acknowledges that developing countries cannot expect that by opening their doors to FDI, TNCs will transform their technological base. It also states that 'deficiencies in technological learning and transfer' can mean that markets alone do not create technological dynamism. And this in turn signals to the fact that there is an important role for government and public policy to 'upgrade capabilities to optimize the transfer of TNC technologies and encourage its dissemination'.
But what kind of policy intervention is possible and desirable? Therein lies the rub. And the WIR-99 shies away from this by delivering a single paragraph on how 'the new rules of the game' have banned the use of many policy instruments which were critical in transfer of technological capabilities and in the success stories of NICs.
The WIR-99 skirts around this, perhaps the most crucial problem area. It tells us (page 223) that there is some scope for technology policy, on the 'supply side,' and in the area of additional financial resources and 'technology support services'. It is most unfortunate that WIR-99 is unable to provide anything more on this vital issue beyond citing the 'new rules of the game'.
There are at least three fundamental issues here. The first is the inability of UNCTAD to look at these 'new rules' in critical terms, that is, posing the following questions: Do these new rules make sense? Where did they come from? Are they benefiting everyone on equal terms? Does the macroeconomic stance mentioned in our introduction make sense? Is it really true that there is no alternative for macroeconomic policy making?
The second fundamental issue concerns the compatibility between the timid policy recommendations that WIR-99 does advance and the 'new rules' the report mentions at different stages. The point is that these new rules are not restricted simply to trade and investment liberalization, and they are more and more frequently associated with macroeconomic policies which impose a very restrictive posture on public expenditures. For example, investing on the 'supply side' (one of the policies recommended by WIR-99) is difficult in the context of fiscal policies where the priority is to eliminate deficits. Policy recommendations such as those proposed to increase public investment to upgrade 'all factor inputs' that TNCs need (infrastructure, skills, information, and so on) simply are not compatible with macroeconomic policies which are based on a restrictive fiscal stance.
A important item in WIR-99 concerns the relation between FDI and the strengthening of high-technology (hitech) exports from developing countries. It is true that in many cases, TNCs have restructured their activities in such a way that hi-technology exports are an end result. This is more obvious in the case of FDI flows between developed countries, where the scientific and technological base is stronger.
However, in the case of developing countries, the situation is much more complex and more careful attention to data is needed.
Take the example of Mexico. According to the most recent official data on technology contents of exports, (in 'Science and Technology Indicators 1997', published by Mexico's Science and Technology Council, CONACYT), the share of hi-technology goods in total exports is already 15% (and 18% in the manufacturing industry). This is a figure presented as a promising sign that the benefits from TNC activities are starting to roll in. But how robust is this figure? Not much. The data is biased in two different ways. First, a classification of goods according to technological complexity is adopted from several sources. (Typically, R&D expenditures at the branch level, from various sources are used to prepare this classification.) Then exports are classified as hi, medium or low technological content.
But the import contents of exports is not taken into account. In the case of Mexico, where exports from in-bond plants accounted for 45% of total exports in 1998, the hi-technology contents indicator can be quite misleading. The two most important industries here are auto-parts, machinery, electrical and electronic machinery and equipment, all of them with strong presence in the maquiladora (in bond) plants. Computers and TV sets are typical individual items. But, the actual value added from Mexico's economy is less than 4% (closer to 2% according to several studies). Thus, goods eligible for the hi-tech classification appear artificially to make up a significant share of Mexico's total exports are, in fact, exports in disguise. And this example is applicable to other countries where TNCs play a dominant role in exports from in bond plants.
In fact, the example from Mexico's automotive industries points in the direction of technological downgrading. This is clearly the message from the study quoted in WIR-99 (page 249) on Mexico's automobile sector. TNCs were responsible for a massive restructuring of the sector, and now this industry is responsible for 21% of total Mexican exports to North America. However, the three big US producers took advantage of the maquiladora regime and local content dropped and imports of parts and components rose. This resulted in a contraction of the supplier industry. The full implications of this contraction are not mentioned in WIR-99 but they do include technological downgrading. Although exports of auto parts increased as the Big Three took advantage of the Mexican regime, in many instances the technological capacity of the local suppliers shifted from transmissions and braking systems, to windows and seats.
It is also worth mentioning here that, in the Mexican case, performance requirements which are critical for the building of backward linkages are completely excluded due to NAFTA's rules on investment. Can we expect market forces alone to build the backward linkages required by Mexico_s economy? It takes a lot of faith to consider that this will be the final outcome. This faith is not based on historical experience or on economic theory.
The chapter on employment oscillates between very broad or general statements and references to case studies on very specific points. The end result is an unhappy one because the report fails to present adequate data on employment generated by FDI in different sectors and regions, skill enhancement or upgrading, and on the quality of jobs. The tables in the statistical annex cover only a tiny fraction of the issues involved and there is plenty of room for improvement of the report's coverage.
Perhaps the main omission in WIR-99 is that wages have been on a downward trend in many developing countries for more than a decade. This is certainly the case of Mexico, where minimum wages dropped in real terms by more than 80% since 1981. Between 1994 and 1998 average wages dropped by more than 25%.
It is also the experience of much of Latin America (with few exceptions). This is why the share of the total wage bill in GDP for many developing countries has been reduced by a significant amount in the past years. It is of vital importance to take into account the fact that wage repression is central to stabilization policies, where the control and reduction of inflation is a high priority. This is totally ignored in the WIR-99 at a great cost for the report's quality and coverage.
But the report's omission does not stop here. It is also well known that stabilization policies have required a restrictive stance in monetary and fiscal policies which have resulted in sluggish growth (or even downright recessions) in many countries. This has added more unemployment to the already existing structural unemployment, and this has contributed to put more downward pressure on wages. This is the general framework for the analysis of the labour market in which FDI is operating today in much of the developing world, and it is also applicable to some degree in economies in transition.
The WIR-99 presents precious little data on open unemployment in its introduction to the chapter, and fails to mention that the open unemployment figures are almost totally meaningless in the context of developing countries where there are no provisions for unemployment insurance and where members of the labour force cannot have access to the luxury of being unemployed. Statistics on open unemployment have to be supplemented with data the share of the labour force that is earning incomes below minimum wages (if there is a guaranteed minimum wage), or on data on the share of population living below the poverty line.
A critical issue to which the WIR-99 devotes insufficient attention is on wage differentials between workers hired by TNC affiliates and workers in domestic firms. The report states that although comprehensive data are lacking, studies for some countries suggest that in general the workforce directly employed in foreign affiliates enjoys higher remuneration and more favourable conditions of work than that employed in domestic firms in host countries. (The study quoted here is an in-house study by UNCTAD dating back to 1994, something quite amazing considering the mandate to the authors of the WIR-99 is to analyze and discuss recent data.) The report then goes to present as an exception the cases of affiliates in labour intensive assembly operations in export promotion zones (EPZs).
But this may be quite misleading and the report should handle these figures with caution. In the case of Mexico, wages of the workforce in the maquiladora industries are significantly lower than wages for workers hired by domestic firms in the same branches of the manufacturing industries. Even if the question of comparability arises, the wage differential is so important (between 80% and 50%) that the conclusion of the WIR-99 seems shaky. And to this we have to add the fact that employment in the maquiladora industries is precarious and has involved more unfavourable working conditions. This is a fact that speaks louder than the rhetoric of the pro-NAFTA establishment.
In relation to the issues of labour productivity and wages, WIR-99 carries another misstatement. According to it, productivity differentials explain the fact that real wages paid by TNCs in developing countries are lower than those paid in developed countries. Quoting from a 1998 UNIDO study, the report states that productivity differentials between developing and developed countries may be as high as 50 percent. These figures are given a prominent position in the report, and it is important that UNCTAD staff recognize that there are many other studies with different results and a different perspective. An important example is provided by Harley Shaiken's studies on Mexico's automobile industry which show that productivity differences between Mexican and (comparable) U.S. plants are at most 15%. The same studies reveal that in those same plants the wage differentials correspond to a factor of ten.
One of the difficulties with this chapter of the WIR-99 is that many of the boxes carrying comments on studies for specific countries and/or issues are misleading. An example is Box IX.2 on home work and TNC distribution channels. The report carries information on outsourcing by TNC affiliates and bad working conditions. The note could have mentioned (but chose to ignore) the more telling examples of Nike and GAP stores. (One important publication ignored by the report is Ross, Andrew (ed.), No Sweat. Fashion, Free Trade and the Rights of Garment Workers. London: Verso, 1998). The report does state that there are abuses, and that outsourcing often leads to remunerations which are below minimum wage standards, and that those informally employed do not receive adequate legal protection.
However, the important point here is that the remedies suggested by the WIR-99 are related to more reliance on ILO conventions (which are more often than not violated), consumer movements and self-regulating codes of conduct (usually drafted by the TNCs themselves). Thus, WIR-99 seems to embrace the generally accepted attitude of complacency in which the State abandons its role as a mediator and corrector of the great imbalances which free market relations frequently engender. Apparently, the report suggests the idea that it is up to civil society to attempt to redress the imbalances and asymmetries, and that the good faith of TNC executives will do the rest through codes of conduct which are not legally binding.
The few comments on industrial relations at the end of the chapter skirt around the central issue of how labour law, unions and working conditions are evolving in the world in which TNCs operate today. It is no secret that a fierce system of 'hire and fire' is being sought (perhaps above all other priorities now) by TNCs and their business councils. The case of Mexico once again is relevant in this respect. A de facto deregulation of the labour market has been taking place during the past decade. The structures regulating industrial relations have been systematically under attack, although the neoliberal reforms have stopped short of reforming the Federal Constitution. Flexibilization is the magic word, and every dirty trick in the book is a valid tool in the pursuit of this goal. The scene from the ground is quite different from what WIR-99 presents in its final section.
[* Prof. Alejandro Nadal is a Mexican academic and economist at the Centre for Economic Studies and Science and Technology Programme at El Colegio de Mexico, and is heading a project for multi-disciplinary project for alternative development strategies. He contributed this review to the SUNS]
This document was published in the South-North Development Monitor(SUNS), edited by Mr C. Raghavan. It is being circulated for the benefit of the NGO community.
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